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ABSTRACT 
Texts of Tension, Spaces of Empowerment: 
Migrant Muslims and the Limits of Shi'ite Legal Discourse 
Linda Darwish, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2009 
This dissertation examines fatwas (expert legal opinions) produced by the Shi'ite 
legal establishment (marji'Tyah) for Shi'ites in the West, looking at the construction, 
support, and communication of minority Muslim identity in the Western cultural context. 
Its significance lies in examining how law is socially relevant to the construction of 
identity in relation to the religious or cultural other, how it may be used to negotiate 
tensions, to compensate for feelings of otherness and powerlessness, and to strengthen 
group solidarity. 
Shi'ite legal methodology makes a strong claim to a dynamic method of legal 
reasoning (ijtihad), continually responding to changing social conditions. Contemporary 
migration provides a case study by which to observe and evaluate its exercise in meeting 
practical, ethical, and moral challenges. Is migration a place for unprecedented 
innovation in legal interpretation? Does the law open up to the possibility of change in 
the Western context? What social, rhetorical, or ideological factors might propel or 
restrain ijtihadl Moreover, the fatwa genre of law is not restricted to experts but brings 
the recipients of the law into dialogue with the law-givers. It is this "interpretive relation" 
between scholar, layperson, and social context that generates the conclusions of my 
study. 
Laypersons appear to be highly optimistic regarding the law's possibilities for 
legitimizing cultural adaptation and see its flexibility as essential to supporting a 
iii 
"selective engagement" model of minority identity. In contrast, by adhering largely to the 
classical Qur'anic model of hijrah and to an ideological conception of Muslim-other 
relations that posits a strong differentiation of the non-Muslim "other," scholars are able 
to largely avoid high-risk ijtihad, while promoting a "resistance model" of minority 
identity. Scholars exhibit the perception that religious safety depends on the construction 
of Muslim spaces bounded by normatively enjoined words, symbols and practices. 
However, in place of the power of force, which nearly always accompanied hijrah 
in the classical model, scholars uphold what they describe as Islamic morality, not simply 
as a legal imperative, but as an instrument of empowerment and influence. It is this 
positioning of piety and morality as a means of empowerment that makes the 
contemporary legal discourse socially relevant. 
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TRANSLITERATION 
Arabic transliteration follows the Library of Congress style 
INTRODUCTION 
"Fatwas [...] are always the same, and yet endlessly varied."1 
Taped to my computer monitor is a three by five piece of paper on which is 
written the following question: "What do fatawa {smg., fatwa) produced for Shi'ites 
living in the West tell us about how the marji 'Tyah shapes and supports Shi'ite minority 
identity in the West?" I have kept this paper attached to my computer screen through 
several moves over the last few years. In its now crumpled and tattered state, it has 
helped me to maintain my focus on the central question of this dissertation, which has 
been my primary occupation for longer than I care to admit. But before this piece of 
paper sees the recycle bin, I shall let it perform its final task. By Isolating six key words 
in two groupings of three each in this question, I can construct the framework of my 
inquiry. 
Fatwa is the first term of importance. It defines the source material for the study, 
within certain limitations which will be defined in chapter one on methodology. A Shi'ite 
fatwa, as is explained in detail in chapter two, is an authoritative legal opinion issued by a 
qualified legal scholar (mujtahid), which is the result of his independent legal reasoning 
(ijtihad) on any question of law (istifta') submitted to him. The scholars, as their identity 
and legitimacy unfolded, came to inherit the delegated authority of the central spiritual 
leaders of Shi'ite Islam, the Imams, who are by necessity descendents of the Prophet 
1
 Gregory C. Kozlowski, "A Modern Indian Mufti," in Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their 
Fatwas, edited by Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1996), 250. 
1 
Muhammad. The fatwa is a very practical and dynamic area of legal discourse, the study 
of which sheds light on contemporary legal thought. 
The second key word is Shi'ite, which refers to the smaller of the two main 
sectarian divisions within Islam. The term Shi'ite is an anglicized form of the Arabic, 
shl'ah, meaning party or partisan. At its most basic level, it refers to the handful of 
individuals who gathered around Ali3 in support of his candidacy to the caliphate 
following the death of the prophet Muhammad (632 CE). These supporters were thus 
referred to as Shi'at 'AH. For some time, they remained defined simply by this show of 
loyalty to Ali, and, by extension, the family of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt). According to 
Marshall Hodgson, this political grouping gradually developed a religious sectarianism, 
largely in consequence of the massacre of Ali's second son, the Prophet's grandson, 
Husayn (d. 680), known to Shi'ites as Imam Husayn,4 and his party of seventy-two men 
2
 The term imam (lower case i) is commonly understood to refer to a congregational prayer leader and 
sometimes, in addition to that, to someone in a similar role to that of a pastor or priest in a Christian church, 
or a rabbi in the Jewish tradition. In Shi'ite Islam, however, Imam (distinguished in English by the upper 
case I) refers to twelve descendents of the Prophet Muhammad, especially designated as political and 
religious leaders of the Shi'ite community, and believed to be infallible. All but the last of them died 
between the years 661 and 874 CE. The twelfth Imam is said to have disappeared from public access in the 
outer boundary year. This is when the period known as the Lesser Occultation—because the Imam was 
accessible only by way of four deputies in succession—began. It lasted until 941 CE when communication 
with the Imam shifted to a purely esoteric mode. This marks the beginning of the Greater Occultation 
which continues until today. For the Shi'ites, or according to orthodox Shi'ite doctrine, this twelfth and 
final Imam remains spiritually active within the Shi'ite community from his place of occultation. It is said 
that his return at the end of time, along with the Messiah Jesus, will vindicate the Shi'a and usher in a 
period of unparalleled universal justice. "He will fill the earth with justice," an authoritative Shi'ite 
Tradition states, "as it had been filled with injustice." The place of the Imams in the Ja'fari school of law 
(as the branch of Shi'ite law with which we are concerned is called) is the fundamental distinction between 
it and the four extant Sunni schools. Shi'ite Traditions, which, along with the Qur'an, reason ('aql), and 
consensus (ijma % form the basis of Shi'ite law, are generally traced through a line of transmission to the 
authority of one of the Imams, which is not the case for Sunni Traditions. Unless otherwise stated, my use 
of the term Imam in this dissertation always refers to this specific Shi'ite meaning. 
3
 Aside from being the fourth Caliph for the whole of the Muslim community, for the Shi'ites, Ali was also 
the first Imam. The son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Muhammad, he died in 661 CE at the hands of a 
former supporter turned Kharijite; (originally supporters of Ali, the sect became some of Ali's most ardent 
opponents). 
4
 Husayn was the third Imam, after his brother Hasan, the second Imam, died in 669 CE. 
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on the plains of Karbala.5 Out of the community's response to these sad and pivotal 
events in Islamic history a world of religious devotion and piety emerged, revolving 
around the concept of the Imamate.6 
This brings us to the third term of importance, the marji 'Tyah, or, as framed in our 
question, the institution of the marji 'Tyah. Chapter two provides an in-depth discussion of 
how the institution of the marji 'Tyah evolved. Here, we briefly note that marji' al-taqlTd 
(source of emulation) refers to the highest level Shi'ite legal scholar, whose reasoned 
opinions best reflect those of the Imams, collectively, and especially, that of the last and 
"hidden" Twelfth Imam, known as Imam al-Mahdi (the rightly guided). Their opinions, 
that is, those of the scholars, constitute a structural and institutionalized authority 
unparalleled in Sunni Islam. 
The second set of terms takes us into the problematic area of peoples and places, 
and common territorial definitions of cultural difference. The assumed correspondence 
between space and culture, as is commonly understood by the terms (Muslim) "minority" 
and "the West," has been criticised in postcolonial scholarship. In line with this 
scholarship, postmodern cultural theorists Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson propose a 
new approach to identity and difference that questions this isomorphic association of 
culture with place, and thus, with identity.7 They suggest that it might be more useful to 
5
 The total number of companions, including women and children, many of the latter of which were also 
slain or died of thirst, was closer to a hundred and fifty. Imam Hassan Qazwini (Qazwini is here using the 
term imam in its more general sense of Muslim cleric) offers a concise, yet poignant narrative of these 
events in his interesting biography, entitled American Crescent: A Muslim Cleric on the Power of his Faith, 
the Struggle against Prejudice, and the Future of Islam and America (New York: Random House, 2007), 
12-16. 
6
 Marshall Hodgson, "How Did the Early Shi'a Became Sectarian?" Journal of the American Oriental 
Society 75 no. 1 (Jan.-Mar., 1955): 1-13. Hodgson's is an interpretation that appears to me consistent with 
the historical record and the place that the Imams came to occupy in Shi'ism. 
7
 Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, "Beyond 'Culture': Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference," in 
Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology, ed. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson 
(London: Duke University Press, 1997), 33-51. 
3 
speak of identity as process, rather than essence; as in flux, rather than fixed and tied to 
particular geographic spaces and territories, themselves historical constructions of 
modern colonialism and post-colonialism. Thus, in post-colonial theory, identity is 
always in process, perpetually constructing itself out of fluctuations of relationships tied 
Q 
to power and place. I will discuss identity more fully below. The point at present is to 
say that these terms define the object of my study as one of analyzing the construction of 
Muslim identity in geographical and social contexts marked by an intersection between 
tradition and post-modernity in Western societies. 
At its broadest, then, this is a study of religion, migration, law, and identity. 
Along with other studies of migrant Muslim communities, I endeavour to theorize 
Muslim "minorityness," with specific reference to the Twelver Shi'ite community of 
religious scholars and laypersons. I ask how those positioned as religious leaders apply 
the authority of their learning and control of authoritative textual sources to the 
construction, protection, and extension of Shi'ite Muslim minority identity in non-Muslim 
environments of the West. The questions I bring to the texts explore ways in which 
contemporary religious scholars, trained in traditional methodologies, negotiate the 
inevitable tensions. As a primary discursive source of authoritative ethical guidance, the 
marji 'Tyah has a potentially powerful influence on the community's sense of place and 
identity. 
Like other immigrant communities, Muslims in the West face numerous issues in 




 Yvonne Haddad notes that the term was coined by Syed Z. Abedin "in his foreword to Kettani's book, 
Muslim Minorities, xiii. See Haddad, "At Home in the Hijra: South Asian Muslims in the United States," in 
The South Asian Religious Diaspora in Britain, Canada, and the United States, ed. Harold Coward, John R. 
Hinnells, and Raymond Brady Williams (New York: SUNY Press, 2000), 257 n. 25. 
4 
for the observance of a religious law that addresses a considerable number of daily life 
issues further complicates the already problematic relationship between religion and 
secular society. The organization of time and space, the body and its covering, education, 
gender relations, attitudes to secular authorities—to mention just a few issues—in the 
context of the West become susceptible to new kinds of questioning and doubt. That 
these issues fall within the category of "law" is comprehensible upon recognition of the 
totality and unity of religion and social intercourse in Islamic legal thought. 
As in other legal systems, Islamic legal methodology encompasses principles that 
offer potential for change, for constant revision and updating, conditioned by time and 
place and the theoretical approach of the legal school (madhhab), as well as the 
individual jurist within a given madhhab. In other words, it is theoretically possible that 
two or more legal opinions within the same school of thought be equally legitimate 
though different from each other. It is theoretically possible, also, that different legal 
authorities propose different solutions to the problem of Muslim identity in the West. It is 
this potential for diversity of opinion on a timely and relevant subject that inspires the 
rationale for embarking on this study. 
In reading these sources it becomes evident, however, that solutions to the 
problem of Muslim minority identity in the West are proposed belongs not just to the 
experts; they are forged, in the institution of ifta' {fatwa giving), out of an ongoing 
dialogue between the mujtahid and the mustaftT (person seeking a fatwa). As others have 
put it, "Behind the encounter of mustafti [sic] and mufti [sic], the posing of a query and 
the giving of a fatwa [sic], lies a complex social and interpretive relation."10 In addition 
10
 Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers, "Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal 
interpretation," in Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas, 20. 
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to these two conversational partners is the third element, that of social context. This study 
suggests that it is out of this "interpretive relation" between scholar, layperson, and social 
context that particular conceptions of Shi'ite Muslim identity in the West may be 
quarried. I see this dynamic intersection of non-static elements as reflective of what 
Gupta and Ferguson call the "interstitial space" between places or cultures of 
difference.11 These "borderlands," Gupta and Ferguson argue, the "marginal zones" 
where differences meet and where tensions and dialogues take place, are "the 'normal' 
locale of the postmodern subject,"12 and are thus places that can yield new 
understandings of cultural knowledge. 
In the present case, the trialogue challenges our assumed understanding of 
categories such as Islam and the West. Tensions are found to exist within as well as 
between these categories, suggesting that far from being discrete and closed entities, they 
are defined by more fluid and moveable boundaries. For example, if at times a mustaftT 
identifies closely with his or her Muslim heritage, say, with regard to a political 
relationship to the non-Muslim state, but feels that breaking with traditional Muslim 
gender boundaries does no harm to their Islam, a mujtahid may draw the lines differently, 
regarding a supportive and loyal political relationship with the Western government 
mandatory, while maintaining strict support for head coverings and beards. Both seek to 
isolate certain symbols as essential markers of identity and discard those that seem not to 
fulfil that purpose. 
Close scrutiny of the legal discourse on Shi'ite Muslim identity in the West 
demonstrates further the construction of cultural spaces that push the boundaries of our 
11




assumed isomorphic definitions of territory and culture. While the morphing of territory 
with culture may suit the classical Islamic legal discourse of what counts as Muslim 
space, the model is inadequate for understanding the processes of identity formation in 
the post-modern world, where space and place are understood to mean far more than 
territory. It seems that being able to disentangle the naturalized association of culture 
with place (Gupta and Ferguson) means that a more richly textured understanding of 
cultural space becomes possible. Interpreting texts that remain essentially classical in 
form and orientation through post-modern lenses allows us to focus on the use of 
symbols, rather than territory, as the central defining element of cultural space. 
This notion of space as culturally constituted suggests a particular kind of sacred 
space, constructed not by territory, as in the classical view, but by the symbols of words, 
behaviours, and especially, "normatively enjoined practices."13 Consequently, while the 
content of what defines space as Muslim, that is, the pre-eminence of Islamic law, 
remains continuous, it takes shape in a different form. While the classically rooted thrust 
to expand the borders of Muslim space continues to be active, traditional definitions of 
what constitutes Muslim space, closely linked to discrete and bounded territories, open up 
to more individualized forms, characterized by personal behaviour. The post-modern 
"home" or "abode" of Islam {dar al-islam) becomes, then, transportable, mobile, 
transnational, and, in some sense, the private property of individual Muslims who choose 
to define their own universe of meaning (i.e. culture and identity) by an appropriation of 
the requisite symbols of what it means to be Muslim in the West. 
MUSLIMS IN CANADA: A DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW 
13
 Barbara D. Metcalf, "Introduction: Sacred Words, Sanctioned Practice, New Communities," in Making 
Muslim Space in North America and Europe, ed. Barbary Daly Metcalf (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996), 5. 
7 
As the fatawa analyzed in this research do not often specify geographic location, 
apart from the general designation of the West, it is impossible to situate the community 
that requests legal guidance more precisely. I have chosen Canada as a demographic case 
study because it has a very high level of immigration. Reliable research puts Canada's 
foreign born population at 17.4 percent in 2003.14 This is comparatively higher even than 
the United States, which in 2003 had a foreign born population of 11.5 percent.15 
Whereas most studies of Islam and Muslims in the North American context focus on the 
United States, the Canadian context represents an interesting experiment in 
multiculturalism. While an analysis of the intersection of Shi'ite legal discourse with 
Canadian multiculturalism is beyond the scope of this writing, it is fitting to provide at 
least a preliminary survey of population numbers and demographic trends, the data for 
which is conveniently accessible. 
Muslim population figures in North America generally do not differentiate 
between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims. It is generally understood that Shi'ites make up 
approximately 15% of the total Muslim population worldwide. Recent events in Iraq and 
Lebanon might suggest that the ratio would be slightly higher in diaspora. Abdulaziz 
Sachedina notes the lack of statistical data regarding Shi'ites in North America. His 
research, based on oral history, suggests that Shi'ite families would likely have come to 
North America "well before the middle of [the 20th] century, although the appearance on 
the American scene of a significant well-educated and professional Shi'i middle class is a 
Carola Suarez-Orozco, "Formulating Identity in a Globalized World," Globalization Culture and 
Education in the New Millennium, ed. Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco and Desiree Baolian Qin-Hilliard 




comparatively recent phenomenon." Liyakat Takim, also on the basis of oral accounts, 
traces the beginnings of Shi'ite migration to the West to the latter two decades of the 19th 
century and the first decade and a half of the 20th century. Most of these migrants were 
from Lebanon and settled primarily in the Detroit/Dearborn area. By the 1940s, Takim 
notes, there were at least 200 Muslim families (both Sunni and Shi'ite) in Detroit, though 
the greatest influx took place in the 1950s.17 
This is corroborated by Linda Walbridge whose studies of the Shi'ite community 
in Dearborn suggest that their presence in North America became numerically significant 
in the second half of the 20th century. The Islamic Center of America, for example, a 
major Shi'ite institution in the Detroit-Dearborn area, was founded only in 1963.18 The 
relatively late institutional establishment of the Shi'ite Muslim community in North 
America may be indicative of Takim's observation that it is only where Shi'ites make up 
a large portion of the Muslim community are they inclined to emphasize their specifically 
Shi'ite identity; otherwise, feelings of vulnerability incline them to blend with the larger 
Muslim community.19 
Besides the lack of statistical data on Shi'ites in North America, Canadian census 
figures are also not wholly reliable in documenting the Muslim population in general, as 
they are based not on religious, but on linguistic self-identification. This would tend to 
Abdulaziz Sachedina, "A Minority Within a Minority: The Case of the Shi'a in North America," in 
Muslim Communities in North America, ed. Yvonne Y. Haddad and Jane I. Smith (Albany: State University 
of Albany Press, 1994), 5.1 discuss leadership aspects of the Shi'ite community in North America in detail 
in chapter two. 
17
 Liyakat Takim, "Multiple Identities in a Pluralistic World: Shi'ism in America," in Muslims in the West: 
From Sojourners to Citizens, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
218. 
18
 Linda Walbridge, "The Shi 'a Mosques and Their Congregations in Dearborn," in Muslim Communities 
in North America, 340. 
19
 Liyakatali Takim, "Foreign Influences on American Shi'ism," The Muslim World 90, no. 3-4 (Fall 2000): 
466. 
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inflate the figures, particularly where speakers of Arabic are concerned, as a large 
percentage of Arabic-speaking immigrants are not, in fact, Muslims.20 On a smaller scale, 
the same may be said of Persian or Urdu speakers; many Persian-speaking immigrants 
are Jews and Christians, and many Urdu-speakers in North America are Christians. 
In 1871, the year of Canada's first national census, a total of 13 people identified 
themselves as Muslim.21 There are no reliable statistics for the total number of Muslims 
in Canada today. Most research puts the figure at about 750,000, though in 2009 it could 
well be as high as a million. An unpublished demographic study by a Universite de 
Montreal sociology of religion professor, Glen Smith, tables Census Canada's 2001 and 
2006 statistics by language23 for each of the cities of Halifax, Quebec City, Montreal, 
Ottawa-Gatineau-Hull, Toronto, Hamilton, Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton, and 
Vancouver.24 Bearing in mind the weakness of the linguistic method identified above, by 
analyzing these figures we are able to track patterns of settlement in different cities and 
regions of Canada. 
Taking Montreal as an example, the differences between the 2001 and 2006 
censuses show an overall increase of more than 26%, with relatively equal increases in 
the Arabic, Persian, Urdu, and Bengali populations (between 25%-36%), but only 3% 
increase in the Gujarati population. Arabic speakers in Toronto, on the other hand, had 
20
 Using language as an indicator also fails to take into account conversions to and from Islam. 
21
 Karim H. Karim, "Crescent Dawn in the Great White North: Muslim Participation in the Canadian Public 
Sphere," in Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, 262. 
22
 See, for example, Abdul Malik Mujahid, assisted by Amerah Egab, "Profile of Muslims in Canada," 
http://soundvision.com/info/muslims/muslimsincanada.asp (accessed February 1, 2009); The Canadian 
Society of Muslims, "Muslim Population Statistics," http://muslim-canada.org/muslimstats.html (accessed 
February 1, 2009). The latter source cites the 2001 census which put the number of Muslims in Canada at 
approximately 650,000. 
2
 Smith includes figures for speakers of Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Bengali, and Gujarati. 
24
 Smith unfortunately omits statistics for London, Ontario, which had a Muslim population of 11,725 
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Muslims, or Quebec City's 3,020. 
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the lowest percentage increase at only 17%, compared to the Urdu-speaking population's 
increase of over 45%. Despite this high number, the total increase of Muslim language 
speakers in Toronto rose only by just under 15%, well below the 26% rate of increase in 
Montreal. 
At just under 24%, Vancouver's rate of increase in the five year period was closer 
to that of Montreal. Overall, Vancouver saw virtually equal rates of increase to Montreal 
within each language group. For example, Persian speakers increased in Vancouver and 
Montreal at a rate of 24% and 25% respectively. However, the city that showed the 
highest rate of increase between 2001 and 2006 for all language groups was Calgary. The 
Bengali speaking population alone rose by more than 63%, with Urdu and Persian 
speakers not far behind at 57% and almost 52% respectively. Calgary's Arabic speaking 
population's 22% increase represents roughly the same rate as in Montreal and 
Vancouver. Overall, the Muslim population of Calgary increased at a rate of 40%, 
compared to its general population increase of slightly more than 18% during the same 
period, roughly double the rate.25 
This figure is well beyond the Canadian national average of 5.4% growth and is 
therefore, relatively consistent with the explosion in Calgary's overall population.26 By 
way of comparison, for example, while Montreal's overall population increased by only 
2.3%, just half of the national average, its Muslim (or speakers of Arabic and other 
According to the 2006 census, Calgary's population was at 1,162,310, while the 2001 figure was 
951,395. 
26
 Others put the rate of increase at 12%, still more than double the general population's national average 
growth of 5.4%. CBC News, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/calgarv/storv/2007/03/13/calgarv-census. html 
(accessed February 1, 2009). 
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Muslim languages) population increased by 26%, as noted above. That is, the Muslim 
population of Montreal increased at a rate at least eleven times faster than the general 
population of the city. These figures suggest at least two possible conclusions. On the one 
hand, according to Calgary's statistics, the Canadian Muslim population is following the 
same urban trends as the general Canadian population. On the other hand, Montreal's 
26% increase in the Muslim population represents a growth pattern well in excess of its 
general population growth, suggesting that if these trends continue, Montreal will 
continue to outstrip many other Canadian cities as a centre of Muslim life. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
I am, of course, indebted to several writings on the subject of Islam and Muslims 
in the West. Such studies are plentiful. A survey of any major bibliography of works on 
Islam in the West reveals that the number of monographs and articles written during the 
last two decades of the 20th century far outnumbers the output of the previous eight 
decades. Since September 2001, scores of publications have been added to that number. 
Studies of Islam in the West take different approaches, which may be classified into three 
broad trends: history and demographics; social issues, including approaches to Islamic 
CBC News, "Quebec sees population rise but Montreal loses ground," 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2007/03/13/qc-quebeccensus20070313.html (accessed February 
1, 2009). 
28
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Allan D. Austin, African Muslims in Antebellum America (New York: Garland Publishing, 1974); Harold 
Barclay, "The Muslim Experience in Canada," in Religion and ethnicity in Canada, ed. Harold Coward and 
Leslie Kamamura (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1978), 101-113; G. H. Bousquet, 
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The Moslem World, 26 (1926), 262-266; Eric C. Lincoln, The Black Muslims in America (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1961). The bibliography also includes at least half a dozen theses and dissertations on Islam and 
Muslims in the United States, many written prior to 1980. 
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law; and ritual practice. The concept of Muslim minority identity is often a sub-theme of 
all three types. This review focuses on research that includes some element of identity, or 
that studies the methods of interpretation and/or application of Islamic law in the West. 
Standing out as "the first of its kind" is The Muslim Community in North America, 
published in Canada in 1983.29 This collection of papers presented at a conference held at 
the University of Alberta in 1980 on the theme of "Islam in North America," is a cross-
disciplinary foundational study of Islam and Muslims in North America. Contributors, 
both members and non-members of the Muslim community, express a variety of different 
opinions, sometimes disagreeing sharply with each other. One area of agreement is that 
the contributions all attempt to answer the question of how "a religious system that is 
much more a way of life than a theological structure [can] adapt to North America."30 
Several chapters express minority Muslim status in terms of the problematic of 
vulnerability to outside influences. At least one author suggests that the community faces 
two options in overcoming that vulnerability. "If Islam and Muslims are to survive as a 
minority," Murray Hogben writes, "either religious purism or cultural semi-isolation or a 
more liberal interpretation and cultural integration must succeed in protecting them from 
Introduction to The Muslim Community in North America, ed., Earle H. Waugh, Baha Abu-Laban, and 
Regula B. Qureshi, (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1983), 1. 
30
 Ibid., 2. The question alludes to the twin and in my view false assumption that Islam is relatively 
unconcerned with theology and that its presumed emphasis on lifestyle is unique amongst Western 
religions, particularly as compared with Christianity. While it is true that Islam never had an equivalent of 
the early church councils, nor as official an excommunication agenda, it is my understanding that both of 
these assumptions ignore the fact that Islamic law presupposes what it considers correct belief and is 
significantly attuned to matters of excommunication (takfir); and that while religions differ in how they 
address lifestyle, Western religions in general are at once systems of belief and ways of life. In my opinion, 
it is, rather, the secularization of religious belief in the West that gives the appearance, especially of 
Christianity, that it is concerned predominantly with the private conscience of the believer. That Islamic 
law has tended to predominate Islamic ethics and morality, as opposed to doctrinal or esoteric approaches, 
suggests only an emphasis on law as a method of religious guidance, rather than any apriori statement of its 
nature. 
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non-Muslim influences." The latter option alludes to what Waugh identifies as the need 
for a renewed ijtihad that will help "reconcile" Islamic legal doctrine to the North 
American context while addressing the perceived problems of "protection" and 
"integration."32 These are some of the key ideas that I deal with in the present work. 
In an earlier article, Waugh focuses on the role of the imam or mosque leader in 
the West and suggests that the imam's role as mediator between law as ideal and law as 
performed by the community in the West opens up opportunities for creative explorations 
of new models while preserving ancient traditions.33 His study shows that imams are 
often caught between adopting Western cultural forms to win the younger generation and 
maintaining tradition to preserve the older. In addition, they face new responsibilities for 
which their training does not equip them. His conclusions, based on a case study mosque 
in Edmonton, Alberta, point to a need for new avenues in leadership preparation to help 
imams deal with guiding Muslims through the ambiguities of decision-making "in the 
new world." 
Waugh develops these thoughts further in an article in The Muslim Community, 
cited above. 4 He suggests that the tension observed earlier between the ideals imagined 
by the institutional leadership and the practices of the ummah (Muslim community) in 
North America are exacerbated by the lack of unanimity or stability regarding what it 
means to be Muslim. The tension is often resolved, he says, through successive 
rationalizations that generate agreed upon compromises between leadership and ummah, 
31
 Murray Hogben, "The Socio-Religious Behaviour of Muslims in Canada: An Overview," in Muslim 
Community, 111. 
32
 Waugh, Introduction to The Muslim Community, 3. 
33
 Earle Waugh, "The Imam in the New World: Models and Modifications," in Transitions and 
Transformations in the History of Religions, Essays in Honor of Joseph M. Kitagawa, ed. Frank E. 
Reynolds and Theodore M. Ludwig (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), 124-49. 
34
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and that signal new expressions of Islamic tradition adapted to the modern secular 
context. Thus, leadership and ummah are and must be engaged in dialectical relationship 
around values generated by the intersection of Islam and Western culture. 
Baha Abu-Laban echoes Waugh's warning that for the community to survive in 
the West, a new kind of leadership, trained not just in the Islamic sciences, but also in 
Western culture, needs to emerge. Only this kind of leadership will succeed at renewing 
ijtihdd and reforming Muslim law in dialogue with the cultural conditions of Muslims in 
i f 
the West. In this same volume, Muhammad Abdul-Rauf expresses his optimism about 
the future of Muslims in the West, whose beliefs he holds to be in fundamental agreement 
with American values of liberty, equality, and human dignity.36 Further, he says, the 
American Constitution's guarantee of freedom of religion provides protection and support 
for the Muslim community to formulate its own manner of expressing their shared values 
in the American context.37 In sum, the authors in this volume see the success of the 
community issuing out of a trialogue between the interpreters of Islamic law, the Muslim 
community, and Western cultural values. These correspond to the more precisely defined 
groupings of my analysis: maraji' al-taqlid (sing, marji % mustaftis, and the Western 
social context. 
Continuing on the theme of identity touched on above, a publication that has been 
particularly helpful to me is Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe, a 
collection of case studies around the theme of space and the way that diasporic Muslim 
communities treat what the authors refer to as "a vivid sense of 'displacement,' both 
35
 Baha Abu-Laban, "The Canadian Muslim Community: The Need for a New Survival Strategy," in 
Muslim Community, 76-92. 
36
 Muhammad Abdul-Rauf, "The Future of the Islamic Tradition in North America," in Muslim 
Community, 271-72. 
37
 Ibid., 277. 
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physical and cultural." The authors look at how rituals and Islamic institutions in 
America reflect Muslims' spatial conceptions of minority identity and how they wish that 
identity to be read by non-Muslims. The authors argue that spatial manifestations 
function as "a clear form of resistance to the dominant categories of the larger culture."39 
As such, they are said to empower Muslims in asserting their "otherness." The work 
suggests that the negotiating endeavours of the younger generation of Muslim immigrants 
is opting neither for strict tradition, nor for the adoption of Western cultural models, but 
is developing new forms of assertion of American Muslim identity, reflective of a greater 
confidence in Muslim self-definition in North America and Europe. 
Another helpful work looking at identity is one of several studies edited by 
Yvonne Haddad and John Esposito, entitled Muslims on the Americanization Path T The 
central question of the book asks if Muslims will remain as 'Muslims in America,' or if 
they will evolve with a distinctly American Muslim identity. If the latter, how does the 
history of Muslim immigration and past experience contribute to the shape American 
Muslim identity will take? In chapter one, "The Dynamics of Islamic Identity in North 
America," Haddad suggests that as the number of Muslims in the United States increases 
and as their institutional infrastructure develops, the tendency will be to become more 
assertive of a specifically "Muslim presence" in North America.41 Haddad's finding that 
Muslims who arrived before and after 1960 have differed markedly in their approaches 
would seem to substantiate this prediction. Earlier arrivals tended to adapt more readily to 
38
 Metcalf, "Sacred Words," 2. 
39
 Ibid., 18. 
40
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Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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American life, fitting Islam into their Christian contextual framework. Later arrivals see 
accommodation as an unwarranted compromise and feel that their educational and 
technological contribution to American society entitles them to propose Islam as the best 
solution to America's social problems.4 
Some of the articles in this volume expect that answers to the questions listed 
above must involve a deeper examination of legal issues, Islamic and American, facing 
Muslims living in the West. Khaled Abou Fadl's chapter on the history of Islamic legal 
discourse on Muslim minorities is especially helpful, as is a contribution from Yusuf 
Talal DeLorenzo that provides an overview of the origins and development of the Fiqh 
Council of North America. A Sunni body, the Council offers legal opinions, advice, and 
resources on a great variety of issues of concern to Muslims, as well as to such non-
Muslim professionals as lawyers and journalists. Redressing the inadequacy of relying on 
"imported" scholars, the Council adds to the traditional qualifications obligatory on its 
members the requirement of "at least five years of residence in North America."4 The 
author adds an appendix consisting of a sampling of fatawa issued by members of the 
Council, demonstrating the complexities of North American Muslim life. Although 
valuable in and of themselves, uncovering the identity dynamics implicit in the fatawa 
would require examination and analysis. 
In another edited volume, Haddad and Esposito are joined by Jane Smith, also a 
prolific writer on Muslims in the West, in looking at Muslim diaspora communities in 
North America within the broader context of Christian and Jewish immigrant 
Ibid., 21-22. 
Delorenzo, "The Fiqh Councilor in North America," in Muslims on the Americanization Path?, 69. 
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communities in the United States. Particularly apropos to the present research is Ingrid 
Mattson's discussion of the use of Islamic paradigms in defining Muslim approaches to 
America, which I discuss in chapter one in the context of my methodology. 
Identity is a central theme of several other studies. I discuss here three that focus 
on Islamic law, from different approaches. The first is a 1987 ethnographic study done by 
Yvonne Haddad and Adair T. Lummis, entitled Islamic Values in the United States. The 
authors use extensive interviews and questionnaires to determine the subjects' levels of 
social integration on issues such as loans and interest, food and alcohol consumption, 
occupations, inheritance, American holidays, relations between men and women, pets, 
education, and other matters. The study asks how Muslims in the United States perceive 
the relevance of Islamic law in their everyday lives. The authors detect two approaches to 
Muslim identity in the United States within their sample. The liberals have a weak, if any, 
connection to their Muslim identity, whereas conservatives maintain standard Islamic 
norms regarding food and ritual practice, but otherwise assimilate to Western norms.45 
Their conclusion is that those who "welcome assimilation into American life" feel "at 
home" in the West, whereas others "are genuinely concerned that [assimilation] will 
jeopardize the maintenance of Islamic values."46 As an ethnographic study, relying on 
surveys and interviews, the study does not deal with normative values from the 
perspective of legal authorities. 
44
 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Jane I. Smith, and John L. Esposito, ed., Religion and Immigration: Christian, 
Jewish, and Muslim Experiences in the United States (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2003). 
45
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Kambiz GhaneaBassiri uses a similar methodology with a concentrated sample of 
Muslims living on the West Coast of the United States.47 He suggests that the wide 
diversity of Muslims in Los Angeles is a microcosm of America. This 'diversity' is, 
nevertheless, questionable, as his sample consists overwhelmingly of youth between the 
ages of 9 and 30.48 His objective, as that of Haddad and Lummis, is to investigate 
attitudes towards the application of Islamic law in the West. He analyzes his data in terms 
of two sets of competing factors: religious sources such as texts, rituals, dogmas, and 
institutions on the one hand; and individual goals, needs, cultures, and religious 
understanding on the other. The results of his study show that the latter set of concerns 
are far more influential in determining what it means to be Muslim in America. Again, 
his study is from data collected in field research and does not deal with the authoritative 
textual sources produced for this population. 
Finally in this regard, in Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, Tariq 
Ramadan49 looks at the construction and interpretation of Islamic law for Muslims in the 
West. As an active participant, his objective is "to protect the Muslim identity and 
religious practice" while helping Muslims to become full citizens of the West.50 As do a 
growing number of liberal (as well as more mainstream) Muslims, he argues that 
overseas legal experts are unsuited to the task of supplying legal guidance to Muslims in 
the West. The universality of Islamic law, he says, demands a renewed ijtihad "in the 
Kambiz GhaneaBassiri, Competing Visions of Islam in the United States: A Study of Los Angeles 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997). 
48
 Fifty-six percent of his sample is under 30 years old, 36% as young as 9 - 17. Less than 10% are over 50 
years of age. 
49
 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). This 
is an expanded version of his earlier book, To Be a European Muslim: A Study of Islamic Sources in the 
European Context (Leicester, UK: Islamic Foundation, 1999). 
50
 Ramadan, Western Muslims, 27. 
19 
light of our new western context." This, he argues, would help to move Islam and 
Muslims out from the margins of Western societies and into the mainstream, where they 
can contribute as European or American Muslims. He pleads with Western Muslims to 
abandon their "bipolar" and reactionary, self-protecting postures that alienate them and 
confirm them in "Otherness." He insists that the tools for an authentic Islamic 
adaptation, not just to, but of, Western society are available and beckon Muslims to make 
all that is good in Western society their own. As a result, Muslims will not remain as 
"minority" communities, but become responsible adults in societies that are "home" to 
wherever they reside. In sum, Ramadan offers afiqh-basQd solution of "legal integration'' 
to the problem of acculturation.53 
While the majority of the studies surveyed above deal predominantly or uniquely 
with Sunni Islam, their findings with regard to the relationship of Islamic law to Muslim 
identity in the West apply equally, if not more so, to Shi'ites in the West whose 
leadership issues are more complex and demanding. A recurring question regarding 
identity asks whether leadership styles and popular perceptions are leading Muslims in 
the West to define themselves as 'Muslims in the West,' or as 'Western Muslims'? The 
differences between these two models indicate something about which model of minority 
Muslim identity, discussed in the next chapter, is favoured. Further, many of the sources 
surveyed identify ambiguities and tensions around interpretation and application of 
Islamic law within Muslim communities in the West; and stress the need for a more 
culturally relevant and appropriately trained leadership able to engage Western culture 
while taking full advantage of the tools of legal interpretation. 
51
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However, among the sources discussed thus far, none conduct a close 
examination of popular level Islamic legal discourse and its bearing on Muslim minority 
identity. What I mean by popular legal discourse is a genre of literature deeply embedded 
within classical legal methodology, but produced for and in a style intended for use by 
common lay people, that is, the expansive and growingfatwa literature generated by 
highly qualified Muslim scholars and, in Sunni Islam, by ideological leaders such as 
Osama bin Laden and others, as well.54 We turn our attention now to a few studies that 
look primarily at modern Sunni fatawa, some, but not all of which, is produced for 
Muslims in the West. Given that Shi'ite legal interpretation takes place within the 
institution of the marji 'Tyah, I discuss writings that treat Shi'ite legal discourse for 
Muslims in the West in chapter three, where I discuss the marji 'Tyah in detail. While all 
of these writings make a significant contribution to the field, none conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of fatawa across a broad spectrum of social and religious aspects 
of daily life. This is where I hope that my research will fill in a gap. A review of these 
writings will help to put my work within its academic context more specifically. 
In his PhD dissertation, published in 1997, Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen reviews the 
history of scholarship on fatawa?5 His review highlights the study of fatawa issued 
during periods of major social change, beginning with a work by Christian Snouck 
Hurgronje at the turn of the 20th century.56 Hurgronje observed how fatawa served as a 
popular forum for scholarly debate about religion and social change, muftis (Sunni 
54
 For a detailed discussion of the fatwa genre in Shi'ite Islam, see chapter two. 
55
 Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, Defining Islam for the Egyptian State: Muftis andFatwas oftheDar al-Ifta 
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scholar who issues fatwas) even inventing mustaftis at times in order to put forward their 
point of view.57 After this, Skovgaard-Petersen remarks, the study of fatawa among 
Western scholars declined until the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s that was 
accompanied by a virtual explosion oifatwa publications.58 The fatwa became the 
ideological battle ground for diverse visions of normative Muslim life, attempting "to 
circumscribe the mental and moral universe of their day, always balancing around the 
boundaries of what is conceivable, legitimate, and right."59 Following Peter Berger's 
theory that religion in the modern world is significantly affected by choice, the author 
concludes that state muftis, unlike their independent and more radical counterparts, 
function as agents of the state in furthering adaptation to modernity. 
Skovgaard-Petersen's work is valuable in demonstrating how state muftis are 
instrumental in institutionalizing a particular vision of Islam for the modern Egyptian 
state, a vision that encourages mustaftis to choose between conflicting^a/awa. His work 
is beneficial also in considering some of the problems of siu&yxng fatawa. He discusses, 
for example, the invention both of fatawa and mustaftis. Given the difficulties of 
ascertaining the authenticity, particularly of the latter, he suggests that this does not 
detract from the value of exploring this material as a barometer of the mufti's worldview 
and understanding of Islamic social values and morality. 
Differences between Sunni and Shi'ite structures of legal authority do not lessen 
the validity of his observation. Whether or not all of the questions put to Shi'ite mujtahids 
are genuine cannot be determined with certainty. I am inclined, nevertheless, to accept 
the vast majority of those coming from minority contexts as genuine essentially because 
57
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they appear to reflect lived experiences and describe situations that are commonly beyond 
the practical knowledge of Shi'ite mujtahids, none of whom reside in the West. Also, I 
am informed that the general stylistic uniformity of istifta 'at is due not to fabrication, but 
to the work of editors who prepare questions submitted to mujtahids according to a 
standard format.60 
In a later publication, "A Typology of State Muftis"61 Skovgaard-Petersen 
highlights the value of studying a religious class who consider themselves "defenders of 
the shan'a and its norms in a society moving toward secularization."62 His article goes 
beyond his earlier work in comparing Egyptian muftis with their counterparts in Lebanon 
and Syria. His analysis leads him to observe that, particularly in Egypt, the mufti is an 
important player in debates around the role of Islamic law in contributing to an Islamic 
response to issues of modernity. He observes a widespread popularity of progressive 
muftis among moderates, demonstrating that religious professionals continue to exercise 
an influence and to be seen as authorities in some circles. 
He notes also an increased number oifatawa during times of social upheaval and 
change, such as emerge during periods of intense inter-cultural contact. This suggests the 
continued relevance of the fatwa as an instrument of religious guidance in society. It also 
implies that these would be periods of lively legal debate out of which new perspectives 
could emerge. One such development that he notes is the practice of some contemporary 
muftis to refer to experts in diverse fields of secular learning. Kate Zebiri's study of 
Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut, discussed below, is a case in point. Some Shi'ite scholars, such 
60
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as Ayatollah Muhammad Ali Taskhiri, call for the same in Shi'ite legal reasoning.63 My 
study shows that this is found extremely rarely in fatawa for Muslims in the West. 
Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas 4 is the "first case-based 
volume on Islamic legal interpretation [...]"65 The first and second chapters provide a 
critical history of the development of ifta' in Sunni Islam and of ifta' and ijtihad in Sunni 
legal theory respectively.66 It is unfortunate that there is no parallel survey of the 
institution in Shi'ism. Likely, this is due to Hallaq's observation that "the institutional 
history of futya [in Shi'ism] is not well documented."67 Each chapter thereafter treats a 
particular fatwd or set of fatawa in the pre-modern, early modern and modern periods 
from across the Islamic world. In total, 53 fatawa, conveniently listed in an appendix, are 
discussed. 
Attention is paid to "the institutional context in which the fatwd was issued, the 
sources cited by the mufti, the language and rhetorical strategies employed, the method of 
reasoning, and the intended audience."68 Some authors include a discussion of the legal 
history of the issue being raised.69 Several footnote brief explanations of legal principles 
employed by the mufti.10 Having a uniform methodology gives the book a coherence that 
the absence of a conclusion makes all the more urgent, and cumulatively demonstrates 
the methodology's effectiveness. On the whole, the book provides a methodological 
63
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model for the present work in terms of structure and analysis. I have attempted to adhere 
to this model throughout my work. 
Although none, apart from Juan Cole's discussion of a Shi'ite/aftva in India, deal 
specifically with a minority context, fatawa of the modern period frequently treat new 
questions emerging out of technological advancement or interaction with non-Muslims. 
There is a noticeable tendency for muftis to treat modern issues by supporting Islamic 
textual evidence with scientific or pseudo-scientific analysis. It seems reasonable to 
hypothesize that the mujtahids examined in this research might likewise make at least 
strategic use of non-traditional sources of knowledge. 
While virtually all of the fatawa examined in Islamic Legal Interpretation, 
whatever the subject matter, have some relationship to government bodies and political 
implications, this is not the case in fatawa produced for Muslims in the West. While the 
fatawa examined in this thesis are overwhelmingly apolitical, it would be naive, however, 
to presume that they concern the private lives of Muslims only. Rather, they represent a 
potential source of reference in shaping the direction some Muslims might take in 
defining themselves in multicultural societies of the West. 
As noted above, Kate Zebiri treats the fatawa of Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut, 
formerly the leading mufti of al-Azhar, within a wider discussion of his legal 
methodology and his approach to Islam and modernism.71 Her interest is in his 
"methodology in issuing fatwas, rather than on his opinions per se."72 She analyzes his 
use of the traditional sources of Sunni law (Qur'an, Sunna, ijma', and ra 'y), and his 
opinion of the views of previous muftis. Zebiri finds that the spirit of the Qur'an, 
71
 Kate Zebiri, Mahmud Shaltut and Islamic Modernism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
72
 Ibid., 108. 
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embodied in its principles, is at the heart of Shaltut's legal decisions, whether or not it 
speaks directly to the question at hand. Secondly, his use of ahadith is impartial, as he 
considers the import of sound hadith he does not agree with. He is suspicious of the 
traditional understanding of ijma' (consensus) as "absolute unanimity,"73 relying rather 
on textual sources and independent reasoning. The latter, ra 'y (opinion), has wide 
application and like other modernists, he makes liberal use of maslahah (common good), 
not so much as the basis of 'ilia (effective cause),74 but as a general principle. Similarly, 
he prefers hikmah (the wisdom behind the ruling)75 to 'ilia. This recourse to what one 
might refer to as the internal logic of a case may widen or restrict permissions. 
In addition to these traditional sources, Shaltut employs what Zebiri refers to as 
empirical evidence, such as scientific knowledge, including a confident reliance on the 
assumed goodness of human nature and the guidance of conscience. Regarding the 
rulings of previous muftis, Shaltut has an attitude of "detached respect." Finally, so 
confident is Shaltut in the sources of the law and their accessibility, ultimately, his 
objective is to educate and thus empower ordinary Muslims to make legal decisions "as 
far as possible independent of muftis"71 By analyzing the legal methodology of one 
leading modernist mufti, Zebiri provides us with a helpful model that can be extended to 
comparative study. 
M.B. Hooker's recent study78 shows how traditional Islamic legal methodology 
provides tools that enable jurisdiction to extend its coverage to modern issues such as 
73
 Ibid., 116. 
74
 Ibid., 117. 
75
 Ibid., 118. 
76
 Ibid., 122. 
77
 Ibid., 123. 
78
 M. B. Hooker, Indonesian Islam: Social change through contemporary fatawa (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai'i Press, 2003). 
26 
abortion or euthanasia authoritatively. He finds that contemporary Sunni fatdwa are 
highly determined by the principles of maslahah and sadd al-dhard T (preventing access 
to a wrongful action). These methodological principles facilitate two inter-related 
tendencies in contemporary Indonesian fiqh (jurisprudence). The first tendency is to 
provide a highly determinative role for the elements of time and place {zamdn-wa-
makdri). So contextual is this approach to law that Hooker is tempted to suggest that 
Indonesian ijtihdd comes close to constituting its own madhhab.19 The second tendency 
is that extensive use of these principles renders the category of mubdh (legally permitted 
actions) "highly charged,"80 allowing an extensive space for ethical ambiguity, 
inconsistency and uncertainty, particularly on what the author refers to as "'edge' 
issues."81 What this means finally is that the promotion of these principles sustains a legal 
system that is predisposed to interpretive heterogeneity. 
Vardit Rispler-Chaim suggests that fatdwa provide the most reliable route to 
contemporary Islamic legal thought, whether of "establishment" or "fundamentalist" 
on 
Islam.0" She examines medical fatdwa gathered from fatwa collections and Egyptian 
newspapers and periodicals. Her method is to group the fatdwa according to ten topics: 
abortion, organ transplants, post-mortem examinations, and AIDS, to name a few, in 
addition to a chapter dealing with several less prominent issues such as freezing sperm or 
using a siwdk (wooden toothpick) to clean one's teeth. In each chapter, she summarizes 
the most salient issues and questions raised by the fatdwa, important considerations 
79
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involved in the debates and what some prominent mufti has opinionated or what the 
general view of the muftis is. She makes frequent reference to historical precedent or 
significant historical changes. While many issues are occasioned by questions of concern 
to modern Western medicine, a few deal directly with contact with non-Muslims.83 
The author draws attention to the social dimension of Islamic medical ethics; that 
is, that permissions are predicated on the social benefit of an ethical choice. The 
individual is not the sole, nor the primary subject of concern in these decisions. Her 
second major point is that Islamic ethics is inseparable from theology and law. Abortion, 
for example, is tied to the place and role of women and the family; AIDS to sexual 
morality; and euthanasia to family responsibility and God's ownership of the body. Just 
as Western ethics cannot proceed today without giving human rights central place, 
Islamic ethics, Rispler-Chaim suggests, is bound to a comprehensive and systematized 
Islamic worldview. I would add that Islamic ethics, while deeply rooted in theology and 
law, and so relatively stable, is also prone to be situational, particularly insofar as regard 
for benefit to Islam and the Muslim community is concerned. If it were not so, there 
would be little theoretical justification for ijtihdd, an interpretive methodology that is at 
least partly premised on the presupposition that social reality is not static and that the 
law's intent is to make practical the divine will in changing circumstances. 
Gary Bunt's Islam in the Digital Age, a development of his previous book,84 is a 
phenomenological exploration of "Cyber Islamic Environments, an umbrella term which 
can refer to a variety of contexts, perspectives and applications of the media by those who 
83
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define themselves as Muslims." Bunt endeavours to describe and analyze the content 
and symbolic meanings of Islam on the internet. He is interested in changes in the 
communication of knowledge, and how these influence forms of expression, dialogue, 
and self-understanding. Two notions that form the hub to which the material connects are 
jihad and fatwa. His project hopes, by "rational analysis and discussion," to "defuse" the 
sensationalism often associated with these terms.86 In his discussion of online authority, 
Bunt observes how the internet facilitates shifts in "traditional notions of authority" 
whereby unrecognized individuals and organizations acquire an aura of authority beyond 
their merits.87 This phenomenon, particularly relevant to Sunnism, intensifies traditional 
lines of competition and introduces new competitors. Similarly, the internet reveals a 
variety of opinions, some of which "are safer to articulate in cyberspace than in real space 
and time [...]"88 Technologically connected Muslims have immediate access to this 
knowledge, further extending the boundaries of communication. 
Bunt's study yields an important observation regarding the effect of the internet 
on traditional definitions of majority and minority populations. There is more connection, 
he finds, between online Muslims universally than between Muslims of different social 
status in the same country. This "digital divide" - those with access to cyberspace and 
those without - is an important factor in Muslim life today, blurring the boundaries 
between majority and minority contexts. On the basis of this consideration, it would seem 
proper to make a methodological distinction between print and online fatawa in this 
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work. However, the fact that most fatawa are available in both formats makes this not 
only tedious, but unnecessary. Further, Bunt observes that some sites catering to the 
needs of Muslim minorities have a decidedly more candid approach, suggesting that 
methods of expression in majority and minority contexts are not always uniform. A 
further question would ask if the content of afatwa remains the same whether it is issued 
for a mustafti in the West or in a Muslim environment. 
On a practical level, Bunt supplies a wealth of references to websites offering 
online fatawa. His chapter on Shi'ite online advice notes several sites, some of which I 
became aware of by this means. About a site based in Qom, Bunt remarks, "As this site 
evolves, it will surely contain a greater proportion of content from a wider band of 
scholarly opinion in Qom, and would be a useful focus for a study of contemporary 
opinion (in conjunction with 'traditional sources')".89 The present study - limiting itself 
to guidance for minority contexts - attempts to make just such a contribution. While not 
strictly a study of religion on the internet, this work is greatly aided by Bunt's attention to 
technical and methodological aspects of the study of online fatawa. 
The authors of the first set of studies summarized may be broadly characterized as 
ethnographic studies. Although the latter set looks at legal texts and methods of 
interpretation, the specific legal texts of fatawa for Muslims in the West appear only in 
article length studies, or as small sections of books, such as Bunt's. What the present 
study offers is a thorough analysis of Muslim minority identity through the lenses of 
jurisprudential sources generated by and for the community. My objective is to study the 
dynamics involved in the process of the construction of Muslim identity in the West, 
observing at the same time how the authoritative legal sources articulate their 
89
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understanding of Muslim relations with non-Muslims and non-Muslim society within the 
post-colonial historical context. Specifically, I examine how these scholars - and the 
community that recognizes their authority - treat values underlying law, education, and 
public life in secular societies. Given this, I ask: What patterns of permissions and 
prohibitions emerge and what does this tell us about how religio-legal discourse 
contributes to the shaping of Shi'ite minority identity in the West? 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I provides the background material that 
helps to situate the primary focus of the study. Chapter one outlines the methodology 
used in studying the textual material and a small number of interviews conducted with 
leaders within the Shi'ite community in Montreal. I employ elements from a variety of 
methodologically related sources, including discourse analysis, analysis of Jewish 
responsa literature, and gleanings from some of the sources on Islam in the West 
discussed above. The chapter also provides the theoretical framework that helps to situate 
the analysis within the field of minority Muslim identity. After a very brief synopsis of 
the main trends in contemporary identity theory, I discuss the particular model of 
minority identity, elucidated by Ingrid Mattson, which I use for charting the approach to 
identity that best characterizes the legal opinions expressed in each of the chapters, each 
of which is devoted to a different set of legal issues. The chapter sets the stage for 
identifying how jurists use the tools of legal interpretation in crafting Muslim minority 
identity in the West. 
The next two chapters place the legal sources within their textual and historical 
context. Chapter two provides an historical survey of the development of the institution 
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of the marji 'Tyah and of /afwa-giving. I discuss problems with the institution identified by 
contemporary Shi'ite scholars, both clerical and Western trained academics. This prepares 
the way for interpreting the implications of the opinions of modern and contemporary 
mujtahids for proposed reforms of the institution of the marji 'Tyah and for its influence in 
the West. 
Chapter three is an historical survey of the Twelver Shi'ite (Imaml) madhhab on 
the issue of migration from classical to modern times. It begins by examining the 
intended purpose of migration to dor al-isldm (constituted as Medinah) in the period 
before, as compared to after, the conquest of Mecca. This places us in a more 
advantageous position for understanding the legal reasoning and rationale behind 
contemporary legal opinions. It is found that fatawa attempt to maintain the principles 
associated with early legal discourse on hijrah. This contributes to the tensions between 
mujtahids and mustaftfs. 
Part II examines fatdwd on at least five major areas of legal questioning. Each 
chapter deals with a subset of Islamic law as delineated in most legal handbooks. Issues 
emerging specifically out of the modern immigrant experience appear as distinct chapters 
in some of these handbooks, while in others they are scattered throughout various 
chapters, or designated as miscellaneous questions towards the end of a scholar's resdlah 
(legal treatise). 
The first chapter of Part II, chapter four, looks at the foundational question of 
purity and impurity, specifically Shi'ite legal discourse on the purity status of non-
Muslims. Traditional legal handbooks commonly begin with this subject of central 
importance to Islamic legal, and particularly ritual, practice. The discussion on purity 
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extends to an analysis of fatawa regarding food and drink, a subject sometimes linked to 
the purity status of non-Muslims in legal thought. The chapter demonstrates a dissonance 
between person-related and product-relatedyttfovra, showing generally more inclusive 
opinions with regard to the former and retentive opinions in the latter, easing and 
complicating Muslim life in the West respectively. 
Chapter five follows from matters of purity, as do traditional legal manuals, with 
questions of ritual worship ('ibdddf). Here, I look particularly at how questions of prayer 
and fasting in the Western social and geographic context impact upon the scholars' and 
laypersons' views of Muslim minority identity. The chapter demonstrates how ritual 
worship is crucial in supporting an uncompromised Muslim identity in the West while 
also going beyond identity to witness, and calling Muslims to engage in the universalist 
mission of da 'wah (calling people to Islam). 
In chapter six, I turn to the second major division of Islamic legal manuals, that of 
social relations (mu 'dmalat), and examine fatawa dealing with an issue not generally 
covered in pre-modern manuals, that of education. In fact, only one contemporary 
mujtahid, Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah of Lebanon, gives the subject a 
chapter of its own in his resalah for Muslims in the West. Other scholars include fatawa 
related to education in other chapters, notably, gender relations. The chapter shows how 
social context impels a significant retention of conservative values on the part of scholars, 
further extending the call to mission (that is, da 'wah). It also highlights the tension 
between mustaftis and mujtahids evident throughout the study. 
Chapter seven examines a second issue not generally dealt with as a discreet 
subject in legal manuals, but an important one historically and in the present. This is the 
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matter of personal appearance, a theme that involves men wearing beards or working as 
barbers, and female head coverings and modest dress, as well as other matters touching 
on appearance. I relate my analysis of this material to contemporary discourses around 
the hijab (female head covering), popular, scholarly, and legal. The chapter demonstrates 
a coalescence of practice on the matter of hijab between mujtahids and a community of 
educated females, though for radically different reasons. 
The penultimate chapter, chapter eight, looks at fatawa regarding government, 
and the Muslim immigrant's legal rights in relation to and obligations towards Western 
political institutions. Here, it appears that the disconnect between mujtahids and mustaffis 
is reversed, in that while the former, with only some exceptions, stress the selective 
accommodation model of minority identity via civil obedience and fulfilling contract 
obligations, the latter demonstrate influence from more revolutionary Islamic and Third 
World discourse that inclines them towards an identity of resistance. 
The conclusion looks at some of the implications arising out of an observed 
tension between applying legitimizing principles of ijtihad, evidently the preference of 
mustaftis, and the mujtahids'' tendency to severely limit their application to matters of 
purity. It argues further that this is done within an overall framework that facilitates the 
evident objective of establishing enclaves of Muslim space which, in turn, endeavour to 
serve the purpose of enhancing hijrah (migration) by da 'wah. 
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PART I: METHODOLOGICAL 
AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
CHAPTER ONE 
METHODOLOGY 
THEORY AND METHOD 
Several authors have been helpful to me in providing the theoretical framework 
and analytic tools for my research. I accept, and attempt to demonstrate, the fundamental, 
underlying theory developed by Leonard Pospisil's anthropology of law, as presented by 
Peter Haas. According to Haas, Pospisil argued that "legal systems should be seen as 
ways of organizing reality the same way as myths and rituals are."1 What Pospisil adds to 
our understanding of law, to my mind, is not that law is a way of organizing reality, 
which seems self-evident, but the insight of its congruence, and thus comparability, with 
myths and rituals. Consequently, as others have studied the way that religious beliefs and 
ritual practices contribute to the shaping and support of Muslim identity in the West, I 
look at a practical expression of law (that is, fatawa) from this same perspective, relating 
it especially to the concept of minority identity, which I discuss in detail below. 
In my methodology, I attempt to follow the example modeled by the authors and 
editors of Islamic Legal Interpretation, also described below.2 I am likewise greatly 
indebted to the method and theory of discourse analysis described by James Paul Gee. 
Gee maps the methodology and outlines the ways one can enter deeply into the world of 
meanings a text holds but does not reveal without the analyst expending great effort.3 
Thirdly, Peter J. Haas' theory of communication, which he models in a methodological 
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study of Jewish responsa literature, is, due to similarities of style and content, easily 
transferable to Islamic fatwa literature.4 These are the main sources from which my 
analytic method is culled. 
Muslim migration is, however, different from the Jewish case in at least one very 
significant manner. While the Jewish community has, by historical necessity, been 
accustomed to migration and residence amongst non-Jews for the last two millennia, 
Muslim migration to non-Muslim territory is neither obligatory nor does it have as 
extensive a historical precedence.5 Rather, Muslim migration for reasons not specifically 
religious or political, such as a strategic element of conquest, is a considerably recent 
phenomenon, as some scholars have noted. Thus, while Jewish scholars have had to 
grapple with the question of why Jews have been forcibly scattered among the nations, 
Muslim scholars are compelled to deal with a different question. Prior to deriving rules 
about behaviour once Muslims are in the West, scholars must first deal with the 
philosophical foundations of permanent and voluntary migration to non-Muslim territory. 
In other words, the discourse needs first of all to justify this type of migration in the face 
of the far more highly preferred option of residence in Muslim territory, safely under the 
Haas, Literary History. I am grateful to Professor Norma Joseph for recommending this work to me. 
5
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of Muslim Minority Affairs 11, no. 2 (July 1990): 226. 
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banner of divine law. Classical jurists indeed treated the subject at length at least at the 
theoretical level. That it remains a fundamental concern of the law is amply demonstrated 
by the contemporary juristic discourse. 
Juristic discourse for Muslims in the West continues to draw upon its justificatory 
foundations throughout the process of deriving rules of behaviour. The integration of 
foundational principles that justify voluntary migration to the West on the one hand and 
legal norms of behaviour on the other provides the logic of a central conclusion of the 
study. Despite living outside of the formal boundaries of Islamic legal authority, migrant 
Muslims are exhorted, through the transportability of the law, to remain within the 
normative boundaries that it creates. This in turn gives rise to numerous tensions around 
what qualifies as legitimate Islamic practice in the West and why. 
My analysis of the contemporary material is strengthened by reference to legal 
opinions within the Twelver Shi'ite madhhab on a given topic by a longitudinal and 
latitudinal comparative approach. As it is not feasible and would detract from my primary 
objective to trace the history and development of every legal opinion included in this 
work, I select those where most benefit is gained by longitudinal comparison, such as the 
law of migration to non-Muslim territory (chapter three), and the purity status of non-
Muslims (chapter four). Latitudinal comparisons take place naturally, as a matter of 
course in analyzing the views of more than one marji'. 
I base my theoretical framework of minority identity on a paradigm developed by 
Ingrid Mattson, which I describe below. I have also made methodological use of the 
general bibliography of sources on Islam and Muslims in the West outlined in the 
literature review. Though all of these have been helpful in different ways, I should note 
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GhaneaBassiri's work for suggesting several useful questions applicable to my study.7 As 
discussed in the Introduction, GhaneaBassiri's study attempts to uncover the role that 
"Islam play[s] in the development of the identity of Muslim immigrants[.]" To this end, 
he asks: "How is it appropriated in their daily lives? How are its obligations met in the 
context of the U.S. secular mainstream, which often views Islam with derision?" 
GhaneaBassiri's study is based primarily on interviews with Muslims on the West coast 
of the United States, the results of which indicate the community's self-reflective, and 
potentially shifting perceptions of their own identity in a Western context. My study asks 
how these same questions are dealt with in the authoritative legal texts that are intended 
to shape Muslim identity in the West, and in the exchange of ideas between the 
community and its clerical leadership. 
My methodology, then, follows three broad tracks: a) discourse analysis informed 
by a methodology applicable particularly to legal texts of the fatwa genre; b) legal 
context; and, c) a theoretical framework of Muslim minority identity with reference, at 
times, to the social context for which the fatawa are produced. Below, I describe my 
methodology further according to these three categories, 
a. Discourse Analysis 
The authors of Islamic Legal Interpretation identify several areas of inquiry for 
analyzing fatwa literature which I use in my study. These may be summarized as related 
to four general categories: source context; textual analysis proper; social context; and, 
legal context. Source context questions ask who the author of a fatwa is and what his 
general position regarding contemporary social issues is. Where is the fatwa located? 
See Introduction, n. 44. 
GhaneaBassiri, Competing Visions, 8. 
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What is its "home"—the internet, or a print source? If it is a print source, is it in a 
standard legal manual or in a collection of fatawa published specifically for the West? If 
the latter, is it a collection of fatawa belonging to only one mujtahid, or does it belong to 
a group collection? Who is included, and who is not? Are the fatawa responses to real or 
hypothetical situations? What kinds of editorial adjustments may be discerned? Asking 
about the source of afatwa helps to understand its purpose in relation to a scholar's other 
work and in relation to the overall theme of fiqh of minorities ifiqh al-aqalliyai). 
The second set of questions treats the texts themselves, both questions {istifta 'at) 
and responses (fatawa) in terms of form, style, and content. This is the most prevalent 
and detailed element of the methodology. Although the fatwa's form is generally 
uniform, structural details sometimes differ. To what purpose does a mujtahid structure a 
fatwa differently? What is its length? What kind of language style does he use? Are there 
key words indicating his purpose, method, or alluding to his larger body of work and 
thought? What issues does he privilege? What, perhaps, does he ignore? With regard to 
istifta 'at, how does a question influence, or appear to attempt to influence, the resulting 
fatwal What grammatical turns of speech are used in the question and the response? Are 
certain patterns of speech observable? 
In his introductory text to the methods of discourse analysis, James Gee shows 
how identifying "conversations" embedded in discourse that happens between two or 
more interlocutors can elucidate a speaker's argument and fit it within a larger social 
debate. By "conversations" he means "public debates over issues or themes." Similarly, 
he suggests that intertextual references, that is, quotations from or allusions to other 
sources, also help to illuminate the speaker's frame of reference. I refer to these as 
Gee, Introduction to Discourse Analysis, 52. 
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presuppositional worldview discourses that shape the mujtahids'1 points of view. Thus, 
in regard to conversations, I might ask how a mujtahid's use of language in afatwa on the 
subject of women's clothing, or on the hijab more specifically, correlates to the larger 
discourse on hijab historically, politically, and sociologically. What does this tell us 
about his objectives in taking the position he takes? In regard to intertextuality, I look for 
allusions to or quotations from sacred texts, and ask how the mujtahid uses the texts to 
support his argument and how he aligns himself in relation to those texts. What are his 
primary sources of authority? 
Gee speaks also of the "situated meanings" of words or phrases that an 
interlocutor uses.11 This refers to language whose primary home of meaning belongs to a 
specific discursive discipline, such as usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), for 
example. How do mustaftis and mujtahids employ the situated meanings of language to 
persuade the other, or to otherwise strengthen their argument? One prime example of this 
is the legal principle of haraj, or excessive hardship that might result from observing a 
ruling in certain circumstances. Given other conditional factors, this would serve to lift 
the force of a ruling in those circumstances. While mustaftis appear to have a broad 
understanding of the principle and strongly incline to its use, mujtahids tend to restrict its 
application to only the most severe conditions. On the other hand, mujtahids make 
frequent use of the principle of precaution (ihtiyat) that tends to limit permissive 
interpretations of a question. 
In his Responsa: Literary History of a Rabbinic Genre, Peter Haas outlines a 




 Ibid., 69. 
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between sender, receiver, and medium of communication. He suggests that in order to 
reduce misunderstanding and ambiguity—inherent in the nature of symbols—and to 
enhance clarity, the sender and receiver of responsa literature must understand the 
"universe of discourse" in which communication takes place.13 By this Haas means the 
literary and social context to which a particular use of language belongs. Haas gives a 
helpful example here, in the sentence, "The batter ran home."14 Without understanding 
the referent of the symbol "home" within its discursive universe, i.e., baseball, the 
sentence remains ambiguous: did he make a homerun, or run home for dinner? Further, 
the clues that the surrounding context in the real world of space and time would provide 
are absent in this form of communication. Thus, without employing tools of analysis, one 
is forced to rely on assumptions, which are often misleading. 
This is all the more urgent, Haas argues, when communication takes place across 
distance, as is the case between mustaftis and mujtahids. For then, the receiver is all but 
"fictional" to the sender, and communication "is much more representative of the writer's 
[i.e., the sender's] reality than of the actual readership."15 As Setrag Manoukian puts it, 
mustaftis are generally "totally unknown and 'exist' only inside the texts [.. .J."1 To the 
researcher, also then, mustaftis remain fairly anonymous, with social variabilities such as 
age, ethnicity, specific locality, or gender most often unspecified in the literature. 
Consequently, although we are limited in what we can say about mustaftis, critical 
Haas, Literary History, 56-62. 
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analysis can uncover possible motivations, worldviews, and attitudes towards Muslim 
identity in the West. 
In analyzing the istifta' and fatwa material I ask, therefore, what effect distance 
has on the communication? How do mustafti (as receiver) and mujtahid (as sender) 
attempt to compensate for distance and potential misunderstanding? What techniques do 
they use to try to situate the other in their world, mustafti?, by describing their social 
context in the West, and mujtahid?, by attempting to persuade the fatwa receiver of the 
moral logic of the decision? Attention to Haas' theory of communication helps to bring 
into relief what I call "juristic worldview discourses" that tend to characterize the 
"senders" of my research.17 
b. Legal Context 
Analyzing certain major legal issues relevant to today is helped by reviewing the 
legal discourse treating them historically, as this allows us to see developments and 
changes which in turn bring out significance that is otherwise inaccessible. This is 
especially true for the general theme of migration itself, as with the question of the purity 
status of non-Muslims. Hence, I examine these issues from a more historical perspective 
than others. On other questions, I sometimes refer to earlier sources that demonstrate 
links with the past, or reveal shifts of focus or interpretation. More commonly, however, 
the legal context becomes current by making explicit the legal principles implicit in the 
texts, and the particular usage to which a mujtahid puts them. I discuss some of these 
principles below and at various places throughout the text. A complete discussion is, of 
course, impractical, as that would be a work in itself. Chapter two is, however, devoted to 
a detailed overview of the fundamental structure of Twelver Shi'ite jurisprudence and the 
I define this term below, in the section on terminology. 
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institution of the marji 'Tyah, including the practice of ifta'. Here, it is helpful to note—in 
very broad strokes—the philosophical and ethical theory underlying Shi'ite law. 
Twelver Shi'ism developed two theories of theological ethics associated with the 
Akhbarimd Usuli schools. Robert Gleave's illuminating comparison of them 
demonstrates how each responds to the problem of context and change in radically 
different ways. Following Muhammad Baqir al-Bihbahani (d. 1205/1790), who secured 
the dominance of the Usiili rational methodology in Shi'ite fiqh, 'aql (reason) and 
revelation are "mutually supportive", agreeing with each other "on all matters [.. .J."1 A 
minority of jurists even attributed to 'aql the same certainty as that derived from the law. 
Along with Bihbahani, the majority of present-day Usiilis recognize the uncertainty of the 
results of ijtihad?9 The case for reason's moral discernment being of legal {shar'/) 
quality is argued, Gleave explains, from the premise that God is not irrational, which is 
what one would have to conclude if the findings of moral reason and revelation were in 
conflict. This is the doctrine of mulazama, that is, the logically necessary correlation 
between reason and revelation. 
It follows that with regard to the question of "the nature of right and wrong,"20 
early Twelver Shi'ites agreed with the Mu'tazilites that "[v]alues truly exist in the world, 
waiting to be perceived by human beings." That is, they "subscribe to an objective 
ontology of moral values."21 According to Bihbahani, the theory that actions merely have 
properties that suggest their necessary moral value to 'aql; or the theory that the moral 
18
 Robert Gleave, Inevitable Doubt: Two Theories of Shi'i Jurisprudence (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 219, 218. 
19
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 Gleave, Inevitable Doubt, 219. Some Mu'tazilites also held one of two other views, neither of which 
subscribe to the moral ontology of acts: 1) that the evil of an act lies in certain properties it possesses that 
'aql understands as evil; 2) that an act is considered evil when performed in circumstances in which it is 
evil to perform it. Gleave associates these with the early Basran, and later Basran schools respectively, and 
the ontological view with the Baghdadi School. See ibid., 210. 
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value of an action lies in the context in which it might be performed, and its motives, are 
faulty. The latter is especially so as it opens the door to a wrong action being considered 
right in some circumstances, thereby attributing evil to God and basing legal change on 
external circumstances. For UsulTs, then—the school to which the mujtahids examined 
00 
here belong—an "evil act" is by definition a "forbidden act." 
However, for Bihbahani and the Usiili school, necessity {darura) allows that a 
greater evil be outweighed (marjiih) by a lesser evil.23 For example, Bihbahani argues 
that although lying and killing are prohibited, they may be outweighed by the greater evil 
of allowing harm to come to the Prophet. Thus, the moral imperative of protecting the 
Prophet outweighs that of not lying or killing in that particular situation only; in all other 
situations lying and killing remain evil and forbidden. Bihbahani is able, by this theory, 
to protect the ontological morality inhering in actions while at the same time legitimizing 
situational ethics. Similarly, Bihbahani considers actions to be of two moral properties: 
essential (primary) and non-essential (secondary). The former, such as abusing one's 
children, are unchanging, whereas the latter, the neglect of prayer for example, may be 
permitted in certain circumstances because their moral value is designated by the 
Lawgiver according to His knowledge and will. 4 
These theories are significant to the derivation of rules, particularly with respect 
to contemporary problems, and they raise what Hourani terms the ethical question of 
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"what constitutes a right action?" Or, what Kevin Reinhart refers to as the scholar's task 
of "assessing acts."27 All acts in both Sunni and Shi'ite law are classified according to 
five moral values: 1) wajib—obligatory acts, for which commission is rewarded and 
omission is punished; 2) mustahabb—recommended acts, commission of which is 
rewarded but omission is not punished; 3) mubah—indifferent or permitted acts which 
are neither rewarded if done nor punished if left undone; 4) makruh—disliked acts, 
whose commission is not punished, but the omission of which is rewarded; 5) haram— 
forbidden acts which are punished and rewarded if committed or omitted respectively. In 
addition, jurists often use the terms/a 'iz or halal mfatwas, both meaning "permissible." 
These are not technically mubah because the law is not, as Frederick Denny points out, 
merely indifferent towards them; rather, they require a juridical declaration of 
permission. As Denny rightly observes, there is really "nothing toward which the Islamic 
system is truly indifferent within the possible range of human actions [...]."28 
While acts cannot arbitrarily shift from one category to another, because Islamic 
law is also essentially situational certain conditions may legitimize a forbidden act 
becoming permitted, or vice versa, etc. Contemporary problems in the West appear to 
present innumerable opportunities for such rationalization, particularly in the minds of 
laypersons. How legal scholars treat such questions is one of the more note-worthy 
aspects of this study. As Shi'ite legal methodology prides itself on an engaged and 
rigorous ijtihad, it is instructive to look at how scholars and laypersons treat the problems 
Moral Values," al-Tawhid 14:3, available from: http://al-islam.org/al-tawhid/default.asp?url=eternity.htm 
(accessed January 23, 2009). 
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of migrants where principles intended to make the law adaptable to particularly 
challenging situations may be deemed relevant. 
One such principle that appears frequently in the fatwa material analyzed in this 
research is that of difficulty and hardship ('usr wa haraj). As a principle of negation 
(qa 'idat al-naft) 'usr wa haraj is intended to relax regulations in contexts where 
observing a ruling would contravene the Qur'anic notion of the divine law as balanced 
and not burdensome.29 Specifically, it allows that a primary ruling (hukm awwalT) be 
lifted when a person is unable—for valid reasons—to fulfill it. The principle is based on 
verses of the Qur'an, often quoted in the classical texts defining such situations, which 
suggest God's wish to not unduly burden his servants.30 The broader textual context of 
the Qur'anic verses validating this principle and the explanation given in Ja'far Sajjadi's 
dictionary of specialized terms in Shi'ite law and other religious sciences indicate that the 
primary reference is to lifting rules of 'ibadat, such as ablution, prayer, and fasting, when 
following them is not possible or is extremely vexing. If, for example, one is unable to 
complete ritual ablutions (wudu') of an area of the body that requires ablution because it 
is covered by a bandage which is laborious to remove, on the basis of 'usr wa haraj it is 
permitted to simply wipe that area instead.32 
29
 Ja'far Sajjadi, Farhang-iMa'arif-iIslam (Tehran: Kavian, 1979), 1:1,257. 
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In my own search amongst classical sources the term haraj shows up primarily in 
the context of siyam (fasting), as suggested by Sajjadi.33 Moreover, rulings are often 
expressed as instances of the Qur'anic verse, "And God has not made religion to be 
hardship [haraj] for you."34 But there are also references to haraj being relevant to other 
matters. For example, it is understood to be behind extending permission to marry the 
wife of one's adopted son on the precedent of the Prophet's controversial marriage to his 
adopted son Zayd's wife. This, al-Murtada says, is "so that believers would not be 
burdened by hardship [haraj] in what concerns marrying [the wives of] their adopted 
sons."35 This, to me, suggests the possibility of understanding haraj in a psychological as 
well as material sense. 
Like everything else in legal interpretation, the specific conditions that constitute 
haraj vary to some degree from one jurist to another, giving rise to doubts and questions 
in the minds of laypersons. As we will see, several mustaftis invoke the idea of hardship 
when attempting to obtain a lenient ruling as, for example, in shaking hands with the 
opposite sex. Contemporary jurists seem, in contrast, to hold a very narrow definition of 
hardship, generally defining it as something that endangers the legally obligated person's 
life. Being at a geographic distance from their followers and anxious to protect Muslims 
in the West from perceived dangers to their religious practice and identity, legal scholars 
33
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tend to place more stress on ihtiyat, a principle that appears to function in binary 
opposition to 'usr wa haraj. 
In his definition of ihtiyat, Sajjadi states that ihtiyat must not lead to 'usr wa 
haraj.36 The intention, it seems, is to arrive at a reasonable balance between hardship and 
duty. Further, it is said that ihtiyat "is generally good in every situation unless it results in 
disrupting the social order."37 More precisely, Sajjadi states, ihtiyat becomes necessary 
when the following conditions are present: in the absence of certainty regarding an 
obligation; when the rule regarding any matter falls between duty and permission 
(ibahah) or recommended practice (mustahabb), or between forbidden (hurmah) and 
permitted; or when general knowledge of a ruling is present but not the details of how to 
do it. It is applicable, moreover, to both areas of Islamic law: 'ibadat and mu 'amalat, but 
pertains strictly to actions (as opposed to beliefs, for example).38 It is a characteristic of 
the Usuti endorsement of ijtihad and the principle of zann (probable opinion, valid 
conjecture) derived from it that, in theory, makes it possible for Usulimujtahids to not 
rely so heavily on ihtiyat. As we will observe, actual practice seems not to take full 
advantage of this generous provision, 
c. Minority Identity 
Identity, some say, "is the most widely used concept these days in the social 
sciences and humanities from which it has passed into popular discourse." It has been 
the subject of numerous studies in philosophy, sociology, social psychology, 
anthropology, religious studies, and other disciplines. Identity, it is said, moreover, "is 
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always problematic, something that is not just given but that has to be sought, striven for, 
and forged out of fragments [...]" and always subject to change or "even to outright 
dissolution."40 It is, some theorists maintain further, always in process, perpetually 
constructing itself out of fluctuations of relationships tied to power and place.41 This 
becomes observable in the analysis of some of the fatawa in subsequent chapters. 
Two trends have dominated the study of identity construction: social theory, 
which emphasizes the role of human agency and parallel notions of "choice and 
intentionality"; and cultural, or poststructural theory, which downplays the role of the 
subject and attributes agency to one or another historical process.42 In line with this 
theory, Gupta and Ferguson maintain, difference is not the starting point of identity, but 
the "end product" of a "historical process that differentiates the world as it connects it."43 
One could say that identity, according to this theory, has no concrete existence; rather, it 
is the perception of the place of a given element—one's gender, race, religion, ethnicity, 
sexuality, or values—in relation to others. 
Consequently, cultural theorists of identity de-emphasize personal agency in the 
construction of identity, and speak, rather, of "the subject as constituted through 
discourse."44 It is through discourse that relationships of power are perceived, processed, 
and finally, some theorists maintain, "performed." Identity is thus constructed for the 
subject in relation to discourses emerging out of a theoretical framework that interprets 
the world "in terms of binary oppositions and in relation to their "other," their 
40
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'constitutive outside'." This defining of oneself over against one's perceived opposite is 
descriptive especially of resistance identities, though according to the theory, the power 
to produce one's identity belongs not to the subject, but to the discourse, against which 
"human beings have little agency [...]."46 As discourses of resistance become embedded 
in a given population, so an identity of resistance emerges in human practice. Discourse, 
therefore, is fundamentally linked to the production and performance of identity. In 
connecting this theory to the development of Muslim minority identity, I wish to engage 
in an analysis of the discursive 'practice' of juridical discourse for Muslims in the West. 
Returning to a slightly revised version of the fundamental question of this research, I ask: 
What do fatawa produced for Shi'ite Muslims in the West tell us about how the juristic 
discourse of the marji 'Tyah seeks to shape and support Muslim identity in the West? 
Sociologists have identified three main patterns of identity formation among 
immigrant groups. Although slightly different names may be used to define these 
patterns, they essentially refer to the same three basic models. The assimilation model is 
characterized by "ethnic flight" from one's own cultural references and total embrace of 
the majority culture. Those who adopt this model believe that social success in a minority 
context is dependent on complete rejection of the perceived source of one's barriers to 
upward mobility.47 At the other end of the spectrum is what is variously termed 
"resistance" or "separatist identity," which is a largely adversarial response (for which 
reason it may also be called "adversarial identities") born out of the perception of one's 
own group as intentionally marginalized by the dominant community. Informed by a 
45
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construction of otherness that is framed by relationships of power, it attempts to 
compensate for its own perceived powerlessness by manifesting contempt for the 
dominant culture and an attitude of superiority for one's own group.48 The midway 
response is constructed by blending elements from the two primary cultures. It is 
involved in negotiating between assimilation and resistance, as it attempts to forge a new, 
blended identity. This category is variously called "combined identity," "selective 
engagement,"49 or "selective assimilation," and "transcultural identity."50 
But there is another, less obvious, way that discourse shapes the way Muslim 
minority identity is perceived in the West. This is the various historical paradigms that 
may be culled from the authoritative sources of Islam—the Qur'an and Islamic traditions 
of the Prophet and early Muslim community. Ingrid Mattson looks at how contemporary 
Muslims in the United States interpret a number of these paradigms as sustentative of 
three different approaches to Muslim identity in the West.51 She rightly states that each of 
these discursive paradigms has implications regarding the particular kind of society it 
would produce.52 Further, Mattson makes explicit the implicit notion that defining 
Muslim identity in the West is at the same time a process of defining the West. "In order 
to understand their role in America, Muslims need to define not only Islam but also 
America. Muslims need to place America in its proper theological and legal category so 
they can determine what kind of relationship is possible and desirable for them to have 
with this country."53 
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Mattson connects a spectrum of Islamic theological and legal categories of 
America with three basic models similar, though not identical to those outlined above, 
identifying them as "embrace," "resistance," and "selective embrace" paradigms 
respectively. The paradigm of "embrace" sees broad compatibility between Western 
democracy and Qur'anic pluralism. Not yet a well developed model, she says, it may be 
patterned on the first Muslim migration to the Christian land of Abyssinia, where the 
persecuted Muslim community was granted state protection. "As a paradigm for 
cooperation between Muslims and Christians, it therefore has a strong emotive effect. 
Further, the fact that many Muslim immigrants to American [sic] have taken flight from 
oppressive governments or situations of conflict and are welcomed by kind and tolerant 
Christians makes this an exceedingly suitable precedent for Muslims in America." 
Another model that supports full participation in the state institutions of the West 
is the Qur'anic account of the prophet Joseph's enslavement in Egypt, where Joseph rose 
to occupy a top position in the Egyptian government.55 In contrast to the assimilation 
model described above, the paradigm of embrace does not advocate rejecting one's own 
traditions. Rather, its embrace of Western culture is premised on an assumption that 
American constitutional democracy at its best is confluent with the ideal Islamic state, so 
that, in effect, one embraces Islamic ideals, but in Western form. 
In contrast, according to Mattson's "resistance" paradigm, Western society is 
"irreconcilably opposed to the Islamic premise that society should be based on obedience 
to God's commands, that is, an Islamic society."56 Thus, the resistance model patterns 
itself after the "medieval bifurcation of the world," into Islamic and jahilT (morally and 
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spiritually ignorant, pre-Islamic) society, or similarly, dar al-islam (the Abode of Islam) 
and dar al-harb (the Abode of War). The model emphasizes the centrality of sharT'ah in 
defining Muslim life in the West. It corresponds to the "separatist" or "adversarial" 
identities described above.57 
The moderate middle paradigm, which Mattson identifies as the most common, is 
that of "selective embrace," in which Muslims seek to make a positive contribution to 
Western society. This finds its legitimation in the Qur'anic command to Muslims to call 
others to good and to forbid what is wrong (al-amr bi al-ma 'rufwa al-nahT 'an al-
munkar). As Mattson puts it, "The dilemma for such Muslims is how to correct wrongs 
within American society generally without compromising their beliefs and allegiance to 
Islam by participating in the system without reservation. In other words, what these 
Muslims would like to do is to engage selectively in those organizations and institutions 
through which they can effect societal change but also bring an Islamic perspective to the 
issues and not compromise their essential religious principles."58 This is the paradigm 
that underlies some Muslim grassroots community groups that conduct social programs 
primarily for other Muslims. Others are motivated by this paradigm to engage American 
society at the political level. 
Each of these paradigms has both detractors and supporters, and for each, 
Qur'anic justification and criticism may be found. It becomes, therefore, a matter of 
interpretation, an endeavour that always involves making choices about what counts as a 
valid principle and how it should be applied. 




As mentioned previously, this research does not include Sunni fatawa. Most work 
on Islam and Muslims in the West deals primarily with Sunni Islam, leaving a gap in 
research on Shi'ism. Treating Shi'ite legal texts alone defines the boundaries of the 
research and allows for a more detailed and focused study of this community's approach 
to minority identity. This is valuable for several reasons. As I discuss in detail in chapter 
two, the Shi'ite legal structure and institution of ifta' is distinct in several ways. Whereas 
the practice of fatwa-giv'mg in Sunni Islam is relatively amorphous in that any learned 
individual may aspire to the role, if not the office, of mufti, the Shi'ite system restricts 
such activity strictly to those who have attained the highest level of training within its 
authorized institutions and have had their authority established by the production of a 
resdlah demonstrating comprehensive knowledge of the textual sources and methods of 
legal interpretation (comprehensive ijtihad, that is, ijtihad mutlaq). The aspiring mujtahid 
must then be authorized by an established marji' to the office of marji' al-taqlid and 
establish a popular following on the basis of knowledge and piety, among other 
qualifications. The centralization of the Shi'ite legal institution means also that scholars 
interpreting the law for Muslim minorities in the West remain at a geographical and thus 
existential distance from their followers living in the West, which is not the case amongst 
Sunnis. Limiting the study to Shi'ite legal scholars respects this theoretical 
distinctiveness.59 
Three additional characteristics of Shi'ite legal authority suggest the usefulness of 
this limitation. If, as discussed in the previous paragraph, issuing fatawa within the Sunni 
59
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legal system is relatively diffuse amongst people of widely differing approaches and 
levels of training in Islamic sciences, it is also a less emphatically authoritative 
institution. Sunni fatawa, while respected as educated and reliable opinions, particularly 
when issued by recognized muftis, carry no theoretically binding authority. A person 
seeking afatwa need not restrict his or her request to a given scholar, but may investigate 
opinions from any one or more of several scholars. He or she is then free to evaluate and 
to heed or ignore the advice given. A Shi'ite layperson, on the other hand, must in theory 
remain faithful to seeking the advice of one recognized living scholar and is bound, by 
moral obligation, to obey the opinion offered. While there is no legal mechanism for 
enforcing fatawa, legally observant Shi'ite laypeople nevertheless feel themselves bound 
to the opinions of their chosen marji\ Thus, as an important and influential institution, 
the marji 'Tyah merits a focused study in terms of its relevance to Muslims in the West. 
The second characteristic of Shi'ite legal authority relevant here is its relationship 
to ijtihad. Whereas it is said that the door of ijtihad in Sunni Islam was closed in the 9th 
century, soon after the establishment of the four extant schools of law (Maliki, Hanafi, 
Hanbali, and Shafi'i),60 ijtihad continued virtually uninterrupted among Shi'ite legal 
scholars since its introduction into Shi'ite legal methodology sometime in the 14th 
century. The necessity of ijtihad was premised, among other things, on the perception of 
Islamic law as a dynamic and flexible system, continually responding to changing social 
conditions. Contemporary Muslim migration to the West provides a fitting case study by 
which to observe and evaluate the exercise of ijtihad in a context that is not just modern, 
60
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but one that is complicated by the historical and political impact of colonialism and post-
colonialism. Examining a set of fatawa that is shaped by a uniform methodological 
presupposition—that of the ongoing necessity of ijtihdd—enables us to focus our 
question on how legal scholars use their tools of interpretation in responding to the 
unique situation of Shi'tes in the West. Is this a place for unprecedented innovation? 
What social, rhetorical, or ideological factors propel or restrain the dynamism of ijtihacP. 
In sum, what is the role of ijtihdd in shaping Shi'ite Muslim identity in the West? 
Thirdly, unlike the Sunni legal system where the number of individuals issuing 
fatawa is difficult to determine with any certainty, the Shi'ite institution makes it possible 
to access a significantly representative sampling of legal authority; the boundaries around 
who can issue fatawa, and thus who to include in the study, are clearly defined. This 
enables the generation of viable conclusions. 
Finally, implied in the above is the additional factor that the Western context 
allows freedom for Shi'ite minorities to explore a distinctly Shi'ite identity that is not 
always possible in the larger Muslim world, where Shi'ite minority identity is constrained 
by a different set of variables. To assume that Shi'ites would simply blend into and reflect 
larger Muslim minority identities in the West would be to disregard the reality of Shi'ite 
self-awareness as an integral community and thus risk unwarranted generalizations. 
TERMINOLOGY 
Standard terms of Islamic legal interpretation are given in English translation in 
parentheses throughout the text and are also listed in the Glossary of Terms. Where 
relevant, I further discuss the significance of some terms as they appear in the text. What 
I define here are terms that, because of historical usage or variations in signification, 
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evoke some ambiguity; that is, the classical legal terminology defining and differentiating 
between Muslim and non-Muslim space, namely, dar al-islam and dar al-harb. I also 
define a term that I have found useful that as far as I know originates with myself, namely 
"juristic worldview discourses." 
Some readers may find the terminology of dar al-islam and dar al-harb 
problematic as it may appear to them outmoded and inappropriate in the modern world of 
nation states. Although I do not use these terms extensively, I do find them appropriate as 
descriptive of a particular frame of mind that lingers within some conceptualizations of 
the relationship between Islam and the West. A functional definition of dar al-islam is 
that it is the abode "where it is possible to live an ethical life under the guidance of the 
Shari'a."61 Dar al-harb would then refer to territory not under Islamic law and where 
Muslims are not free to practice the Islamic rituals. While helpful, this definition is 
vague, as the first half may be interpreted liberally to include places where shari'ah is not 
the law of the land but where Muslims may live without effectively violating that law. 
Such an interpretation would further infer ambiguity regarding the latter half. The 
definition implies questions such as: is it required that the ruling government be Islamic, 
or simply that there are no legal or social impediments to the performance of an essential 
ethical core of the sharT'ahl Which aspects of the shari'ah need to be in place, or at least 
unobstructed, for a given territory to be considered dar al-isldml 
A stricter definition offered by A. Abel, "territory in which the law of Islam 
prevails,"62 suggests a narrower set of criteria for determining what counts as dar al-
islam and suggests a perception of social reality characterized by strong cleavages along 
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religio-political lines. Khaled Abou El Fadl's work is based on the more inclusive 
definition cited above and his discussion of juristic discourse on migration suggests that 
the linguistic dichotomy implicit in the stricter definition could not be maintained in 
practice. In other words, as in most areas of law, historical realities belie the clarity 
strictly dichotomous language presupposes. As El Fadl remarks, the apparent "linguistic 
dichotomy" between dar al-islam and ddr al-harb "obscures a much more complex 
historical reality[.]"63 This is at least partly because variety of opinion on the legality of 
migration was itself "a function of historical specificity." 
M. K. Masud further demonstrates the juristic complexity betrayed by 
, oversimplified linguistic dichotomies. Whereas dar al-islam in the strict definition 
referred to a state governed by sharl'ah, historical realities admitted conditions such as 
dar al- 'ahd (Abode of the Covenant) and dar al-sulh (Abode of Peace), implying a more 
heterogeneous reality. In addition, legal discourse dealt with the status of Islamic territory 
that is re-conquered by non-Muslims.65 
Legal opinions of contemporary jurists regarding residence in non-Muslim 
territory seem to assume the broader definition of ddr al-islam—any place "where it is 
possible to live an ethical life under the guidance of the Shari'a." Indeed, the narrower 
definition—"territory in which the law of Islam prevails," would all but rule out the 
possibility of migration to the West. At the same time, as we will see throughout this 
study, contemporary jurists interpret the application of freedom to practice specific 
elements of the shari'ah with a scrupulousness typical of the profession. Moreover, their 
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oft-employed term dar al-kufr (Abode of Unbelief), rather than dar al-sulh or ddr al 'ahd, 
suggests that their primary frame of reference is moral and ethical before it is political, 
and that permission for permanent residence in the West is granted only after careful 
moral deliberation. 
By "juristic worldview discourse" I mean a body of reasoning that is shaped by a 
/jg/i-based approach to what it means to lead a good Muslim life. One such discourse is 
the classical Islamic argument that the rights of God Qxuquq Allah) have a decisive claim 
on human beings. The term haqq in Islamic legal terminology is commonly rendered as 
'having a right upon oneself,' that is, "something incumbent upon one to do (haqq 
'alayya 'an qf'ala dhalika)."66 The common sense understanding of the phraseology and 
the philosophy clearly portrays the notion of haqq as a duty owing, such that it is correct 
to deduce, as Anver Emon does, that "haqq signifies both an obligation on one person 
and a claim of right on another."67 This is quite different from a Western anthropocentric 
notion of (human) rights as "entitlements due to every man, woman, and child because 
they are human."68 
Semantically related to the notion of haqq is the legal term qada' (literally: 
decision or ruling). Implicit in its primary meaning of divine decision is the notion of "the 
payment of a debt" owing, or fulfilment of an obligation, especially to God, such as a 
Anver M. Emon, "Huqiiq Allah andHuquq al- 'ibad: A Legal Heuristic for a Natural Rights Regime," 
Islamic Law and Society 13 no. 3 (2006), 328. Emon's source is Ibn Manzur, Lisan al- 'Arab 6th Edition 
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lapsed prayer obligation. For example, Sistani speaks of "a person who has qadha (i.e. 
qada') prayers on him."70 Legal handbooks provide numerous rules as to how to perform 
qada' prayers, and enumerate the conditions under which prayers may shift to qada'. 
Usually, qada' is required because of accidental lapse (oversleeping, for example), or 
travel.71 
Two further terms merit brief definitions. By "the West" I mean the broad 
geographical area designated by legal scholars in their legal treatises as al-gharb, by 
which they mean any non-Muslim country that is politically secular and socially and 
religiously pluralistic, and in which Muslim law is not given any special consideration. 
As the literature by and large does not specify location or social context beyond this 
general description—apart from again general descriptions of social behaviour—my own 
definition remains similarly broad. 
The term "progressive" should also be defined. I use this term in the very limited 
sense of an approach to legal interpretation and practice that is not fully bound to the 
past, theoretically or intellectually, but sees the law as capable of adapting to the modern 
world and permits that world a measure of participation in the process of ijtihad. Thus, 
my definition is not as far reaching as that of the authors of Progressive Muslims, for 
whom the term progressive "refers to a relentless striving towards a universal notion of 
justice in which no single community's prosperity, righteousness, and dignity comes at 
69
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the expense of another." The reason for not adopting this definition is that the cases in 
which I use the term do not reflect the depth of critical reflection and "serious 
engagement with the full spectrum of Islamic thought and practices"73 elucidated by these 
authors. What my definition has in common with Safi's is that it does not imply a 
coterminous relationship between progress and Westernization and, by the same token, 
does suggest continuity with Islamic legal and theological tradition in conversation with 
modernity. 
PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIALS 
The primary sources used for this research are of three main types: a) print fatwa 
collections of current and recently deceased mujtahids who have addressed questions 
specific to the Western context; b) online fatawa issued by mujtahids of the same 
description; and c)fatwa and non-fatwa sources authored by classical, pre-modern, and 
contemporary Muslim scholars. The majority of these sources are in Arabic and a 
minority in Persian. Where English translations are available, these have been consulted 
along with the original Arabic or Persian. Print sources are of two types: collections of 
fatawa for Muslims in the West issued by several mujtahids; and a single mujtahid's 
publication.74 Three contemporary mujtahids have published works of the latter type: 
Ayatollahs Sistani, Fadlallah, and al-Hakim. Sistani and Fadlallah also have their own 
websites where they treat questions dealing with migration and life in the West. 
Omid Safi, "Introduction: The Times They are A-Changin' - a Muslim Quest for Justice, Gender 
Equality, and Pluralism," in Progressive Muslims on Justice, Gender, and Pluralism, ed. Omid Safi 
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 3. 
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A compilation of istifta 'at and fatawa from ten mujtahids, recently deceased and 
contemporary, is published in Beirut.75 This source, which I use extensively, includes 
Ayatollahs Khomeini, Khui, Muhammad Reza Golpayegani, Muhammad Ali al-Araki, 
Shaykh Javad al-Tabrizi, Ali Khamenei, Sistani, Luft Allah al-Safi Golpayegani, al-Fadil 
al-Lankarani, and Makarim Shirazi. The text is organized topically, with several 
mujtahids contributing legal opinions under each chapter. Its chapters follow the general 
format of standard legal manuals, beginning with issues of purity and impurity, and 
moving from matters of worship ('abadat) to social relations (mu 'amalai). Additional 
chapters deal with questions of specific relevance to the non-Muslim context. Indicative 
of his general disfavour among some in Qom is the exclusion of Ayatollah Muhammad 
Husayn Fadlallah from this compilation. 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 
Here, I provide the biographical context of only the main mararji' whose fatawa 
are analyzed in the research. 
The major centres of Shi'ite learning today remain Iran and Iraq, specifically Qom 
and Najaf, respectively. Along with Karbala in southern Iraq, the site of Imam Husayn's 
defeat by the armies of Yazid, Najaf is also an important pilgrimage city as the site of 
Imam Ali's shrine. Until the early twentieth century, Qom was not nearly as prestigious 
as Najaf. That began to change only in the 1920s, initially as a result of consolidating the 
new, modern nation of Iraq's borders with Iran. It is said that the seminary population of 
Najaf dropped from about eight thousand to under two thousand at this time.76 Najaf s 
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importance waned further in the early 1960s when, as part of its targeted assault on 
prominent Shi'ite figures, the Baath party imposed restrictions on the number of non-Iraqi 
students permitted entrance, and again further after the Iranian revolution, when Saddam 
Hussein "changed those caps to an outright ban [...]."77 By 1981, Najaf had only about 
two hundred students, as opposed to Qom's thirty-five thousand.78 The biographical 
sketches of some of the more frequently cited mujtahids in this study are divided by their 
respective geographical spheres of activity. 
Iraq 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (b. 1931), from here on identified simply as Sistani, was 
one of those who left his native Iran to study in the holy city of Najaf in the early 1950s, 
several years prior to the restrictions placed on foreign students. As do the majority of the 
highest ranking clerics, Sistani comes from a long family line of Muslim scholars. Sistani 
acquired the office of Grand Marji' (al-marji' al- 'uzma) after the death of his former 
teacher, Ayatollah Abol Qasim al-Khui in 1992,79 and now "enjoys the largest following 
in the Shi'i world today [.. . ] . " 8 0 
Unlike most Shi'ite clerics, apart from Ayatollah Khomeini, Sistani has in recent 
years become well known even amongst North Americans, though for quite different 
reasons than Khomeini. Habitually apolitical by conviction—he has traditionally 
followed the quietist line of Shi'ite political theory—Sistani has effectively been thrust 
into the frontlines of Iraq's fragile political scene, often mediating a measure of stability 
in volatile situations. Due to his noted "moderate stance, his juristic notion of democracy, 
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and his capacity for even-handedness [...,]" some observers of contemporary Iraqi 
politics see Sistani as the voice of reason, and Iraq's only viable '"guarantee of 
democracy.'"81 More importantly for purposes of this research, however, are his views on 
the marji 'Tyah and his legal methodology. 
Contrary to Khomeini's theory, described below, Sistani maintains a traditional 
view of the marji 'Tyah, that is, that it is an institution "confined to religious scholarship 
and piety," answerable to the people who have the right to choose whom they wish to 
follow and pay their religious taxes to.83 His extensive learning in Islamic as well as non-
Islamic sciences is well attested to and it is said that his methodology reflects this 
learning in his inclusion of modern legal theory and cultural ideas in his hermeneutics. 
Whether or not this is the case, it is not generally observable in his fatawa for Muslims in 
the West which still reflect a traditional conservatism on many issues expressed in 
traditional terms. In line with his traditionalism, he is opposed to clerics assuming the 
Islamic nation's highest political office (i.e., Khomeini's theory of walayat al-faqih, 
guardianship of the jurist), but supports their role in providing "direction, guidance" and 
oversight to "committees set up to run civil affairs, enforce security and provide public 
Nabeel Yasin, "A Man of His Word," Index on Censorship 33 Issue IV (2004), 85. The latter quote is the 
author's quoting of Iraq's then interim president, Ghazi Alyawer. See also, Yitzak Nakash, cited above, and 
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Sistani's direct political role in bringing democracy to Iraq. Describing Sistani as a quietist in terms of 
opposing clerical participation in actual government, and an activist with regard to providing Islamic legal 
guidance in times of political injustice, Rahimi suggests that the "most significant contribution that Sistani 
and his type of political activism could provide in democratization and peacemaking in the country lies in 
its potential to strengthen Iraqi civil society" (14). More importantly, Rahimi draws attention to Sistani's 
resolve that all legislation be fully consistent with Shari'ah norms. 
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services." As Walbridge notes, Sistani's dissociation from the anti-West rhetoric 
characterizing Khomeini's persona makes him a preferable option to the latter for 
Muslims in the West to follow.86 His fatawa may be found in a special resalah devoted to 
questions for Muslims in the West, or in collections of such fatawa issued by a variety of 
mujtahids, in local magazine publications of Islamic centres, such as the Lebanese 
Islamic Centre of Montreal, as well as on Sistani's official website and other online 
venues. 
Prior to Sistani, his famed teacher, Abol-Qasim Khui (1899-1992) had the largest 
following of Shi'ite Muslims in several countries, including Iraq, Pakistan, and India. 
He had acquired the position, Walbridge notes, in preference to the two highly revered 
mujtahid sons of Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim upon the latter's death in 1970 and in 
accordance with the conventional method of popular recognition of his station, that is, 
"the reverence shown to him, [and] the khums paid to him."88 Khui was staunchly 
apolitical, refusing to take sides in the Iran-Iraq war. Nevertheless, his followers were not 
spared arrest and torture in the government crackdown on the Shi'ite religious 
establishment in the late 1970s and Khui himself "was placed under a virtual house arrest 
on 
that continued until his death twelve years later." 
Khui differed from Muhsin al-Hakim in his opinion regarding the permissibility 
of tab 'id (composite legal rulings), that is, following the fatwa of a different mujtahid 
than one's own on a given issue. According to Khui, taqlid is defined as "reliance on the 
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opinion of another at the point of action." Since an unconditioned proof cannot include 
two contradictory arguments, it is unreasonable, in Khui's opinion, to emulate two jurists 
whose opinions are not in agreement. It is preferable, he argues, to exercise ihtiyat and 
avoid the action altogether. If the conflict between these opinions is not known, however, 
it is permissible to follow the opinion of another jurist. Muhsin al-Hakim's permission for 
tab 'Id is premised on a definition of taqlid (emulation) as reliance on the opinion of an 
expert at the level of commitment; that is, commitment is attached to the principle of 
following the rulings of the jurists; which jurist one follows is a matter of choice. Unless 
it is for "frivolous reasons,"91 one is therefore permitted to choose the ruling of one jurist 
over another in a given situation, a concession that Ali Taskhiri argues may well be of 
benefit to the highest aspirations of Islam in the modern world.92 
Very little is written about Ayatollah al-Sayyid Muhammad Sa'id al-Tabataba'i 
al-Hakim, one of three senior clerics in Najaf after Sistani.93 Yitzhak Nakash says only 
that he has, along with his two colleagues, taken the quietist position of Sistani.94 Faleh 
Jabar mentions him in reference to Muqtada al-Sadr's belligerent attitude towards all and 
sundry. In a first step, Jabar says, al-Sadr eliminated some important rival clerics. "His 
second step was to pressure the old Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim into paying 
Ayatollah Muhammad Ali Taskhiri, "Combining Legal Rulings," in Shi'ite Heritage: Essays on Classical 
and Modern Traditions, ed. and trans. Lynda Clarke (New York: Global Publications, 2001), 237. 
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allegiance to him." Al-Hakim's interest in migrant Shi'ites is unaccounted for. He has 
published at least one resalah devoted to questions from migrants. His decisions tend to 
be more conservative than those of other scholars on several matters. Al-Hakim is also 
the most openly critical of Western society, about which he evidences very little actual 
knowledge. 
Iran 
Born in 1902 in central Iran, Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini (d. 1989) came from 
a long line of religious clerics. As a youth, he studied under Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim Ha'iri 
Yazdi (d. 1936). Khomeini became a mujtahid in the early 1930s and very soon thereafter 
began to openly oppose the pro-Western Pahlavi regime. As one of his biographers puts 
it, his aim "was more to islamize politics rather than to politicize Islam."96 His political 
statements and public agitation led to his arrest in 1963 and exile in 1964. Khomeini 
settled in Najaf where his thought was radicalized and from where his teachings were 
recorded and sent to Iranian students around the world. It was Khomeini's exposition of a 
revolutionary interpretation of Shi'ite history reflected in its popular piety of suffering 
and martyrdom, along with the teachings of Ali Shari'ati (d. 1977),97 and Ayatollahs 
Murtaza Mutahhari (d. 1979),98 and Mahmud Taliqani (d. 1979),99 that led to the 
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overthrow of the Shah and Khomeini's triumphant return (from Paris to which he had 
been exiled in 1978) to lead what turned out to be the "Islamic" revolution in Iran in 
1979. 
It is likely during his communication with Iranian students abroad that Khomeini 
issued his fatawd addressing questions regarding life in the West, though these never 
amounted to a volume dedicated to this purpose, as it has for Fadlallah, Sistani, and al-
Hakim. Khomeini's Tarawa for Shi'ites in the West appear in the major collections of 
fatawd issued by several mujtahids for Shi'ites living in places of migration. His 
following extends beyond Iranian Shi'ites. Linda Walbridge documents the views of a 
number of Lebanese and Iraqi Shi'ites living in Dearborn, Michigan whose taqlid of 
Khomeini was frequently intended to reflect their support for his political leadership, as 
well as his austere religious conservativism.100 
The principles on which Khomeini bases his political theory also inform his legal 
methodology. According to orthodox Shi'ite political thought, in the absence of the Imam 
who represents, and in fact embodies, the divine law, all human government is 
illegitimate. However, through ijtihdd, the divine law is accessible to the human mind. 
Since only those with the requisite training, that is, the jurists, have access to ijtihdd, they 
alone can interpret and apply the law. These ideas belong to the general Shi'ite legal 
theory as it evolved over the centuries, and resulted—on the level of juristic 
representation of the Imam on the religious level—in the institution of the marji 'Jyah and 
basis of consensus. Forough Jahanbakhsh, Islam, democracy and religious modernism in Iran, 1953-2000: 
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the twinning of ijtihad and taqlld. Khomeini takes these principles a step further in 
asserting that as representatives of the divine law, the jurists logically have the right to 
represent, as custodians, the authority of the absent Imam in both his religious and 
temporal duties. 
With regard to his legal methodology, the merging of political and religious 
authority suggests an epistemological assumption that the law and the highest 
authoritative jurist's interpretation of the law must be one and the same. Dissent and 
diversity of opinion are ruled out. This represents a radical departure from traditional 
legal theory that virtually prides itself on difference of opinion, and suggests an 
ideological, rather than purely religious, approach to legal interpretation. 
In 1989, the marji 'Tyah in Iran faced the problem of appointing a successor to fill 
both the spiritual and temporal leadership positions left vacant by Khomeini's death. 
According to Khomeini's modified interpretation of walayat al-faqih, this did not have to 
be the same person, as in his own case, so long as the temporal leader was from the 
clerical class.102 The spiritual leadership was already limited, of course, to the mujtahids. 
As Linda Walbridge explains, to maintain its power, the government needed to appoint a 
senior marji' from within its own ranks. Thus it was that the temporal post of "president" 
was filled by a low ranking mujtahid, 'Ali Khamene'i, while "two very elderly mujtahids 
[were appointed] as the government-endorsed marajV [sic] [...]." 
After the deaths of the latter, Khamene'i, though considerably lacking in requisite 
credentials to be considered the highest ranking marji', was nevertheless seen as the most 
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expedient choice. As Walbridge observes, the government's imposition of Khamene'i 
violated at least two basic principles of the marji 'lyah. Khamene'i was neither qualified 
by expertise in legal reasoning, nor, it follows, could he be freely selected by the people 
on the basis of their respect for his learning.104 Though some have chosen to follow 
him—thereby demonstrating their compliance with the government—the vast majority of 
Shi'ites inside and outside of Iran have ignored the government's choice and follow 
Sistani, Fadlallah, or one or another among several other options, including Ayatollahs 
Yusuf Sanei, Muhammad Sa'id Tabataba'i al-Hakim, or the outspoken clerical critic of 
the government, Grand Ayatollah Hossain-Ali Montazeri. 
Lebanon 
Born in Najaf in 1935 to a notable family from south Lebanon, Sayyid 
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah spent his early years in the sacred shrine city, where, from 
a young age, he began his studies in the traditional seminary curriculum. Like Sistani, 
Fadlallah was a student of Khui, as well as Muhsin al-Hakim (d. 1970).105 It was the 
latter, however, along with his politically active fellow student, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr 
(1933-1980), and Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 1989), whose examples Fadlallah has sought to 
emulate.106 While critical of Khui's apolitical approach, Fadlallah has actively supported 
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Khomeini as the first successful modern leader of an Islamic state, by whom he was 
1 f)7 
rewarded in being granted the title of marji' al-taqlid in 1986. 
Inspired also by al-Sadr's political activism, Fadlallah launched his own revival 
movement among the many disenchanted and poverty-stricken Shi'ite youth of east 
Beirut, where he established youth clubs, clinics, and community centres, and where he 
also took up residence in 1966.108 His eloquent and dramatic sermons, weaving together 
"traditional Islamic themes and the fashionable rhetoric of anti-imperialist 
nationalism,"109 gained him much repute among the youth. Through his experiences of 
suffering with the Shi'ites and other citizens of Lebanon during the prolonged civil war 
(1975-1988) and numerous Israeli bombings, he became known also as an 'alim of the 
people. 
Fadlallah has also been critical of the structure and training of the clerical class. 
During his studies, he co-founded a journal with Baqir al-Sadr, in which he published 
editorials calling for a more modern approach to Islamic studies and for making the 
teachings of Islam "relevant to changing circumstances [...]."n0 Fadlallah's legal 
methodology reflects an awareness of modern fields of knowledge. This sometimes leads 
him to different opinions than other mujtahids, particularly on modern and scientific 
issues.111 While some of Fadlallah' sfatawd for Muslims in the West do reflect this more 
progressive thinking in terms of results, others use a popular philosophical or scientific 
107




 Martin Kramer, "The Oracle of Hizbullah: Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah," in Spokesmen for the 
Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East, ed. R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997), 93. 
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 Ibid., 89. 
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 For example, Fadlallah advises a mustaftl living in northern Europe to arrange his or her own prayer 
times at regular intervals. This issue is discussed in chapter five of the present work. For a discussion of 
progressive leaning fatawa from Fadlallah on issues not directly linked to life in the West, see Talib Aziz, 
"Fadlallah and the Remaking of the Marja'iya," in The Most Learned of the Shi 'a, 205-215. 
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frame of reference to put forward a traditional opinion. In other words, while Fadlallah's 
legal reasoning often differs from other mujtahids in terms of form—and length—this 
should not lead one to assume that they differ also in terms of content. 
In contrast to Sistani, Fadlallah envisions the marji 'Tyah as a tightly structured, 
politically relevant institution. He argues also against its de-centralization on the 
argument that the marji 'Tyah provides religious leadership and guidance for "the entire 
Shi'ite community" and as such "should transcend political boundaries, just as the papacy 
is not restricted to Rome or Italy."112 Like the Vatican, the marji 'Tyah should be led by 
one, highest ranking marji', who would command universal allegiance and be supported 
by scholars^ specializing in all fields of modern learning. Fadlallah's vision of the 
marji 'Tyah would seem incompatible with the notion of a Western-based marji 'Tyah, as 
discussed in chapter two, and might suggest further that his interest in addressing issues 
facing Muslims in the West is reflective of this broader vision of a universally 
authoritative institution, and perhaps, of himself as a promising candidate for the 
position. 
I have not come across any collections oifatawa for Muslims in the West that 
include those issued by Fadlallah. Instead, Fadlallah's fatawa appear in several of his 
own publications dedicated to this purpose. His official website also has more than one 
section dealing with his views on migration, with the concept of fiqh (legal thought) for 




THE MARJI'FYAH: FROM QOM TO CALIFORNIA 
The historical survey of the institution of the marji lyah to follow reveals a 
substantially closed authoritative structure. Thus, developing afiqh for the West 
meaningfully conscious of cultural context would perhaps require a development of 
ijtihad as significant as the 14th century acceptance of the principle, which I discuss 
below. A recent congress on ijtihad in the modern world, sponsored by the College of 
Islamic Schools at Tehran University, expressed support for principles of ijtihad such as 
time and place (zaman va-makan). One participant suggested that applying this principle 
would prevent "a superficial approach" (sathT negart) to legal responses to modern 
questions, implying that this is at least sometimes the case.1 Deriving rulings (ahkdm; 
sing., hukm) for new situations places a heavy demand on scholars to apply these and 
other principles of legal interpretation so as to engage dynamically with contemporary 
problems. A description and history of /aftva-giving will help to set the stage the modern 
context. 
IFTA' (PRACTICAL LEGAL INTERPRETATION): SCHOLARLY LEADERS AND LAY 
FOLLOWERS 
In theory, fatawa are authoritative replies from qualified scholars—usually 
brief—to questions (s. istifta') followers submit to them. In Shi'itefiqh, they are 
considered commands (sing, dasturf and differ from (court) rulings (sing, qada') in that 
afatwa is absolute and complete (hukm kulli), whereas a qada' is reliant on corroborating 
1
 Hawzah: akhbar va itla 'at, "Hamayesh-e ijtihad dar dore-ye mo 'aser ba hudur-e ra 'Ts-e majlis-e khabar 
gan-e rahbarT," http://w\vw.hawzah.net,/Hawzah/News/NewsPrint.aspx?id=7627l (accessed January 13, 
2009). 
2
 See for example, Ayatollah Ah al-Sistani, Tawdlh al-Masa'il [CD-ROM, ALAHKAM, version 2.0] (Qom, 
1415), 1:6. 
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evidence (masadiq).3 Further, while court rulings are based on case evidence and are 
enforceable by the state, the scholar issuing afatwa draws upon scriptural teachings of 
the Qur'an and Traditions, as well as classical law. Fatawa are therefore the result of 
independent legal reasoning conducted by a mujtahid (often used as a synonym for 
marji <).4 
According to Shi'ite. fiqh it is obligatory for every layperson to do taqlid of the 
living scholar that he or she, after thorough investigation, considers the most qualified. 
The muqallid (one who does taqlid) is then bound to the fatawa of his or her marji' and 
may not choose to follow afatwa from a different marji' simply out of preference for his 
opinion, though under exceptional circumstances it may be possible to do so.5 Shi'ite 
scholars see it as necessary to mention that taqlid signifies acting in accordance with the 
fatawa of one's marji' and not simply having knowledge of them.6 
Since about the middle of the 19th century, it is said in Shi'ite juridical theory that 
to act in accordance with one's own knowledge—effectively under one's own 
authority—particularly in matters of 'ibadat,7 is prohibited, so much so that even what is 
done correctly (performing ablutions in the correct manner, for example) apart from 
3
 Al-Sayyid al-Yazdi, Su'alvaJavab [CD-ROM ALAHKAM, version 2.0] (Tehran: MarkezNashr 'Ulum 
Islami, 1376 h.sh.), 1:13. However, unless attached to a court ruling, the binding character of the fatwa can 
be largely theoretical, as there is no institutional mechanism for enforcing it. 
4
 While all maraji' (pi.) are logically mujtahidun, not all mujtahidun have the status of marji'. As used in 
this work, mujtahid is coterminous with marji'. 
5
 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Tahrir al-Wasila [CD-ROM ALAHKAM, version 2.0] (Qom: Dar al-Kutub 
al-'Ilmlya), 1:6. An exceptional circumstance would be that one's chosen marji'has not issued afatwa on a 
given issue; one is permitted in this case to follow another marji' on this issue only. 
6
 E.g. al-Khui, Minhaj al-Salihw (Qom: MadTnat al-'Ilm, 1410 h.), 1:5. 
7
 Shi'ite fiqh, as is Sunni, generally divided into two main areas: 'ibadat (matters related to worship such as 
performing ablutions {wudu' and ghus[), prayer (salat), and other obligatory acts of worship); and 
mu 'amalat (matters related to worldly affairs). Often, they are given the shorthand of matters affecting 
one's relationship with God and one's fellow human beings, respectively. 
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taqlid is considered batil (futile) from a legal perspective. The Shi'itt fatwa, then— 
unlike the Sunni counterpart which is merely "'informational' or communicative"9—in 
theory carries potential for significant influence on the community.10 While some 
fatawa—for Muslims in the West or elsewhere—appear to be rather mundane (stating 
that it is permissible to use soap made of pig fat, for example), others (stating whether or 
not it is permissible to disobey the government of a Western country in select matters, for 
example) have more serious implications. It is my contention, however, that all fatawa, 
no matter how apparently mundane, participate in the construction of a discourse and that 
this discourse as a whole produces or shapes a certain conception of minority Muslim 
identity. 
According to Ahmad Dallal, fatawa may be broadly classified into two categories; 
what Dallal calls a "minor" fatwa is generally private and will contain such elements as 
guidance, practical instruction, doctrinal explanation, or suggestions for settling disputes. 
They are noteworthy for aiding in the daily affairs and smooth running of society. 
Dallal's "major" fatwa is generally of public application and may well address political 
decisions such as a declaration of war or peace, or "administrative and fiscal measures 
and reforms."11 The 1891 smoking ban issued by Mirza Hasan Shirazi against the British 
tobacco monopoly in Iran is an example of a major fatwa in the modern Shi'ite world, as 
See, for example, Muhammad Kazim Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shi'ite Islam: From the Office of 
Mufti to the Institution ofMarja' (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and 
Civilization, 1996), 175. 
9
 Oxford Encyclopedia, s.v. "FATWA: Process and Function," 2:10. Even so, Sunni fatawa. from 
particularly high ranking scholars such as the chief mufti of al-Azhar, currently Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 
can carry great weight amongst the general population. Oxford Encyclopedia, s.v. "FATWA," 12. 
10
 Hallaq argues that many Sunni fatawa, being at once "legal discourse" and "social instrument," have had 
long term influence, having been regularly incorporated into substantive law. See Hallaq, "From Fatwas to 
Furu": Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law•," Islamic Law and Society 1.1 (1994), 29-65. 
11
 Oxford Encyclopedia, s.v. "Fatwa: Modern Usage," 2:14. 
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is Khomeini's 1971 ban on celebrating the 2,500' anniversary of monarchy in Iran. 
While "death sentence" fatawa such as Khomeini's call for the killing of author Salmon 
Rushdie for his novel, The Satanic Verses, seem typically to define the term in popular 
Western understanding, far more standard are the literally thousands upon thousands of 
every day "minor" fatawa dealing with points of doctrine or private ethical questions, 
which, nevertheless, have social consequences, directly or indirectly. This study treats 
solely this type of fatwd. 
Ayatollah Khomeini enumerates the criteria by which a scholar qualifies as a 
marji'; he must have maturity (al-bulugh), knowledge (al- 'aql), faith (al-iman), capacity 
of ijtihad (al-ijtihdd), justice (al- 'adt), purity (i.e. legitimacy) of birth (taharat al-
muwallad), and restraint (dabt); and, he must be male and living, for it is not permitted to 
follow a dead mujtahidP As for justice, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani explains that this 
describes someone whose general and specific conduct complies with the divine law, as 
testified by people around him.14 Usually, it takes many years of study and interpretive 
practice to reach this level of knowledge, so a scholar is often quite advanced in years by 
the time he becomes a marji'. The most qualified among them acquire a following which 
adds to their prestige, further boosting their credibility. 
With the potential for more than one marji' to fit the description given above, 
how does an ordinary person know whom to follow? In general, one should, upon 
reaching the age of accountability, which coincides roughly with puberty (12 for boys 
and 9 for girls), inquire of knowledgeable and pious relatives (notably one's parents) as 
to who is the most learned and pious scholar. According to Ayatollah Sistani, identifying 
12
 Ibid., 16. 
13
 Khomeini, Tahrir al-Wasila, 1:6. 
Seestani, Islamic Laws, 2. 
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such a person rests on three general guidelines: if one is him or herself a learned person, 
one may rely on one's own judgment regarding a scholar in question; or, when the 
positive testimony of two learned and just individuals regarding a scholar is not 
contradicted by another two equally learned and just individuals, their judgment is to be 
taken as valid. The same applies in the case of one learned and just individual; or thirdly, 
when the accumulated testimony of several individuals attests to a scholar's 
qualifications and one is convinced by their testimony, one may follow the marji' in 
question. However, one should not allow this rather technical procedure to obscure the 
weight of personal charisma that was often significant in raising the status of one jurist 
above that of his contemporaries.15 
Once a muqallid has chosen his or her marji', the next issue is how to gain access 
to his fatawa. The methods are the same according to all scholars. The contemporary 
scholar Shaykh Luft Allah al-Safi explains that it may be through one of four ways: by 
hearing it directly from the mujtahid; by hearing it from two just individuals; by hearing 
it from one trustworthy individual; and, finally, by reading it in the mujtahicTs resalah, 
which includes the scholar's independent legal statements as well as istifta'at and 
fatawa} Resalahs are commonly arranged in a uniform format, beginning with matters 
of taqlid, followed by purity and methods of ritual purification, moving on to ritual 
practices ('ibadat) and then finally addressing matters of social intercourse (mu 'amalat). 
Resalahs are commonly expanded through the publication of additional istifia 'at/fatawa 
as new issues and questions arise. 
15
 Ibid. I take Taskhiri's reference to a jurist's "personal capabilities" as alluding to this quality. See 
Ayatollah Muhammad Ali Taskhiri, "Supreme Authority (marjilyah) in Shi'ism," in Shi'ite Heritage, 163. 
16
 Shaykh Luft Allah al-Safi, Tawdih al-Masa'il [CD-ROM ALAHKAM, version 2.0] (Qom: Dar al-Qur'an 
al-Karlm, 1414 h.), 1:5. 
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The fourth method, that is, reading the mujtahid's published legal treatise and 
responsa, is considered the least reliable because the mujtahid may have changed his 
mind in the intervening time.17 New technology, such as a marji',s official website, is 
helpful here, as a scholar's fatawa can be updated regularly.18 Lesser reliance on print 
sources clearly suggests that issuing fatawa is an ongoing task subject to continual 
acquisition of knowledge that may change with time and circumstance. This suggests that 
fiqh al-mughtaribin (Islamic law for Muslims in the West) might well represent a 
dynamic and evolving field, one with great potential to direct the path and shape the 
identity of, as well as to provide unity to the community in the West. 
The form given to fatawa reveals something of their character. Fatawa generally 
attempt to be non-specific in applicability, as shown by the use of conventional naming 
substitutes (Zayd and 'Amr, for example).19 Further, as Wa'el Hallaq points out, 
questions should be worded in the third person, even if one is speaking, as is most often 
the case, about a situation with which one is personally involved. This non-personalized 
use of language might suggest a detached and formalized tone in istifta 'at and fatawa. On 
the contrary, because fatawa are necessarily based on real and not hypothetical problems, 
they also reflect the human quality of individual religious thought or development. 
Further, there is no set format that questions must follow. This allows questioners 
to exercise a measure of control over the way a question is put, and could, as Brinkley 
Messick observes, affect the response (i.e., the fatwa) to some degree; for it is the 




 Indeed, the internet has become a major medium for disseminating religious guidance, a phenomenon 
that opens up a whole series of new research questions. See Gary Bunt's very interesting studies, notably, 
Islam in the Digital Age. 
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 Hallaq, "Ifta'," 33; Messick, "MuftTs," 11. 
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consideration." For the most part, this does not appear to be a highly significant factor 
in the fatawa examined in this study, but it may account for some apparent discrepancy 
between two fatwas from the same scholar treating virtually the same question. While the 
majority of questions examined in this study simply state the situation more or less 
objectively, a number of istifta 'at do include bits of cultural or situational information 
expressed in such a way as to try to sway the fatwa in a more lenient direction, more 
often without success. Ayatollah Montazeri's online muqallidxxn are notably explicit in 
articulating their circumstances and wishes. 
Detailed istifta 'at may be due to at least two factors. As we will see below, some 
Shi'ite academics in North America have argued that the geographical distance between 
mujtahids and their followers in the West creates a parallel cultural distance; mujtahids 
lack the cultural experience necessary to engage the issues in an intellectually 
comprehensive manner. Secondly, as we will observe in the several chapters analyzing 
fatawa, an apparent hesitancy to exploit possibilities within the legal methodology further 
distances mujtahids, from mustaftls. While methods for obtaining contextually sensitive 
legal opinions exist, scholars geographically far removed from the context of their 
subjects tend, rather, to rely on the past and avoid taking risks in the direction of 
innovation. One area where significant change has occurred in spite of this widespread 
tendency is in the area of the purity status of scriptuary non-Muslims, where majority 
opinion has shifted radically in the modern period.21 Mustaftls may include detail in an 
effort to provide rationalization for a more dynamic ijtihad. 
Messick, "Muftis," 10. Mufti is the common term in Sunni Islam to refer to someone who issues a fatwa. 
Though at one time of use also in Shi'ism, the more common term in the latter is mujtahid. 
21
 For a detailed discussion of this subject see chapter four on purity and food. 
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The cultural gap between mujtahid and mustafti opens up the potentially active 
role of the mujtahid's wakil (representative) residentjn the West. While the primary job 
of the wakil is to relay the fatawa of his (wakils are, to my knowledge, always male) 
marji', a subject we discuss in greater detail below, a wakil may also have a formative 
influence by relaying first-hand knowledge of the cultural context of the followers of the 
mujtahid he represents. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARJI 'IYAH: RESPONSIBILITY AND DUTY 
Being qualified to issue fatawa clearly rests on an acquired and restricted 
authority. This authority is rooted in an aspect of prophetic succession. The Arabic root 
fatiya occurs in two verbal forms in the Qur'an that refer, respectively, to asking (the 
Prophet) for practical guidance (istifta') and to giving a response (yufti). In Twelver 
Shi'ite Islam, after the Prophet's death the responsibility of authorizing individuals to 
issue fatawa devolved upon a special class of the Prophet's descendents, known as 
Imams. According to Hamid Algar, the first Imam, Ali (son-in-law and cousin to the 
Prophet), authorized others to continue the prophetic practice of issuing fatawa, whether 
or not the Imam himself was present.23 Algar suggests, in line with Modaressi Tabataba'i, 
that this may indicate a certain distribution of authority on the part of the Imams, who 
delegated the task of "inferring of details and specific rulings [...] to their learned 
followers."24 Further, from his place of occultation, the twelfth and last Imam called upon 
those who narrated the prophet's traditions (s. riwayah) to provide guidance to the people 
Q. 4:127—"They consult thee [yastaftiinaka] concerning women. Say: Allah giveth you decree 
concerning them..."; Q. 4:176—"They ask thee for a pronouncement. Say: Allah hath pronounced 
hwftlkum] for you concerning distant kindred. [...]" 
Hamid Algar, "Fatwa," http://www.iranica.com/articles/v9f4/v9f440.html (accesses February 1, 2009). 
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on "newly occurring problems." As Algar observes, this would suggest the then close 
association between legal scholarship and knowledge of the Imami traditions. 
Initially the custody of the tradition narrators, knowledge of the opinions of the 
Imams eventually came to be the unique possession of those highly specialized in legal 
reasoning. The technical term used to denote this type of authority, walayah, suggested a 
guardianship role: jurists simply exerted their best effort to uncover and protect 
knowledge of the divine will, held solely by their infallible Imams. By the 14th c. CE, 
ijtihad as a source of law was added to reliance on tradition, gradually overtaking it in 
preeminence. However, as Ayatollah Taskhiri points out, it was the link between the 
jurists' guidance and "that of the divinely-protected (ma'sumah) leadership [of the 
Imams] in learning and conduct" that continued to validate the leadership of the former.26 
Even at this relatively early stage, the acceptance of ijtihad set the course for the 
already subtly present division between two classes of believers, as authority to practice 
legal interpretation was associated only with those trained in its methods.27 Qur'anic 
justification for a special scholarly class is typically found in Surah 9:122, which reads: 
"Nor should the believers all go forth together [into battle]: if a contingent from every 
group remained behind, they could devote themselves to studies in religion and admonish 
their people when they returned to them, that they [might learn] to guard themselves 
[against evil]."28 With the task of deriving legal opinions devolving upon an especially 
learned and increasingly specialized class ('ulama', fuqaha'), the duty of common people 
1 U 1 U . 
26
 Taskhiri, "Supreme Authority," 163. 
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 Norman Calder quotes a tradition narrated by Kulayni (d. 941) in which a "distinction between the 'ammi 
[common person] and the 'alim [scholar] was already implicit [...]." See Norman Calder, "Doubt and 
Prerogative: The Emergence of an ImamT Theory of ijtihad," Studia Islamica 70 (1989), 74. 
28
 As articulated by Taskhiri, "Supreme Authority," 159. 
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('ammi) was only to inquire and obey; ultimate responsibility before God as to the 
validity of a ruling rested on the shoulders of the mujtahid.29 Although adoption of the 
title mujtahid roughly coincided with acceptance of the practice of ijtihad, the formal 
office emerged only under the Shi'ite Safavid state that ruled Iran from 1501-1726.30 
A group calling itself Akhbans (after the technical term akhbar, meaning Imami 
tradition) in the 18th c. attempted to again centre legal authority solely in narrated 
traditions, apart from ijtihad. The attempt failed, largely due to the work of Vahid 
Bihbahani (d. 1792), an apparently indefatigable scholar whose extraordinary intellect 
pushed the Akhbdris to the margins of Shi'ite fiqh, saved legal reasoning from the last 
great assault against it, and established once and for all the role of the mujtahid as 
authoritative interpreter of the law. This Usull (from the technical term for a fundamental 
[legal] principle, asl) victory further distanced the clergy, with their specialized 
knowledge, from the laity.31 
The culmination of this development saw the emergence of the supreme mujtahid 
in the office of the marji' al-taqlid in the 19th c. Prior to this period, taqlid had looser 
reference to a general practice of the less knowledgeable masses following the legal 
guidance of the highly trained minority. Pairing the term taqlid with the terms ijtihad, 
mujtahid, and marji' clearly suggested an unequal yet symbiotic relationship between 
them. "By the nineteenth century," writes Lynda Clarke, "discussion of ijtihad and taqlid 
frames juridical treatises either as a preface or postscript, highlighting the fact that 
authority is the product of expertise in a discipline of complex legal reasoning limited to 
Moussavi, Religious Authority, 2. 
31
 Juan Cole, "Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa'i on the Sources of Religious Authority," in The Most Learned of 
the Shi 'a, 83. 
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only a few." When Sayyid Muhammad Kazim Yazdi (d. 1919) institutionalized the rule 
that every Shi'ite not qualified to do ijtihad (the vast majority of the community) be 
required to follow the rulings of a living marji', the corollary of which was the 
invalidation of religious observances performed outside of this framework, the institution 
of the marji 'iyah became the defining element of Shi'ite fiqh and Shari'ah-based 
religiosity.33 Thus, what in the 14th c. one of the earliest scholars to admit legal reasoning, 
'Allamah al-Hilli (d. 1325), stated as merely permissible—that the 'ammi act on the basis 
of taqlid of the mujtahid—was elevated in the late 19th/early 20th c. to legal obligation. 
Consequently, the practice of seeking a fatwa became increasingly indispensable, as 
reflected in the twinned terminology of legal identity: marji' (source of emulation) and 
muqallid (the one who emulates).34 
The introduction of ijtihad also precipitated a fundamental epistemological shift 
from the certainty of knowledge earlier assumed to characterize the infallible traditions to 
acceptance of the principle of doubt (shakk) and the possibility of error implied in the act 
of human reasoning, which is at the heart of ijtihad. Shaykh Murtada Ansari (d. 1864), 
whom Ahmed Kazemi Moussavi refers to as "the most famous marja' [sic] of the pre-
Modern Age," further expanded the scope of juristic authority when he systematized 
principles for dealing with four different levels of doubt.35 He also divided legal decisions 
iZ
 Lynda Clarke, "The ShTT" Construction of Taqlid," Journal of Islamic Studies 12, no. 1 (2001), 41. 
33
 Though attributed primarily to Yazdi, the binding obligation that every lay Shi'ite follow the rulings of a 
living mujtahid was earlier conceptualized by Shaykh Murtada Ansari (d. 1864). See Moussavi, Religious 
Authority, 174-75; 271-72. 
34
 Clarke, "The Shn Construction," 40. 
35
 These included (and remain valid today): "al-bara'a (allowing the maximum possible freedom of 
action); at-takhyir (freedom to select the opinions of other jurists or even other schools of law if these seem 
more suitable); al-istishab (the continuation of any state of affairs in existence or legal decisions already 
accepted unless the contrary can be proved); and al-ihtiydt (prudent caution whenever in doubt)." Moojan 
Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Law: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985), 187. 
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into four categories according to their respective level of certainty: qat' (certainty); zann; 
shakk (subdivided as described in the last footnote); and wahm (erroneous conjecture).36 
Ansari's contribution expanded the scope of juristic authority, further supporting the 
necessity of popular recourse to specialized knowledge. 
Another important development in the marji'Tyah occurred in the 19th c , which 
the highly influential modern scholar Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (d. 1980)37 classifies as 
the beginning of the third period, the period of the "grand marji'Tyah" (al-marji'Tyah al-
'uzma) which extends into the present time. As the marji 'Tyah narrowed the number of 
those qualified to pronounce on legal matters on the macro-level, so did the "grand 
marji 'Tyah" on the micro level, to the point that authority might be said to be consolidated 
in one universally authoritative grand marji', beginning with the marji'Tyah of Kashifu'l-
Ghita (d. 1813).38 Still seen as the ideal by some jurists, in reality there have, since al-
Ghita, been very few periods when the community was able to settle on one most learned 
and pious scholar.39 
After Ayatollah Burujirdi (d. 1962), there was no sole marji'. Among the several 
high-ranking maraji' to die in the latter decades of the last century, J. Calmard lists 
Ayatollahs Abul-Qassim al-Khui (d. 1992), Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini (d. 1989), 
Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari (1986), who were, at times, in competition with each 
Al-Sadr was one of "scores of Shi'i jurists" killed by the regime of Saddam Hussain "to keep his shii 
subjects cowed." Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, introduction to Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Lessons in Islamic 
Jurisprudence, trans. Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 23. 
38
 Talib Aziz, "Baqir al-Sadr's Quest for the Marji'iyah," in The Most Learned of the Shi'a, 143-44. 
39
 Ayatollah Burujirdi (d. 1960) was sole marji' after the death of the last of his contemporaries, Sayyid 
Aqa Husayn Qummi (d. 1947), helping to maintain the rising status of Qom. He was followed by several 
mujtahids, none of whom was considered the sole marji'. For a discussion of the crisis in the marji 'Tyah 
following his death see below. 
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other.40 Momen's list of the generation after Burujirdi is more complete. In addition to 
the three above, Momen lists Ayatollahs Muhammad Rida Gulpayegani, Mar'ashi-Najafi 
(d. 1990), Muhammad Hadi Milani (d. 1975), Ahmad Khwansari, 'Abdu'1-Hadi Shirazi 
(d. 1961), Al Kashifu'l-Ghita, and Muhsin al-Hakim (d. 1970), whom Momen identifies 
as the most broadly supported.41 Among those listed here, this study includes fatawa 
from Ayatollahs Khui (often spelled Khoei) and Khomeini, as, although now deceased, 
they issued fatawa specifically for Muslims in the West. 
Today, there are again several Grand Maraji' concentrated in the major Shi'ite 
centres of Qom, Mashhad, and Najaf, though some reside in other areas such as Beirut, 
Tehran, as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan. Sources vary as to their number. One web 
source lists twenty-three names of maraji' bom between 1920 and 1942.42 The majority 
(fifteen)43 were educated in Najaf, Iraq and the rest in Qom, Iran. A related website on 
the city of Qom lists thirty-eight, including Muhaghegh Damad, residing in Tehran, 
whose views on ijtihad are discussed briefly below.44 A Shi'ite site lists thirty-two names, 
with photos, all of whom are given the title "Grand Ayatollah," along with links to their 
official websites.45 One or two of this list are deceased (e.g. Ayatollah al-'Udhma Sayyid 
Kadhim al-Haeri). Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei tops the list, followed by Sayyid Ali 
40
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al-Sistani and Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. Fatawa from these marjaji' are used 
extensively in this work, as are those of five of the remainder of the first ten names: 
Mirza Jawad Tabrizi, Sayyid Muhammad Saeed Tabataba'i al-Hakim, Shaykh 
Muhammad Fazel Lankarani, Shaykh Yousif Saanei, Shaykh Nasir Makarim al-Shirazi, 
and two listed further down, Lutfollah Safi al-Golpayegani, and Janaati. The criterion 
used to select the sample is that a mujtahid has issued fatawa for Muslims in the West, 
whether in his own publications, such as those of Sistani, Fadlallah, and al-Hakim, or in a 
compilation of fatawa from several mujtahids. The study also includes some fatawa from 
Ayatollah Montazeri (stripped of his title by Khomeini in 1989). The vast majority of 
these men are over 70 years of age. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: FROM DECENTRALIZATION TO INCLUSIVITY 
Since at least the 1960s, the marji'iyah has been in process of internal reform. 
Ann Lambton identifies the major intellectual trends that emerged out of a series of 
papers occasioned by the uncertainties created by the death of Ayatollah Burujirdi, the 
sole marji' in the world at that time, in 1962. The initiative was led by a group of Iranian 
scholars who called themselves the Islamic Societies, and whose membership consisted 
largely of the clerical class. Questions around "the functions and choice of the marji' al-
taqlid'' were deeply impacted by political events threatening the institution's 
independence from both government and people, and challenging its responsibility 
towards society.46 
Ann K. S. Lambton, "A Reconsideration of the Position of the Marja' al-Taqlid and the Religious 
Institution," Studia Islamica no. 20 (1964), 119. 
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One solution put forward was to decentralize the institution, advocated by at least 
two participants (Sayyid Murtada Jaza'iri and Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmud Taliqani ). 
This would be accomplished partly by the establishment of a fatwa council. Supporters 
argued that the rule of centralizing authority in one most learned mujtahid was a modern 
invention and that it was virtually impossible to fulfill, as no single individual "could be 
'the most learned' in all aspects of religion."48 For some, such as Murtada Mutahhari 
(d.1979),49 this implied the need to reexamine the meaning and scope of ijtihad. Defining 
it as "the adaptation of general laws to new problems and changing circumstances," 
Mutahhari argued, presupposed that the mujtahid be "in touch with current affairs." He 
proposed, therefore, that every mujtahid specialize in a certain area and "be 'followed' 
only in that field in which he has specialized."50 
Mutahhari's proposal was closely tied to his dissatisfaction with the then political 
ineffectiveness of the clerical class. Specialization would free up the time of a few to 
concentrate on social and political issues.51 Contemporary jurists have continued to call 
for the establishment of a fatwa council (dar al-ifta') as the most practical way of 
deepening and broadening the knowledge base of the marji 'Tyah as a whole, thereby 
47
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maintaining and extending the scope of its relevance in the contemporary world. Grand 
Ayatollah Ali Taskhiri52 writes: 
In order for the marji' to serve as a general authority for all sectors of the 
community and in order for him to remain fully aware of all the community's 
juristic problems and everything required to distinguish the correct social, 
legal, and political position, he should seek the assistance of a committee of 
senior scholars capable of issuing legal opinions as well as leading specialists 
in the area for which an authentic Islamic position needs to be identified. It 
may no longer be possible for any individual, isolated ijtihad to address all 
the contemporary problems.53 
Taskhiri is careful to ground his call for specialized knowledge firmly within the 
raison d'etre of the marji lyah. "Above all," he writes, "it must be kept in mind that the 
marji'Tyah is only a marji'Jyah in so far as it issues fatwas."54 Further, in Taskhiri's view, 
the establishment of afatwa council would not eliminate the necessity of a supreme 
marji'; rather, the latter would call upon the specialized expertise of the former to express 
"the Islamic position (mawqif IslamT)" on any given issue in a united and comprehensive 
manner.55 In addition to contextual knowledge of society and politics, "new 
interpretations of'superiority in learnedness'" include "expertise in determining the 
welfare (maslahah) of the Islamic community" and inferring rulings in accord with 
"what is best for Islam."57 These proposals, if applied, would inevitably strengthen the 
institution by expanding its knowledge base and furthering its social relevance. 
52
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As will be shown in this study, this expanded definition of a 'larriiya (supreme 
knowledge) appears to be at work in the fatawa of some contemporary mujtahids who 
make at least cryptic allusions to socio-political factors influencing their legal reasoning. 
In addition, phrases such as "the Islamic position" and "for the sake of Islam" are typical, 
especially of Ayatollah Yadlallah's fatawa. It is conceivable that a mujtahid's use of such 
language is intended to demonstrate his expertise in the new methodology. Further, one 
could safely assume that the comprehensive approach detailed above would inevitably 
provide resources not only for treating new social issues, but also for dealing with 
common questions in fresh ways. Fadlallah is again a case in point. 
While the majority trend is to seek an expanded role for the clergy, as outlined 
above, dissenting voices within the clerical class argue for the opening up of the 
institution to lay participation. Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistari,58 for example, suggests 
that because fiqh is a human science, it necessarily must include knowledge from outside 
of religion proper, something that lay people have as much if not more access to; 
secondly, it means that jurisprudence is subject to elements of context and change, so that 
fatawa should not be merely theoretical or hypothetical, but specific to concrete reality in 
a given time and place.59 Finally, that fiqh is a human science means for Shabistari that a 
Shabistari is a contemporary Shi'ite cleric active in the religious-reform movement in Iran. He is known 
for his application of modern hermeneutical method to Islamic textual sources. According to Said Amir 
Arjomand, Shabistari's 1996 publication, Hermeneutics: the Book and Tradition, is "a rigorous critique of 
the foundations of theocratic government in legalistic Islam [...]." S. A. Arjomand, "The Reform 
Movement and the Debate on Modernity and Tradition in Contemporary Iran," International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 34 (2002), 719-31, 724. Accessed online at: http://www.drsoroush.com/PDF/E-CMO-
20020000-The_Reform Movement_in_Contemporarv_Iran.pdf (accessed January 27, 2009). 
59
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fatwa "is merely an expert view, not a divine imperative exempt from discussion and 
criticism."60 
Taking these points to their logical conclusion, Shabistari argues that 
jurisprudence should not be the prerogative solely of the clerical class, and the laity 
should not merely "confine themselves to 'emulating' (n. taqlid) the jurists."61 Rather, as 
human beings, the laity has been endowed by God with an intellectual capacity to 
understand the difference—"to some extent"—between good and evil. It would seem that 
in relying on the same principle (i.e., ijtihad) that in earlier centuries implied a clear 
division between expert and laity, Shabistari's reasoning around fiqh as a human science 
and ijtihad as a universal human capacity would tend to blur that boundary.62 One might 
even suggest that were his theory to be broadly accepted it could radically alter the 
centuries' long character of Shi'ite/r<j/i most clearly symbolized by the marji'vyah. 
THE MARJI'IYAH IN NORTH AMERICA: A PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP 
For some Shi'ite academics in the West, the major problem of the marji 'Tyah is its 
supposed looming irrelevance, said to be a result of an inadequately trained leadership. 
There are different reactions to this perceived problem, ranging from calls to modernize 
the structure of the marji 'Tyah while maintaining its essential function to 
institutionalizing mechanisms that would promote unity and centralization. A scholar 
such as Abdulaziz Sachedina has no problem, it seems, with the theoretical assumptions 
Ayatollah Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistari, "Religion, Reason, and the New Theology," in Shi'ite 
Heritage, 259. 
61
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of the institution. TaqlTd, Sachedina argues, is a fully reasonable approach to the religious 
life, a reasoned decision to trust the judgment of experts in "religious practice." It does 
not entail the necessity of accepting their opinions in other fields, even religious ones, 
"such as theology or mysticism, history or philosophy [...]." While recognizing an 
inadequate grasp of relevant knowledge among members of the institution, Sachedina 
argues not for a wider learning, but, rather, for alternative sources of guidance: "Modern 
life is complex. Most of the marja' [sic] live in a limited and narrow social-cultural 
environment to grasp [sic] the critical need to understand the problems of modernity, and 
provide an adequate guidance for maintaining faith." Along the lines of Shabistari's 
proposal, Sachedina's argument might suggest not a broadening, but a narrowing of the 
scope of juristic authority, and extension of responsibilities to an educated laity. 
On the other hand, Sachedina's proposals could suggest reform and change in the 
methodology of clerical training. In a 1994 article, he identifies an inadequately prepared 
leadership as the emigrant community's most pressing issue, even within the fields in 
which they traditionally function. He grieves the fact that leaders are commonly imported 
from the East whether for legal guidance or ritual worship at major festivals. He 
envisions a locally trained leadership conversant both in traditional religious sciences and 
Western culture as the best solution to the "practical irrelevance"66 of the institution and 
its "perceived disconnect with the concerns of the community, especially women and 
youth.67 Liyakatali Takim68 offers the same critique. In organization and training, he says, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w7index. php?title=Abdulaziz_Sachedina&o1did=260624073 (accessed February 1, 
2009). 
64
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the institution fails to provide adequate leadership for the emigrant community, 
particularly the youth, who are largely alienated from the legal perspectives of a foreign 
trained leadership.69 The problem of clerical cultural training will become readily 
apparent in our examination of fatawa for Muslims in the West. 
With these concerns in mind, a seminary was established in New York State in 
the early 1980s.70 The project was, however, short-lived. It was closed in 1996, according 
to the former president, Shaykh Mukhtar Fyzee, due to a lack of support and even 
opposition from centres in the Middle East and the Subcontinent.71 Further, according to 
Shaykh Fyzee, since it followed the curriculum of Qom and Najaf, it did not produce 
graduates equipped "to make a significant impact on the religious lives of Shi'is in 
America."72 Instead, the institution of the marji 'Tyah has, for its North American reach, 
relied solely on the production of a genre of juridical texts—mustahdathat (new events, 
issues)—produced in Qom, Beirut, and Najaf, and disseminated via the internet and print 
publications, including resalahs and popular media such as magazines. More recently, a 
hawzah (seminary) was established in Montreal for training religious scholars. Called 
Dar al-Hikmah, at the time of this writing it has four students in residence and several 
more via internet courses.73 
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the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. Dr. Takim is Associate Professor at the University of 
Denver, Colorado. University of Denver, "Portfolio Community: Liyakatali Takim," 
https://portfolio.du.edu/pc/port?portfolio=ltakim (accessed February 1, 2009). In addition to his academic 
activities, Professor Takim is a popular community speaker and active contributor to the NASIMCO (North 
American Shia Ithna 'Ashari Muslim Communities Organization), 
http://ww\v.nasimco.org/IEBPublications.asp (accessed February 1, 2009). 
69
 Takim, "Multiple Identities," 224. 
70
 The Hawzeh-ye 'llmi functioned from 1980 to 1996 in Medina, NY. 
71
 Telephone conversation, July 22, 2005. 
72
 Takim, "Multiple Identities," 223. 
73
 Personal conversation with Seyed Mahdi Shahrestani, a founding member of the institution, May 29, 
2008. 
94 
TRANSCENDING DISTANCE: DEPUTIES OF THE AYATOLLAHS IN NORTH AMERICA 
The little direct contact between the institution and the emigrant community 
necessitates the use of intermediaries. The most common way a marji' communicates 
with his followers is by appointing a resident representative (wakil).74 The qualifications 
of a wakil, though far less stringent than those of a mujtahid, particularly with regard to 
knowledge, nevertheless share the same principles. The wakil should have a background 
in hawzah (theological seminary) studies, particularly in Islamic law, and should be a 
righteous and trustworthy person. If the marji' is not well acquainted with a candidate, 
the latter may be appointed on the testimony of two righteous individuals. The wakiVs 
qualifications are commensurate with his responsibilities. As an intermediary between the 
people and the marji'ht represents, the wakil's primary responsibility is to transmit 
questions to the marji' and to receive and communicate the latter's responses. He may 
also have additional duties, as assigned and authorized in writing by the marji'. He could, 
for example, be assigned to collect finances on behalf of the marji' and make charitable 
disbursements. 
Sistani's official resident wakil in North America is a talented young man by the 
name of Seyed Mohammad Mahdi Shahrestani,75 who resides in Montreal and is a 
founding member of the Canadian Dar al-Hikmah.16 Though not a mujtahid himself, he 
functions much as a cultural informer would and in this way can have an indirect 
74
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According to Shahrestani, he holds the only official authorization from Sistani. Because of his youth, 
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influence on the marji "s ijtihad. In addition to his resident wakil, Sistani has also 
appointed his son-in-law, Sayyid al-Kashmiri, who resides in Qom, or sometimes Dubai 
or London, as wakil for North America. Kashmiri visits mosques throughout the 
77 
continent by invitation, but his connection to emigrants is limited by his itinerancy. 
It is not unheard of for a marji' to have more than one resident wakil and not 
having official authorization does not prevent others from communicating a marji "s 
fatawa. In Canada since the end of 1990, Seyed Nabil Abbas, imam of the Lebanese 
Islamic Center of Montreal and representative of the Islamic Chiite Supreme Council of 
North America, is but one of several scholars acting as wakil™ The Shia Scholars of 
North America website contains a link to a list of similarly positioned scholars in North 
America, along with their contact information. The highest concentrations are in the 
states of New York, Michigan, and California.79 While only some of the scholars listed 
here might have official wakil status, all perform the duties of a wakil, that is, 
transmitting and explaining messages between muqallids and mujtahids. For "regular" 
questions, the wakil need not consult the marji' directly, but may simply answer 
according to his knowledge of the latter's rulings; for more complicated questions, he 
will communicate with the marji' by email. 
As are other local leaders, Seyed Nabil Abbas is regularly called upon to help 
solve people's personal issues, by personal pastoral counseling as well as legal teaching. 
With regard to the latter, Seyed Abbas includes an explanation of Sistani's fatawa in his 
77
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Friday sermons and other teaching venues. He also answers people's questions on matters 
of law, according to the guidance of Ayatollahs Hakim and Sistani. 
While some mosques, as those studied by Linda Walbridge in Dearborn, 
Michigan, promote the teachings of one marji' over another, other mosques give their 
constituents freedom of choice. Most of Seyed Abbas' congregation (75%-80%) follows 
Sistani, but there is no obligation to do so and the mosque (Islamic center) that Seyed 
Abbas leads has no official link to Sistani.81 
THE SUCCESS OF THE MARJI'IYAH IN NORTH AMERICA: UNITY AND DIVIDED 
LOYALTIES 
In spite of what some scholars have seen as weaknesses in leadership formation, 
the marji 'Tyah still exercises substantial control over the emigrant community, 
particularly in larger Shi'ite population centres. Linda Walbridge observes the gradual 
reification of sharVah-minded Islam among Shi'ite immigrants to Dearborn, the largest 
Shi'ite population in North America.82 Her study compares the three Shi'ite mosques 
established there between 1963 and 1989, observing how each of the latter two further 
narrowed the field of acculturation.83 This was accomplished, at least in part, by mosque 
leaders actively promoting strict adherence to the marji' al-taqlia^4 without recognizing 
the need to accommodate Islam to its cultural context. It was, according to Walbridge, the 
conservative attitude of the leadership that set the standard for the community at large, 
especially in regard to female modesty, which appeared to function as the barometer of 
religiosity. Thus, a large percentage of the community saw its identity as linked to the 
81
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official centres of authority. Of the three, only the "Islamic Center of America" attempted 
to maintain institutional independence and to reflect the identity of its members as 
American Muslims. As reflected in Walbridge's account, this seems to have been due, at 
least in part, to the leadership of Sheikh Chirri who promoted American cultural 
understanding—understood by Chirri as Christian culture—among the members of his 
congregation. As Walbridge explains, Chirri's desire to maintain local jurisdiction over 
the affairs of the Center led him even to turn down a generous offer from Ayatollah al-
Khui to build a school.85 
In general, Walbridge observes a significant increase in the practice of following 
a marji', particularly among the Lebanese, many of whom had never heard of the 
institution until the 1980s. She attributes this to the 1979 revolution in Iran and to the 
growth of the Shi'ite community in Dearborn/Detroit. Not all members of the community 
follow the same marji'. The choice of marji', Walbridge suggests, has a considerable 
impact on the direction the communities in North America will take. It is a divisive issue. 
Lines are drawn both nationally (between Lebanese, Iraqis, and Iranians)86 and regionally 
(within a given national community).87 Walbridge's study highlights the ways in which 
regional differences might influence the relationship between the North American Shi'ite 
community and the marji 'Tyah. She suggests that Lebanese involvement in business could 
temper the strict adherence of Iraqi Shi'ites to the "official" Islam of the marji'Tyah, 
Linda Walbridge, Without Forgetting, 48-9; 63-4. Walbridge's plans to study the mutual influences of 
North American Shi'ites and the marji'Tyah was terminated by her untimely death in December, 2002. 
86
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contributing to a more adaptive and accommodating posture. Assuming that all three 
regional communities continue to be influenced by the marji 'Tyah, one could expect this 
to be reflected in the choice of marji'. 
Liyakat Takim sees the marji'iyah partially as a "focus of unity" in the West, as 
the community rallies around a given marji' more than ethnic, linguistic, cultural or 
OQ 
political bonds. But Takim also highlights several weaknesses of this arrangement. His 
analysis identifies reliance on and competition between different centres for external 
funding from khums as a major inhibitor of independent local initiatives. "In the 
American context," he writes, "the khums factor has enabled the religious leaders, 
although residing abroad, to direct the religious and socio-economic lives of the Shi'is in 
America."91 The splitting up of loyalties between different maraji' along political lines 
further divides the community, sometimes manifesting in differing ritual observances, as, 
for example, in determining the start of the 'Eid holiday at the end of Ramadan.92 
These problems have prompted responses from the Shi'ite community in North 
America. One such attempt is the Council of Shi'a Muslim Scholars, established in 1993 
in order to promote the development of local leadership and to unify the community. The 
Council's mandate is to "support the Shi'a communities in North America through 
unification and cooperation of scholars; to serve Islam and spread the religious awareness 
and in particular the way of Ahlul-Beit; to follow the line of Marja'eyyah [sic]," and to 
88
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ensure that the above goals are met. However, in Takim's assessment, the Council has 
been largely unsuccessful, effectively institutionalizing leadership problems that are felt 
on the ground and furthering apathy within the community. More importantly to the 
present discussion, according to Takim, it has not managed to unite the community or to 
provide a uniform method for treating questions of religious practice in the American 
context. Largely dissatisfied with these solutions, Takim says, many young Shi'ites are 
turning to Western trained academics such as Mahmoud Ayoub, Abdulaziz Sachedina, 
Sayyid Hossein Nasr, and Abdolkarim Soroush for guidance.94 
The sources examined here are in basic agreement that as the North American 
Shi'ite population has increased, so has connection to institutions in the Middle East, with 
law and ritual closely presided over respectively by 'ulama' (religious scholars; sing. 
'alirri) and preachers from abroad. In examining the political, religious, and cultural 
repercussions of this affiliation on the formation of Shi'ite identity in North America, the 
primary objective of the ulama', Takim suggests, appears to be to mark differentiation 
from the Sunni community. Staging performances of Shi'ite rituals as performed in 
Shi'ite majority locations and maintaining close links with legal authorities there is 
understood to strengthen this distinctive identity. 
However, judging by the fatwa literature, maintaining a distinctly Shi'ite as 
opposed to universal Muslim identity does not appear to be a major concern to the 
immigrant population. Questions from Shi'ites in the West are evidently geared more 
towards overcoming challenges to the fulfillment of personal life-goals in a Western 
environment without having to forfeit an Islamic identity derived from legal observance. 
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In sum, the analyses offered by scholars such as Sachedina and Takim draw attention to 
the complexity of the challenges facing the Shi'ite community in North America. Their 
discussions also clarify significant differences with the Sunni community, whose far less 
centralized leadership structure might offer greater possibilities for local initiatives. 
FLQH AL-AQALLIYAT (JURISPRUDENCE OF MINORITIES): BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND 
ACCOMMODATION 
Sunni scholars have been revisiting the well established discipline of fiqh al-
aqalliyat for at least two decades. Not a new discipline, minority fiqh has appeared 
scattered throughout Sunni and Shi'ite legal handbooks from classical times to the 
present.95 Contemporary Sunni fiqh approaches the issue on at least three different levels. 
After briefly introducing each level, I will discuss their standing in contemporary Shi'ite 
legal thought. 
At the first level, studies present the theoretical bases justifying a sub-discipline 
specializing in legal reasoning for Muslims in the West. The argument from history in 
support of Western-based fiqh is as follows: classical and medieval laws regarding the 
relationship of Muslims to a non-Muslim polity or social environment took place in 
historical conditions in which Muslims found themselves in lands previously governed by 
Islam but overtaken by others. In this context, to allow formal means of adaptation, or 
resemblance to non-Muslim social practices, as in food or dress, for example, would 
indicate acquiescence to foreign domination. In the contemporary context, residence in a 
non-Muslim environment is largely a result of migration which is both voluntary and in 
95
 Classical and medieval minority fiqh commonly addressed five inter-related questions: permissibility of 
residence, inviolability of the Muslim person and property, Islamic identity, extent of jurisdiction of Islamic 
law, and the relationship of minority Muslims to the non-Muslim state. See Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law 
and Muslim Minorities," 141-87. For a discussion of Shi'ite views on these questions see chapter three on 
hijrah (migration) to the West. 
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pursuit of the wellbeing of Muslims in education, employment, and asylum from political 
or religious oppression. These factors suggest the need for a different approach. 
At the second level, Sunni studies explore principles of contextual legal 
hermeneutics and their application to common ethical questions facing Muslims in the 
West.96 Three principles for generating legal change generally associated with reform 
movements may be noted: the principle of time and place (zaman wa-makan); the 
principle of harm and benefit (mafsada wa maslahah); and the principle of necessity 
(darurah). Tariq Ramadan97 argues that a systematic and strictly regulated application of 
these principles to contemporary issues facing Muslims in the West is needed to connect 
the stable "universal principles" of scriptural sources with shifting social realities of time 
and place.98 
It is perhaps the third level that is most innovative in Sunni fiqh al-aqalliyat. This 
is the establishment of local training institutions, such as seminaries, and a fiqh council 
for providing contextually relevant legal guidance in the West. A Sunni body called The 
Fiqh Council of North America, which grew out of earlier organizations, was established 
See, for example, Shaykh Taha Jabir al-Alwani, Towards a Fiqh for Minorities: Some Basic Reflections, 
Occasional Papers Series 10. London, Washington: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2003 
http://www.iiituk.com/docs/pdf/preamble-opl0-en-v3.pdf (accessed February 2, 2009). The author is 
president of the Fiqh Council of North America since 1988. Others are by lay people and are posted on the 
world-wide-web. See, for example, Nuh Ha Mim Keller, "Which of the four orthodox madhhabs has the 
most developed fiqh for Muslims living as minorities?" QNews, the Muslim Magazine, 
http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/nuh/fiqh.htm (accessed February 1, 2009); Ahmad Alkatib, "Sexual 
relationships for Muslims in the West: The problem and its different solutions," presented at the 5th annual 
AMSS (UK) Conference, February, 2004, organized by the Association of Social Scientists (UK) London. 
http://www.alkatib.co.uk/sexual%20problem.htm (accessed January 29, 2009); and numerous pertinent 
articles published by the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM). 
97
 Tariq Ramadan is a Swiss born Muslim academic who advocates strengthening local Muslim identities in 
the West, at least in part, by interpreting Islamic law in dialogue with the legislation active in a given 
nation. He suggests that adapting Islamic law to the West is far less difficult than appears at first glance. 
See his Western Muslims, cited in the Introduction. Nevertheless, much controversy has been raised around 
his persona, particularly by those on the political right in the United States. In 2006, American authorities 
revoked the visa that would have allowed him to take up a position at the University of Notre Dame in 
Indiana on alleged terrorist connections. 
98
 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims, 37, 43. In this book, Ramadan provides a useful overview of six major 
tendencies in the history of Sunni ijtihad. See 24-30. 
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in 1986. The Council sees its mandate as "advising and educating its members and 
officials on matters related to the application of Shari'ah in their individual and collective 
lives in the North American environment."100 This three-step process in Sunni fiqh al-
aqalliyat suggests that reaching this final level of establishing institutional support for 
locally and contextually trained legal scholars presupposes a recognition of the value of 
such a project (level one) and requires the application of a dynamic and enterprising 
interpretive methodology (level two). 
With regard to level one—justifying a sub-field of fiqh for the West 
theoretically—the Shi'ite legal establishment appears somewhat skeptical. Fadlallah, for 
example, treats fiqh al-aqalliyat from the perspective of universal Islamic citizenship and 
seems hesitant to recognize the validity of local expressions of Islamic identity. In giving 
ultimate priority to the universal applicability of Islamic law, Fadlallah's primary focus is 
on the Islamic legal position on immigration and citizenship and the emigrant's dual 
contractual responsibility to the non-Muslim state on the one hand and what he calls "the 
interests of Islam" on the other. The question of citizenship is fundamental to Fadlallah's 
thought on minority/zg/z. While Muslim citizenship in the West in and of itself is not 
advisable as it threatens the Islamic identity of future generations, he says, it is 
permissible on two conditions: the provision of safety-nets, or what his translators call 
"incubators" (muhassin)101 such as Islamic schools and social clubs, that would ensure 
that future generations learn who they are; and the utilitarian value citizenship offers in 
99
 Namely, the Religious Affairs Committee of the then Muslim Students Association of the United States 
and Canada and the Fiqh Committee of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). 
100
 The Fiqh Council of North America, http://www.fiqhcouncil.org/ (accessed February 1, 2009). 
101
 Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah's official website, Arabic pages, 
http://arabic.bavvnat.org.lb/marjaa/almahjar.htm (accessed February 1, 2009). A more literal translation of 
this term might be "fortress" or "protective shelter." 
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the propagation of Islam and in influencing the foreign policies of Western 
governments.102 Thus, for Fadlallah, the jurisprudence of minorities is subject to the 
supportive and strengthening potential it might offer to "the interests of Islam" in the 
West. 
With regard to methods of interpretation, some Shi'ite scholars argue that context 
has a legitimate, though strictly regulated place in ijtihad. The contemporary scholar, 
Muhaghegh Damad,1 for example, considers the idea that "the fiqh of the last 
millennium and a half has no meaning or relevance [today]" to be "entirely without 
substance and indefensible."104 That is, change for the sake of change is unnecessary and 
invalid. Nevertheless, Muhaghegh Damad agrees that change may be effected by certain 
conditions, notably, what he calls "changes in perception."105 His theory links the first 
two principles listed above: time and place; and harm and benefit. He explains that 
change in the former may precipitate—but not legitimate—change in the latter, and thus 
affect the law.1 This is because while changes in law are tied to an "evolution in the 
needs afld requirements of society," proof of harm or benefit in Shi'ite usul al-fiqh, unlike 
Sunni, must be textual. In other words, historical and social context may permit change in 
r 
102 Based on his articles, "The Jurisprudence of Minorities," Fadlallah's website, English pages, 
http://english.bayynat.org.lb/Jurisprudence/minorities.htm (accessed February 1, 2009); and "Role and 
problems of emigrants," http://english.bayynat.org.lb/Issues/letter.htm (accessed February 1, 2009). The 
latter is a letter from Fadlallah to the annual conference of the Jammaa Islamia in the U.S. and Canada 
(December 2003). 
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 Muhaghegh Damad is a legal scholar and Ayatollah associated with the University of Tehran. 
104
 Ayatollah Seyyed Mostafa Muhaghegh-Damad, "The Role of Time and Social Welfare in the 
Modification of Legal Rulings," in Shi'ite Heritage, 217. 
105
 Ibid., 218. 
106
 He gives the example of marital laws obliging men to live with their wives, in the words of the Qur'an, 
'"in accordance with that which is recognized as good (a/-/«a Vu/).' (4:19)" Whereas was what was 
perceived as "good" during the time of the prophet in the case of financial compensation for divorce, for 
example, would not suit today's economy. Therefore, while the duty of financial compensation is fixed in 
the text, the precise amount is not; the latter is conditioned by social and temporal context. Ibid., 218-19. 
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what is considered harmful or beneficial in a given situation, as long as the criteria for 
determining this remains stable, that is, textual. 
Some scholars see factors such as "time" as having more extensive application. 
Ayatollah Kashani, for example, suggests that even conflicting Imami hadiths may be 
reconciled on this principle. Whereas in the majority opinion, the esoteric unity of the 
Imams places them (and thus their statements) outside of time, Kashani allows the 
possibility that one Imam may have decided differently on an issue because his temporal 
social context differed from that of another. "This," Muhaghegh Damad says, "is an 
entirely different view from that of other jurists, and even though Kashani's discussion 
pertains to the problem of conflicting traditions it might well be taken as a guide for 
ijtihad based on the social needs of different times."107 That is, according to Muhaghegh 
Damad's understanding of Kashani, while social context may not abrogate earlier laws, it 
may provide grounds for a different interpretation of the law. 
Fadlallah's hermeneutic of change is similarly connected to the principle of 
competition or balance between benefits and harms (al-tazahum bayna al-masalih wa 7-
mafasid), zealously tempered by his concern that Muslims in the West maintain a delicate 
balance between adaptation to cultural and philosophical currents on the one hand, and an 
unambiguous Islamic identity on the other.108 The over-arching principle guiding his 
methodological theory is that of benefit to Islam and the contribution a ruling makes to 
the Muslim emigrant's primary responsibility "to gain the people to the cause of the 
Islamic call [.. . ] . " 1 0 9 An individual should refrain from doing anything that would reflect 
107
 Ibid, 218. 
108
 Fadlallah, "Role and problems of emigrants," Fadlallah's official website 
http://engIish.bayynat.org.lb/Issues/letter.htrn (accessed February 1, 2009). 
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negatively on the reputation of Islam and the community; for example, he cautions 
against the performance of non-essential Islamic practices, such as certain mourning 
rituals, that might be misunderstood in the Western context. Further, he argues, Islam 
must always be an agent of change in its environment, rather than the object of influence. 
It is overarching principles such as these that inform Fadlallah's hermeneutic. In 
negotiating costs and benefits associated with obligations and permissions, his theory 
allows that in cases where implementing a hukm would result in mafsadah, a ruling may 
be suspended; but this is not permissible if done merely to gain some temporary personal 
advantage in Western society. According to Qur'an 2:173, he argues, the only other 
condition that would allow the suspension of a ruling is dire necessity (darurah), defined 
as imminent risk to one 'slifeorwellbeing.110We may conclude that in admitting the 
principle of al-tazahum, Fadlallah cautiously anticipates the possibility of a more 
progressive reasoning. However, his dedication to a tightly controlled and goal-driven 
application of contextual interpretation suggests a less confident optimism in this regard. 
As to the third level of Sunni fiqh al-aqalliyat, the Shi'ite institution is hindered 
on two main fronts. In the first place, the institutional structure of marji' al-taqlid 
suggests an incongruity between a highly centralized leadership and local training 
initiatives, as proposed by Takim and others. This was evidently the case in the first 
failed attempt discussed above. Secondly, without a vigorous application of interpretive 
principles geared towards context and change, the usefulness of such a project seems 
restricted largely to relocating the organs of authority, rather than to developing 
something similar but different—similar in form and structure, but different in 
110
 Fadlallah, "The Jurisprudence of Minorities," http://english.bayynat.org.lb/Jurisprudence/minorities.htm 
(accessed February 1, 2009). 
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methodology and content. Shi'ite minority fiqh seems limited at the present time to the 
collection of fatawa produced in the major centres of Shi'ism by a class of scholars 
reticent to apply their interpretive skills to the development of something like Ramadan's 
hyphenated Muslim.111 
CONCLUSION: A FRAGILE STABILITY 
Critiques of the marji'iyah's function in the West indicate that while the 
institution seems relatively stable, significant problems of connection, ideologically and 
practically, are pressing for change. While the wakil system may be helpful in bridging 
the gap between the marji' and his followers in the West, secular trained Shi'ite scholars 
such as Sachedina and Takim point to more fundamental weaknesses. Unless these are 
addressed adequately, the skepticism with which some view the institution may become 
the primary vantage point of the younger generation, especially those born in the West. 
111
 That is, the Canadian-Muslim, or French-Muslim, etc. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SHI'ITE LAW OF MIGRATION (HURAH): 
FROM MEDINA TO MISSISSAUGA 
Muslim thinking on the question of migration to dar al-islam begins in the period 
of the Qur'an's emergence. Legal reasoning on the subject developed in the following 
centuries, but derives the core of its theoretical principles from the framework given in 
the Qur'an. Though all five of the major Islamic legal schools1 share the main outlines of 
this framework, minor differences exist between schools, and not infrequently between 
different jurists and eras within each school.2 
In Imam! fiqh the rules of migration tend to revolve around the central concept of 
freedom to manifest one's identity as a Muslim.3 In general, the central feature of Shi'ite 
Muslim identity is the unhindered practice of religious rituals, whether in their common 
Muslim or specifically Shi'ite form. Sometimes, however, rules also address freedom to 
manifest a specifically Shi'ite identity, in which case Shi'ite law distinguishes between 
dar al-islam and dar al-iman (the land of true faith).4 In most cases, however, Shi'ite law 
does not stipulate a sharp intra-Muslim social divide, which is of practical relevance only 
11 refer here to the four extant Sunni schools: MalikT, HanafT, Shafi'Tand HanbalT; and the Twelver Shi'ite 
Ja'faff school, often identified as Imaml. I make no reference to the Isma'HT Shi'ite school of law, nor to the 
ZaydT. The former has, in general terms, its own distinctive approach and the latter does not differ 
significantly from Twelver Shi'ite law. 
The most comprehensive treatment of the issue of Muslim minorities in pre-modern legal discourse is 
Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities," cited in chapter one, note 5. The author discusses 
rulings of jurists from the four Sunni schools and the Ja'fari and Zaydi schools of law. See also, by the 
same author, "Striking a Balance," in Muslims on the Americanization Path?, 47-63; and "Legal Debates 
on Muslim Minorities: Between Rejection and Accommodation," Journal of Religious Ethics (2001), 127-
162; See also, Bernard Lewis, "Legal and Historical Reflections," cited in chapter one, note 6; and 
Muhammad Khalid Masud, "The obligation to migrate: the doctrine ofhijra in Islamic law," in Muslim 
Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination, ed. Dale F. Eickelman and James 
Piscatori (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 29-42. 
3
 While this condition is characteristic of Sunni schools to some degree, it is more pronounced in Shi'ite 
law. See Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities, 152. 
4
 Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities," 152. 
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when Shi'ite identity becomes a self-consciously held criterion for migration from Sunni 
dominated lands. 
Bernard Lewis suggests that the position of Muslims residing under a non-Muslim 
polity was of little concern to jurists after the first three centuries of Islam. Lewis argues 
that the earliest jurists were occupied with the question of non-Muslims living in Muslim 
territory, but that the "corresponding problem of the Muslim under non-Muslim rule 
hardly arose and, where it did, received only minor and fleeting attention." It was, he 
says, "largely a hypothetical question."5 In contrast, Khaled Abou El Fadl observes that 
while not constituting an area of law in itself, rules around hijrah represent a sufficiently 
important topic to have been dealt with in substantial detail by successjve jurists in all the 
major schools of Islamic law.6 
Nevertheless, deliberate and permanent migration from dar al-islam to non-
Muslim territory emerged as a serious legal question in the nineteenth century under 
conditions quite different from the Qur'anic and classical periods.7 Migration in the 
modern world has more often been motivated by the possibility of social and economic 
advancement rather than for religious reasons.8 Importantly, however, classical and pre-
5
 Lewis also claims that the question arose only in the context of conversion of a non-Muslim and "whether 
he may remain where he is or must leave his home and migrate to a Muslim country." He further reduces 
all Sunni jurists into one stream of thought, with only minor and insignificant differences in points of detail, 
and Shi'ites into another. The former, he says, required hijrah to a Muslim polity, even as the prophet 
commanded all Muslims to emigrate to Medina as long as Mecca was still pagan. The latter, he observes, 
were more accustomed and sensitized to living in hostile environments, and so regarded residence in a non-
Muslim territory a means of Islamic witness. While there is some truth to this, it seems to be an 
overgeneralization, as will be demonstrated in this chapter. See Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 48. 
6
 Further, according to El Fadl, the debate was considered under several categories of thought and 
definitions of terms and was not restricted, as Lewis claims, to discussions of jihad. Abou El Fadl, "Islamic 
Law and Muslim Minorities," 148-49. 
7
 See Masud, "The obligation to migrate," 42ff. 
8
 Emblematic of this development is afatwd on the issue of studying in the West requested by Algerian 
students in 1985, discussed by Muhammad Khalid Masud. The fatwa brings together post-colonial theory 
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modern discourses on migration provide the foundation for contemporary interpretations. 
Modern jurists have allowed themselves varying amounts of flexibility in interpreting the 
primary textual sources of Qur'an and Hadith and the classical and medieval law for the 
contemporary challenge of defining a host of legal issues surrounding migration to the 
West. I look at the views of modern and contemporary jurists, including Muhammad Ali 
al-Ansari, and Ayatollahs Khameini, Golpayegani, Ali al-Sistani, and Muhammad 
Husayn Fadlallah within this broader context. 
Following this introduction I discuss the framework given in the Qur'an and 
Imami traditions, which looks at migration in terms of departure from dar al-shirk (the 
Abode Polytheism), or dar al-kufr (the Abode of Unbelief)—often in the reduced form of 
dar al-harb to dar al-islam, concentrated at the time in Medina (i.e., dar al-hijrah, the 
Abode of Migration).9 The Qur'an commonly links hijrah to jihad (struggle in the way of 
God), indicating that migration had a dual purpose of consolidating the Muslim 
community and strengthening the Islamic movement beyond its territorial borders. 
Definitions are, of course, relevant to interpretation and I discuss the hermeneutical 
implications of some of these terms below. I next survey the main trends of classical and 
and classical Islamic legal approbation of the pursuit of knowledge to come to a favourable response. 
Masud, "The obligation to migrate," 42-43. 
These are the most common translations of these terms. Literally, shirk signifies associating others with 
God and in this sense suggests the notion of polytheism. Toshihiko Izutsu identifies it as a subcategory and 
"the most typical manifestation ofkufr" (136). Kufr itself is a multi-layered term signifying thanklessness 
as well as the unbelief that underlies it. While both deny the absolute Oneness of God, the more 
comprehensive term, kufr, in Qur'anic usage, "functions as the center of the whole system of 'negative' 
properties" (156). Izutsu's detailed study of these terms is illuminating. His analysis ofkufr suggests that 
the term functions as a system involving five essential elements: fisq, fajr, zulm, i'tida', and israf, translated 
as 'sin' or 'disobedience', 'bad conduct', wrong/injustice/evil/tyranny, 'to pass beyond one's proper limits,' 
or 'to transgress (the bounds of God)', and 'to be immoderate', or 'to commit excesses' respectively. 
Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'an (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2002), 156-177. Dar al-harb refers to territory not only not under Islamic control, but also to be won over 
for Islam. 
110 
medieval Shi'ite juristic texts; finally, I look more closely at modern and contemporary 
issues. 
If, as Abou El Fadl observes, the classical discourse represents a fluid process of 
legal discussion, not hardened in dogmatic positions,10 the contemporary discourse 
continues this trend, constrained, nonetheless, by the classical and pre-modern frame of 
reference. The present study of Shi'ite legal discourse on migration shows a picture of 
continuous revisiting of the same questions and re-articulating and rationalizing of legal 
opinions anew with each generation. Though the content of these opinions changes little 
until the modern period, it is not unreasonable to suggest that it is precisely because of 
having occupied space in juristic discourse throughout the centuries, however 
monotonously, that jurists of the modern period are able to rework and update the legal 
tradition with relative ease. 
THE VALUE OF HURAH: BELIEVERS OF A HIGHER RANK 
The high estimation early jurists have of hijrah and muhajiriin (migrants) to dar 
al-islam can be seen in the earliest Shi'ite traditions and Qur'anic legal exegesis. Surah 
4:97-101 stipulates migration from lands of oppression - Mecca and the land of the 
Bedouins in the immediate context - for all except "the feeble among men, women, and 
children who are unable to devise a plan and are not shown a way" (4:98). It is said that 
God will, or rather, may, forgive these for remaining separated from the Muslim 
community and exposed to the influence of and possible harm from non-Muslims. 
Similarly, El Fadl notes that "early Shi'ite jurists reportedly disapproved of Muslims 
residing among nomads because this was bound to lead to ignorance."11 The hardship and 
10
 Abou El Fadl, "Striking a Balance," 47-63. 
11
 Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities," 148. 
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sacrifice involved in hijrah is acknowledged in the Qur'anic text and the migrant is 
promised an appropriate recompense and provision in this life, in material and status 
wealth. "Those who spent and fought before the conquest are not on the same level as the 
rest of you"12 underscores the hierarchical distribution of honour within the early Muslim 
community, as determined by a person's relationship to the hijrah. Should the journey 
prove to be too arduous and the migrant perish in the process, he or she is promised a 
special reward from God.13 
If the Qur'an speaks to the honour accorded to the muhajirun, two frequently 
quoted Traditions express the importance of hijrah as the obligatory duty and enduring 
symbol of Muslim identity. "Hijrah will not end until repentance ends, and repentance 
will not end until the sun rises from the west,"14 expresses its endurance. "Hijrah will 
remain as long as kufr (unbelief) remains,"15 is indicative of its central and lasting role of 
boundary-marker between believers and unbelievers. On the other hand, jurists have 
consistently interpreted these Traditions in the light of a third that limits hijrah to the 
time of Mecca'sjahiliyah: "There is no hijrah after the conquest [of Mecca]"16 suggests 
that the intent of hijrah is to create a space for the flourishing of a social order governed 
12
 Surah 57:10 (al-Hadid). 
13
 Surah 4:100 {al-Nisa'). 
14
 Al-Shaykh al-Tusi, al-Mabsut ftfiqh al-imamiyah (Tehran: al-Maktabah al-MurtadawTyah li-ihya' al-
Athar al-Ja'farlyah, 1967/8), 3:4; 'Allamah al-Hilli, Tadhkirat al-fuqaha'(Qom: Mu'assasat Al al-Bayt li-
Ihya' al-Turath, 1993), 9:10; Mirza al-Qummi, Jami' al-shatat [CD-ROM, ALAHKAM, version 2.0] 
(Tehran: Mu'asssasat Kayhan, 1413), 1:371; al-Shahid al-Thani, Masalik al-afham, (n.p., d.n.), 3:16. 
15
 Al-Tusi, al-Mabsut, 3:4; 'Allamah al-Hilli, Tahrir al-ahkam (n.p, n.d.), 2:130; 'Allamah al-Hilli, 
Tadhkirat al-fuqaha', 9:10. 
16
 Al-Kulayni, Usui al-Kafi, [CD-ROM, ALAQAED, version 1.0] (Tehran: Dar al-Kitab al-Islamlyah, 1388 
q.), 5:433; al-Tusi, al-Mabsut, 3:4; 'Allamah al-Hilli, Tadhkirat al-fuqaha", 9:10, 1:405; al-Muhaqqiq al-
Thani, Jami' al-maqasid fishark al-qawa'id (Qom: Mu'assasat Al al-Bayt 11-Ihya' al-Turath, 1408/1987), 
3:373; Mirza al-Qummi, Jami'a al-Shatat, 1:371; al-Shahid al-Thani, Masalik al-afham, 3:16. 
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by Islam, and to provide an environment in which Muslims will be safe from the 
17 
temptation to revert to their former religions and ways of life. 
Classical and medieval law continues and develops this Qur'anic and Traditional 
evaluation of the muhajir to the lands of Islam as a highly honourable position and an 
expedient path to the growth and success of the community. Early converts are praised, 
for example, when they can add to their early conversion the fact that they also migrated 
to Medina with the Prophet. Ali, for example, is favourably compared to Abbas, the 
prophet's uncle, who elected to remain in Mecca at the time of the hijrah in 622 CE.18 
Similarly, a person who converted earlier than someone else but did not migrate is less 
honoured than one who converted later but migrated.19 Finally, all other things being 
equal - early conversion, knowledge of Qur'an, pleasantness of voice - the muhajir is 
chosen over the non-muhajir to lead prayers.20 
Migration is understood as a decisive and costly moral act, demonstrating one's 
commitment to Islam. Those who forsake their means of livelihood to migrate "to God 
and to the Prophet" are promised ample provision and protection.21 A portion of this 
economic support is derived from the ahl al-kitab (People of the Book) in the form of the 
jizyah. Some jurists argue that a convert from ahl al-kitab should not be exempted from 
Sufis interpret these ideas spiritually, emphasizing "the spirit of the dweller" rather than the geographic 
location of their dwelling.17 In Rumi's (d. 1273) verse, "the home of the Beloved" is the believer's heart, a 
place of "no borders or boundaries, no prohibitions or restrictions"—the "Land of Love." This presents a 
challenge to the legal discourse. See Haideh Ghomi, "The Land of Love: Rumi's Concept of'Territory' in 
Islam," in The Concept of Territory in Islamic Law and Thought: A Comparative Study,'" ed. Yanagihashi 
Hiroyuki (New York: Kegan Paul International, 2000), 74. 
18
 Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi, Bihar al-anwar [CD-ROM, ALAQAED, version 1.0] (Beirut: Mu'assasat 
al-Wafa', 1983), 10:241. Others acknowledge the different choices made without attaching any particular 
value judgment to them. See, for example, al-Shaykh al-Tusi, al-Mabsiit, 3-4; al-'Allamah al-Hilli, TahrTr 
al-ahkam, 2:130; Mirza al-Qummi, Jami'a al-shatat, 1:371. 
19
 Sharif al-Murtada, al-Nasiriyat (n.p., n.d.), 368. 
20
 al-'Allamah al-Hilli,Mukhtalaf al-Shi'ahfiahkam al-shari'ah (Qom: Markaz al-Abhath wa-al-Dirasat al-
IslamTyah, 1412/1991 or 1992), 67,55-56; al-Shahid al-Thani, Masalik al-ajham, 1:318 
21
 Surah 4:100. 
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paying the jizyah (tribute) because it is for the support of the muhajirun. While 
demonstrating a practical economic decision, this also indicates the priority, even over 
conversion, of caring for the needs of "the first to lead the way"23 who serve as models of 
correct Islamic practice.24 
Rules of migration also impact marital issues and female conversion within 
marriage, indicating an ambivalence in Islamic attitudes towards women. For example, a 
Bedouin man who marries a muhajirah, is not permitted to take her out of dar al-hijrah 
unless he is knowledgeable of the prophetic Sunna.25 Rules regarding female conversion 
to Islam and migration are far more restrictive. If the wife of a kitabi (scriptuary) converts 
to Islam in dar al-hijrah, the husband is not permitted, according to classical 'ulama', to 
remove her from there and take her to dar al-harb.26 One gathers from what is stated 
elsewhere that the primary intention here is to protect the female convert from 
persecution and/or the threat of apostasy. Moreover, in the event of a war, her presence in 
dar al-shirk would clearly put her at risk. However, the sexual politics of migration 
reveal that although her Islam does not officially void their marriage contract, her non-
Muslim husband is not permitted to live with her in dar al-hijrah and has only severely 
11
 Al-Shaykh al-Mufid, al-Muqni'a (Qom: Mu'assasat al-Nashr al-Islaml, 1410/1989 or 1990), 279; Shaykh 
al-Tusi, al-Nihayah fi mujarrad al-fiqh wa-al-fatdwa (Tehran: Chapkhanah'i Danishgah, 1342/1963), 193. 
23
 That is, "of the Muhajirin and the Ansar, and those who followed them in goodness—Allah is well 
pleased with them and they are well please with Him, and He hath made ready for them Gardens 
underneath which rivers flow, wherein they will abide for ever. That is the supreme triumph" (Surah 
9:100). 
24
 al-'Allamah al-Hilli, Muntaha al-matlab fi tahqiq al-madhhab (Mashhad: Qism al-Fiqh fi Majma' al-
Buhuth al-Islamlyah, 1412/1992), 1:297. 
25
 Ibn Babawayh, al-Muqna' wa-al-hidayah lial-Shaykh al-Saduq (Mashhad: Majma' al-Buhuth al-
Islamlyah, 1409/1989), 318. 
26
 Ibid.; Shaykh al-Mufid, al-Masa'il al-saghaniyah (n.p, n.d.), 70; Shaykh al-Tusi, al-Nihayah, 457; Ibn 
Babawayh mentions only a Christian husband, al-Mufid Christians and Jews, and al-Tusi, Jewish, 
Christian, and Zoroastrian husbands. Rather than see this as a progression in the law, it is more likely 
simply progressively precise specification of the same range of legal applicability as those possibilities 
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limited sexual access to her, if any.27 Full terms of the marriage contract are 
automatically re-activated if he converts to Islam. Likewise, sexual access is unhindered 
if only the husband converts to Islam.28 
Inheritance laws also demonstrate the favoured position of migrants that must 
have been a significant financial incentive for migration as more and more Meccans 
converted to Islam. The law stipulated that unbelievers would not inherit from believers, 
but believers would inherit from non-believers. Likewise, even though a Muslim, and 
therefore entitled to inheritance, a non-migrant was disinherited from his or her Muslim 
kin in Medina, so long as Mecca remained dar al-shirk.29 Intended to prevent 
contributing to the general economic strength of dar al-harb,3 this provision might have 
also worked unintentionally against migration. The fourteenth century scholar, al-Shahid 
al-Awwal, advises that those in financial straits should work towards the capacity to 
migrate. Being divested of a potential inheritance would do little to advance a person's 
financial capacity. 
The pietistic value of migration is evident also in that those who travelled to the 
Christian kingdom of Abyssinia starting in about 615, in addition to Medina in 622, are 
spoken of as having participated in two migrations, for which they are doubly praised.32 
Migration to Abyssinia, as to Medina, was motivated by the intention of finding safe 
27
 Ibid. Ibn Babawayh says he can visit her during the day and implies that children may be born of these 
visits. Al-Mufid says that he is not permitted to visit during the day and that no sexual intercourse is 
permitted so long as he does not convert to Islam, while al-Tusi says that he cannot sleep with her at night, 
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haven. Unlike the hijrah to Medina, however, it was completely voluntary. Moreover, it 
did not lead to the establishment of an Islamic social order. 
DEFINING MIGRATION: SEPARATION AND COMMITMENT 
But what, linguistically and theologically, is migration? How is it understood, and 
defined? Modern scholars such as W. M. Watt observe that the stem of the first form of 
the verb, "hadjara, means 'to cut someone off from friendly association with'" and this is 
the sense intended in Qur'an 4:34, 38 and 73:10, also noted by Watt.34 This gives hijrah a 
rather different meaning, as Watt notes, than the popular understanding of "flight." It 
includes, from this standpoint, a deliberately positive function of community building 
with a specific group of people, in this case "believers," and a parallel rejection of one's 
former community as a necessary means to those ends. 
Watt's interpretation is reflected in M. K. Masud's analysis. Masud likewise 
suggests that the Qur'an's use of various forms of h.j.r. to convey ideas such as "to 
reject," "to shun," and "to depart," in Qur'an 23:67 and 69, 74:5, and 19:46 respectively, 
connects the idea of migration—understood from Surahs 59:9; 2:218; and 3:195—with 
that of "a distancing - physical or otherwise - usually from evil and disbelief." Hijrah 
thus suggests a dichotomous action of rupture and commitment; as Masud nicely puts it, 
of abandoning "one's property and relations in order to support the nascent community of 
Muslims in Medina." However, while non-migrants were disinherited from the 
muhajirun and given a lower status in the community, it would seem something of an 
See also, Masud, "The obligation to migrate," 30. 
34
 Encyclopedia of Islam 2nd ed., s.v. "Hijrah," 366. 
35
 Masud, "The obligation to migrate," 32. 
36
 hajara: 59:9; 2:218; 3:195 and muhajir. 9:100, 117; 33:6; 59:8; 60:10; 8:72. See M. K. Masud, "The 
obligation to migrate," 31. 
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overstatement to suggest, as Masud does, that "refusal to migrate signalled exclusion 
from the society."37 
In summary, when we consider the prevailing culture of Mecca from which the 
early Muslims were commanded to dissociate themselves, a case can be made that the 
internal constitution of hijrah signifies the breaking of relations with the spirit and mental 
attitude of jahiliyah, from—as Toshihiko Izutsu puts it—the sense of "tribal honour, the 
unyielding spirit of rivalry and arrogance,"38 in order to form a new society based on 
Islamic principles where honour belongs to those whose migration demonstrates their 
strong commitment to the new community. Hijrah thus represents a new beginning, the 
birth of a new society in embryonic form, as the marking of the Islamic hijri calendar 
further indicates. It is similar, in this sense, to Christian baptism which signifies the 
spiritual birth of a new creation within the consciousness of the individual believer even 
as the believer leaves behind the ways and life-foundations of the past, patterned on the 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.39 
Turning to classical Shi'ite scholars, we note that Sharif al-Murtada (d. 1044) 
offers a territorial meaning of hijrah rooted in prophetic history that emerges out of his 
ta'wll (esoteric exegesis) of Surah 4:100: "and whoso forsakes his home, a fugitive unto 
Allah and His messenger." He argues that when the Qur'an says "And Lot believed him 
[Ibrahim], and said: Lo! I am a fugitive unto my Lord {inrii muhajir ila rabbi)"40 it does 
not mean that he is literally ascending to heaven, but that he is going to the very place 
Masud, "The obligation to migrate," 32. 
Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts, 29. 
39
 This idea is conveyed in several places in the Christian New Testament. See, for example, Romans 6:3-4; 
Colossians 2:11-15; 3:1-11; 1 Peter 2:21-22. 
40
 Surah 29:26. 
117 
that God commanded him to go. It is metaphorical language, he says, in the same way 
that anthropomorphisms used of God need not and should not be understood literally. 
Similarly, he argues, Surah 4:100 means, "He made his hijrah to the place which he 
commanded him to migrate, which is to the place of the hijrah of the prophet."42 
Consequently, according to al-Murtada, the idea of leaving one's home and 
family "as a fugitive to God" has pre-Muhammadan prophetic precedence, and the 
departure of the muhajiriin from the idolatry of Mecca is, in essence and in obligation, 
imitative of that of Abraham and Lot from Harran. Al-Murtada specifies the destination 
as the place to which the Prophet was commanded to go, a point that reoccurs in the 
prophetic hadlth urging Muslims to visit the Prophet's tomb in Medina, also associated 
with the concept of hijrah. "Whoever visits me after my death," the Prophet is believed to 
have said, "is like the person who migrated to me during my lifetime, and if they cannot, 
then let them send me greetings and it will reach me."43 The blessings promised in Surah 
4:100 are, according to this tradition, not restricted to pre-conquest Muslims, but are 
extended, through ritual, to future generations. The ritual of prophetic visitation or 
greetings thus universalizes hijrah esoterically and attributes its merits to any believer 
within the entire Islamic era. 
Al-Majlisi's (d. 1698) interpretation of Surah 26:29, on the other hand, 
emphasizes the faith aspect of Lot's journey in that by it, much like Ali to Muhammad, 
Lot demonstrated his early belief in the prophethood of Abraham.44 Moreover, he ties 
sincerity of belief to separation from evil, as indicated in the meaning offered above by 
41




 al-Shaykh al-Mufid, al-Muqni'a, 457. 
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Watt. In migrating to his Lord, Majlisi argues, Lot "departed from amongst the wrong-
doers in the way of migration, while they remained in the disgrace of their deeds." 
Thus, Majlisi's emphasis reminds Muslims that migration is not only to somewhere but 
also from something, that is, oppression and shirk (associating another with God). His is a 
deliberate and condemnatory stance towards those who are, rightly or wrongly, deemed 
to be in error and sin. 
We can conclude from the above that while the term hajara is employed in the 
sense of geographic migration, its predominant sense is ideological. That is, in Qur'anic 
usage and classical commentary, hijrah has a consistently marked association with the 
construction, confirmation and consolidation of identity for which separation from non-
Islam—often territorial but always ideological—is required. While exceptions are 
admissible under certain conditions, migration in this sense is the divinely mandated 
normative practice and honoured preference, especially, Masud argues, if accompanied 
by jihad.46 It is encouraged by the bestowal of status and privilege on the muhajir and 
removal of the same from those who subject their faith to the threat of loss by remaining 
among the unbelievers. 
With the development of Islamic societies, and their encounter with non-Islamic 
civilizations, one might expect this ideological meaning of hijrah to come to the fore as 
an important criterion in the juristic discourse on hijrah. What we find is that the terms of 
reference used in this discourse tend to include both the language of territorial migration 
and the concern for socio-religious identity, which is its internal constitution. 
Masud argues that according to the majority of Sunni and Shi'i jurists the highest level of faith that of the 
believer who migrates and performs jihad against the unbelievers. See Masud, "The Obligation to 
Migrate," 34. 
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FROM AL-TUSI (D. 1067) TO AL-QUMMI (D. 1816): AN ENDURING THEME 
Shaykh al-Tusi provides a legal systematization of the norms set forth in Surah 
4:97-101. As he explains, the verse delineates three legal categories regarding the law of 
hijrah and every Muslim fits into one or another of these three: there are, he says, those 
for whom hijrah is obligatory; those for whom it is recommended; and those for whom it 
is neither obligatory nor recommended.47 Several later jurists re-iterate this schema 
almost verbatim.48 For al-Tusi and succeeding jurists, the main elements used to 
determine the category to which a person belongs are security from religious oppression; 
freedom to manifest the signs of Islam; and possession of the means, financial and 
otherwise, to undertake migration. 
In al-Tusi's first category are those who are oppressed, do not have freedom to 
practice Islam nor the protection of family, and who have the necessary means of 
migration. These are obliged to migrate. According to 'Allamah al-Hilli (d. 1325), 
because women and boys are exempt from the obligation of jihad, they are also exempted 
from the obligation of hijrah, again stressing the connection between hijrah and jihad.4 
In the second category are those who are free to "manifest [their] religion"50 or have 
strong family or tribal protection.51 These are recommended nevertheless to migrate "so 
as not to increase the number of the mushrifdn."52 Implied is the notion that "to stay in 
47
 al-Shaykh al-Tusi, al-Mabsiit, 3-4. 
48
 See, for example, 'Allamah al-Hilli, Tdhrir al-ahkam 1:132-33; 'Allamah al-Hilli, Tadhkirat al-fuqaha' 
1:405; and in the modern period, Mirza al-Qummi, Jami'a al-shatat 1:352, 371-373/4, 399. 
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 'Allamah al-Hilli, Tahrir al-ahkam, 2:13. 
50
 'Allamah al-Hilli adds, "to practice the duties of Islam" which may be suggestive of a wider scope of 
freedom beyond ritual duties. Tadhkirat al-fuqaha', 9:10. 
51
 al-Tusi, 3-4. 'Allamah al-Hilli adds, "against the mushrikin." Ibid. 
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 al-Tusi, 3-4. That is, the general population of the lands of mushrikin, thereby contributing to their 
strength economically and otherwise. Cf. al-Shahid al-Thani, Masalik al-afham, 3:16. 
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dar al-harb [sic] meant to strengthen the enemies of Islam."53 Al-Tusi cites Abbas Ibn 
Abd al-Muttalib and Uthman ibn ' Affan as examples of those who could have but did not 
migrate. In what may be understood as a polemical point, the later scholar, Muhammad 
Baqir al-Majlisi suggests that, along with the prohibition of inheritance imposed on the 
non-migrant, remaining in dar al-harb gives a Muslim a status inferior to someone such 
as Ali, who did migrate.54 
According to al-Tusi, the third category consists of those who are neither obliged 
nor recommended to migrate because they are enfeebled by illness or lack of financial 
means, as indicated in the Qur'anic text. It is possible, the text goes on to say, that God 
may forgive them. Even so, these are also recommended, on the basis of the Tradition 
"hijrah remains as long as shirk remains," to migrate if and when their situation 
improves. In contrast to the early notion that performing hijrah deserves reward as an 
obligatory act, 'Allamah al-Hilli insists that hijrah is in the first instance an 
"uncompensated duty"5 that may be relaxed only under certain specified conditions. 
Apart from these conditions, not fulfilling this obligation is haram.56 
'Allamah al-Hilli stipulates that a man57 who asks his relatives to bring him back 
to dar al-shirk may be given permission to return with them, as long as he is confident 
that he has the internal moral fortitude to resist the temptation to apostatize, even though 
5 8 • » • - • * • : • - • • • • " •
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he is not obliged to leave dar al-hijrah. However, if he lacks strength of will and 
character he must not leave dar al-hijrah, a view that the author says is shared by al-
53
 Masud, "Being Muslim in a Non-Muslim Polity," 120. See also Masud, "The obligation to migrate," 31. 
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Shafi'i. Interestingly, al-Hilli adds that the Imam advises that such a person try to escape 
from his relatives (presumably they are putting pressure on him to return, which is clearly 
at odds with the above—asking them to come and get him) and join the Muslims in 
fighting against them. In any case, he concludes, those of the Imam! school oblige only 
the religiously oppressed to migrate.59 
Migration is thus never seen in completely neutral terms; it is always the ideal, or 
at the very least, the preferred opinion of the jurists wherever possible. In principle, 
hijrah is determined by the oppressive presence of shirk or kufr, as noted above. 
Although the Tradition, "There is no hijrah after the conquest [of Mecca]," might seem to 
terminate this principle, some jurists argue that its interpretation is subject to certain 
hermeneutical nuances.60 It is restricted, for example to place, since after the conquest the 
duty of hijrah was lifted from Mecca, but not necessarily from other places dominated by 
kufr or shirk. Conversely, once Mecca became permanently part of dar al-islam, the merit 
hijrah from dar al-harb was reversed such that the obligation—along with its requisite 
rewards—became not to migrate from dar al-islam. In other words, although the duty of 
migration from Mecca ended, the symbolic significance of hijrah as a community 
boundary marker over against kufr and the spirit of jahiliyah remained a key element in 
the construction and affirmation of Muslim identity.61 
Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities," 152, 157. Maliki, Hanafi and Shafi'i law are not 
altogether dissimilar though the range of opinion within each school makes it difficult to generalize. 
According to the eponymous founders of the Sunni madhahib, hijrah is required, recommended, or 
required only if there is fear of apostasy according to b. Malik, Abu Hanifa, and al-Shafi'i respectively. See 
Abou El Fadl, 153ff. Ja 'fari law is evidently closest to Shafi'i in this respect. 
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The 15tn - 16tn c. jurist al-Muhaqqiq al-Thani (d. 1533)62 holds a different 
interpretation of the "no hijrah after the conquest" Tradition. He maintains that the duty 
of hijrah remains, but, in agreement with ' Allamah al-Hilli, says that its reward is 
terminated or decreased in value.63 Further, following the authority of al-Shahid al-
Awwal (d. 1384),64 he limits the definition of "the rituals of Islam" (sha 'a 'ir al-islam) to 
their Shi'ite form. It would thus become obligatory to migrate from Sunni dominated 
lands if living there posed a hindrance to an open manifestation of one's Shi'ite identity, 
suggesting again that a primary function of hijrah was to denote and protect community 
identity; to al-Muhaqqiq al-Thani, that identity is simply more narrowly defined. At the 
same time, however, he appears to consider this ambitious ruling impractical, suggesting 
that al-Shahid might be referring to the time when the Imam was present, but that during 
his absence it is sufficient to practice taqiyah (religious dissimulation).65 
A critical factor in pre-modern discussions of whether Shi'ites should migrate 
from Sunni dominated lands is the role of taqiyah in a jurist's reasoning. While for al-
Muhaqqiq taqiyah might alleviate the requirement to migrate from Sunni dominated 
lands, three centuries after him, al-Mirza al-Qummi (d. 1816) argues persuasively that 
this is indeed the case, as substantiated by prophetic hadith.66 In al-Qummi's opinion, 
supported as he says by other unnamed scholars of his time, these earlier authoritative 
conditional on having a clear practical strategy for migration. Yahya Ibn Sa'id al-Hilli, al-Jami' h al-
shara 7: tahqiq wa-takhrij jam' min al-fudala' (Qom: Mu'assasat Sayyid al-Shuhada' al-'Ilmlyah, 
1405/1984-1985), 239. 
62
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Allah al-'Ulama al-Mar'ashTal-NajafT), 86. 
65
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scholars were painting a highly exaggerated picture of the situation for Shi'ites in Sunni 
dominated lands. But, in his time, as in theirs, he argues, even taqlyah is unnecessary.67 
Al-Qummi suggests that the key to resolving the dispute is to define the term 
sha'a'ir. He offers two explanations specifying the actions to which the term refers: the 
rituals themselves—salat, fasting for Ramadan, and the adhan (call to prayer); and their 
primary objective, that is, the denoting of religious identity. Thus far, all Muslims are in 
agreement, he says. One may, therefore, be excused from migration so long as these 
conditions are met. It is only in what he alleges are merely minor issues, such as wiping 
the feet in ablution, "prostrating on something suitable for prostration, and saying "hay 
'aid khayr al- 'amaV [come to good works] in the adhan, and things like this" where 
Sunnis and Shi'ites differ.68 And these have not with certainty been classed as absolute 
duties "such that we could argue that their performance is dependent upon hijrah, so that 
hijrah is a necessary precondition [to the performance of a command from God]."69 
Whereas, he reasons, the difference between Tmdn on the one hand and kufr and shirk on 
the other is undeniably evident. 
Al-Qummi concludes that to infer, as al-Shahid has done, that hijrah is obligatory 
from Sunni lands because it is obligatory from bildd al-kufr (land of unbelief), is 
erroneous as it wrongly conflates Sunni Islam with kufr and, similarly, because it makes 
too much of the notion of "the signs of faith (Tmdn) [i.e. Shi'ism]" as distinguishable from 
"the signs of Islam [what all Muslims practice in common]."70 Such distinctions are 
exaggerated, he says, being derived from a methodology of inference from the text and 
67
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having no sound basis in usul al-fiqh. Further, the Imams authorize close association with 
Sunnis in social and ritual life and sanction the practice of taqiyah - indeed, maintain that 
it is the highest religious duty - if manifesting one's Shi'ite identity in this context 
becomes hazardous.71 This is why, he says, the command to migrate from Sunni lands is 
not supported by the Imams or any of the leading jurists, except al-Shahid al-Awwal and 
less strongly by al-Muhaqqiq al-Thani. If anything, the weight of usul al-fiqh tends rather 
towards the maximum liberty allowed {bard 'at al-dhimmah).72 
Al-Qummi contrasts this with the obligation to migrate from bildd al-kufr, an 
obligation, he says, that is lifted only if one has relatives to assist in the preservation and 
manifestation of one's Islam. In defending this position, he supports a minimalist view of 
Sunni-Shi'ite differences while maintaining the commonly held Muslim/non-Muslim 
dichotomy. 
CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION TO THE WEST: FROM PROTECTION TO PROPAGATION 
Unlike the Qur'an and Traditions which dwelt primarily on the question of 
migration to dar al-islam, jurists of the middle period had cause to deal more equally 
with migration both to dar al-islam and from bilad al-kufr. For contemporary jurists, the 
dominant question is clearly whether Muslims are permitted to reside permanently in 
non-Muslim nation-states. A survey of the modern discourse shows that the majority 
opinion maintains the early principles identified above—the freedom to manifest a 
Muslim identity and security against the loss of faith—as the fundamental criteria of 
legitimation. As is usual in law, juristic opinion is not completely uniform. Differences 
Ibid, 1:373. 
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tend to revolve around the question of motivation, with greater stress placed on the 
propagation of Islam. 
We look first at the contemporary scholar, Muhammad Ali al-Ansari al-Shushtari. 
Al-Ansari argues from the legal principle that whatever the shan'ah makes obligatory, it 
commands what is necessary to its performance as well (muqaddimat al-lazim). 
Likewise, what the law permits, it renders permissible whatever actions are inseparable 
from its performance. It is as if, for example, a father gives his son permission to obtain 
knowledge that is only obtainable in the West; one ought to assume that its precondition, 
i.e., travel to the west, is included in that permission.73 It is difficult to tell if Ansari is 
hereby sanctioning migration to the West, subject to parental approval, or if he is using 
this as a purely hypothetical example. Reason suggests that he would not use an example 
of something of which he disapproved. It is logical to conclude, then, that this represents 
his own position on migration to the West. 
While other mujtahids deal with questions regarding migration to the West, two 
contemporary mujtahids who take an active interest in the subject are Ayatollahs Ali al-
Sistani and Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. Sistani follows the classical approach to the 
question of whether Muslims may voluntarily choose to reside in a non-Muslim country 
and environment.74 That is, the central element of his argument is whether this would 
pose a threat to a Muslim's religious belief and practice or to that of his or her 
dependents. But his ruling ignores both the Qur'an and the arguments between various 
classical and medieval jurists. His only source of authority is the Traditions of the Imams. 
7
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Perhaps this is because he wants to underline the earliest Shi'ite precedents of his legal 
opinion. 
Sistani begins with what might appear to be an unconditional negation of 
permission for travel to the West, or any non-Muslim country for that matter. He quotes 
several Imami Traditions that list al-ta 'arrub ba 'd al-hijrah (literally, assimilation after 
migration) among "the seven major sins" whose consequence is Hellfire. Al-ta 'arrub 
ba 'd al-hijrah is the official legal term that, in Sistani's words, means "leaving an 
environment where you could follow Islam and moving to a place where you maybe [sic] 
prone to not following Islam."77 Although on a par with kufr, interpreting the term 
inconclusively, as in, "may be prone to," opens up a range of possibilities. Sistani 
explains that it is applicable only to situations in which an individual feels susceptible to 
the temptation to apostasy. "Travel to non-Islamic countries, whether in the East or the 
West, is hardm" he says, "if it results in the loss of the Muslim's religion whether the 
purpose of travel is tourism, or commerce, or study, or temporary residence, or 
permanent, or any other reason."78 He adds that this is the case even if the purpose is to 
preach Islam to Muslims and others in the West. His primary concern appears to be born 
75
 The term ta'arrub, coming from the root '.r.b., means literally "to assimilate to the ways of the Arabs." 
This is the term that Sistani uses consistently in his text. Professor Mahmoud Ayoub (in conversation) 
suggests logically that the correct term would be tagharrub, from the root gh.r.b. That is, the difference 
between the two words is only a £ (gh) in place of the £ (')• The latter term would mean to assimilate to the 
West. Thus, the use of ta 'arrub must be a typographical error. Given that Sistani's explanation of al-
ta 'arrub ba 'd al-hijrah, discussed above, refers to leaving dar al-Islam for any non-Muslim territory, 
Western or non-Western, it may be that Sistani is importing the term in its assimilation sense only, and 
ignoring its etymological signification of "the ways of the Arabs." 
7
 Sistani, al-Fiqh, 61-62. For example, '"Abid ibn Zurarah said, '1 asked Aba 'Abdullah (SA) about the 
major [sins] and he said: In the Book of Ali (SA) they are seven: unbelief in God [kufr], murder, causing 
distress to parents, obtaining interest knowingly, enriching oneself on the money of orphans, running away 
from battle, and al-ta 'arrub ba 'd al-hijrah. Then I said: So, are these the major sins? He said: Yes," 62. 
77
 Online English translation of Sistani, al-Fiqh IT al-Mughtaribin (A Code of Practice for Muslims in the 
West), http://www.sistani.org/local.php?modules=nav&nid=2&bid=53 (accessed February 1, 2009). The 
definition does not appear in the original Arabic text. 
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 Sistani, al-Fiqh, 64. 
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of a scepticism regarding Western society's capacity to be hospitable to an Islamic 
lifestyle. 
There are, however, exceptions to the ta 'arrub ba 'd al-hijrah clause. Threat to 
one's life in a Muslim country is one such exception, overriding the potential threat 
migration poses to religious commitment. The sole limitation on migrating to a non-
Muslim country in this case is that it be "only to the extent that it saves your life." 
Presumably, what Sistani means by this is that once the danger is over, normal criteria 
apply. Ayatollah Ali al-Khameini concurs with this general principle. In his legal 
opinion, there is no problem in taking political asylum in the West, so long as the 
prospective refugee does not obtain this status on the basis of a fabricated testimony of 
persecution.80 Although on the one hand, Sistani stipulates that any sin, major or minor, 
delegitimizes migration, he disregards minor sins that are committed only occasionally. 
Finally, great rewards are promised to those whose motive for migration is to propagate 
Shi'ism, subject to standard conditions discussed above. According to Sistani, it is wajib 
kifaya, that is, the duty is sufficed by a portion of the community fulfilling it; but all who 
are able should join in doing so. 
Sistani's readers reveal a concern to know what is meant by such open-ended 
terms as "loss of religion" and what the conditions are that might lead to it. Sistani 
explains: "What the fuqaha' mean by 'loss of religion' is either doing what is haram by 
indulging in minor or major sins such as drinking alcohol, or committing adultery, or 
eating mayta [carrion] or drinking unclean things or other haram activities or failure to 
79
 Ibid, 65. 
80
 Khameini, Ajwabat al-Istifta 'at (al-Kuwayt: Dar al-Naba' lil-Nasr wa-al-Tawzf, 1995), 2:104. 
81
 Sistani, al-Fiqh, 68-69. 
82
 Ibid, 70. 
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perform one's legal obligations such as salat or sawm or hajj or other religious duties." 
It is worth noting that environmental temptations such as "the open display of pretty 
women," in and of themselves are not problematic. Likewise, the right kind of 
environmental influences that strengthen one's religious feelings and knowledge is also 
not considered an indubitable safeguard against the loss of religion.85 Rather, for Sistani, 
as others, it is individual agency that determines the effect of environmental factors. 
Permissiveness, then, begins with one's own sense of inner moral confidence. Further, a 
wife's lack of confidence in this regard prohibits only herself from travel; it does not 
affect her husband.86 Nor does Sistani consider it urgent to teach one's children Arabic 
beyond what is necessary for reciting salat.87 Instead, they should be encouraged to 
understand the rituals in the language of their social upbringing. 
Ayatollah Khameini's fatawa on migration follow the general thrust of Sistani's. 
We have noted above his ruling on political asylum. In addition, he advises migrants that 
they should not live somewhere where their religion might be despised, and, as if to 
overstate the case for not losing one's religious commitment, "it is obligatory on this 
person, besides preserving his religion and legal school, to be active in defending Islam 
and Muslims and whatever else is required for the spread of the religion and the laws [of 
Islam...] to the extent he is able."88 On the interesting question of what women converted 
in dar al-kufr are required to do "if they are unable to manifest their religion there due to 
fear of family or society," Khameini stipulates pragmatically that if migration will cause 
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 Ibid, 65. 
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 Ibid, 68. 
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 Ibid, 67. 
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 Ibid., 65. 
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 Ibid, 69. Sistani does, of course, concur that learning Arabic in order to better understand Islamic sources 
is recommended. But he does not prioritize it. 
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 Khameini, Ajwabat al-Istifta 'at, 2:104. 
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them distress, they are not required to leave, but "they are obliged to persist in salat and 
siyam and other duties of Islam as much as possible."89 
Ayatollah al-Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah deals with Muslim migration 
to the West in his book, Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar (Remaining in the Place of Migration).90 
His primary concern is to help Muslims in the West to move forward in their thinking 
from an isolationist mentality that tries to reproduce the Islamic life of the East in the 
West to an adaptive model that prepares them to form a new Islamic Western culture that 
can impact and influence the West. The extensive re-assessment of the philosophical 
foundations necessary for an effective and affective Muslim presence in the West offered 
in Fadlallah's work is atypical and suggests a deeper engagement with the social realities 
in which the legal discourse functions. However, in the final analysis, regardless of the 
position taken by a mujtahid, it must at some point be legitimated within the context of 
Islamic legal discourse on hijrah. 
Although Fadlallah's interpretation of hijrah, theoretically and practically, is 
apparent throughout Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar, it is the writer of the Introduction, Mustafa 
al-Shawki, who deals with hijrah as a theoretical concept in Islamic thought in a manner 
consistent with Fadlallah's thesis. It is necessary only to introduce this theory briefly. Al-
Shawki draws on the literal definition given earlier by Watt, that is, that hijrah "in and of 
itself involves separation from social and family ties," but gives it a distinctly modern 
gloss—"in search of a better life."91 This allows for a liberal amount of flexibility in the 
interpretation of conditions that permit it. For example, as a secondary motivation after 
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar: Bayna al-Isalah wa al-Mu 'asarah (Beirut: Dar-
Al-Malak, 1421/2000). 
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purely religious reasons, migration is permissible for the pursuit of (secular) education 
and economic advancement. Secondly, migration is permitted if it is undertaken to carry 
the banner of Islam throughout the world.93 Fadlallah will incorporate this incentive— 
that of da 'wah—into his argument extensively. 
Primarily, however, migration is to serve the purpose of providing Muslims with 
religious freedom, as suggested by Qur'an 4:97. As do others, al-Shawki broadens the 
scope of this scripture to refer to freedom from persecution whether that persecution is 
under a Muslim, or, as in the scriptural context, a non-Muslim polity. In this case, the 
Shi'ite priority of justice suggests that a non-Muslim just government is preferable to an 
unjust Muslim one. Thus, escape from religious oppression, termed "the escape to God," 
is the first and most important motive for migration,94 placing these Muslims in the ironic 
position of escaping to God in the West. This also suggests an interpretation of Islamic 
rule based on practical, rather than purely theoretical criteria, as a government that is 
Islamic in name only may be considered, in the context of Surah 4:97, to be un-Islamic. 
We may note, as well, the positive and negative consequences of migration 
suggested by al-Shawki and implied in the above. These will re-appear as fundamental 
principles in Fadlallah's philosophical construction of the Muslim migrant to the West. 
Positive consequences of migration include the potential for Muslims to be actors in 
influencing the West for Islam; in bringing Muslims from various parts of the world 
together; and "whatever benefits arise out of these two."95 Negatively, migration puts 
Muslims at risk of being acted upon such that their spiritual constitution is weakened and 
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 Ibid., 6. 
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 Ibid., 7. 
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their performance of religious obligations gradually abandoned. Further, there is the 
danger of political compromise. Most seriously of all, the Muslim in the West may face 
the loss of his or her religious identity, which, ironically, may have been the primary 
cause for migration in the first place. Finally, al-Shawki notes, there are other dangers 
specific to each country that he is not in a position to discuss at this point. 
Instead, al-Shawki poses several legal and philosophical questions raised by 
migration. In anticipation of Fadlallah's thesis, he asks what kind of Islamic discourse 
will best equip Muslims to face the challenges of their new Western social context. Is it 
an isolationist discourse that advises hiding one's Islam in the secrecy of the heart? Is it a 
materialist discourse that completely obliterates the memory of God? What kind of 
discourse will enable Muslims to engage the Western societies in which they live so as to 
"preserve their principles and their honour in the midst of these societies" and maximize 
their influence?96 It is with these issues that Ayatollah Fadlallah will occupy the reader in 
the remainder of his book and which we will look at in various sections throughout this 
study. 
CONCLUSION: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
As a general framework, we may suggest that the issue of migration began with 
the priority of migrating "to the Prophet and to God" as important for the formation of a 
new community and consolidation of Muslim identity. As societies became more settled, 
probably around the time of' Allamah al-Hilli in the 14th century, it became more 
acceptable to remain in dar al-shirk on condition of religious freedom for Muslims. 
Finally, jurists of the modern period permit voluntary temporary and permanent 
migration to non-Muslim territory if the same condition is present and, subject to its 
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intention, may even attribute religious virtue to it. The overriding concern in all cases 
remains that the mukallaf (legally capable) be free to discharge his or her religious 
obligations. 
More specifically, what emerges from this historical survey of the concept of 
hijrah in legal discourse is the consistent presence of three central principles established 
from at least the time of al-Shaykh al-Tusi (11th a ) , that is: the establishment and 
maintenance of Muslim identity; the symbolic importance of boundaries between the 
Muslim and other communities; and the concern to circumvent potential temptations to 
apostasy. It becomes evident in the modern fatwa literature that whatever the position of 
the jurists, their concern is with how best to express these essential foundational 
principles in the changing conditions of modern life. However, some modern jurists add 
to the justifications for migration two significant criteria: the pursuit of higher education 
and the possibility of influencing the West for Islam {da 'wah), the latter positioned front 
and centre by Fadlallah and regarded as valid by Sistani. These represent a more recent 
interpretation aimed at the empowerment and expansion of the ummah and its sphere of 
influence. 
With regard to the traditional framework, contemporary juristic texts suggest 
conformity to the spirit of the law. That is, the preferred state is to remain amongst the 
community but permission to migrate may be extended in situations of necessity. On the 
other hand, religious oppression, manifesting itself as the obstruction of Islamic ritual 
practice, in consequence of which Muslim identity is excluded from the public space, 
constitutes the primary reason to forbid residence in a non-Muslim country. This is so 
particularly if the situation further suggests the enfeeblement of Islam and Muslims and 
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empowerment of non-Muslims over Muslims, in consequence of which Islam is 
dishonoured. The same principle extends, as will be observed in later chapters, to 
particular situations in which the freedom to obey the divine law is threatened with 
compromise. Thus, the contemporary jurist has the delicate task of determining the 
relative weight of risks and benefits of Muslim migration to the West and of the specific 
ethical choices migration to non-Muslim lands generates. 
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PART II: ANALYSIS OF FAT AW A 
CHAPTER FOUR 
PURITY, FOOD, AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS: 
" A T HOME IN THE HURAH"? 1 
The number of detailed Western scholarly studies of the Muslim purity code is an 
inaccurate reflection of its importance in Islamic law.2 Legal handbooks—Sunni and 
Shi'ite—begin, as a matter of custom, with several chapters devoted to meticulously 
detailed explanations of what acts, substances, and creatures cause ritual impurity 
(impurity: najasah).3 Handbooks pay particular attention to which substances pollute 
water and under what conditions, rendering such water unsuitable for use in ritual 
ablutions (wudii'). Ayatollah Khomeini, for all his revolutionary political discourse, and 
while bemoaning the narrow focus of his colleagues on matters of purity at the expense 
of developing Islamic political theory, nevertheless pays no less attention than apolitical 
clerics to the adverse effects of blood, feces, urine, semen, and the like. His Tahrir al-
Wasilah, for example, follows the traditional pattern in devoting the first several chapters, 
1
 The phrase is adapted from Yvonne Haddad's article entitled, "At Home in the Hijra: South Asian 
Muslims in the United States," edited by Harold Coward, John R. Rinnells, and Raymond Brady Williams 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 239-258. 
2
 This is understandable, Ze'ev Maghen argues, for at least two reasons. Most western scholars of Islam 
come from social and intellectual contexts in which purity issues do not weigh very heavily; it is easy, 
therefore, to assume that the enormous amount of time needed for such study can more justifiably be spent 
pursuing other - more obviously relevant — issues, such as politics and fundamentalism. In this, Western 
scholars are not alone; Ayatollah Khomeini himself, while devoting hundreds of pages to questions around 
ritual purity, decried such attention as a fatal distraction from the societal relevance of religion. Given this, 
the meticulous linguistic facility required for such research hardly seems worth the effort. Thus, Western 
scholars understandably find it more worthwhile to expend their intellectual and material resources on more 
apparently momentous matters than the allegedly harmful effects of bleeding, urinating, copulating, 
vomiting, and handling of bodily or other substances- Nevertheless, some excellent studies have managed 
both to begin to untangle this complex issue, and to demonstrate the fallacy of the field's insignificance. 
See in the bibliography: Julie Marcus, (1984); A. Kevin Reinhart (1990); Ze'ev Maghen (1999), (1999b), 
(2004); Marion Holmes Katz (2002). 
3
 In Shi'ite legal handbooks, the chapters on taharah (purity) are preceded only by a brief exposition of the 
necessity and proper manner of taqlld. 
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after a brief discussion of taqlid, to matters of purity (taharah) and impurity, 
approximately one hundred and twenty-five pages in all. 
Purity chapters include rules of pre-worship washings: wu&u' in the case of minor 
pollution (hadath), and ghusl (full washing) in the case of major (janabah/junub). These 
are customarily followed by chapters dealing with ritual itself, notably four of the five 
pillars (arkan; pillar: rukri) of religion: prayer (salat), fasting (sawm), religious tax 
izakai), and pilgrimage (hajj), indicating the intimate relationship between purity and 
fitness for ritual worship.4 But purity also extends beyond ritual. In a thought-provoking 
article, Ze'ev Maghen observes the social relevance of purity issues, noting Muhammad 
IqbaPs5 comment that scrupulous attention to ritual purity is not only not "socially 
harmless" (read: irrelevant), but positively powerful. 
In order to appreciate the legal context and socio-cultural significance of 
contemporary fatawa involving purity issues, a brief summary of the main outlines of the 
Shi'ite purity code is offered below. While broadly parallel to the Sunni code, Shi'ite law 
4
 On this point, see Kevin Reinhart's helpful article, "Impurity/No Danger," History of Religions 30 (1990), 
1-24. 
5
 Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) was an important philosopher-poet and part-time politician of the Indian 
Subcontinent who is credited with having planted the intellectual seeds for the creation of Pakistan, as the 
fulfillment of a Muslim nationalism in India. Iqbal was a modernist, influenced by Shah Wali Allah, 
founder of Islamic modernism, and Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Iqbal, who completed three graduate degrees 
in Europe, wrote his most famous work in 1930, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore, 
1930) a collection of lectures on Islamic modernism delivered two years earlier. Oxford Encyclopedia, s.v. 
"Iqbal, Mohammad." 
6
 Ze'ev Maghen, "Much Ado About Wudu'," Der Islam 76 (1999), 252. Maghen, perhaps over-stating his 
case, goes so far as to say that attention to purity may be perceived to be as revolutionary and anti-
imperialistic as politics itself, persisting as possibly the final "bulwark" against the incursion of 
Westernization, the one persistent "focus of Muslim unity, identity and religiosity [...]." His point is that 
while it may appear to be purely a religious ritual of little social consequence, this assumption is open to 
question. As an example of the compelling social and political force that Maghen sees hidden within ritual 
ablutions, he recounts an event reported by a weekly paper of the Algerian Front Islamique de Salut (FIS) 
in which a number of Islamist organizations had held a mass rally in anticipation of "Operation Desert 
Storm." He quotes the correspondent as commenting that while it is often said that a full concert hall has 
the potential to motivate a crowd into action on behalf of their nation, he replies with "Give me young 
people who are not afraid to perform ablutions with cold water at the crack of dawn, and I will give you a 
prosperous Algeria and a liberated Palestine!" Maghen, "Much Ado," 205. 
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differs in some respects, most notably in having traditionally held a majority opinion on 
the impurity of non-Muslims (najasat al-kuffar). As we will see below, this controversial 
doctrine has, since the late twentieth century, begun to decline and resemble the Sunni 
view more closely, leading to significant social implications. We look at this 
development in some detail, including the relationship of the doctrine to dietary 
restrictions. 
The chapter argues that through the use of ijtihdd, the notion of jion-Muslim 
impurity, though deeply rooted in classical and pre-modern legal discourse, has in 
contemporary legal thought ultimately given way to a more socially inclusive approach. 
In contrast, dietary laws unrelated to questions of non-Muslim purity have retained 
significant force in sustaining social and moral boundaries between believers and 
unbelievers, boundaries that are implicit in the notion of non-Muslim impurity. In 
consequznct, fatawa addressing the whole of this inter-related field of inter-religious 
bodily contact, food, and employment in the West reflect only a very cautious opening to 
the other, hedged about and compensated for by measures intended to protect the 
boundaries within which it is thought safe to mingle with Western society. 
SHI'ITE MUSLIM PURITY LAW: TRANSIENCE AND PRECLUSION 
The structure of purity law can be outlined briefly and clearly by answering five 
main questions: What substances are intrinsically impure? How does a person or item 
become defiled and what are the different states of pollution that one may be in? What 
are the consequences of defilement? How is purification accomplished? And finally, what 
does this tell us about the logic of the Muslim purity code as applied to the focus of our 
inquiry? I leave the final question till the conclusion of the chapter. To answer these 
138 
questions, I rely primarily on a contemporary legal treatise by Ayatollah Sistani. As is 
typical in all topics of Muslim law, Shi'ite purity law varies in some respects from one 
jurist to another. These differences will become relevant in our analysis of contemporary 
fatawa (legal opinions) later in the chapter. For the present, it is possible to ignore them 
without detriment. Prior to answering the five questions posed above, I look at a 
substance of fundamental importance: water. 
All water unmixed with other liquids, such as fruit juice, for example, is called 
pure {mutlaq). This is the default status of water, such that it may be ruled as impure only 
when one knows with certainty that it has been changed into mixed, or impure, water.7 Of 
the five types of mutlaq water, two are commonly used for purification: kurr water, 
which refers to a measurement of water legally permitted for purification; and jar! 
(running) water, also used for purification.8 Conversely, jurists also use the term/an 
water to refer to the form of moisture that, when disconnected from its source and found 
in contact between something of intrinsic impurity (the hand of a kdfir, for example) and 
something pure (food otherwise permitted handled by that hand), contaminates the latter. 
Water, then, depending on specific conditions, may act either as a purifier or a conduit for 
pollution. 
Seestani, Islamic Laws, 10. Jurists discuss how much of another liquid or item is needed pure water to 
become mixed, and thus impure. In brief, it depends on attending factors such as whether the added 
element changes the smell or appearance of the water. In other words, impurity depends on whether or not 
the defiling substance (which may or may not be an impure substance such as blood; it may be juice, for 
example) affects or changes the water's primary constitution as water. Note on spelling: when using my 
own transliteration, I use the standard format (e.g. Sistani, tawdih). Otherwise, I follow the format used by 
the source to which I am referring. This results in different spellings for the same referent, as, for example, 
Seestani and Sistani. 
8
 Ibid., 5. The other types of pure water are water of lesser measurement than kurr, rain water, and well 
water. The first may also be used for purification under certain conditions. 
9
 Ibid., 8. 
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According to Ayatollah Sistani, ten things are intrinsically impure (najis al- 'ayri): 
urine, human feces, semen, dead body, blood, dog, pig, kdfir, alcoholic drinks, and the 
sweat of an animal that eats najdsah.10 We may divide this list somewhat neatly into three 
categories. The first category includes substances that regularly exit the body whether 
through sexual or non-sexual activity: urine, feces, semen, and blood—blood, of course, 
is slightly different in that the only regular or natural pattern of exit is through 
menstruation.11 The second category consists of living and dead beings: living kafirs,n 
dogs, and pigs, and the dead body of any creature.13 The third category is less definitive. 
We may designate it as consisting of other substances: alcohol and the sweat of animals 
that eat najdsah. Kevin Reinhart divides the list into two categories: the first is "pus, 
vomit, blood, urine, excreta of all animals (except birds) [...]." He defines these as 
"[njearly anything that has left its proper place in the body." Reinhart finds the impurity 
Ibid., 15. Urine and feces of animals that are forbidden to eat "and whose blood gushes out forcefully 
when its large vein (jugular) is slit" are also impure. It is also true, as Sistani elsewhere states, that water 
left (su'r) in a vessel after a dog, pig, or [non-scriptuary] kafir have drunk is impure. Ibid., 11. 
11
 Maghen's theory regarding the origins of blood impurity in Islam is intriguing. A detailed discussion 
would divert from our focus. In brief, he argues that permitting flowing blood into the sanctuary or God 
would be a violation of the very meaning of sanctuary, which essentially designates a place of safety, 
illustrating the fundamental incompatibility between places of sanctuary (and the worship that takes place 
there) and the pollution of bloodshed. For this reason, for example, a double tax was levied on people 
entering Mecca with blood-stained weapons. The prohibition against shedding blood while in the state of 
ihram further illustrates this hypothesis. See Ze'ev Maghen, "First Blood: Purity, Edibility, and the 
Independence of Islamic Jurisprudence," Der Islam (2004), 49-95. See especially 91-95. 
12
 Differences of opinion exist among Muslim (Sunni and Shi'ite) scholars as to which religious 
communities should be classified as kuffar (plural of kafir). We will look at the views of some Shi'ite 
Qur'an commentators below, but this will be far from a comprehensive study. Western studies of the 
classification of non-Muslims in Shi'ite law are few. One exquisite study of Sunni law shows a significant 
presence of the idea that all unbelievers constitute one undivided community. See Yohanan Friedmann, 
"Classification of unbelievers," in Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim 
Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 54-86. Shi'ite reluctance to differentiate 
between scriptuaries and non-scriptuaries, where such reluctance exists, must be somehow linked to a 
Shi'ite interpretation of Qur'an 2:213 and 10:19 referring to a time when "the people were one community." 
Friedmann cites Etan Kohlberg's comments that a majority of Shi'ites interpreted this as a "predominantly 
infidel" community, for "had it consisted of believers, [...] prophetic missions would have been 
superfluous." Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion, 14-15. See also Etan Kohlberg, "Some Shi'i views of 
the antediluvian world," Studia Islamica 52 (1980), 41-66. 
13
 With regard to animals, this refers to what has died of itself, carrion. In this case, the products derived 
from the animal, such as its meat, leather, or milk, are also impure. What is slaughtered following Islamic 
legal requirements (al-dhibh al-shar "i) is pure, muzakka. 
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of these substances to be explained by logic. The second category discerned by Rienhart 
includes "pigs, dogs, wine, carrion, corpses, water used by unclean animals, the food left 
over by an unclean animal, its milk, and so on [,]" which Reinhart suggests must have an 
historical, rather than logical explanation.14 
All of these items are impure in and of themselves and have the capacity to trigger 
a temporary state of defilement, minor or major. Legal sources refer to minor defilement 
as hadath (affected). Hadath, or "transient effect," to use Kevin Reinhart's translation,15 
takes place when an impure bodily substance (or wind) exits the body. Sleep also triggers 
minor impurity as impure substances are likely to have exited the body during sleep, 
though one is mostly unaware of it. Hadath is also caused by sexual acts apart from 
intercourse, such as touching with desire.1 A person affected by minor impurity is 
prohibited exclusively from ritual activities, such as worship, both obligatory and 
1 7 
recommended prayers. Reinhart suggests, for this reason, that impurity in the Muslim 
code carries no social stigma, unlike impurity in other religious systems. Being in a state 
of hadath, Reinhart emphasizes, simply requires "a new act of ritual ablution" (wudu') 
Reinhart, "Impurity," 7-8. Apart from certain assumptions implicit in his description of category one 
items, Reinhart's categorization is helpful. Reinhart's error, in my view, is defining category one 
substances as impure only when they "have crossed boundaries of the body [...]." Otherwise, he suggests, 
they are not impure. My objection to this argument is two-fold, textual and logical: firstly, nothing in the 
legal sources, to my knowledge, suggests that these substances become impure at a given point. The 
sources simply list them as impure, wherever they are found. It simply happens that one rarely comes into 
contact with them unless they have left the body. The one exception to impurity regardless of place may be 
blood, which, it is specifically stated, is impure when flowing outside of the body. Secondly, this argument, 
clearly based on the theory developed by Mary Douglas, assumes that impure bodily substances "ought not 
to be outside the body [...]." This is a questionable assumption. The condition of human beings when 
excrement and urine do not leave the body is problematic, to say the least. Common sense makes it clear 
that these substances ought indeed to leave the body at regular intervals. 
15
 Ibid., 9. 
16
 Ibid., 10. 
17
 See the discussion of wudu' below. 
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before ritual worship may legally be performed. Likewise, Marion Holmes Katz refers 
to actions that trigger minor pollution as "cancelers [sic] of wudu '."1 While Reinhart's 
theory is interesting, it breaks down at the point of major impurity, as will be seen below. 
Major impurity (not to be confused with intrinsic) is called janabah. 
(preclusion).20 It is caused by sexual intercourse and discharge of semen, whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily. Again, to cover all possibilities, jurists discuss the details of 
distinguishing an emission of semen from one of urine (the latter causing only minor 
pollution).21 The term "precluded" describes the condition of major impurity well, as it 
precludes the affected person from ritual activity and makes it "reprehensible" (makruh) 
to perform some non-ritual activities. Sistani's list of nine activities that are reprehensible 
to perform when in a state of janabah includes both religious actions such as "reciting 
more than seven verses of the Qur'an," as well as ordinary activities of eating or 
drinking.22 While not contagious, thereby reducing the potential for social stigma, the 
strong recommendation to not engage in the latter type of activities suggests that the 
Islamic purity code is less rigidly ritual-bound than argued by Reinhart. 
Legal sources also refer to both minor and major impurity as najasah 'aradiyah 
(circumstantial impurity), or najasah fiqhiyah (legal impurity), to contrast the transient 
nature of this state of impurity with the intrinsic impurity {najasah 'aynlyah) belonging to 
the elements listed above. A Muslim, it should be clear, can never be intrinsically impure, 
18
 Reinhart, "Impurity," 9. In some cases, notably in relation to dogs and pigs, the contact is contaminating 
only if it takes place through flowing water. 
19
 Marion Holmes Katz, Body of Text: The Emergence of the Sunni Law of Ritual Purity (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2002), 101. 
20
 Reinhart, "Impurity"; Katz, Body of Text. 
Seestani, Islamic Laws, 61. 
22
 Ibid., 63. 
23
 By najasah fiqhiyah legal scholars infer a technical or formal impurity that attaches to people because of 
legal determinants but does not belong intrinsically to a group of people as class. 
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and in the Sunni system, this immunity extends to all human beings. Shi'ite law, as noted 
above, allows for the possibility of non-Muslim intrinsic impurity. But human beings are 
not the only location where contamination occurs. Virtually any item may become 
defiled, and law books discuss numerous cases, offering rulings on a variety of potential 
situations, such as, for example, how to treat an egg with a drop of blood in it.24 
A key element in determining pollution is certainty of knowledge. An example 
from Sistani illustrates the effect of certainty: "If a fly or an insect sits on wet, najis thing, 
and later sits on wet, Pak [pure, clean] thing, the Pak [sic] thing will become najis [sic], 
if one is sure that the insect was carrying najasat [sic] with it, and if one is not sure, then 
it remains Pak [sic]."25 The point is that two distinct but related factors comprise the 
necessary conditions for determining najasah: material reality and certain knowledge of 
that reality. The principle oiyaqln (certainty), as we will observe later, is very effective 
in neutralizing the conditions that might trigger anxiety for Muslims living in Western 
cultures, which pay little or no attention to any systematized purity code. 
Purification, simply stated, is the process by which a state of purity is restored. 
Naturally, only pure water of sufficient amount (kurr) to not itself become contaminated 
in the process may be used for purification of any kind.26 The most visible and commonly 
known form of purification, even among non-Muslims, is the pre-ritual worship ablutions 
If it is found only in the yolk, the skin of which remains intact, Sistani says, the white part of the egg 
remains pure and edible. Seestani, Islamic Laws, 17. 
25
 Ibid., 22. The place of certainty is, of course, more complex than this. Additional principles govern 
situations of ambiguity. The principle of istishab (to drag along), for example, results in a ruling that if at 
nine in the morning, one is certain that a carpet is pure, and then, at eleven one questions that knowledge, 
the carpet remains pure because the certainty that determined it as pure in the first place "is dragged" along 
(istishab) into the rest of the day, such that mere doubt or questioning cannot undo it. My understanding of 
this concept was enhanced by a most interesting conversation with Seyed Mahdi Shahrestani. 
26
 Jurists discuss several more details of the conditions surrounding water used for purification. For 
example, if the water is of such a small amount that it takes on the smell of the impurity it is purifying an 
object of, it is said to have become contaminated and, naturally, has not affected the desired purification. 
See Seestani, Islamic Laws, 25-33. 
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called wudu'. Wudu' is the means of purification from minor pollution, hadath, and is 
obligatory, Sistani says, on six occasions. These include but are not limited to: prior to all 
obligatory and recommended prayers, apart from the prayer for the dead, and prior to 
washing and purifying a Qur'an that has become najis (impure, unclean). Ghusl 
(lustration) is obligatory in seven situations, including major pollution, junub.29 As stated 
above, failing to perform ghusl when required makes it makruh to perform a variety of 
religious as well as non-religious activities. 
But Islamic law requires purification (tathir) also of items that may have 
contracted impurity, such as vessels for food or water, cooking pots, clothing, or carpets, 
etc. Sistani discusses this under the rubric of mutahhirat (things that purify). For 
example, a utensil that was licked by dog is purified in the following manner: "If the 
mouth of a utensil which a dog has licked, is narrow, dust should be thrown into it and 
after adding some quantity of [pure] water, it should be shaken vigorously, so that the 
dust may reach all parts of it. Thereafter, the utensil should be washed in the manner 
mentioned above" [i.e.] "three times if less than Kurr water is used, [etc.]."30 Not unlike 
ordinary washing, this "non-religious" method of purification recalls a comment 
Ayatollah Makarim al-Shirazi attributes to Fadl ibn Hasan al-Tabarsi (d. 1154) 
suggesting that what we call impurity may simply be religion's vocabulary for an 
-71 
aversion to what people, on the basis of culture, consider disgusting. 
27
 For details of how this done, and the rules surrounding wudu', refer to any jurist's legal manual, for 
example, Seestani, Islamic Laws, 41-60. 
28
 See ibid., 55, where all six situations are listed. 
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 Too knotty to simply be listed here, details may be found in ibid., 61-69. 
30
 Ibid., 26. 
31
 Ahkam al-Mughtaribm wafqan li-fatawa 'asharah min maraji' al-taqlid(Tehran: Markaz al-Taba'ah wa 
al-Nashr li'1-Majma' al-'alaml IT ahl al-bayt, 1420/1999), 17 n.l. The relationship between "religion" and 
"culture" can be ambiguous. It is certainly tempting to predict a pronounced correspondence between a 
strong religious purity code and cultural traits of a given society. The general repulsion towards (and fear 
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Ablutions, it may be said, have no necessary hygienic purpose (though they may 
be said to aid this and popular understanding often associates ablution with actual 
cleanliness.) Rather, the primary intent, especially of wudii', appears to be symbolic of 
the worshipper separating himself or herself from moral evil in the act of worship. We 
will elaborate on this idea in the next section. The legal permission to use sand or dry 
dust when no water is available clearly reveals the symbolic function. More 
demonstrably, perhaps, a person afflicted with minor impurity (hadath) is not barred from 
engaging in non-ritual activities, though as stated above, this is not the case with major 
impurity (Janabah). 
It should be noted, in conclusion, that according to the Muslim code, the natural 
state of all things, apart from what the law determines as unclean, is purity (taharah). 
Ablutions (wudii'), lustration (ghusl), and purification (tathir) simply restore nature's 
equilibrium. Contracting pollution, though frequent and literally impossible to avoid, is in 
reality a temporary yet significant aberration from the divinely created condition of 
purity.32 "The transient nature," Katz observes, of various impurities "and the routine 
ease of their ritual reversal made the alternation of purity states into a background rhythm 
of) dogs in (especially Shi'ite) Muslim cultures—feelings hardly shared by Western countries—is a case in 
point. Claude Fischler argues that strong distrust of and emotional disgust towards unknown foods "arises 
from a strictly cultural difficulty of identification and classification, often rooted in religion. He refers to 
this phenomenon as "a socially (re)constructed biological safeguard." See Claude Fischler, "Food, Self and 
Identity," Social Science Information 27, 2 (London: SAGE, 1988), 282-4. Against this theory, it is said 
that in Mali, where the majority of the population is Muslim, "best friends throw excrement at each other 
and comment loudly on the genitals of their respective parents - [as] a proof of the love of friends." Here, 
dissonance between the Muslim purity code and a cultural practice could not be more explicit. Robert 
Brain, Friends and Lovers, quoted in Ray Pahl, Friendship (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 97. 
32
 As a 'natural state,' purity may be paralleled with the fundamental Islamic doctrine offitrah, the 
primordial and natural human condition of submission to God, marred only by violations of faith, such as 
holding beliefs considered un-Islamic or Islamically unorthodox. This doctrine is based on Qur'an 7:172, 
"And when thy Lord took from the children of Adam, from their loins, their seed, and made them testify 
touching themselves, 'Am I not your Lord?' They said, 'Yes, we testify'—lest you should say on the day of 
Resurrection, 'As for us, we were heedless of this.'" For an interesting discussion of fitrah, particularly in 
application to a modern Muslim interpretation of religious freedom, see Abdulaziz Sachedina's The Islamic 
Roots of Democratic Pluralism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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of ritual life, one that could be slowed by devotional exercises such as fasting and vigils 
but never definitively halted."33 This daily experience of transit from one state to the 
other would suggest ambivalence in one's relationship to the world around oneself, 
creating both a level of comfort as well as an acute awareness of the potential for 
pollution lurking in the world. In other words, it would appear to produce a sense of 
safety and security along with a conscious awareness of danger. The literature indicates 
that the latter is particularly accentuated amongst purity-conscious Muslims in the West. 
Fatawa in response demonstrate an intention on the part of scholars both to elevate 
feelings of safety in some areas, and to warn of dangers in others. 
Before leaving this overview of the Shi'ite purity code, it is helpful to briefly 
discuss the matter of spittle or backwash (su V, literally: leftover). Ze'ev Maghen's 
treatment of the legal status of su 'r in Sunni Islam is illuminating.34 In his analysis of 
hadiths dealing with the spittle of ritually contaminated Muslims, Maghen shows that in 
contrast to other bodily fluids which are in all circumstances either pure or impure 
consistently, saliva "has an indifferent/neutral—or fluctuating/dependent—ritual [I would 
use the word legal] status [...]."35 Even in the most ritually polluted state, a Muslim's 
saliva remains pure; yet, the saliva of an intrinsically impure creature, pig for example, is 
seen to be consistently impure and ritually contaminating. 
The point Maghen draws from this is two-fold: firstly, as part and parcel of the 
essence of an organism, su 'r is neutral with regard to purity. It is defined in this regard 
33
 Katz, Body of Text, 145. 
34
 Su 'r refers not just to saliva in the mouth, but, primarily in fact, to the liquid left behind in a vessel after a 
person or animal has drunk from it (backwash), as seen in the example of the vessel licked by a dog above. 
See Ze'ev Maghen, "Close Encounters: Some Preliminary Observations on the Transmission of Impurity in 
Early Sunni Jurisprudence," Islamic Law and Society 6 no. 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 359. 
35
 Ibid., 362. 
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only by acquisition; su V acquires its legal status from the being with which is it 
associated; secondly, su 'r demonstrates how defilement, as Maghen puts it, is never 
"'absorbed': pollution somehow fails to penetrate, pervade or in any essential way alter 
one's 'person'."36 In other words, Maghen's analysis shows the 'superficiality' and 
transience of ritual impurity, as well as the inalterability and permanence of intrinsic 
impurity; the latter can neither become pure, nor can a pure being ever (logically) become 
intrinsically impure, even in the most ritually defiled of conditions. The relevance of this 
fundamental principle of the purity code for our purposes is in relation to the classical 
and pre-modern Shi'ite majority opinion regarding the impurity of non-believers, as 
discussed below. The status a jurist gives to su > in relation to non-Muslims indicates his 
opinion on non-Muslim impurity and underlines the intrinsic quality of that status. 
Finally, some of the insights drawn from scholarly analyses of purity codes across 
religious traditions are worth mentioning very briefly. Much of this discussion originates 
in biblical scholarship. David Freidenreich's fascinating study of purity and food in the 
three Abrahamic traditions brings to light three categories of impurity within the Hebrew 
context: "ritual" impurity, identified, Freidenreich notes, by Jonathan Klawans and Tikva 
Frymer-Kensky, while easily contracted via contact with bodily fluids and highly 
contagious, is neither sinful nor permanent. It is roughly parallel to minor and major 
impurity in Islam. "Moral" impurity, on the other hand, expresses what Klawans 
describes as a highly contagious and dangerous defilement resulting from sinful actions. 
The Muslim code, as will be seen below, also has a strong underlying moral current, 
though this is not seen as physically contagious. The third biblical term Freidenreich 
Ibid., 364. 
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discusses is what Christine Hayes calls "genealogical" impurity. Intrinsic and 
permanent, this form of impurity is fundamental to inter-communal identity formation. 
Further, in respect of being inalterable and ethnically defined, Judaic genealogical 
impurity is similar to Shi'ite conceptions of intrinsic impurity of non-Muslims, although 
the analogy is not complete. 
THE MORAL CURRENT OF ISLAMIC PURITY LAW: QUR'ANIC TERMINOLOGY 
Qur'anic language of purity and impurity is characterized by dichotomous 
categories, by interlocking sets of binary opposites connoting strong moral boundaries 
between belief and unbelief. Similarly, clear Qur'anic associations between purity and 
fitness for the right kind of worship—that which is endorsed by the Qur'an—are 
contrasted with a perceived coherence between pollution and idol worship, once again 
highlighting the terminology's symbolic current. This internal agreement between purity, 
belief, and fitness for worship on the one hand and impurity, unbelief, and unfitness for 
worship on the other brings into relief the highly individualistic character of the Islamic 
purity code and the consequently general—though not altogether absolute—notion of the 
non-contagious nature of pollution. As every human being, according to Islam, is 
individually accountable before God in morality and worship and does not access God's 
pleasure or displeasure through the merits or demerits of another human being, so ritual 
pollution attaches only to the person who contracted it and cannot be transferred to others 
merely by contact with a "precluded" person. Rather, a person must come into direct 
contact with the polluting agent itself. 
37
 David Moshe Freidenreich, Foreign Food: A Comparatively-enriched Analysis of Jewish, Christian, and 
Islamic Law, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (Columbia University, 2006), 16-18. 
38
 For a helpful discussion on the place of the individual in Islamic thought and society, see Richard Bulliet, 
"The Individual in Islamic Society," in Religious Diversity and Human Rights, ed., Irene Bloom, J. Paul 
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The Qur'an uses several nearly synonymous words to indicate substances, actions, 
entities, and sometimes people that it considers polluted. The most common, rijs, appears 
10 times in the Qur'an39 and is commonly understood as a synonym for najas, the 
technical legal term—especially for Shi'ism—denoting "intrinsic impurity."40 A key 
verse for rijs, Surah 5:90, "O you who believe, wine (implying any alcoholic beverage) 
and games of chance (al-maysir) and idols and divining arrows are a filth (rijs) of Satan's 
doing, so avoid it so that you may succeed," shows the close association between moral 
evil, uncleanness, and divine prohibition. That believers are addressed specifically 
suggests that moral filth is an identifying feature only of unbelievers. This is made clearer 
in Surahs 22:30 and 9:125, where the obstinate worship of idols in spite of the divine 
Revelation is said to accumulate rijs. Surah 9:95 specifically identifies "wrong-doing 
folk" (al-qawm al-Jasiqin) as rijis.41 The same idea is conveyed in Surah 9:28, which is 
the sole occurrence of the term najis: 
Oh you who believe! Truly, the associaters (mushrikuri) are impure (najisun); 
so let them not approach the holy sanctuary (al-masjid al-haram) after this 
their year. And if you fear poverty then God will enrich you from his bounty, 
if he wills. God is the Knower, the Wise." 
Martin, and Wayne L. Proudfoot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 175-191. Bulliet argues 
that the strong historical evidence that Muslim piety is often grounded more in following the personal 
example of others than on conformity to doctrine demonstrates a strong individualism in Islamic practice, 
reinforced by the sense of individual responsibility of confessing Islamic faith, fulfilling religious 
obligations, and answering finally to God on the Day of Judgment. 
39
 Surahs 5:90; 6:125; 6:145; 7:71; 9:95; 9:125; 10:100; 22:30; 33:33. The last one eludes me. 
40
 See Katz, Body of Text, 13, 48. 
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Shi'ite scholars have commonly read the word najis in the technical sense, as a 
formal legal term denoting moral, doctrinal, or substantial impurity.42 For a number of 
Shi'ite commentators and jurists, as will be explained below, substantial impurity 
suggests that unbelievers may be classified—as far as purity is concerned—with rijis 
substances such as wine, carrion, pork, urine, and vomit (among others), which, when 
ingested or eliminated from the body, render believers circumstantially impure. The same 
concept is also found in a non-legal sense in several other verses, such as Qur'an 10:100: 
"It is not for anyone to believe except by the permission of God. And he has appointed 
filth (al-rijs) upon those who have not understanding."43 
Both najas and rijs, then, denote an extreme form of impurity. In a Sunni tradition 
on the authority of Abu Hurayra, their association with unbelievers is contrasted with 
dissociation from Muslims, as the Prophet exclaims that a believer "/a yanjuslyanjis." 
As Maghen explains, the word is rendered without vowels and could read either "a 
believer is never contaminated!" or "a believer never contaminates!" Maghen concludes 
that both readings are consistent with the logic of the Islamic purity code and underline 
the fact that the code allows that nothing intrinsically pure, such as a believer, can ever 
change its status; nor can it contaminate or pollute others.45 In other words, whatever 
circumstantial impurity believers might experience, this can never alter their intrinsic 
purity. In the Sunni code, human beings are, as a class, much like water in that they are 
distinct from substances that, if impure, carry pollution with them and affect the world 
42
 Katz, Body of Text, 48. 
43
 See also 6:125; 7:71; 9:95; and 9:125, which reads: "But as for those in whose hearts is a disease, it 
(Surahs of the Qur'an, it seems) added to them filth upon filth and they died while yet unbelievers 
{kafiruri)." In other words, hearing the Qur'an only increased them in unbelief and emphasized the contrast 
in moral quality between the hearts of unbelievers and of believers. 
44
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150 
around them. As we will see, the classical Shi'ite majority position on the intrinsic 
impurity of unbelievers ruptures this principle to some degree. 
Impurity and purity in Qur'anic vocabulary are also conceptually associated with 
prohibition and permission. The most common Qur'anic word denoting something that is 
morally filthy, khabith, is the precise antonym of tayyib which carries the notion of 
pleasant and typically refers, among other things, to permitted foods.46 The pair is also 
parallel to the legal terminology that divides the world into things forbidden (haram) and 
permitted (halal). The verb harrama—meaning to make "unlawful, forbidden, 
prohibited,"47—identifies certain behaviours, as well as persons, places, times, or objects 
(especially certain foods) as "taboo." Qur'an 2:173, for example, says: "He has forbidden 
you carrion (mayta), blood, the meat of swine (lahm al-khinzir), and whatever has been 
consecrated to other than God [...]." In its original meaning, taboo carries the idea of 
setting apart as sacred and unapproachable, thus referring simultaneously to what belongs 
to the divine realm and to the forbidden.48 As Toshihiko Isutzu observes, in its connection 
to taboo, haram refers not only to '"an action punishable by law,'" decided solely by 
God's free will, but also to the sacred state of heightened ritual purity (ihram) required of 
those who make the pilgrimage.49 Maghen points out that the term is also used to describe 
the state of ritual purity required for daily salat.50 In its strongest sense, then, to be in the 
state of ritual purity, which theoretically occurs several times daily, is at the same time to 
be in "the state of taboo." 
46
 Izutsu, Ethico'-Religious Concepts, 235. 
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Purity, we understand then, is in the first instance the condition of readiness for 
worship, being inwardly cleansed of the most serious taboo (that is, unbelief), avoiding 
association with sinful substances and behaviours, and being symbolically purified by the 
rites of ihram. The Qur'anic terminology suggests utter incompatibility between faith and 
its works on the one hand and unbelief and its practices on the other, parallel to the divide 
between purity and impurity. By including unbelief within the conceptual and legal 
framework of purity and impurity, Isutzu notes, the Qur'an "creates, as it were, a new 
moral and spiritual conception of taboo, and gives an ethical content to the primitive idea 
of haram, by placing 'under taboo' various manifestations of kufr."51 Fadlallah's 
interpretation of unbeliever impurity, as will be seen below, appears to draw from this 
Qur'anic frame of reference. 
In more general terms, the moral framework of the Shi'ite purity code—one that 
presupposes and builds upon an ethical divide between belief and unbelief—translates 
into a social paradigm that has, not unlike that of the ancient Judaism studied by Christine 
Hayes, been used "not only to describe but also to inscribe" and indeed to sanctify 
"sociocultural boundaries" between insiders and (in this case non-Muslim) others.52 This 
tendency is manifested in numerous areas where direct or indirect social contact threatens 
to undo purity. The most ubiquitous case for Shi'ites is foodstuffs. Shi'ite law identifies 
three categories of prohibited food: food touched with moisture by non-Muslims which is 
then considered impure; food containing something najis, such as pork or wine; and food 
derived from an illegitimately slaughtered animal (ghayr mudhakka). For Muslims in a 
non-Muslim society, care must be taken with regard to contact with all three, which raises 
51
 Isutzu, Ethico-Religious Concepts, 238. 
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 Christine E. Hayes, Gentile Impurities and Jewish Identities: Intermarriage and Conversion from the 
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questions regarding several contingent areas of life: commercial transactions involving 
foodstuffs or animal products, renting accommodations, frequenting barbershops and 
laundromats, sitting on trains and buses, burying the dead, and using cleaning agents, 
among other things. 
In conclusion, I suggest that the framework described above lends itself to a legal 
interpretation that could be expected to reproduce a sacred-profane dichotomy on the 
social level, thereby reinforcing the perception that rigid social boundaries between 
insider and outsider are sanctified and thus permanent expressions of cosmic reality. The 
analysis to follow later in the chapter will examine this hypothesis. 
CONTROVERSIAL CLEANLINESS: NON-MUSLIM FOOD AND PURITY IN CLASSICAL 
LEGAL DISCOURSE 
My treatment of these subjects of Shi'ite legal discourse between the seventh to 
the fifteenth centuries relies largely on secondary source materials, particularly that of 
David Freidenreich, whose work looks closely at this period. My own research into the 
primary sources takes Freidenreich's study further by looking at Qur'anic exegesis on the 
topic of non-Muslim impurity for the same period and legal discourse on the impurity of 
non-Muslims and their food in modern and contemporary times. On the question of the 
relationship between the impurity of non-Muslims and their food, secondary research 
reveals some ambiguity. Maghen, for example, argues that there is no connection 
between the Muslim purity code and food prohibitions, even into the modern period. His 
argumentation is persuasive but, in my opinion, he overstates his case, neglecting or 
minimizing the importance of evidence to the contrary, particularly in Shi'ite fiqh.53 
53
 Maghen, "First Blood," 67ff. Admittedly, Maghen's conclusion is based on a study of primarily Sunni 
fiqh. While some of Maghen's reasons are convincing, they do not, in my opinion, warrant a summary 
denial of connection between impurity and prohibition. Maghen's critique of Mary Douglas' general theory 
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In agreement with Freidenreich, I argue that following the introduction of legal 
rationalism in Shi'itefiqh a fundamental shift in the relationship between unbeliever 
impurity and food prohibitions took place. This study therefore looks at the issue from 
the perspective of two quite distinct phases within the early period. This shift is best 
demonstrated by dividing the discussion more or less into two parts: a) food of non-
Muslims; and b) non-Muslim impurity. I argue further that scholars in the contemporary 
period make a different and perhaps more subtle shift by maintaining a connection 
between non-Muslim impurity and food prohibitions while reversing the majority opinion 
on non-Muslim impurity or employing other legal principles that effectively neutralize 
any negative repercussions the association holds. 
a. Food of non-Muslims 
Freidenreich's study demonstrates that the pre-rationalist period of Shi'ite legal 
discourse finds no direct connection between the purity status of non-Muslims and 
prohibitions on consuming their food. Authorities prior to al-Mufid (d. 1022) and al-
Murtada (d. 1044) prohibited non-Muslim food for reasons other than the intrinsic 
impurity of non-Muslims. When impurity was mentioned by early authorities at all in this 
context, it clearly referred to circumstantial impurity only. "If they eat from your food 
and they perform ritual ablutions, then there is not harm," Ja'far al-Sadiq is said to have 
stated. Freidenreich, I believe, is correct in concluding that had al-Sadiq (or those in the 
community who produced the statement in his name) intended to pronounce on the 
of purity, especially as applied to Islam, along with her tacit and explicit pairing of impurity and dietary 
prohibition, is especially illuminating. Maghen himself also admits that Sunni "fiqh al-taharah [...] does 
occasionally interweave issues of legal edibility and ritual purity." Ibid., 89. Further, some association must 
be admitted on the basis of the Qur'anic material (e.g. 5:90 / 6:145) as discussed above. Kevin Reinhart 
prudently suggests some association between purity and dietary law in the Sunni context: "The underlying 
meaning oirijs, when not specifically contamination, is certainly 'something worthy of avoidance' but the 
'why' of that avoidance is elusive. Encyclopedia of the Qur'an, s.v. "Contamination," 1:411. 
54
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intrinsic impurity of non-Muslims, "his requirement that they perform ablutions prior to 
sharing a meal would make no sense."55 This prohibition was, however, difficult to 
rationalize, Freidenreich shows, as the food of circumstantially impure Muslims was not 
similarly prohibited. As a rationally unsatisfying discourse, it could not be maintained 
without modification once Shi'ite legal theory admitted the principle of reason. 
A key scripture regarding the food of non-Muslims for both pre- and post-rational 
theology is Qur'an 5:5, stating: "the food of the People of the Book is permitted to you." 
The verse is widely interpreted by Sunni scholars to include meat slaughtered by non-
Muslims, but early Shi'ite authorities advanced a more restrictive interpretation. The 
argument was two-fold. The first part conditions the apparent permissiveness of the text 
on a pair of clauses found in 6:118-121, "Eat of that over which the name of God has 
been mentioned if you are believers in his signs [...] And do not eat of that over which 
the name of God has not been mentioned for this is grave sin \fisq] [.. . ] . " 5 6 It might be 
argued that as a minority, the Shi'ite community had more interest in defining their 
boundaries more closely.57 On the other hand, partaking of the food of outsiders to the 
same degree as Sunnis could have been used, on the basis of taqiyah (dissimulation), to 
deflect undue attention from themselves. 
M
 Ibid, 327. 
561 use Toshihiko Izutsu's translation of fisq here as "grave sin," a word that Izutsu argues denotes a 
particularly high degree of kufr, expressed as disobedience to what God commands, whether that be 
performing the forbidden, or failing to perform what is commanded (157-61). As a synonym of kufr, it is 
contrasted with iman, which means "to follow the guidance of God [...]." Izutsu, Ethico-Religious 
Concepts, 162. 
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Whatever the motivation, with remarkable consistency, Shi'ite traditions from the 
"Four Books" explain that only Muslims (and sometimes only Shi'ites) are capable of 
invoking God's name properly; Christians and Jews, not to mention non-scriptuaries, 
may not, on account of their false doctrines regarding God, be trusted in this matter.58 
Although also citing traditions that permit meat slaughtered by Jews and Christians, the 
last of these authoritative traditionists, Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Tusi (d. 1067) 
concludes, nevertheless, that these "must be interpreted as exceptions to the general 
prohibition of foreign food."59 Al-Tusi allows for exceptions in two standard situations of 
necessity: the absence of an alternative sustenance, and the threat of danger, in which 
case the Shi'ite is justified in practicing taqiyah.60 The minority who permits non-Muslim 
slaughter does so on the basis of a more inclusive or pluralistic theology that accepts "the 
legitimacy of non-Shi'i references to God's name [,..]"61 Freidenreich notes that each of 
the four authoritative Imami tradition collections contain such traditions.62 
The second part of the argument used by restrictive authorities is that "food" in 
5:5 cannot mean all food, including meat, as Sunnis understand it, for such an inclusive 
meaning would suggest the absurd notion that pork, carrion, and blood are likewise 
permitted. The verse, they argue, requires a delimiter to make sense, and most authorities 
advance the interpretation attributed to al-Sadiq that "this refers to grains and whatever 
See Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 314-17. 
59
 Ibid., 316. 
60
 Ibid, 317. Maintaining strict abstinence could, for example, result in unnecessary identification of 
themselves as Shi'ite in situations where this could compromise personal security. 
61
 Ibid., 319. 
62
 Ibid, 318. Freidenreich notes in this connection that some traditions, notably the Isma'ili jurist al-Nu'man 
b. Muhammad (d. 974) added the condition that the non-Muslim and non-Shi'ite invocation of God's name 
be witnessed by the Shi'ite who was to eat the meat. Including non-Shi'ite Muslims in this clause suggests 
a strong current of distrust among Isma'ilis of anyone outside of the community. 
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does not require slaughter." This interpretation raises the question as to why Muslims 
would need permission to consume the (uncooked) grain of non-Muslims, a question I 
have not come across in my research.64 Thus, while the majority opinion on non-Muslim, 
including scriptuary, slaughter was clearly the more restrictive, permissive interpretations 
existed alongside, but these were either in the minority or were explained away as 
exceptions to the rule. 
Another situation concerned whether some of the meat sold in Muslim markets 
might have non-Muslim origins, suggesting a sufficiently integrated market to anticipate 
this possibility. Al-Mufid's leniency in this regard is typical of the general principle that 
excessive investigation—that is, beyond what can be clearly and easily ascertained about 
the source of meat, particularly in a Muslim context—is unnecessary and unwarranted. 
One needn't go beyond the surface, al-Mufid says, "because the outward appearance of 
Islam is sufficient for you to regard the meat as permitted."65 Later jurists also argue that 
anything that marks a meat product as having been in Muslim hands is sufficient 
evidence of its legal slaughter (tazkiyah). 
So, from where did the notion that the food of unbelievers is forbidden because 
unbelievers are impure originate? Freidenreich argues that in the new atmosphere of 
rationalism that arose in the early 11th century, the argument articulated above was 
This is the rendering that Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi gives the tradition. Others offer a slightly different 
version, such as "and the like," where al-Majlisi has "whatever does not require slaughter." al-Majlisi, 
Bihar al-anwar (Tehran: al-Matba' al-IslamTyah, 1956), 80:42-3. See also Freidenreich, who discusses 
interpretations of this tradition by the Shi'ite Traditionists al-Kulayni (d. 939/40), ibn Babawayh (d. 991/2), 
al-Mufid (d. 1022) and Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Barqi (d. ca. 893/4), 397, 398, 407. Early Shi'ite Qur'an 
commentators advanced the same argument. See, for example, Al-Shaykh al-Ajall Jamal al-Din (Suyuri) al-
Miqdad, Kanz al- 'irfanfifiqh al-Qur'an (Tehran: Haidar, 1384 q.), 1:48, and n. 2 & 3; Ahmad ibn 
Muhammad al-Ardabili, Zubdatal-bayanfiahkam al-Qur'an (Qom: Salman FarsTPress, 1375 sh.), 1:68. 
64
 Cooked grain is another issue, being susceptible to the transfer of impurity through wetness. Perhaps this 
is why it was felt necessary to state that uncooked grain could be eaten. But this hypothesis depends on the 
doctrine of the impurity of non-Muslims and so could only have affected the discourse during and after the 
time of al-Murtada. 
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rationally unsatisfying. Freidenreich demonstrates that it was al-Mufid's student, al-
Shaykh al-Murtada, who was the first to offer a new interpretation of Qur'an 5:5 by 
pairing it not with 6:118-121 but with 9:28,66 which, incidentally, says nothing about 
food.67 My own reading of al-Murtada comes to the same conclusion as Freidenreich. 
That is, al-Murtada argues that non-Muslim food is prohibited both on the basis of 6:118-
121 as well as 9:28. The latter verse indicates that Surah 5:5 cannot be interpreted simply 
on its surface meaning. It must, he says, be referring only to grains and not to the su V of 
non-Muslims, which is forbidden to use in wudu', as is "anything they have touched with 
their bodies."68 The proof for this, al-Murtada reasons, is that unbelievers are impure, 
both intrinsically (najasat al- 'ayri) and legally (najasat al-hukm). 
It seems then, as Freidenreich points out, that while the two ideas (food 
prohibitions and non-Muslim impurity) existed independently of each other in the pre-
rationalist period, the rationalist discourse of 11th century Shi'ite law, in searching for a 
reasoned defense of the intrinsic impurity of non-Muslims, looked to the prohibition 
against eating their meat and vice versa. Thus, for adherents of the rationalist school, the 
impurity of non-Muslims as a causal factor in restrictive opinions regarding their food 
became standard legal opinion and from thence seeped into popular Shi'ite piety. 
b. Non-Muslim Impurity 
As the discussion above suggests, al-Mufid's successors must have felt the 
exclusion of non-Muslim food on the requirement of properly invoking the name of God 
66
 See ibid., 330-36. 
67
 "Oh you who believe! Truly, the associaters {mushrikuri) are impure (najisun); so let them not approach 
the holy sanctuary (al-masjid al-haram) after this their year. And if you fear poverty then God will enrich 
you from his bounty, if he wills. God is the Knower, the Wise." 
68
 Al-Shaykh al-Murtada, al-Intisar (Beirut: Dar al-Adwa, 1985), 89-90. 
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inadequate for sustaining identity boundaries. Prohibiting non-Muslim meat needed, it 
seems, additional defense. As argued above, while not completely abandoning the general 
lines of the earlier interpretation, scholars from al-Shaykh al-Murtada onwards 
strengthened the prohibition on non-Muslim food (Qur'an 5:5 and 6:118-121) by linking 
it with the idea of non-Muslim impurity (Qur'an 9:28). Al-Murtada formulates his 
argument explicitly in contrast to the lenient Sunni view that both permits scriptuary 
slaughter and sees non-Muslims as circumstantially impure at worst. For al-Murtada, 
Surah 9:28 clearly establishes the fallacy of both these premises. Since, as the verse 
declares, unbelievers are intrinsically impure, there is no permission to eat "nor to derive 
benefit from" the animal products of non-Muslims.70 Al-Murtada's interpretation implies 
a tightening of social boundaries in social and commercial life. We will explore these 
questions further in the section on contemporary fatawa below. 
The seeds of al-Murtada's exegesis may have been planted in earlier juristic 
discourse around the su 'r of non-Muslims. Su 'r, we pointed out above, acquires and is 
therefore an indicator of the purity status of the being to which it belongs. According to 
Freidenreich, the classical traditionist Muhammad b. Ali ibn Babawayh (d. 991), author 
of Man layahduruhu al-faqih, one of four authoritative early compendiums of tradition, 
cites a tradition on the authority of al-Sadiq prohibiting food "contaminated by Jewish or 
Christian su >," as does the seventh Imam, Musa al-Kazim with regard to that of Magians 
and Jews.71 Al-Kazim also expresses displeasure at the idea of sharing dishes or beds 
with these non-Muslims, or shaking hands with them. Likewise, al-Murtada prohibits 
Muslims from performing ablutions with water contaminated by the su 'r of non-Muslims, 
70
 Ibid., 193. As cited by Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 331-32. 
71
 Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 326. The tradition Freidenreich cites is from Ibn Babawayh, Man la 
yahduruhu al-faqih (Tehran: Dar al-Kutub al-IslamTyah, 1970), 3:219, #1014. 
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as pointed out above. As Freidenreich observes, these traditions reflect the early presence 
of concern "not only about the transmission of pollution via su 'r but also through direct 
and even indirect contact with the body of a non-Muslim."72 
However, the majority trend in pre-rationalist discourse reflects a view of non-
Muslims as circumstantially, but not necessarily intrinsically, impure. The evidence for 
this is that more permissive traditions, while permitting the consumption of water 
polluted by the su 'r of non-Muslims, still prohibit its use in ablutions,73 (which is also 
indicative, in my view, of the value placed on ritual worship.) Further, other traditions 
permit sharing food with non-Muslims if the latter have performed ritual ablutions.74 As 
Freidenreich points out, were non-Muslims considered intrinsically impure at this time, 
their performing of ablutions would make no difference,75 as intrinsic impurity, jurists tell 
us, is not altered by this means.76 
While this argument is reasonable, the fact that their impurity is understood as 
transferable suggests to me that it is understood as somehow beyond circumstantial, 
especially as traditions on the same authorities permit the use of water containing su 'r of 
circumstantially impure Muslims.77 Moreover, circumstantial impurity is nowhere 
considered indirectly contagious. Making sense of this suggests the altogether reasonable 
possibility that the traditions cannot be taken as a reliably consistent and systematic 
compendium of doctrine at this time; or, it could imply the presence of a third somewhat 
undefined category of impurity between intrinsic and circumstantial. Without further and 
Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 326. 
73
 See ibid., 325. 
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 As cited by Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 326, and 535, n.60. 
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 Ibid., 326-27. 
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 See, for example, footnote 83. Nor, as we have seen, is intrinsic impurity alterable by any other means, 
though it is commonly taken that conversion to Islam changes the purity status of non-Muslims, who are 
then required to perform ghusl to remove the circumstantial impurity accumulated during one's lifetime. 
Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 325. 
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clearer references to such a category, however, especially in the later, more developed 
juristic sources, the latter option seems unlikely.78 As we will observe, later sources seem 
to be aware of this dilemma and, not surprisingly, resolve it by classifying the ambiguous 
category as intrinsic impurity. 
Qur'anic exegesis of Surah 9:28 by Shi'ite commentators subsequent to al-
Murtada suggests that scholars felt it necessary to establish the intrinsic impurity of non-
Muslims doctrinally. My own study of a representative sampling of these commentaries 
bears this out. As a comparative point of reference, the pre-Murtada Sunni scholar Abu 
Ja'far ibn Jarir al-Tabari's (d. 923) commentary notes the disagreement around the 
implications of Surah 9:28 and the precise meaning of the term najis. He cites several 
traditions stating that the impurity connected with the mushrikun is due to their failure to 
perform ghusl, suggesting a perpetual state of circumstantial impurity.79 Others, he says, 
including Ibn 'Abbas, equate najis with rijs, the term used to describe the impurity of 
dogs and pigs. Tabari rejects this interpretation outright, though he accepts the inclusion 
of Jews and Christians within the designation of mushrik while limiting the prohibition of 
mosque entry to the Masjid al-Haram and the surrounding area.80 Tabari is typical of 
Sunni interpreters, apparently accepting the idea that non-Muslims may be 
circumstantially impure but are not themselves impure in substance. 
In contrast, the majority of Shi'ite scholars follow al-Murtada's lead. Al-
Murtada's student, al-Tusi (whose views as tradition narrator were examined above) 
78
 Against my argument, it is possible, as some scholars note, that the boundary between major ritual 
impurity (junub) and substantial impurity (najasah) was at some very early period, less rigid. See 
Encyclopedia of the Qur'an, s.v. "Ritual Purity," 4:504. 
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 Abu Ja'far Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Tafslr al-Tabarv. JamV al-bayan 'an ta'wll al-Qur'an, (Cairo: 
Dar al-Ma'arif, n.d.), 14:190-91. 
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agrees with al-Tabari that the verse includes the People of the Book. In addition to their 
failure to perform ghusl, however, al-Tusi argues that Jews and Christians qualify as 
mushrikun because their beliefs about Ezra and Jesus allegedly compromise the strict 
monotheism of Islam.81 Further, in taking "as lords besides God their rabbis and monks, 
they obey prohibitions and permissions contrary to what God has commanded."82 Al-Tusi 
evidently accepts the theology that associates deviation from the Qur'anic position on 
haram and halal with unbelief because this is equivalent to "forging against God a lie."83 
Commentators after al-Tusi do not depart greatly from the broad lines of his 
interpretation. If anything, they refine it with more extensive linguistic analysis, as 
though attempting to defend the position against criticism. One of the most influential of 
Shi'ite scholars, al-Tabarsi (d. 1153), introduces an analysis around the term najis that 
appears to clinch the argument, as it persists for centuries. Najis, he says, is a masdar 
(verbal noun), admitting no qualifiers of number or gender. Unbelievers are, therefore, 
impure as a class and without exception.84 Later commentators, such as al-Miqdad al-
Hilli (d. 826/1423), repeat the masdar analysis virtually verbatim. 
Like al-Tabarsi, Miqdad sees the impurity of unbelievers as their identifying 
mark: so pervasive is their impurity, he says, there is no other way to describe them— 
laysa lahum wasfilla al-najasah."85 As a legal commentary, al-Miqdad's is one of the 
most extensive on this issue. In addition to clarifying the impurity of unbelievers as 
81
 According to Q9.30, Jews are said to refer to Ezra as the son of God and Christians, of course, refer to 
Jesus in the same way. 
82
 The first part of this statement is an allusion to Q9.31. The second part follows the argument that one 
obeys the laws of whomever one takes as lord and the supposed laws of Ezra and Jesus are allegedly 
contrary to God's commands. Abu Ja'far Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Tusi, Tafslr al-Tibyan (Najaf: Maktabat 
al-Qusayr, 1960), 5:234. 
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 Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts, 131. See Surah 10:69-71. 
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 Fadl ibn Hasan al-Tabarsi, Mukhtasar Majma' al-Bayanfi Tafslr al-Qur'an, (Mu'assasat al-Nashr al-
Islami, 1413 a.h.), 1:20 
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najasah 'ayniyah (intrinsic impurity), having nothing to do with failure to perform ghusl 
or wuda', al-Miqdad argues that the shirk-like beliefs of ahl al-dhimma include them in 
this category.87 Finally, he says, the legal consequences of this status are such that any 
food touched by unbelievers with wetness is contaminated and prohibited to Muslims; 
moreover, unbelievers are forbidden entry into all mosques, as the Qur'an uses the noblest 
part of a thing (al-masjid al-haram) to refer to the whole.89 
However, in the period between these two scholars, Allamah al-Hilli (d. 1325) 
provides a truly Shi'ite rationalization for the impurity of non-Muslims which makes no 
reference to the masdar argument. Al-Hilli borrows Qur'an 9:28 to shore up the Shi'ite 
doctrine of prophetic purity against statements by the Sunni eponymous founders of their 
respective madhdhib, Imam Malik ibn Anas and Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i, in 
support of non-Muslim purity. The prophets all were Muslims, al-Hilli quotes from a 
tradition attributed to Ja'far al-Sadiq, as were all their ancestors. The saying provides 
textual proof in the form of the famous tradition in which Muhammad is believed to have 
said: "They [the prophets] continued to pass through pure loins to pure wombs until God 
brought me into this your world." Al-Hilli clinches his argument with a combination of 
reason and scripture. "If any one of [the prophets] was a kdfir," he argues, "he would not 
be worthy of the characteristic of purity, because God has said that the mushrikun are 
najis, and so he ruled that kuffar are impure."90 Thus, while al-Murtada brought Surah 
9:28 into the discussion on non-Muslim food, al-Hilli used it to substantiate the purity of 
86
 "If they washed their bodies seventy times, they would not add anything [to themselves] except 
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the prophets and their ancestors. Both scholars evidently had in mind the prevailing Sunni 
view that did not sufficiently differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims in the 
matter of purity. By invoking 9:28, the masters of Shi'ite rationalism were able, at least to 
their own satisfaction, to demonstrate the superior piety of the Imami madhhab. 
Until the modern period when new interpretations are introduced,91 commentators 
simply repeat and elaborate on the main threads of the classical position. Al-Kashani (d. 
988/1580), for example, suggests that the impurity of the mushrikun is due to the filth 
(khubth) not solely of their beliefs, but of their inward constitution (batinihim), 
suggesting a notion that beliefs have a direct link with human physiology.92 As do other 
commentators, al-Kashani implicitly acknowledges the still controversial nature of these 
views and, against the more lenient Sunni position that sees the impurity of unbelievers 
as legal (najas al-hukm) only, argues that the narrower view is consistent with a tradition 
on the authority of Hasan al-Basri requiring Muslims to wash after shaking hands with a 
mushrik.93 The majority opinion among Qur'an commentators after al-Murtada, then, is 
clearly that the mushrikun as a class are intrinsically impure. Most, if not all 
commentators, include Jews and Christians in this category. Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi 
(d. ca. 1659), who was instrumental in formulating the Shi'ite worldview supported by 
and supportive of the Safavid dynasty (1501-1726) that made Shi'ism the Iranian state 
For details, see below. 
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 Malatafah Allah Kashani, Tafsir al-Safi (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-'Ilm llal-Matbu'at, 1982), 2:333. This 
latter point is not without parallel in other belief systems, notably Eastern philosophies and indigenous 
traditions wherein what one believes in one's heart and mind manifests in the body, in terms of health, for 
example. The same may be said even of Western traditions with regard, for example, to the perceived 
connection between prayer and bodily wellbeing. 
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religion, also affirms the by now standard Imami opinion on the intrinsic impurity of non-
Muslims and the prohibition against sharing their food and dishes.94 
In conclusion, though the earliest basis for prohibition against non-Muslim food 
was related not to impurity but rather to the non-Muslim's lack of proper belief, with al-
Murtada's new interpretation sometime in the early 11th century, a further basis of 
prohibition—that of non-Muslim impurity—is added. Nevertheless, this later doctrine 
was, like the first, determined first and foremost by a group's distance from the Islamic 
doctrine of tawhid (oneness of God). That is, the less a religious group's idea of God 
conformed to the Islamic idea of oneness—or the more it implicitly or explicitly violated 
it—the more likely that group would be considered impure. This principle is seen in the 
idea that such groups are unable to properly pronounce God's name when slaughtering an 
animal. Thus, I suggest that the extension of the notion of doctrinal error into the 
methodology for determining impurity facilitated the addition of non-Muslim impurity as 
a basis for prohibition and, by extension, for strengthening social boundaries.95 Not until 
the contemporary period do we see any major shift in this opinion. 
THE PURITY SHIFT: MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY LEGAL OPINIONS 
Taking Al-Sayyid Muhammad Kazim Yazdi (d. 1919) as the middle of the 
modern period, we see that a shift to accepting the purity of scriptuaries is a very recent 
development. Yazdi was the sole marji' al-taqlid during the latter years of his life. His 
legal text, al- 'Urwah al-Wuthqa, is a standard reference work for contemporary jurists. 
94
 Baqir al-Majlisi, Bihar al-anwar, 80:42-53. 
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 The doctrinal basis for connecting haram and najis is brought out by a fatwa from Sistani regarding the 
slaughter of "extremists" - who curse the prophet or the Imams. Their slaughter, he says, "is forbidden and 
impure." ,4h£<5/w al-Mughtaribin, 313.922. (The format used for this work, i.e. 313.922, refers to the page 
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his fatwa regarding various fringe groups whose Islam is questionable: "If the groups mentioned [in the 
question] believe in the double witness, even in general, and do not deny a necessity of religion, their 
slaughter is pure (tahirah)." Ahkam al-Mughtaribin, 313.923. 
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As a fundamental text of study within the sutuh (externals) level of the hawzah 
curriculum, it assumes a very high level of learning among those who would interpret 
or comment on it. In the fashion of the hawzah methodology, the contemporary fatwa 
collection I am using quotes Yazdi's opinion at the start of the Book of Impurity and 
Purity. The text reads: 
[among impure things are] the kafir of every kind, including the 
apostate of any kind, Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians; likewise, his 
wetness and parts [of his body], whether containing life or not [an 
example of the latter would be hair or nails]. What is meant by kafir is 
anyone who denies [the existence of] divinity, or tawhid [the unity of 
God], or the message [of Islam and its messenger], or a necessity of 
religion, on condition he is aware that it is a necessity, and such that his 
denial amounts to the same as a denial of the message [as above]. The 
rule is that one is to avoid, out of [obligatory] precaution,97 someone 
who denies a necessity of religion, regardless of whether or not [the 
denier] is aware that what he denies is a necessity [of religion]. [...] 
The person about whom there is doubt whether he is Muslim or kafir is 
pure, even though we do not apply the rest of the rules of Islam to him 
[that is, we do not treat him as Muslim in every legal sense; only in so 
far as purity is concerned].98 
As is customary for seminal texts such as this, numerous full length commentaries exist, 
in which mujtahids note where they disagree and provide proof for the same. The ten 
Momen, Introduction, 201. This level follows on from preliminary studies (muqaddimai). 
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 The text uses only the word al-ahwat (precaution) but I am informed that when used alone, without the 
qualifying adjective "recommended" that it is to be understood as meaning "obligatory." Source: Seyed 
Mahdi Shahrestani. 
98Ahkam al-Mughtaribin, 17-18, 20. My thanks to Seyed Mahdi Shahrestani for his valuable assistance in 
deciphering this text. The unquoted portion of the text, which is not of great concern to us, defines the 
purity status of someone born of a mixed, Muslim-non-Muslim, union. Generally speaking, a child born of 
at least one Muslim parent—legitimate or illegitimate—is considered Muslim as far as purity is concerned. 
Likewise, non-Twelver Shi'ites, unless they share one or more unacceptable beliefs of "extremists," or if 
they curse the Imams, are pure. "Extremists" (al-ghulat) of any kind, however, are unambiguously impure. 
Ibid., 19-20. By extremists is meant groups—archaic and modern—that might consider themselves Muslim 
but who hold beliefs contrary to orthodox Islam, such as those who deify one of the Imams, or, less 
traditionally, who hold to the mystical doctrine of wahdat al-wujud (unity of being). 
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footnotes" written by five highly regarded mujtahids accompanying the portion quoted 
above give us a general idea of some of these disagreements. 
Ayatollah al-Khui, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's predecessor, accepts Yazdi's/afrra 
regarding the impurity of the People of the Book, including apostates from these 
religions, but allows some measure of uncertainty in that he lowers the absoluteness of 
Yazdi's ruling to the level of "[obligatory] precaution."100 In his opinion, then, though 
neither purity nor impurity can be proven with certainty, the stricter of the two should be 
followed. In a separate text, al-Khui likewise argues that scriptuaries who deny the 
prophethood of Muhammad are impure "by majority opinion"101 and avoiding them is 
consistent with precaution.102 While more lenient than Yazdi, Khui's opinion is not quite 
as doubtful of Yazdi, as we will see below, as Sistani's.103 Ayatollah al-Tabrizi likewise 
states that the majority of jurists hold that all unbelievers, including ahl al-kitab, are 
intrinsically impure, and does not mention any disagreement with this.104 In another 
fatwa, however, Tabrizi excludes scriptuaries when equating the impurity of kdfirs with 
that of dogs and pigs, living or dead.1 5 
Sistani glosses Yazdi's ruling by insisting that, in order for it to be legally 
relevant, a person's denial of belief in God and the Prophet must be attested to—by said 
99
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Daftar Intasharat al-IslamT, n.d.), 86. 
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denier—verbally. It seems, as we will see below, that Sistani is in the minority on this 
point. More central to our concern, Sistani remarks that including scriptuaries within the 
general category of kafir, as Yazdi does, is not beyond dispute. On the contrary, he says, 
the kitabT may be included in this ruling only to the degree of recommended precaution 
(al-ihtiyat al-istihbabi), a legal category that is contingent on the absence of certainty to 
the contrary, and carries no definitive obligation of obedience.107 Elsewhere, Sistani is 
less forthright, arguing that scriptuaries who deny belief in the prophethood of 
Muhammad "are impure on the basis of majority opinion, but ruling them as pure is 
not [a] far-fetched [idea]." Nevertheless, he says, "it is better to avoid them."109 
In his book of fatawa for Muslims in the West, Sistani goes the full length on the 
purity of scriptuaries, where he makes the legal principle "everything is pure for you 
unless you know of its impurity" central to his whole approach.11 A person whose 
religion is unknown is also pure, and regarding someone who is inclined towards Islam 
Ibid., 18.2. According to the text, this clearly refers to unbelievers, and not to Muslims who might deny 
belief in God, etc., which suggests to me that Sistani would wish to assume that all people are Muslim 
unless they specifically deny the Islamic statement of faith. 
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 Ibid., 17 n.l. This is so particularly because of the adjective, istihbdbi (recommended). In the opinion of 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, however, precaution itself carries an obligation of obedience on the basis of 
logic. If, he argues, we know that the Lawgiver "has a rightful claim to the obedience of His servants," then 
it follows that this obligation must include "both known and possible injunctionsf.]" Therefore, anything 
concerning which there is a possibility of prohibition should be treated as prohibited; likewise, anything 
concerning which there is a possibility of obligation to perform should be treated as duty. Whatever falls 
into either of these categories of possibility calls for the obligation of obedience as a matter of precaution. 
As al-Sadr puts it, "[t]his means that in a fundamental way whenever we consider prohibition or 
mandatoriness [sic] possible, the source of law is the exercise of precaution. Thus we omit what we 
consider to be possibly prohibited and perform what we consider to be possibly mandatory." Al-Sadr 
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among legal scholars. The majority opinion among jurists is to give priority, rather, to the principle of 
"rational exemption" (bard 'a). That is, where there is absence of certainty regarding a matter, it is rational 
to treat it as standing outside of the human agent's legal responsibility. Al-Sadr also recognizes this 
principle, but treats it as a secondary, rather than primary or fundamental procedural principle. Muhammad 
Baqir as-Sadr, Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence, trans, and introduction Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, 2003), 120-25. See also, pp. 165-69. 
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but not a believer, it is problematic, Sistani says, to rule them impure.111 For Sistani, it 
appears that the only way a Jew or a Christian might be impure is circumstantially so, but 
this must be known without doubt and be affected by flowing wetness to be of any legal 
or practical consequence. The mere assumption that non-Muslim scriptuaries do not 
practice ritual ablutions does not, evidently, count as proof of ritual impurity. Tabrizi 
likewise says that Muslims need avoid scriptuaries only when they have specific 
knowledge of circumstantial impurity; otherwise, they need not.112 
Sistani also alleviates the risk of inadvertently contracting ritual impurity from 
non-scriptuary unbelievers by ruling that it is not required to ask a person about his or her 
religious beliefs prior to taking what could be considered a doubtful course of action. 
Sistani is evidently interested in widening the circle of those who might, by the slightest 
indication, come within the domain of the pure, and likewise in encouraging his followers 
in the West to be confident that they are not surrounded by a constant danger of ritual 
preclusion. Khamenei similarly says, without further explanation, that the intrinsic 
impurity of ahl al-kitab is not commonly accepted, and states that they are ruled as 
intrinsically pure.114 
Makarim al-Shirazi provides a lengthy notation on Yazdi's text and his view 
represents a more strongly worded deviation from the latter's opinion. According to al-
Shirazi, there is no certain proof that even non-scriptuary unbelievers are impure.115 As 
for scriptuaries, he says, many esteemed traditions and verses of the Qur'an provide 
evidence for their intrinsic purity {tahdratahum dhatin) and circumstantial impurity 
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(najasatahum 'aradiyah). The latter, he says, is due solely to the kitabVs lack of attention 
to matters of purity. This general state of circumstantial impurity justifies recommended 
precaution—not with regard to considering them najis—but to avoiding what passes 
through their hands.116 Al-Shirazi sees his interpretation as making sense of an apparent 
contradiction between scriptural texts that both indicate the purity and impurity of 
_ 11"7 
kitabh. His rationalization allows for non-Muslim purity as an intrinsic quality, while 
making allowance for the likely possibility of their circumstantial impurity, which could 
be passed on to a Muslim via direct contact with the polluting item. Al-Shirazi's advice 
of cautionary avoidance covers both considerations. 
Elsewhere, however, al-Shirazi says that all non-believers, scriptuary and non-
scriptuary, are najis, but by precaution (only).118 It seems that the qualifiers of precaution 
(ihtiyat) and precautionary avoidance (ijtinab) can work to narrow the definitional gap 
between intrinsic and circumstantial impurity of non-Muslims by maintaining intrinsic 
impurity, but less definitively so. 
Al-Shirazi's non-absolutist claim for non-Muslim purity is further demonstrated 
in his statements regarding non-scriptuaries. Al-Shirazi says that there is no definite proof 
of their impurity; but nor is there proof of purity, as that would require understanding 
such a reference as contrary to the general thrust of the Imami traditions, which allude to 
their impurity.119 While al-Shirazi seems to favour a shift towards non-Muslim purity, he 
is clearly reluctant to abandon the alleged consensus on the matter, which would, he says, 
be unwise. In the absence of clear proof, al-Shirazi rules, the legal principle, "all things 
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are pure unless there is proof of impurity," prevails. However, the word on interaction 
is again one of caution. Muslims should not be lax about interacting with non-Muslims; 
rather, they should exercise caution in all but situations of necessity. 
Al-Shirazi then interjects the problematical text of Surah 9:28 into his argument, 
focusing on the disputed meaning of the term najis. Rather than repeat the common 
classical argument that its masdar form suggests unmitigated comprehensiveness, he 
notes that the term comprises two possible meanings: literal and abstract; similarly, he 
says, it has been defined as having two sides: internal and external. He notes that in his 
Majma' al-Bayan, al-Tabarsi explained that its root meaning referred to anything that is 
repulsive or hateful (mutanaffir) to human nature, such as diseases for which there is no 
cure or wicked people. In this sense, we might think of the term as a general cultural 
manner of expression for anything that repels, is unpleasant, or disgusting. After some 
ambivalence, al-Shirazi concludes that we are dealing with a general term of many 
possible meanings and that "the literal manner in which it is interpreted in the 
contemporary world may have no connection to what it meant at the time of the Qur'an's 
revelation or in ancient lectionanes." 
In the strongest statement yet, Ayatollah al-Fadil al-Lankarani candidly admits 
that "it is problematic—even prohibited—to consider People of the Book as impure."122 
It seems to him something unthinkable. On the other hand, al-Fadil (as our text refers to 
him) accepts the designation as kafir—whom he rules as intrinsically impure—of anyone 
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above: existence of God, tawhid, and the message and messenger of Islam.123 Further, al-
Fadil conditions the purity status of ahl al-kitab on their not being mushrikun. When 
asked by a mustafti if believing in the Trinity, as Christians do, is not associating partners 
with God, al-Fadil agrees that if they truly believe those they ascribe as partners with God 
to be divine, this counts as shirk. Yet, he insists that there are Christians who are not 
"associationists" and these are pure, even if one is not sure of their belief in this regard.124 
Like al-Fadil, Ayatollah Khomeini says that denial of the Islamic fundamentals 
includes the failure to acknowledge them. For Khomeini, however, it appears that all 
unbelievers are najis, as his official legal treatise, TawdTh al-Masa'il, makes clear; 
Khomeini there declares that "the whole body of an infidel, even the hair, nails and its 
wetness, is unclean."126 The person who doubts the core beliefs or who regards as futile a 
necessary practice of Islam is likewise to be considered an infidel, and impure. However, 
if one is unsure if someone is a Muslim or not, they should be considered pure, though 
they assume the legal position of nonbeliever as far as marriage and burial are 
concerned.127 Khomeini follows the majority opinion that someone about whom it is not 
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known whether or not they are Muslim is pure. For Makarim al-Shirazi, this is so even 
if the person lives in a non-Muslim society.129 
Apart from the exception of Khomeini, the views of contemporary scholars 
represent a fundamental shift of opinion regarding the purity status of non-Muslims. A 
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further exception is Ayatollah Sanei of Iran. While Sanei maintains the medieval opinion, 
he downplays its ramifications for Muslims in daily life. In his legal handbook, Sanei 
declares that all non-Muslims, scriptuary or not, are impure. He argues, however, that the 
conditions needed to contract impurity, including direct contact with flowing wetness and 
absolute certainty of the same, are too difficult to reach, making the doctrine "of no 
significance" (ma 'ril nadarad).130 His opinion does not detract substantially from the 
majority contemporary consensus on the purity of scriptuary non-Muslims. 
Having observed a significant shift in majority opinion, we might ask from where 
it began. Ayatollah Muhammad Ibrahim Jannati of Iran is said to have been the first 
modern legal scholar to embrace the purity of non-Muslims.131 According to Seyed 
Shahrestani, who was a student of his, although Jannati's opinion was not at that time 
authoritative (as he was not yet a high ranking mujtahid) it was adopted by the famous 
Iraqi jurist Ayatollah Muhsin al-Tabataba'i al-Hakim, who then influenced the views of 
other jurists.132 
Jannati accepts the conventional definition of a kafir as someone who disbelieves 
in God, or ascribes a partner to God, does not accept the prophethood of Muhammad, or 
knowingly denies an element of Islam that Muslims consider essential, if that element 
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effectively denies the revelation itself. This is the standard fiqhT definition, divergence 
from which would require an elaborate new ijtihad, which Jannati does not do. Although 
indeed a kafir, Jannati says, such a person is nevertheless intrinsically pure in body. On 
what basis, he does not say explicitly, but we may surmise his reasoning from the 
following: "But," Jannati continues, "from a spiritual (ruhi) and moral (ma 'navi) 
perspective, he [or she] is dirty [foul] (pelld asf)."134 
This suggests that Jannati understands impurity associated with beliefs as 
manifesting within their own field of meaning; that is, as the unbeliever's impurity is 
derived from their unbelief, it remains an abstract, moral quality that has nothing to do 
with matter. Impure material substances, such as feces, etc., in contrast, are—and cannot 
but be—physically and intrinsically impure. Nor, Jannati says, is the kafir 
circumstantially impure if he or she avoids substances that Islam considers impure (pork 
and alcohol, for example). Since Jannati does not distinguish between scriptuaries and 
non-scriptuaries in his masa'/'/, but includes those who deny the prophethood of 
Muhammad (such as Christians and Jews) in the category of kafir, it would appear that 
this same ruling applies to both types of non-Muslims. 
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah of Lebanon likewise reflects a more inclusive 
interpretation of non-Muslim impurity. Whether or not Fadlallah derived his views from 
Jannati, I do not know, but Fadlallah holds to the same notion of moral or spiritual 
impurity. His book oifatawa for Muslims in the West does not have a chapter devoted to 
purity and impurity; my understanding of Fadlallah's views on the subject comes 
primarily from his Qur'an commentary dealing with Surah 9:28. As discussed above, 
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Shi'ite legal commentators have traditionally interpreted this verse to assert the intrinsic 
impurity of non-believers, scriptuaries (more often than not) and non-scriptuaries alike. 
Fadlallah's opinion diverges radically from this boundary-laden interpretation, even as he 
draws the same distinction between tawhid and shirk. For Fadlallah, these terms 
designate fundamentally opposed ideas about God. Though unquestionably impure, being 
an intellectual and symbolic impurity (al-najasah al-dhihmyah, or najasah ma 'nawiyah), 
shirk does not and cannot transmit its spiritual ugliness or shamefulness (qubh) 
physically.135 In no sense, then, are unbelievers intrinsically impure. No human being, 
Fadlallah stresses, "be they mushrik, atheist (mulhid), kitdbi, Buddhist, or anything else," 
may be called impure in and of themselves.136 
That unbelievers are prohibited from the mosque does not, for Fadlallah, serve as 
counter-proof to his argument (as it does, for example, for Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya 
of southern Lebanon);1 rather, he says, the prohibition is rooted in the notion of the 
incompatibility of opposing religious ideas. It is linked to the fact that "al-masjid al-
haram is a masjid of tawhid and has been raised on the foundation of tawhid such that no 
one who has built his life on shirk should enter it, because shirk and tawhid do not go 
together."138 It is the potential that the mushrik has of reintroducing idolatry into the 
mosque, whose foundation and reason for existence is the elevation and propagation of 
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tawhid, which produces the command to banish them from its premises. In any case, in 
defining the category of mushrik, Fadlallah definitively excludes non-Muslim 
monotheists. Evidently, he takes the Christian belief in one triune God as compatible with 
tawhid. 
The question of where to place ahl al-kitab, particularly Christians, with respect 
to tawhid and shirk—and thus with respect to purity—is, as we have seen, irregular and 
laden with ambiguity. When pressed, some (such as al-Fadil) are forced into the position 
common in classical and modern Qur'an exegesis of first converting Christians into 
covert Muslims (by distancing them from trinitarian doctrine according to historic 
Christian orthodoxy) before pronouncing on their intrinsic purity.140 Ayatollahs Jannati 
and Fadlallah are able to avoid having to do this by rejecting the notion that beliefs affect 
a person's bodily purity. For Jannati and Fadlallah, while all non-Islamic beliefs are 
impure or constitute "moral filth," whether trinitarian or polytheistic, impurity remains a 
property of the beliefs themselves, and does not, as su 'r does, become attached to the 
physicality of the people who hold them. 
Before leaving this topic, it is helpful to point out that what we might call the 
kdfir purity code includes laws regarding suspect or marginal Muslims. It is common 
practice among the above mentioned jurists to rule that someone who denies a necessary 
part of Islamic practice, such as prayer or fasting, knowing that it is an Islamic duty, is 
Ibid. Fadlallah's interpretation is reminiscent of Ali Shari'ati's revolutionary interpretation of shirk and 
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impure and should be avoided.1 1 Likewise, the ghulat (extremists) who either deify or 
despise and curse any one of the twelve Imams (some include Fatima) are unanimously 
considered impure, and, logically, it is obligatory at most, precautionary at the very least, 
to avoid them.142 Similarly, al-Shirazi (Makarim) rules that according to obligatory 
precaution, those who believe in the philosophy of wahdat al-wujiid (unity of being)143 
should also be avoided.144 
Looking at the whole picture, then, we may suggest some implications. Within the 
general or what we are calling the ritual purity code, we see a concern to put boundaries 
of protection around all of the spaces—the body of the worshiper as well as the physical 
space where worship takes place—where ritual is performed. The symbolism suggests 
that impurity is diametrically opposed to the places where God is glorified. The Shi'ite 
kafir purity code, we argue, similarly reflects the construction of an allegedly divinely 
ordained pattern by which the believer may determine the intellectual, moral, and social 
boundaries of his or her existence. Avoiding people considered impure may be seen as a 
shar 7 way of minimizing personal contact with ideas contrary to standard orthodox belief 
and thus precluding morally and intellectually harmful influence. Our analysis below of 
specific fatawa touching on purity issues bears this out. 
LIVING AMONG NON-MUSLIMS: CONTEMPORARY FATAWA 
Classical and pre-modern opinions on the impurity of nonbelievers, carried 
forward by some modern jurists, could give the impression that living among non-
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Muslims would result in enormous hardship, or at least confusion, for purity-conscious 
Muslims. Indeed, purity issues affect numerous aspects of daily life in the public realm 
that appear to be of concern to shari'ah-mmded believers. Eating, working with food, 
sitting on public seats, shaking hands, brushing one's teeth, buying clothes, wearing 
clothes, washing clothes, praying in clothes, proselytizing, and being buried, among other 
things, all give rise to questions around the proper—legally and ethically acceptable— 
way to behave. My examination looks primarily at the relation of purity to food 
prohibitions and to employment involving food, drink, and animal products. 
While contemporary mujtahids do not deny the possibility of a connection 
between impurity and food prohibition, they effectively neutralize it. The doctrinal basis 
of this neutralization involves three general principles. These principles diminish the 
possibility of contracting impurity from non-Muslims. The principles are: assumption of 
purity (asalat al-taharah); necessity of certainty of knowledge (yaqln); and non-
investigation (investigation: tahqiq). I define these principles below and discuss how they 
function in the fatwa material, which I divide into two general categories: person-related 
and product-related fatawa. By person-related I mean fatawa treating the possibility of 
contracting impurity from contact with non-Muslims who are considered impure. By 
product-related I mean purity issues that exist independently of potentially impure 
persons. Though the former may also involve products, the potential for impurity rests 
merely with a product's physical contact with a person considered legally impure. 
a. Person-Related Fatawa: Impossible Impurity 
Among person-related fatawa, the most common area of questioning is that 
related to food products; what, for example, are the rules around food touched by a non-
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Muslim who is impure? This kind of issue appears with some regularity in a variety of 
contexts, such as university life, employment, and friendship, and is closely linked to 
other person-related issues evoked by purity concerns: shaking hands, sitting on seats in 
public transport, using laundromats, renting apartments, or being buried, for example. We 
turn now to the principles that mujtahids employ in an apparent effort to minimize the 
impact of impurity while preserving the code. 
The principle of asalat al-taharah says that everything in the world is assumed to 
be pure. When conditioned by the second principle which states that certainty of 
knowledge that something is impure removes that item from the category of purity, this 
deceptively simple principle opens the door to subtle varieties of opinion. Put negatively, 
the two principles combined state that in the absence of certain knowledge (yaqiri) of 
impurity (or, similarly, in the presence of doubt, shakk) an item remains pure. Knowledge 
here may be of two types. One is general legal knowledge of the rulings of one's 
mujtahid to the effect, for example, that all non-Muslims are intrinsically impure, as are 
dogs and pigs. This type of knowledge removes the said group of people from the 
assumption of purity. It still does not, however, translate automatically into a principle of 
avoidance under all circumstances. For this, a second type of knowledge is needed, that 
is, specific knowledge that the right conditions are present to render such impurity 
communicable. For a negative ruling to be applicable, the first knowledge is fundamental, 
and the second knowledge must amount to complete certainty. The following example 
illustrates: 
A student at a Western university asks Khamenei for a ruling when there is a 
strong probability that utensils used for food and food itself have been touched during 
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preparation by the wet hands of unbelievers. While it seems logical, given the context, to 
presume that the said items have indeed been touched by non-Muslims (thus pointing to 
prohibition if these unbelievers are considered impure), Khamenei's response is that 
"mere probability (mujarrad ihtimal) of the kafir's wet touch is not sufficient to obligate 
avoidance."14 In other words, the objective presumption of purity outweighs any 
circumstantially-derived assumptions to the contrary, no matter how probable, so long as 
they remain assumptions. If the questioner had stated absolutely that he or she saw the 
kitabT non-Muslim hand him or her a wet apple, Khamenei would have reason—if he held 
to the intrinsic impurity of scriptuaries—to oblige avoiding consuming the contaminated 
item.146 Though he answers the question in the terms in which it was submitted to him 
(that is, on the assumption that scriptuary kafirs are intrinsically impure), Khamenei adds 
a more fundamental reason for not requiring abstention. This is that he holds to the 
intrinsic purity of ahl al-kitab.147 For Khamenei, this automatically nullifies the 
possibility of contracting impurity from such a person. 
However, Ayatollah al-Sayyid Muhammad Sa'id al-Tabataba'i al-Hakim 
demonstrates how the principle of ihtiyat could alter this ruling and again put up 
boundaries. Concerning food that has been touched by the wet hands of a European 
shopkeeper whose religion is not known, al-Hakim says that the food is pure, "but, 
nevertheless, it is preferable and better as being more consistent with the most 
precautious by recommendation (al-ahwat istihbab"") to keep away from it or purify it if 
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possible." Considering that al-Hakim holds to the intrinsic purity of ahl al-kitab, his 
fatwa suggests a significantly strong cautionary tendency. Though giving a permissive 
ruling, he nevertheless advises caution, likely on the basis of the possibility that the 
shopkeeper may be a non-scriptuary kafir. While, for Khamenei, ambiguity of knowledge 
nullifies a prohibition, for al-Hakim this same ambiguity leads in an opposite direction. 
This is possible because of ihtiyat, a technique used by more conservative jurists to cover 
all possibilities of error particularly when knowledge of the situation is incomplete.149 
Returning to the example of Khamenei'sfatwa above, if a mukallaf knows with 
certainty that items in the house of a non-scriptuary have been touched with wet hands, 
then anything used for eating, drinking, or prayer must be purified before use. Other 
items, however, such as doors and walls, do not need to be purified.150 This latter point 
suggests the hypothesis that impurity affects different items and their uses differently. It 
appears that prayer, consuming (and sometimes storing) food and water, and burial are 
more carefully surrounded by concern for purity than are instances of incidental contact 
with the day-to-day, such as doors, or train seats, or defiled clothing worn other than in 
prayer. In the case of having one's laundry done, for example, al-Khui rules that it is not 
necessary to know about the purity of instruments used for washing clothes, nor about the 
religion of the operators of the machines. All that is necessary is that the water be of a 
sufficient amount to wash off impurities that were previously attached to the clothing. 
Khamenei rules that even if non-kitabi kafirs (whom he considers intrinsically impure) 
have worked on machines and possibly touched them with oil on their hands, this is not 
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an adequate basis of prohibition. Rather, it is necessary that the would-be contaminated 
Muslim witness the incident (i.e., haveyaqin). However, in the event that "one is certain 
of having contracted impurity from such a machine, one is obliged to purify one's body 
and purify or change one's clothing for prayer."152 
It seems from the above that jurists who remain committed to the impurity of non-
Muslims are, nevertheless, at pains to demonstrate its innocuousness. Ayatollah Sanei 
provides an excellent example. Sanei, as noted above, rules that all non-Muslims are 
intrinsically impure but does not on this basis encourage social segregation. Again, this is 
clearly due to the principle ofyaqin. In answer to a question requesting classification of 
all non-Muslims and non-observant Muslims on a purity scale, Sanei replies that "Kiiffar 
are completely impure, but socialization with non-Muslims is not a matter of concern - as 
in eating food for example - because making food or something else impure is dependent 
on knowledge and one hundred percent certainty that does not normally reach that 
level."153 In a different fatwa, he further explains the precise content of that knowledge: 
"[...] Becoming impure from contact is conditional upon contagious wetness, and 
knowledge of such contact must be as clear as the light of the sun [,..]"154 Further, he 
says, modern ways of cleaning can be trusted to purify utensils and plates used by 
kufjfar.155 
Finally, the third principle—non-investigation (investigation: tahqiq or taftlsh) in 
order to reach certainty of knowledge—further narrows the possibility of prohibition. 
That is to say, the first principle (assumption of purity) may not be over-ruled by the 
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second principle (necessity of certainty of knowledge to the contrary) if obtaining that 
knowledge requires any amount of investigation on the part of the muqallid. So, for 
example, Sistani states that one is permitted to buy canned goods sold at a non-Muslim 
supermarket, so long as he or she is not aware of something haram in them. It is not 
necessary, moreover, to ask about the ingredients.156 This is the responsibility of the 
shopkeeper only.157 
The non-necessity of asking questions explains the high level of confidence jurists 
such as Sanei exhibit in virtually eliminating the possibility of a person reaching yaqin 
during the course of his or her daily life. Why, one may be justified in asking, is 
investigation viewed so unfavourably? One explanation, offered by Freidenreich, is that 
"[t]he burden on the consumer would be onerous if he had to ascertain the precise origin 
of every item being purchased."158 This is especially so, I would think, for a law that 
prides itself on balance and not making the lives of Muslims difficult.159 An additional 
possibility is that being too inquisitive may give Muslims a reputation for superfluous 
fastidiousness that could harm the image of Islam in the eyes of Westerners. Mujtahids 
express this concern in other contexts, such as obeying the government. 
In conclusion, we may say that the principles of the assumption of purity and of 
non-investigation make the principle of yaqin, which is what is needed to produce a 
negative ruling, difficult to obtain. Consequently, the "treacherous path" threatened by 
dividing the world into pure and impure is effectively avoided by the principles of ijtihad. 
It is my contention that this is a deliberate attempt to minimize the practical implications 
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of a rather unpalatable doctrine (impurity of non-Muslims) and avoid bringing the burden 
of tawhin (weakening [Islam]—in this case in the eyes of non-Muslims) upon Muslim 
minorities. We turn now to the operation of these principles in the field of product-related 
fatawa. 
b. Product-Related Fatawa: Prohibition and Danger 
More numerous—and more inhibiting—than person-related^a/awa are questions 
dealing with impure and/or forbidden products in the contexts of the mukallaf as 
employee, consumer, and member of a Western society, in which such products are 
commonplace. In the case of employment, is a mukallaf permitted to deliver pizzas with 
forbidden meats on them, or to clean warehouses and offices where one is required to 
move boxes of alcoholic beverages? Can a Muslim work for an establishment such as a 
grocery store or restaurant that sells haram products? Are the wages derived from selling 
haram products legitimate? Are Muslims permitted to buy products produced in the West 
and stamped as halall What about buying halal products from a Muslim store that also 
sells haram items, such as beer and wine? Finally, as member of a Western society, are 
those who are mukallaf permitted to frequent restaurants, cafes, or meetings where 
alcohol is served? Looking at these fatawa in terms of the Muslim's diverse roles in 
relation to the items helps us to identify a corresponding logic. 
Included in the product-related category axe fatawa dealing with "what is taken 
from the hand of a kafir [or found in his lands]."160 Although the non-Muslim person's 
involvement is a crucial factor here, the point of interest is not the non-Muslim's bodily 
purity status, but the purity status of the item in his or her hands. Animal products also 
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give rise to questions regarding whether leather items may or may not be worn during 
prayer. It is not always the case that prohibition of an item's use for one purpose carries 
over into other uses. As with person-related^a/awa, the level of an activity's sanctity— 
which falls into a relatively stable and consistent pattern—is a relevant factor. Again, my 
methodology is to highlight interpretive principles and how they are used to achieve 
specific results; examples from the fatwa literature support the analysis. 
While the three principles governing legal interpretation discussed above remain 
operative in the field of product-related questions to some extent, they function somewhat 
differently here. Assumption of purity, for example, when applied to products, generally 
works in precisely the opposite direction than when applied to people. The basic principle 
here is that whatever comes from the hands of unbelievers or is found in their lands, is 
ruled as impure (ghayr muzakka),161 unless it is known to be, or shows convincing 
indications of being, otherwise.162 Secondly, the principle of certainty of knowledge 
(yaqin) remains a means of easing restrictions, but shifts its value. That is, if yaqin was 
needed to establish the /mpurity of a kafir's touch, ihtimal (probability) is sufficient to 
establish the purity of a product the status of which is questioned. Finally, the matter of 
tahqiq becomes incumbent upon individuals in certain circumstances, such as upon the 
seller of meat to Muslims. These principles tend to make issues related to products more 
complex than those treating people. 
Further complicating matters, the above are joined by three additional principles, 
two increasing and one diminishing the potential for prohibition. A principle that, in 
some circumstances, could increase the likelihood of prohibition is that of aiding the 
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performance of something forbidden by Islam (/ 'anat al-haram or / 'anat al-sharr 
[evil/sin]), even if among those for whom a given activity is permitted, such as eating 
pork. The principle that one is not permitted to benefit from what is forbidden163 also 
increases the likelihood of a prohibitive fatwa. The diminishing principle is that of istihlal 
(transformation): when an impure product undergoes a constitutional transformation, 
such that it may no longer be called by that name, or be recognizable as such, it loses its 
prohibitive force. This is a relatively rare event. An obvious example would be wine 
vinegar, that is, vinegar the basic ingredient of which is wine but which no longer bears 
any trace of intoxicants. Istihlal explains al-Khui's/am>a permitting the use of soap made 
from pig fat.164 Further, though pig hairs remain najis, there is no problem in using them 
in matters unrelated to purity; thus, Khamenei's fatwa permitting the use of pig-hair 
paintbrushes.165 
I discuss primarily the two principles that increase prohibition as these are the 
most commonly employed in product-related fatawa. The general thrust of these fatawa 
can be organized around three central questions: can one hold employment that involves 
working with forbidden products? I look at this under the rubric of the mukallaf as 
employee. The second question treats the flip side of this: What are a mukallaf's duties as 
a consumer in Western society? Finally, I look briefly at the third set of questions, which 
deal with product-related issues that arise for the mukallaf as a member of Western 
society. I find that by employing the principles explained above, product-related fatawa 
are more likely to circumscribe than to ease Muslim life in the West. 
Mukallaf'as Employee 
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Aiding sin is a common hazard in the field of employment, as is the principle of 
not gaining benefit from what is forbidden. For example, Ayatollah Golpayegani rules it 
impermissible to work in or receive wages for translating and dispatching requests for 
items that include wine and pork, as "this is considered helping to promote sin [.. . ] . " 1 6 6 
With or without this additional basis for prohibition, however, working with forbidden 
foodstuffs is commonly forbidden on its own grounds. For example, Khamenei rules that 
it makes no difference whether one is delivering pizza with pork pepperoni to those 
permitted or not permitted to eat it; it is forbidden just the same.167 Likewise, according 
to Khui, it is not permitted to accept employment that involves cooking pork or non-
Islamically slaughtered meat.168 
But selling or serving such meat to non-Muslims depends on knowledge and 
informing the buyer. If one knows for certain that the animal was not slaughtered 
according to Islamic law, it is forbidden regardless of the buyer's religion. But what is 
not known to be forbidden meat (that is, not slaughtered according to Islamic law or najis 
food) may be sold to non-Muslims; likewise, the animal's products may be sold even to 
Muslims, but not as food.169 Elsewhere, Khui says that doubted (as to manner of 
slaughter) and najis meat170 may be sold, even to Muslims, on condition the buyer is 
informed. Tabrizi, in contrast, forbids it on obligatory precaution, particularly if it was 
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slaughtered by cutting the animal's throat.171 Carrion, however, may not be sold, al-Khui 
says, under any conditions172 as it is not permissible to gain benefit from what is 
forbidden.173 The prohibition against benefiting from what is forbidden seems to be the 
most prevalent reason behind prohibiting employment that involves forbidden foods. 
Yazdi's ruling to this effect is followed with little deviation in succeeding fatawa from 
Khomeini, Golpayegani, and others.174 Sistani moderates it only slightly by qualifying the 
prohibition as based on precaution.175 Similarly, he reasons that "serving pork even to 
those for whom it is permitted is problematic and is better to avoid out of [obligatory] 
precaution." Khui's list of commercial prohibitions surely reflects this concern, 
expressed more explicitly in his fatawa that follow it.177 
Al-Khui's fatawa regarding employment in the food sector appear to be 
somewhat inconsistent. How might we account for this? One possible interpretation is 
that Khui bases his opinions on a ranking of forbidden foods; while pork and carrion rank 
foremost among forbidden meats, those about which the manner of slaughter is doubted, 
along with allegedly najis food, rank lower on the scale of problematic meats. This 
interpretation seems to be supported by other fatawa from al-Khui. Alcohol, for example, 
would be ranked among the most forbidden along with work that promotes its use. Al-
Khui expresses this in afatwa that emphatically prohibits working in dispatching orders 
for alcoholic beverages; it is not permitted under any circumstances, regardless of the risk 
171
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to one's chances of employment.178 On the other hand, al-Khui allows for the possibility 
of moving boxes of alcohol if that is but a part of one's duties, but prohibits that portion 
of the worker's salary.179 
Ayatollah Montazeri likewise forbids employment in restaurants and hotels that 
serve alcohol, even if the majority of customers are non-Muslims. The mustaftfs question 
is presented methodically and thoroughly. "Take note," the writer says, "that the majority 
of the customers are not Muslims." He further points out the fact that Islamic standards 
are uncommon in such places. Finally, he reminds Montazeri that when alcohol is boiled 
or heated in cooking it becomes vapour. Montazeri's response is definitive. All such 
activity "is aiding the performance of sin and therefore impermissible." Further, he 
advises the mustafiio "ask God's help in finding work in which doing what is forbidden 
is not required because God never puts anyone in a position of having to do what is 
harcim."180 
Noteworthy is that the loss of educational credentials that many migrants have the 
misfortune to experience is not classified as necessity, legally a basis for permission. The 
pressure to take jobs below the migrants' professional qualifications does not, according 
to mujtahids, overrule the principle of not taking benefit from what is haram.181 The only 
mujtahid to offer a different view is Fadlallah. He rules that it is permissible to work as 
an employee who sells forbidden foodstuffs to those for whom it is permitted on behalf of 
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the same; "but one is not permitted to buy it in order to sell it." In other words, 
following Fadlallah's logic, it would not be permissible, or it would be at least 
reprehensible, for a Muslim shop owner to stock forbidden meat, but one may serve in 
the role of employee. Fadlallah's opinion in this matter has significant implications for 
legally observant Muslim migrants' chances for employment in the West. 
In sum, the general trend among mujtahids to rank the prohibition against 
benefiting from what is forbidden above difficulties of finding employment results in 
limiting opportunities for employment in the West. There appears to be very little effort 
to apply legal reasoning contextually, to find innovative solutions that would open up 
Muslims' employment options without necessarily compromising religious obligations. 
Rather, the solution seems to be one of ghetto formation (or, possibly, forcing the 
alternative—disregard for Islamic law where keeping it is inconvenient). Al-Shirazi, who 
cautiously permits working with forbidden meats in situations of necessity, goes so far as 
to propose that Muslims in the West would do better to open their own stores and 
"establish their own associations so that in working amongst themselves, they would be 
able to maintain Islamic laws in all things."183 His solution highlights the negative 
correspondence between working in the mainstream sector and maintaining Islamic law 
implied in many employment-related^awa. 
Mukallaf as Consumer 
There is widespread agreement among mujtahids on the matter of meat 
consumption. Even Sistani and Fadlallah, who often deviate slightly towards permission 
on other matters, here tend towards more restrictive opinions. Generally speaking, meat 
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slaughtered by non-Muslims is forbidden, not on account of non-Muslim impurity, as al-
Murtada deduced in the 11th century, but due to the standard classical position that non-
Muslims, even if they use the knife correctly, cannot—by default—pronounce the name 
of God with correct belief over the animal. Islam, Tabrizi says, "is the condition for the 
one slaughtering."184 Sistani and Fadlallah also prohibit meat slaughtered by non-
Muslims, but only on precaution.185 Ayatollah Montazeri forbids it outright.186 
Similar to determining non-Muslim impurity, prohibiting meat is conditioned on 
certain knowledge that it was not slaughtered Islamically (or that it is, like pork, najis).187 
However, several possible variables make the matter of determining legality of meat and 
animal products more complex. The central axis around which mujtahids calculate the 
relative weight of these variables is the religious affiliation of the product's primary 
economic location: is the market Muslim or non-Muslim? Is the product's original 
connection to a Muslim's or a non-Muslim's hand? Which affiliation indicates the more 
dominant actor or induces trust? Afatwa from Montazeri regarding leather goods reflects 
the same principle. The mustaftl asks about the permissibility of buying leather goods 
from Dubai or other Muslim countries that sell imported leather products. So long as the 
vendor is Muslim and it is clear that he bought it from a Muslim or if from a kafir he 
made certain it was both tahir and halal, it is permissible. But if the vendor is non-
Muslim, Montazeri says, or if he is a Muslim who bought it from a non-Muslim without 
due inquiry, then the product is forbidden.188 
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According to Golpayegani, what is in a Muslim's hand but in a non-Muslim 
market must be avoided out of precaution. Further, if an animal product currently in the 
hand of a Muslim is known to have been previously in the hand of a non-Muslim, "it 
must be avoided."189 Similarly, Sistani forbids from a non-Muslim market meat that was 
previously in the hand of a Muslim. He likewise forbids meat received "from a non-
Muslim, or from a Muslim who got it from a non-Muslim and did not inquire about its 
slaughtering according to Islamic laws [...]."190 Sistani does, however, permit that animal 
products found in the hand of a non-Muslim, the legality of which is (merely) probable, 
be worn in prayer.191 Though not considered najis, it is still haram to eat it. Afatwa from 
Sanei is perhaps the most restrictive. According to Sanei, "meat and its by-products in the 
lands of the kuffdr are ruled as carrion and are najis.'"192 Sanei has a tendency in his 
fatawa to collapse the three types of impermissible food (forbidden meat such as pork, 
carrion, and food contaminated by a kafir's touch), making it difficult to know the precise 
cause of the food's impurity. 
In all of these fatawa, a non-Muslim market or an origin in the hand of a non-
Muslim signifies non-legal slaughter. In contrast, standard opinion is that food purchased 
in Muslim markets in the West, whether in the hand of a Muslim or someone whose 
religion is not known for certain, can generally be trusted as halal, and it is not permitted 
under these conditions to inquire about how or by whom it was slaughtered. 
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The matter of trust is also operative in the realm of testimony. The mere assertion 
by a non-Muslim that meat is halal is insufficient basis for permissibility,193 although al-
Fadil permits the testimony of a non-Muslim vendor so long as he is working in a Muslim 
market.194 The testimony of non-Muslims is likewise of no consequence when stamped 
onto the product. This is confirmed by fatawa from Khui, Sistani, and Golpayegani. As 
Golpayegani puts it, "If it is imported from Muslim countries, it is ruled as halal and 
tahir, and it is permitted to eat, sell, and buy it. But if it comes from non-Muslim 
countries, it is ruled as mayta; the writing is of no consequence unless it is clearly 
determined (ahraza) to have been slaughtered according to Islamic law."195 Sistani 
likewise rules as impermissible meat, whether fresh or canned, bearing a stamp of 
approval but produced by non-Muslims.196 In contrast, the word of a Muslim, even if 
non-observant, is trustworthy unless, Fadlallah says, "he is known for certain to be a 
liar."197 Non-meat products are less threatening. For example, Sistani permits his 
followers to purchase non-meat food products of unknown ingredients from a Western 
store, so long as the buyer "doesn't know that it contains haram items, or ingredients 
1QS 
derived from them"; moreover, in this case, it is not necessary to inquire. 
Montazeri provides a similar response to a muqallid living in a small town in 
Canada, where the only Iranian store is suspected of being run by a Baha'i. "If buying 
from this store is problematic," the muqallid adds, "then what of the thousands of other 
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stores the vendors of which we don't know their religion, or even the Chinese and 
Japanese who have no religion?" Montazeri's reply is double-sided. One need not ask the 
Iranian vendor's religion and may purchase from the store; however, his meat and other 
animal products are not permitted.199 Montazeri does not say, but it would seem that he is 
invoking the principle of precaution. 
In another fatwa, Montazeri suggests that difficulty of finding Islamically 
slaughtered meat in Europe is insufficient reason to abandon "the Qur'an and the practice 
(sunnat) of the infallibles (the Imams)." On the contrary, he says, "the presence of 
modern means for coming and going and of freezers in most homes should resolve the 
problem. And [besides]," he adds, "no-one is forced to remain somewhere in which the 
possibility of acting in accordance with God's law is not easy for him or her, because 'the 
earth is wide enough."200 Montazeri might be understood as suggesting that in addition to 
freedom to practice the rituals of Islamic worship, classically the central criterion used to 
legitimate residence outside of dar al-islam, living in a non-Muslim environment might 
also be conditioned on having access to properly slaughtered meat, even if this required 
extra effort. Similarly to some fatawa from Fadlallah, as will be seen in later chapters, the 
message conveyed here is that mustaftis might be too quick to jump to what mujtahids 
seem to view as rather weak excuses for 'hardship'. 
Consumers also face moral issues with regard to their purchases. For example, 
Sistani permits purchasing halal products from a Muslim store that also sells wine, "if it 
is probable that the Muslim shop owner investigated [the meat's] legality."201 It seems 
that Sistani's concern is not so much one of business ethics, but one of trust; a Muslim 
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who sells wine suggests the need for a measure of caution, though hardly one of vigilante 
activism. Moreover, in permitting the purchase, Sistani effectively puts the greater 
responsibility on the Muslim proprietor or employee rather than the consumer. It might 
be reasoned that in purchasing permitted products, regardless of what else is sold, the 
consumer—to whom the fatwa is here directed—does not gain from what is forbidden. 
Though the purchase may well benefit the shop owner generally, this is not the 
consumer's responsibility. More leniently, Fadlallah gives cautious permission to a 
mustafti who asks if it is permissible "to buy meat from stores of non-observant Muslims 
who sell wine and other forbidden items in their stores." Fadlallah replies: "If we are able 
to buy from those who do not sell alcohol/wine (khamr) then it is obligatory (to buy from 
them); but if this is not possible, then it is permitted (to buy from the other)."202 
In sum, the thrust of these fatawa indicates carefully placed boundaries around the 
consumption of meat and purchase of animal products in Western countries and from 
people not known for certain to be Muslim. The requirement that meat and animal 
products be from a tahir animal, slaughtered by a Muslim and certified by the same, 
places significant restrictions on grocery shopping and making other purchases in the 
West. Nevertheless, proprietors, employees, and consumers have unequal responsibilities 
in this regard. The consumer, though restricted to halal meat products, is responsible only 
for his or her own choice of shopping venue. If done according to the fatwa literature, this 
would mean good business for Muslim butchers, shopkeepers, and markets, not to 
mention lending support to communal solidarity. 
Mukallaf as Member of Western Society 
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One question dominates the discussion around food and drink in the context of 
social intercourse, and that is what a Muslim is to do in the presence of wine or other 
alcoholic beverages. This is, of course, a very common occurrence in the West. Avoiding 
it completely could easily present a formidable obstacle to ordinary social intercourse. 
Nevertheless, there is widespread agreement among mujtahids that such avoidance is 
necessary. Khomeini, Khui, Golpayegani, and Khamenei forbid sitting at the same table 
where alcohol is served. Khamenei likewise forbids merely attending a gathering where it 
is present and adds that this serves as a testimony to one's Muslim identity.203 Fadlallah 
and Sistani take a slightly more nuanced approach. Sistani states that "the table" from 
which the Muslim is barred is literally only the one where alcohol is being drunk; it does 
not refer to other tables within the same room, as in a restaurant. The prohibition against 
sitting at the same table, Sistani says, is based "on precaution."204 Although attendance at 
meetings where alcohol is served is not forbidden, according to Sistani, not attending is, 
on the basis of necessary precaution, the better option. But, he adds, "If it is possible to 
use it as an opportunity to dissuade others from sin, it's okay (la ba's)."205 
Socializing in the presence of hardm food items where one is tempted to consume 
them, might also be problematic. For Fadlallah, merely sitting at a table where there is 
carrion or pork is permitted.206 Montazeri considers a mustaftTs concern to not offend his 
non-Muslim colleagues by not eating their meat when invited to their homes insufficient 
grounds for partaking of it. Moreover, he adds, it is a matter of mutual respect. "In the 
same way that your colleagues - whatever their religion - consider themselves free of 
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Islamic laws of slaughter and you respect their belief," he says, "you should likewise 
consider yourself free [to maintain such laws] and they also must respect your religious 
beliefs."207 
CONCLUSION: A T HOME IN THE HURAH?20* 
This study shows that it is in the field of product-related issues where life in the 
West presents the greatest challenge in terms of purity and food concerns and where the 
weight of prohibition may be said to neutralize the more socially integrative character of 
person-related^a/awa. The "assumption of purity" principle, widely applied in this 
domain, makes rulings of non-Muslim impurity difficult to obtain. Even when a mujtahid 
holds the opinion, as Sanei does, that non-Muslims are impure, conditions for 
contamination are so rare that it still results in what Kevin Reinhart calls an "impurity no 
danger" principle.209 
We might ask why, in spite of its deep roots in classical and pre-modern legal 
discourse and Qur'an exegesis, contemporary mujtahids would downplay or even 
contradict traditional opinion on non-Muslim impurity. From a psychological point of 
view, it is reasonable to speculate that with the rise of Muslim migration to the West, the 
repercussions of a closed social network based on judgments regarding persons amongst 
whom the migrant community lives could give an unwanted impression of anti-social and 
intolerant attitudes. In addition, the relative unimportance of person-related impurity 
gives Shi'ite Muslims in the West a greater affinity with Sunni Islam, for which non-
Muslim impurity is essentially a non-issue. 
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Both Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims, in any case, express concern regarding legal 
slaughter and permit each other's meat, a fact that propels the shari'ah-minded amongst 
the community towards the formation of a subculture built around buying, selling, and 
consuming food. As a necessary daily activity, preparing and eating food is universally 
surrounded by diverse cultural customs and habits that are not easily discarded. When 
tied to religious values, the sense that dietary habits are part and parcel of one's identity 
is even more pronounced. As one food scholar put it, the common adage "you are what 
you eat" suggests that if you don't know what you're eating, your identity is put into 
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question. 
A final possible reason for the shift only in non-Muslim impurity is that not only 
are dietary laws shared with the broader Muslim community, they are also far less likely 
to raise suspicions in the non-Muslim majority community, as such laws are common in 
many cultures (most Westerners are at least minimally familiar with Jewish kosher laws). 
Consequently, they are more widely acceptable. A recent article in the Montreal Gazette 
shows how lively an issue dietary law is within the Muslim community at large. While 
the Toronto-based Halal Monitoring Authority looks after inspecting and certifying food 
the producers of which claim is halal, the article states, no such body exists as yet in 
Montreal. Though hiring inspectors adds significantly to a butcher's expenses, the article 
suggests that many of Quebec's Muslims feel it is worth the effort to ensure certification. 
'"[...] if we say it's halal,'" one proprietor states, '"we have to make sure it's halal.'"211 
This study suggests that rigorous inquiry might be less crucial than recognition 
that a butcher or market is Muslim, a requirement that supports the notion that safety and 
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security lies in the construction of social spaces that are noticeably defined by Islam. This 
is a theme that repeats itself over and over in the fatwa literature for the West, not only in 
the area of purity-related concerns, but from ritual duties to education to dress. Though 
there is a range of opinions, this is not so plentiful as to negate my thesis that, for the 
legal scholars, space in the West is truly safe for Muslims only in as much as it is Muslim 
space. 
This has intriguing associations with the notion of home as sacred space. Safety 
and security, it is said, are fundamental to human beings' "attachment to place," reflected 
in the universal notion of home.212 Similarly, the house (ddr) of Islam is the place "where 
the believers live in safety, while dar al-harb, 'the abode of war,' is the world outside the 
ideal home of the believers."213 As the home protects its inhabitants from hostile forces 
around it, so it also needs protection. Nothing illustrates this more than boundaries, a 
concept filled with sacred meaning. The very word sacred, sanctus, derived from the 
word sancire, meaning 'to limit' or 'to enclose,' Annemarie Schimmel tells us, suggests 
the notion of "making sacred by separation."214 Boundaries around the (African-
American) Muslim home in America "define an area of control," Beverly McCloud 
adds.215 
McCloud shows how in the Western Muslim context this translates into an 
insider-outsider paradigm, where protection signifies preventing the hostile forces of the 
outside world of haram from entering the metaphorical home of Islamic legal observance 
212
 David Brown, God and Enchantment of Place: Reclaiming Human Experience (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 158-9. 
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and harming its inhabitants. I suggest that for the marji' al-taqlid, the custodians of this 
law, life in the West is neither sacred, nor fully safe; nor, yet, is it home. Perhaps 
mujtahids are too far removed from the situation in the West to appreciate the depressing 
consequences of legal rigidity in the minority context. I suggest that without taking 
adequate account of legally valid contextual factors of time and place, and applying a 
very narrow interpretation of necessity, their opinions risk alienating followers. 
Finally, we may note the tendency of mujtahids to correlate responsibility with 
role, a reflection, perhaps, of the fundamental philosophy behind the institution of the 
marji 'Tyah itself, where the muqallid "hangs" his or her responsibility on the shoulders of 
the muqallad, the legal scholar. As those who possess training and knowledge, mujtahids 
bear the brunt of moral responsibility on behalf of their followers who lack the time and 
training needed to gain such knowledge. This pattern is reflected in the case of product-
related fatawa. We see there a structured method of deferral of responsibility -
responsibility rests with the nearest source of the food product and his access to 
knowledge, the shopkeeper before the customer; or with the producer/butcher before the 
shopkeeper. Consequently, while each individual is responsible for his or her own moral 
choices, the level of accountability corresponds to one's degree of access to knowledge. 
This apportioning of responsibility might be understood to offset the otherwise difficult 
task shari 'a/z-minded migrants face in leading a legally defined moral life in the midst of 
a "hostile" environment outside of the Abode of Islam. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RITUAL LIFE: DUTY AND IDENTITY 
To say that the field of 'ibadat is of great importance in Islamic law, as it is to 
observant Muslims, would be an understatement. As the contemporary Sunni scholar 
Sayed Sikandar Shah put it, " 'Ibadah stands central in the teachings of Islam. The Qur'an 
describes it to be [sic] the raison d'etre of human creation: 'I have not created man and 
jinn except for my ibadah''" (Q51:56).1 As a field in fiqh, 'ibadat are also less given to 
alteration than are mu 'dmalat. As Ayatollah Mostafa Muhaghegh-Damad has noted, 
"obligatory and forbidden acts," such as acts of worship, are "fixed." They "do not 
change with time and place and are not determined by the government."2 Moreover, 
neither the necessity nor manner of ritual performance is rationally determined. There is, 
it is said, no rational explanation for why worship is commanded by God "except that 
these were commanded by the Lawgiver, and it is rational to obey him."3 This might help 
to explain the negligible amount of interpretive reasoning mujtahids appear to exercise in 
fatawa on this subject. 
Yet questions on ritual matters in the West are plentiful. Why is this? One can 
postulate that one reason is that laypeople are not always familiar with what the law says 
and, as discussed earlier, obtaining this knowledge from a qualified authority is the 
mukallafs full legal responsibility.4 Robert Gleave has rightly stated that in accordance 
with Usutilegal theory, "[o]ne who refuses to obtain for himself the guidance necessary 
1
 Seyed Sikandar Shah, "Ibadah: A Concept Beyond Ritualism in Islam," Islamic Quarterly 44, 3 (2000), 
537. 
2
 Muhaghegh-Damad, "Role of Time and Social Welfare," Shi'ite Heritage, 213-222, 215. 
3
 Gleave, Inevitable Doubt, 124. 
4
 This is in conformity to the position reached by Shaykh Murtada Ansari (d. 1864), discussed in Chapter 
Two, that knowledge of the law and personal discretion are not in themselves sufficient bases for action on 
the part of ordinary Muslims. 
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to fulfil [sic] the law of God is not forgiven his errors. Even if by chance, some of his 
actions accord with the rulings of God, his intention is faulty."5 This is especially serious 
in matters of ritual law according to Shaykh Ansari's ruling that ritual performance is 
legally void if not performed in obedience to a recognized marji '.6 Variables added by 
the Western context would inevitably augment the need for specialized knowledge of the 
proper manner of ritual worship. As situations prevalent in the West are not commonly 
covered in standard legal manuals, mukallafs who wish to comply with the system are 
obliged to refer to the designated authorities. 
Secondly, it appears that mustaftis anticipate guidance that enables them to 
accommodate to the Western social context to some degree. Many inquire about possible 
mitigating circumstances. This suggests an expectation of legal interpretations that utilize 
principles intended to relax regulations in certain contexts. One such principle is that of 
difficulty and hardship ('usr wa haraj). 'Usr wa haraj, as discussed in chapter one, is a 
principle of Shi'ite law that allows a rule to be lifted when a person is unable to fulfill it. 
It appears to function in binary opposition to the principle of ihtiyat, which is favoured 
rather by mujtahids, and which I discuss below. As discussed in chapter one, the context 
of the Qur'anic verses,8 and the explanation given by Ja'far Sajjadi, indicates that the 
primary reference of 'usr wa haraj is to lifting rules of 'ibadat, such as ablution, prayer, 
and fasting, when following them is made difficult by illness or travel. As we will see 
below, mustaftis frequently try to obtain permission to lift a ruling due to some form of 
perceived "hardship." More often than not, however, the type of hardship they describe is 
5
 Gleave, Inevitable Doubt, 17. 
6
 See Moussavi, Religious Authority, 174-75; 271-72. 
7
 Sajjadi, Farhang, 1:88. 
8
 Surah 2:185, "God desires ease (yusr) for you and does not wish difficulty ('usr) for you..." and Surah 
22:78, "He has not laid any hardship (haraj) upon you in religion..." (and similarly, Q5:6). 
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related to variable contextual factors such as not having time to pray at work and does not 
correlate to any textually determined, or certain, cause. 
This serves as an interesting example of how new situations challenge the Imami 
legal methodology. According to Muhaghegh-Damad, the methodology requires that 
factors such as benefit and harm be established solely "on the basis of textual evidence," 
and not, as in Sunni law, be reached by qiyas (analogy) or other methods such as 
'"discerning the public interest' (istislah)."9 While analogical reasoning is practiced in 
Shi'ite law, it is not the qiyas of Sunni schools, in which the 'ilia may be determined by 
the jurist's opinion (zann). Where Muhaghegh-Damad appears to rule out analogical 
reasoning altogether, Gleave explains that in Shi'ite law, "the identification of the 'ilia 
must be certain."10 Thus, it seems that one factor preventing mujtahids from accepting the 
contextual factors pleaded by mustaftis is the methodology of the Shi'ite madhhab with 
regard to analogy. Another, as we will observe, is ihtiyat. 
The combination of factors outlined above results in some predictability in terms 
of concrete results in legal opinions. Be this as it may, an analysis of the dialogue 
between mustaftis and mujtahids in the field of 'ibadat yields some interesting 
observations. The chapter demonstrates that fatawa in the field of 'ibadat reflect a 
tendency towards a "paradigm of resistance" to the West on the part of mujtahids, while 
also resisting mustaftis'' timid initiatives towards a paradigm of "selective engagement." 
While this is at least partly due to methodology, the literature suggests that a broadly 
based adoption of Metcalf s paradigm of "resistance" issues also out of mujtahids' values 
and attitudes towards the West and their views of Muslim minority identity. While 
9
 Muhaghegh-Damad, "Role of Time," 215. 
10
 Gleave, Inevitable Doubt, 130. 
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ardently endeavoring to preserve Islamic identity and values, with some notable 
exceptions, mujtahids seem generally to lack appreciation for the values of Western 
society and appear to be unfamiliar with problems and realities of minority integration. 
There is common consensus that Islamic ritual life, expressed as the pillars 
(arkan) of Islam,11 is of critical importance to Muslim identity and the fundamental value 
of maintaining the legal strictures of their performance is perceived as especially vital for 
those who reside in the West. Earlier, it was pointed out that hijrah to non-Muslim 
territory in Shi'ite legal discourse was itself conditional upon "freedom to manifest [or 
perform] the signs of Islam," commonly understood as the ritual duties. The problem of 
ritual performance is thus crucial to the larger juristic discourse on migration to the West. 
In Ihefatdwd of 'ibadat, the "signs of Islam" become the enduring and uncompromising 
locality of a manifest Muslim minority identity, constructed around a strict legalism. 
Rituals performed in the West emerge as pillars in a very literal sense, such that any 
weakness in their observance would result in the whole edifice of Islamic identity to 
collapse and to give way to the ascendancy of unbelief over imdn, for which reason 
migration itself is prohibited.12 
The fatawa analyzed in this chapter treat the performance of ritual worship in a 
non-Muslim Western context only, though some overlap with more general questions is 
inevitable. I have chosen for analysis the most representative out of the fifty or so 
consulted. I catalogue them into three general categories: questions occasioned by a 
11
 After confession of faith (shahadah), the four pillars of worship are the five times daily ritual worship 
(three in Shi'ite Islam) (salat), the yearly month long fast of Ramadan (sawm), paying the obligatory 
religious tax (zakai), and pilgrimage (hajf) to the holy sites of Mecca. 
12
 See chapter three. 
1
 Fatawa on ritual practices have been issued also by Khomeini, Khamenei, Fadil al-Lankarani, 
Golpayegani, Tabrizi, and Makarim. These may be found in Ahkam al-Mughtaribin, 92-96, and 100-101. 
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non-Muslim social context; questions that arise out of geographic location relative to the 
natural environment; and questions related to Western sources of knowledge and 
instruments of technology. These are, of course, heuristic categories only and should not 
be considered rigidly defined. As several fatawa might be placed in more than one 
category, I use my own discretion in assigning them to the category of primary relevance. 
After a summary of the most salient features of the fatawa, I will discuss a selection in 
more detail. 
SUMMARY OF STYLISTIC CHARACTERISTICS 
In terms of stylistics, istifta 'at concerning ritual worship and fatawa both tend to 
be brief, with some exceptions. Al-Hakim is habitually more verbose than others, often 
providing detailed justifications for his opinions. Mujtahids tend to structure their 
responses in direct reference to the questions, avoid responding to unarticulated questions 
that might be implied in the language used, and tend not to assume motives. These 
stylistic features give the fatawa an appearance of legal objectivity, though elements of 
subjectivity are often not far beneath the surface. We look first at the general 
characteristics of istifta 'at.. 
Istifta 'at 
MustaftTs appear to be familiar with the generalities of Islamic law. Much of this 
may be attributable more to the editors who rework istifta 'at to conform to a relatively 
standard pattern that uses conventional legal terminology.14 The simplest of what I see as 
four standard formulae is to go directly to the question of permissibility. For example, the 
following question put to Fadlallah: "Is it right to pray in the home of a person from ahl 
14
 The standard format of istifta 'at gives this impression. This was confirmed by Seyed Mahdi Shahrestani, 
mentioned in chapter two, in personal conversation on July 3, 2006. 
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al-kitab and on a piece of material that he says is washed?"15 A slightly more detailed 
question would include sub-questions giving possible variables, each of which requires 
legal guidance. For example: "If the time for prayer arrives when we are working, are we 
allowed to use some of our work time to perform the prayer, if this does not affect the 
progress of our work? And if it does affect our work, is it allowed? And is the prayer 
valid? Is seeking the permission of the work boss obligatory?" also asked of Fadlallah.16 
The third pattern includes a brief description of the mustafti's situation, with or 
without sub-questions. For example, "In some areas in Sweden the sun doesn't set for a 
period of 52 days, and in other regions, the day will be 23 hours long, and in others, the 
day will last for 17 hours. What is the ruling on the prayer and fasting of the Muslim 
brothers who are residing in these areas?" asked of Fadil al-Lankarani.17 Finally, there are 
questions that include one or more of the above components as well as a veiled or 
unveiled attempt to persuade the marji'. Such is the following question answered by at 
least three mujtahids: "The time of prayer arrives during the Muslim employee's work 
hours and work here is highly in demand and precious. The worker will encounter 
difficulties in leaving his job for prayer; it might result in his being dismissed from his 
job. Under these circumstances, can he perform his prayer as qada' (an obligation 
owing)?18 Or, is he obliged to do it even if it leads to having to leave his job that he 
needs?"19 
Fadlallah, al-Hijrah wa al-ightirab: ta'sisfiqhi li-mushkilat al-laju' wa al-hijrah (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-
'Arif al-Matbii'ut, 1999), 376; Fadlallah, Islamic Lanterns, Conceptual and jurisprudence questions for 
natives, emigrants and expatriates, comp. Adil al-Qadi and S. al-Samarra'i, trans. S. al-Samarra'i (Beirut: 
Dar al-Malak, 1425/2004), 309.D12. 
16
 Fadlallah, Islamic Lanterns, 311-12.D21. 
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 Ahkam al-Mughtaribin, 100-101.238. 
18
 See below. 
19
 al-Hakim, Murshid al-Mughtaribin, 193-94.74. 
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In chapter one, we discussed the legal term qada' as referring to an obligation 
owing, especially to God, and noted the strict conditions by which it becomes legally 
operative. Mustaftis, in contrast, tend to use the term in a wider sense of intentional 
postponement due to some practical cause and anticipate the validity of delaying prayers 
until, for example, after employment hours. The legal and theological notion that only 
God has absolute claim of obedience would tend to reinforce the unlikelihood of a ruling 
such as this, as doing so would violate the primary right (haqq) of 'ibadah, and indeed of 
obedience, one owes ultimately to God alone.20 
By articulating the problems perceived to be relevant to themselves, mustaftis set 
the terms of engagement with mujtahids. The fundamental rules of worship being 
familiar enough, questions commonly revolve around three inter-related concerns: 
1. how to define "hardship" ('usr wa haraj) in different situations - i.e., what 
constitutes hardship in the legal sense; 
2. determining legal conditions for performing ritual duties as qada '21 
3. determining conditions for other forms of suspension or alteration of these 
duties. 
We may problematize these tasks in two ways. In terms of adaptation, how does a 
person adapt the practice of Islamic ritual life—which assumes a God-centered social 
order within which human beings stand in relation to God in positive affirmation of 
See, for example, Ayatullah Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi, "The Source of 'Rights'," A l-Tawhld 17, 
no. 2 (2003). Available online at: http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/source_rights/ (accessed January 26, 
2009). Yazdi is within the centre of the tradition when he speaks of rights as being embedded in the 
relationship of the Creator to the created. "Hence," he says, "the first right of possession of creatures is 
established for the Creator. On this basis the right of possession for every existent being has finally to be 
authenticated by divine design. Therefore, if the Almighty Allah (SwT) did not permit man to use his limbs 
and organs he could not have this right. The right to possession of other beings, all of which are the total 
and absolute property of the Creator could not, therefore, be imagined. Also, the first duty of a man 
originates from the real over lordship of the Almighty Allah (SwT) and no duty can take precedence over it. 
All other 'rights' and duties spring from this right and duty." 
21
 See below. 
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God's lordship —to a Western secular public sphere defined by an alternate, human-
centered paradigm? And, secondly, in terms of identity, what constitutes the essential and 
uncompromising features of Muslim identity and what is their meaning in a minority 
situation? 
Fatawa 
The fatawa indicate some general tendencies in terms of rulings, methodologies, 
and reference, explicitly or implicitly, to a number of sub-discourses. Fatawa of ritual are 
largely restrictive and tend towards dichotomizing the perceived socio-ethical world of 
Islam and that of non-Muslims or the West. The majority offer a negative ruling even in 
cases in which social context suggests a need for leniency, which might conceivably be 
granted via juristic principles such as 'usr wa haraj or change in a ruling to adjust to time 
and place (zaman wa-makari). Although 'usr wa haraj is invoked on occasion, what I am 
calling "juristic worldview discourses" appear to function more pervasively and 
decisively.23 
Another prominent underlying discourse is that of da 'wah. A search of the term 
da 'wah in any standard risalah would produce few visible results. Apart from the 
injunction to call on the enemy in expansive warfare (jihad) to convert in lieu of war, the 
early conquests do not display any major missionary objective. On the contrary, the term 
more frequently paired with jihad was not da 'wah, but hijrah, as discussed briefly in 
chapter three. Early Muslims were strongly encouraged to migrate to Medinah in order to 
22
 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Standing Before God: Human Responsibilities and Human Rights," in Humanity 
Before God: Contemporary Faces of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2006), 299-300. The concept is in reference to the classical Islamic notion that humanity as a whole 
answered affirmatively to God when asked, "Am I not your Lord? They said: Yea, verily. We testify" 
(7:172)." Nasr puts it eloquently when he states: The response, 'Yea,' [...] involves not only Adam but all 
human beings, that is, to be human is to have said yes to God." Ibid., 300. 
23
 For an explanation of this phrase see chapter one. 
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fortify the community, while staying behind when one was able to migrate was faulted 
for contributing to the strength of Mecca. From the Muslims' place of strength, they 
would then be in a position to launch military jihad against surrounding tribes. 
In his study of Islamic da 'wah in the West, Larry Poston reaches virtually the 
same conclusion of the early period. He demonstrates that da 'wah during the classical 
period of Islamic history was primarily pragmatic. Its main objective was to eliminate the 
potential for rebellion against Islamic political hegemony, which in turn was necessary to 
create the right conditions for religious propagation.24 In agreement with Richard Bulliet, 
Poston concludes that the overall objective of this strategy was the consolidation of the 
rapidly expanding empire, which the Mongol invasions brought to an abrupt though not 
altogether conclusive end.25 
This does not mean, necessarily, that the idea of da 'wah is un-Islamic or that it 
cannot be included within a legal framework of migration. It is certainly plausible that 
frequent appeal to da 'wah as a justifying element for migration in the contemporary 
fatwa literature may be a deliberate substitute for jihad in the hijrah wa (and) jihad 
model. A fatwa issued by al-Hakim illustrates this hypothesis. In this fatwa, al-Hakim 
employs the metaphor of jihad in reference to da 'wah. He suggests to a Muslim 
employee that the believer who maintains ritual prayer at work in spite of the threat of job 
loss is comparable to a person who fights in the path of God (yuqatil...fi sabil Allah), 
reminding an unbelieving society of the God they have forgotten.26 As will be shown in 
several chapters of this work, Fadlallah also makes frequent reference to da 'wah 
4
 Larry Poston, Islamic Da 'wah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics of Conversion 
to Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 20. 
25
 Ibid, 20-21. 
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 al-Hakim, Murshid al-Mughtaribin, 193-94.74. 
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activities as a legitimizing factor for permissive fatawd in the Western context. Thus, I 
suggest that the correlation between da 'wah as motive for migration to the West that 
mujtahids sometimes make recalls the classical link between hijrah and jihad, further 
underlining the paradigm of resistance to the West. 
Returning to the theme of freedom to manifest the signs of Islam as justification 
for migration, we note that the idea put forward in these fatawd is that by "freedom of 
religion" jurists imply something more than freedom to maintain private religious 
observance—as has historically been the case in Islamic law regarding religious 
minorities. In contrast, the discourse of this literature suggests something quite beyond 
this limited notion of freedom, envisioning a social reality that has existed very rarely in 
any pre-modern society. Rather, the concept of freedom evidently presupposed here 
assumes, at least as far as the practice of Islam is concerned, absolute and comprehensive 
application of and non-obstruction to public religious expression of the faith. Religious 
expression is understood primarily in terms of ritual performance in the precise manner 
mandated by the law in every detail, such that it can maintain an integrity that is to a 
great degree indifferent to social context. 
Consequently, finding legal justification for postponing a given ritual on account 
of contextual causes is rare. Exceptions are, as mentioned above, more often textually 
than contextually determined. This is not to say that there is no attempt at all to test the 
capacity of the law to adapt to new environmental conditions. Nor is it the case than any 
given marji' is consistently and without exception predictable in his responses, though 
one does, as might be expected, observe a general consistency of approach and 
worldview with each mujtahid. Further, it would not be true to say that the mujtahids 
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speak unequivocally with one voice on all matters. Fadlallah's more nuanced style, for 
example, shows at least the blurry presence of a sub-discourse of dialogue (hiwar), or 
engagement with the West, even though this is still secondary to the more critically 
significant discourse of da 'wah. 
We turn now to an analysis of selected fatawa according to topic. My analysis 
asks: What happens when text and context clash, when freedom to observe the law is 
obstructed by the context in which it lives? To what degree does context play a role in 
shaping responses? 
I. THE NON-MUSLIM SOCIAL CONTEXT 
PERFORMING PRAYER DURING HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT 
This question comes up frequently, and is addressed by Fadlallah, al-Hakim, 
Sistani, and Khui. Not surprisingly, all either suggest or explicitly state that prayer is an 
obligatory Islamic duty that cannot be compromised to suit one's schedule. In spite of 
this consensus, there are some noticeable differences in approach. Fadlallah's brief 
response extends beyond the boundaries of ritual law to the matter of the obligation to 
fulfill one's contracts. Al-Hakim's relatively lengthy fatwa speaks to the fundamental 
legal and symbolic importance of prayer to Muslim identity and da 'wah. Sistani suggests 
a partial compromise of symbolic bodily gestures in exceptional situations, and Khui's 
cryptic response to a detailed and doubtful istifta' asserts the impermissibility of personal 
initiative on the part of a muqallid (one who follows the rulings of a mujtahid) in this 
regard. Khui thereby underlines the divine authority of the law and, by extension, the 
delegated authority of the 'ulama'. With this as introduction, we turn to the salient 
features of each of four fatawa in turn. 
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Fadlallah 
lstifia": If the time of prayer arrives when we are working, are we allowed to 
use some of our work time to perform the prayer, if this does not affect the 
progress of our work? And if it does affect our work, is it allowed? And is the 
prayer valid? Is seeking the permission of the work boss obligatory? 
Fatwa: This matter depends on the job contract. If the contract implies using 
the whole time for work, then getting the boss's [sic] permission is obligatory; 
but prayer can never be left unperformed. 
The four questions in the istiftd' suggest that the mustafti desires to be faithful to 
two apparently competing obligations that correlate to the two major divisions of the 
shari'ah: 'ibadat and mu 'amalat. We might say that the individual is attempting to 
balance two sets of rights recognized by Islam—the right of God to worship and the right 
of an employer to honest labour. Whatever decision is made will also help to resolve an 
underlying question about identity and role. One might paraphrase the question as: "To 
what extent can my identity as a Muslim interfere with my role as an employee, or as a 
Muslim employee in a secular environment? How does the law prioritize my obligations 
in this context?" Further, the mustafti asks about the legal status of a ritual obligation if 
performed in violation of secular legal conditions, such as doing so while infringing on 
the employer's rights. 
We are not told where the mustafti resides, but it is plausible that local labour 
laws contain provisions for religious obligations. According to Natalie Fraser of "The 
Lawyers Weekly," the Canadian Human Rights Act requires that employers in Canada 
"accommodate their employees' religious beliefs, unless doing so creates undue 
hardship." 28 This legislation reflects the value given to multiculturalism in contemporary 
27
 Fadlallah, Islamic Lanterns, 311-12.D21. 
28
 LexisNexis Canada, "Understand your Legal Issue," hUp://www.canadian-lawyers.ca/understand-vour-
legal-issue/employmcnt/1036166/ (accessed February 1, 2009). According to a U.S. lawyers association 
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Canadian politics. Though it usually affects accommodating diverse religious holidays, as 
the actual case examples given by Fraser show, it is conceivable that the law could also 
be applied to daily worship requirements, so long as negotiated agreements do not 
compromise the terms of employment or place the employer's business in jeopardy. 
Although Fadlallah makes no reference to these provisions, he directs the mustafti 
to the contract of employment. The Islamic legal code is unambiguous with regard to 
fulfilling one's contracts, as is clearly emphasized in the matter of obeying governments 
discussed in chapter eight of this study.30 The present case similarly obliges the mustafti 
to act according to the terms of the contract. If the contract allows for breaks, Fadlallah 
implies that the mustafti may use these breaks for prayer. If not, he or she must request 
permission. Though not making any direct reference to secular discourse, Fadlallah's 
choice of reference is oriented towards a factor relevant both to Islam and Western social 
values, an approach not shared by his colleagues. As will be seen below, the latter tend to 
keep their arguments to religious interests specific to Islam. 
Having said this, the final directive of the fatwa returns the reader to a religiously 
oriented sub-discourse concerning the non-negotiability of the rights of God (huquq 
Allah). There is no question but that prayer must be performed at the legally stipulated 
times. Fadlallah does not entertain the possibility of performing them as qada', perhaps 
called NOLO, a similar provision exists in U.S. Law. See NOLO, "Your Rights against Religious 
Discrimination," htt"p://w\vw.nolo.coin/article.cfm/objectID/066F46D6-60DF-4734-
B6EBBFC79FE3F80E/104/150/175/ART/ (accessed February 1, 2009). 
29
 In their Report to the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural 
Differences, authors Gerard Bouchard and Charles Taylor outline two possible routes for resolving such 
conflicts of interest: the legal route and the citizen route. The former relies on the courts to issue a ruling, 
and which commonly results in a winner and a loser. Bouchard and Taylor favour the citizen route "which 
is less formal and relies on negotiation and the search for a compromise. Its objective is to find a solution 
that satisfies both parties and it corresponds to a concerted adjustment." Building the Future: A Time for 
Reconciliation (Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences, 
2006), 52. Accessed via Concordia University Library's electronic resources: http://0-
site.ebrarv.com.mercury.concordia.ca/lib/concordia/Doc?id= 10232014 (accessed January 28, 2009). 
30
 See pages 15-16 of chapter eight. 
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because the mustafti does not ask about this possibility. In any case, Fadlallah's reply 
suggests that the rights of God transcend human authorities and are not restricted to 
Islamic territory. Fadlallah is here consistent with the view of the Imami legal school, 
according to which the jurisdiction of Islamic law, not just with regard to ritual, but in all 
fields, extends beyond the borders of an Islamic polity.31 He makes no attempt, however, 
to contextualize its application. 
In summary, if the istifta' implies a question of identity Fadlallah's response 
suggests two essential features: as a Muslim employee, the mustafti must be faithful to his 
or her contracts; as a Muslim, he or she must fulfill his or her religious duties as stipulated 
by Islamic law. Thus, the mustafti's dilemma remains; the matter of ritual duties must 
become a topic of discussion and possibly a cause of tension between the mustafti and his 
or her employer. In light of Fadlallah's enthusiasm for da 'wah in the West, it is possible 
that he sees this situation as providing just such an opportunity. 
al-Hakim 
Istifta': The time for prayer arrives during the Muslim employee's work hours 
and work here is highly in demand. The worker will encounter difficulties 
(sa 'iibah) in leaving his job for prayer; it might result in his being dismissed from 
his job. Under these circumstances, can he perform his prayer as qada'l Or, is he 
obliged to do it even (hatta) if it leads to leaving his job that he needs? (emphasis 
added) 
Fatwa: It is necessary to observe the prayer on time, even (hatta) if at the end of it 
[the required time slot). It is not permitted to delay it from its [appointed] time 
and perform it as qada', whatever the cost, because prayer is a pillar of religion 
31
 According to Abou El Fadl, the Shafi'i, Hanbali, and Maliki schools are generally of the same opinion. 
The Hanafi school alone maintains that Islamic law retains only moral, but not legal jurisdiction over 
Muslims residing in a non-Muslim state. This means, El Fadl explains, that a Hanafi Muslim in the West 
"may deal in usury (riba) with non-Muslims, may sell or buy prohibited substances such as alcohol, pork or 
an animal killed by Islamically unacceptable means such as suffocation or clubbing (mayta), and may 
engage in gambling or questionable financial dealings such as insurance schemes and the like - on the 
condition that such transactions are legal under the laws of the host territory and that the transactions are 
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim." Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities," 172-74. 
(quotation, 174) 
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and the symbol of Islam, and by it the Muslim imposes (jafrid 'ala) his presence and 
character and respect on others, and by it he draws God's pleasure and His success 
and blessing, especially since you are in countries that do not r emember God, 
[knowing] that the person who remembers God in the midst of negligence is 
like the one who fights in the path of God. 
It is the duty of the believer to depend on God and improve his mind 
(literally: beautify his thinking) by him, and trust his promise when he 
guarantees his provision by his word: "Whoever fears God, God will make a 
way out for him and will provide for him from where he has not reckoned. 
And whoever trusts in God, God will suffice him. God is faithful to his 
commands and has set a measure for all things" (Surah 65:2-3) . 
W e have discussed this previously in [previous] mat ters of instruction 
and advice. You should review it and think about it. God bless you (emphasis 
added). 
In terms of identity, the mustafti here suggests that identity issues out of a 
dialogue between what is constant (religious faith) and changing environmental 
conditions. For the mustafti, it appears that conversation with the West is not perceived as 
a threat to one's identity as a Muslim, especially since religious law can, in theory make 
allowances for situations of necessity and hardship. In contrast, where the mustafti 
emphasizes hardship and necessity, al-Hakim stresses duty and honour in a context of 
perceived clash, or even battle between values and worldviews. The same word—even 
(hatta)—that the mustafti uses to highlight extenuating circumstances, al-Hakim uses to 
stress the extent of the law's inviolability. 
Though essentially one ruling, thtfatwd addresses three distinct, but 
interconnected duties—the duty of prayer, of da 'wah, and of trust in God. The first 
duty—regular prayer—is stated both positively and negatively, justified on the basis of 
its status legally, sociologically, ideologically, and pietistically. Legally, as a pillar of 
religion not only is it indispensable, its practice also cannot endure modification, 
regardless of alleged hardship, socially or economically. For al-Hakim, the cost of 
al-Hakim, Murshid al-Mughtaribm, 193-94.74. 
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faithfulness does not mitigate, but in fact accentuates, the value of the duty and the scope 
of qada' is severely limited to real incapacity. Difficulties of the sort the mustafti 
mentions are considered mere inconveniences. 
Perhaps al-Hakim has in mind al-Shaykh al-Mufid's (d. 1022) rationalized 
solution to the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam in the 10th c. CE. Al-Mufid's theory is 
that as God's justice demands that God always do the best for his creatures, the 
occultation of the Imam provides opportunity for God to do better for his creatures than if 
the Imam was known openly. Further, since it is more meritorious to obey and do right in 
difficult times than in good times, the Imam disappeared in order to increase the merit of 
his followers who must now struggle harder against unbelief. Their faithfulness in this 
situation will bring them a far greater reward (thawab) than had the Imam been present 
with them.33 In more general terms, al-Hakim'sfatwd expresses the same idea of greater 
reward for faithfulness in more trying conditions. 
Looked at sociologically, it is plausible to deduce that the rules are inflexible 
because prayer is understood as the locus of Muslim identity. When connected to da 'wah, 
faithful observance of prayer in a non-Muslim context becomes a means of calling others 
to Islam. Thus, rather than fulfill the mustaftfs hope of flexibility, al-Hakim charges him 
with a second duty, which he reinforces by interpreting it ideologically, as a form of 
"fighting in the path of God." Though not on a literal battlefield, the Muslim is 
understood to be in an ideological conflict with a society described as one that fails to 
"remember God." This intertextual reference prepares al-Hakim for the final segment of 
his argument, that is, the pietistic one of advising trust in God's provision. This 
Martin McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaykh al-Mufid (Beirut: Dar al-Machreq, 1978), 125ff. 
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comprises the third duty imposed on the mustafti, made more persuasive by the strength 
of the scriptural promise of divine provision. 
Sistani 
Sistani's/aftva is in response to the question quoted above for al-Hakim. 
Fatwa: If his need to continue in this job reaches the level of compulsion, he 
should pray on time as much as possible, even if just bending and prostrating 
[halfway for ruku' and fully for sajda.] However, this happens only rarely. 
Therefore, he should fear God the blessed and exalted and not practice 
anything that would lead to abandoning a pillar of his religion. He should 
remember God's word (as above, Surah 65:2-3). 
Sistani's approach is quite different than that of al-Hakim. Sistani seems to 
recognize socio-economic realities, while affirming the importance of legally valid prayer 
obligations. His response attempts to balance these two obligations. However, Sistani 
also advises a preventative measure, effectively counseling the mustafti to limit his or her 
job opportunities to those that would not compromise faithful observance of a pillar of 
Islam. This is the preferred reading in the English version, where the translator renders 
the words "should [...] not practice anything that would lead to abandoning a pillar of his 
religion" as "should not accept a job which leads to neglecting the pillar of faith."35 In 
this sense, Sistani's fatwa ultimately maintains the status quo. However, his tone is 
gentler, using the language of "let him pray" or "let him not practice" (liyusalli, wa la 
yumaris respectively) rather than al-Hakim's "it is not permitted" {la yajuz) or "the 
believer is obligated to," ('ala al-mu 'min an) and suggesting, albeit only in exceptional 
circumstances, a symbolic acknowledgement of the prayer where full participation is 
prohibitive. These opinions suggest a certain empathy with the realities of life. 
34
 Sistani, al-Fiqh li al-Mughtaribin, 108.87. 
35
 Sistani, Code of Practice, Chapter on Salat: Ritual Prayer, F88. This is reminiscent of Montazeri's/afwa, 




htifta': If someone works in a shop that belongs to non-Muslims and it is 
difficult for him to pray the 'asha prayer at its appointed time, is it permissible 
to postpone it until after midnight before dawn, especially when the break 
time, which is usually only half an hour, is 'not sufficient to remove one's 
eyebrows'? He might [even] be obliged to leave his work [lose his job] if he 
wanted to pray at a time other than the break. 
Fatwa: He is not permitted to postpone it of his own accord. 
In providing details of his or her situation, this mustafti appears to assume that 
context is relevant to legal interpretation. Again, he pleads hardship (yas 'ab 'alayhi) as 
justifying postponement of the prayer. If not having time for a break disqualifies as 
hardship, surely, losing one's job is serious business. Khui's brief response reveals the 
central force of his argument and his implicit recognition of prayer as a higher good than, 
in this case, employment. Therefore, altering a pillar of the faith is not a matter of human 
will, including, one might read, that of the 'ulama', as their will, too, is subject to 
standard legal procedures and, as delegated authorities, it is their responsibility to 
preserve the law's intent. 
In sum, these four fatawa demonstrate that the law is thought of by its 
representatives as being precise. The implication seems to be that if employment were a 
cause for cancelling, postponing, or reducing prayer, it would have been incorporated 
into the law, along with pregnancy, illness, travel, and the like.37 The requirement of 
basing change on textual proof limits the law's capacity to allow flexibility in new cases 
where context might have provided the incentive to do so. Inflexibility is also attributable 
Ahkam al-Mughtaribin, 94.220. 36 
7
 Traveling, for example, requires only reduced prayers, and the remainder may be prayed after travel as 
qada'. Further, any ritual act that requires purification (wudu'), such as the daily salat, is forbidden for a 
woman while she is menstruating or after childbirth. Missed prayers due,to menstruation or post-partum 
condition do not have to be compensated or prayed at another time. Grand Ayatollah Haj Shaikh 
Mohammad Fazel Lankarani, Resalah ofTawdih al-Masa'el(Tehran: Islamic Cultural Publication Center, 
1999/1378), 145, 254, 90. 
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to a manifest concern of the mujtahids to avoid opening the door to personal discretion by 
setting new precedents or otherwise pushing the boundaries of the law. Moreover, 
maintaining the rituals as required by religious law is central to sustaining an "authentic" 
Muslim identity in Western society. 
While these marks of tradition are shared by the mujtahids, there is one notable 
distinction in methodology. None but Fadlallah make reference to the job contract, 
which, as a feature both of Islamic and secular Western law, may function as a bridge for 
mutual understanding and demonstrates, comparatively speaking, an atypical 
resourcefulness. Fadlallah indicates that he can, to some extent, engage Western secular 
discourse, a matter that would render his guidance appealing to Western educated 
Muslims. Although Fadlallah's methodology does not change the law, it demonstrates a 
measure of compatibility with modern secular discourse. 
Gary Bunt identifies this kind of facility with Western, and especially scientific, 
discourse as the most compelling quality of a religious leader in the eyes of Muslim 
youth in Britain. One young interviewee praises a particular Mullah in the UK who, 
unlike his more traditional colleagues, draws large crowds to his meetings. According to 
one youth, besides speaking in English, Mullah Sahib Salim "used to make sure that you 
are aware of what happens when you are smoking. Even going to scientific terms, telling 
them what happens to you and stuff like that, whereas the other imams they don't speak 
in scientific terms, they just want to tell stories from the past. In a way you would learn 
things from it, but you wouldn't learn it. They wouldn't express what the story tells you, 
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they'll just tell out the story."38 Though Fadlallah's method is not quite as fresh, his 
ability to reach beyond traditional boundaries is perhaps more compelling. 
PRAYER WITH NON-SHI'ITES 
Fadlallah 
Istijia': At university there is a prayer room for Muslims. Is it allowed to pray 
with the congregation, even though it does not belong to my school of 
thought? 
Fatwa: It is allowed to pray with them, but recite for yourself, and you shall 
have the reward of congregation. 
As often occurs in minority situations, sectarian divisions within the same 
religious group call for rethinking otherwise uneasy relations. It is broadly accepted that 
despite some exceptions, Sunni-Shi'ite relations since the 8th century have generally been 
characterized as mutually suspicious.40 Chapter three of this study noted that Shi'ites were 
sometimes recommended or even obliged to leave Sunni dominated lands if it meant 
obtaining freedom to assert their Shi'ite identity. As a formal movement, taqrib 
(rapprochement) had its beginnings in the 20th century and has since become a significant 
38
 Gary Bunt, "Decision-Making Concerns in British Islamic Environments," Islam and Christian-Muslim 
Relations, 9 no. 1 (1998), 109-110. 
39
 Fadlallah, Islamic Lanterns, 310.D16. 
Despite the characterization, several scholars have shown there to have been significant interaction in 
legal thought and methodology. Devin Stewart centres his argument for Shi'ite adaptation of "Sunni 
juridical concepts" around the Sunni theory of consensus. "The Sunni legal system and the theory of 
consensus on which it was based set the ground rules for marginal sects' negotiation of their identity and 
place with respect to Islamic legal orthodoxy and the international system of legal education in the Muslim 
world." Devin Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shi'ite Responses to the Sunni Legal System 
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1998), 18, 21. Ahmed Kazemi Moussavi surveys the history of 
Sunni-Shi'i relations and finds several common elements in their respective approaches to Islam. His 
discussion of taqrib in the modern era suggests that a renewed commitment to ijtihad on the part of Sunnis 
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incorporate Sunni juristic principles such as public welfare (maslahah). Moussavi's hope is that utilizing 
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Moussavi, "Sunni-Shi'i Rapprochement," Shi'ite Heritage, 301-315. 
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and lively issue. A congress on ijtihad held in Tehran in December, 2008, and discussed 
briefly in chapter two, expressed as its goal "coming together and unity amongst the 
Islamic schools" {hambastegT va vahdat-e madhahib-e islamT).42 One of the main 
organizers of the congress stated that examining issues related to ijtihad in the modern 
world was "an opportunity to bring together different schools (of law) and their ideas."43 
This is not a new idea; it was eagerly promoted as early as the late 19th century by Rashid 
Rida, following the pioneering efforts of Muhammad Abduh in promoting Sunni-Shi'i 
rapprochement.44 
The specific matter of intra-sectarian prayer among Muslims does not appear to 
have raised a great deal of discussion in scholarly literature. Fadlallah's/aftva implies 
that he sees the issue as doctrinal and not sectarian in that he permits joining the 
congregation for worship but specifies that the Shi'ite Muslim should perform his prayers 
correctly, that is, according to Shi'ite belief and practice. His fatwa suggests that he sees 
the difference as a relatively minor issue that should not overtake the common Muslim 
identity of Sunni and Shi'a, a position that is reflective of his approach to taqrib as 
expressed elsewhere. In his Ahadith fi al-wahdah al-islamiyah, Fadlallah says that the 
fact that the differences between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims are fewer than their 
commonalities should motivate both sides to recognize the other as Muslim and that their 
Moussavi, "Sunni-Shi'i Rapprochement," 301. 
42
 "Hamayesh-e ijtihad dar dore-ye mo 'aser bar gozdr shod," 
http://www.turkmenstudents.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=9919 (accessed January 15, 2009). 
Hawzah: akhbar va itla 'at. "Hamdyesh-e ijtihad dar dore-ye mo 'aser ba hudiir-e ra 'Ts-e majlis-e khabar 
gan-e rahbari," http://www.hawzah.net/Hawzah/News/NewsPrint.aspx?id=76271 (accessed January 13, 
2009). 
See Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 2(f Century: TheAzhar and Shi'ism between 
Rapprochement and Restraint, trans. Joseph Greenman (Leiden: Brill, 2004). Interestingly, Brunner points 
out that as far as he can tell, the term rapprochement {taqrib) "emerged explicitly for the very first time" 
out of the activities of a "secret society" established by Muhammad Abduh and others in 1884 which had as 
its goal "a rapprochement among Islam, Christianity, and Judaism" (38). 
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differences should propel them not to enmity but towards the pursuit of truth from God.45 
Unity, he says, is not a matter of one side convincing the other but is "Muslims coming 
together on the foundation of truth."46 From this perspective, differences in doctrine may 
be considered on an individual basis, rather than be identified purely in sectarian terms. 
Sectarian divisions, he argues, only weaken Islam and Muslims as a whole in the face of 
greater threats from America and elsewhere. 
MUSLIMS BORN OF UNMARRIED NON-MUSLIM PARENTS LEADING PRAYER 
This issue is addressed to al-Hakim, whose intriguing fatwa demonstrates 
considerable ambivalence in dealing with the problem. 
lstifta': Some new Muslims in America are dealing with a problem, which is 
that their births w e r e the result of friendships be tween their non-Muslim 
fathers and mothers . This is a general situation in their circles such that the 
condition of marriage according to any law is rare or non-existent . Since they 
place a lot of importance on congregational prayer and consider it an 
obligatory ritual, it is very difficult to relinquish it. Wha t should they do? Is it 
permissible for one of them to lead and the others to pray behind him, and to 
overlook the condition of purity of bir th since all or most of them are such? 
What is the legal solution in your opinion? 
Fatwa: There is no solution to the problem once the unrestricted condition of 
legitimate birth is established as evidence. [This is the ruling,] unless [what is 
mentioned above] is [considered] marriage for them according to their 
customs, such that it is established as the religion of the parents , even in a 
secondary sense, or if doubt can be established with regard to the parents , such 
that they consider this legal marriage and not adultery. But if it is wi thout 
doubt adultery, then there is no solution to the problem. 
The novelty of this problem calls for a longer than usual question. The mustafti 
demonstrates familiarity with the law and possible bases for a solution to the problem by 
attempting to appeal, as it appears, to the principle of 'urf (social custom). The problem 
45
 Fadlallah, Ahadithfi al-wahdah al-islamiyah (Tehran: 'Ilamah Tabataba'i, 1989), 135-36. 
46
 Ibid., 100. 
47
 al-Hakim, Murshid al-Mughlaribin, 206-207 F100. 
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raises questions regarding the development of "indigenous" communities of Western 
converts to Islam (or reverts, as is the popular nomenclature).48 
Al-Hakim implicitly corrects the mustaftVs understanding of 'urf, explaining that 
it is not simply a matter of what people do, regardless of legal recognition. But, if the 
practice is by local custom considered marriage in a formal legal sense, then the union is 
legal and the problem is resolved. He seems, however, to doubt this is the case. His goal, 
it appears, is to find some cause to doubt that these are in fact cases of adultery, whether 
by the means just described, or by establishing doubt concerning their illegitimacy of 
birth, since this is the absolute condition for leading prayers, and more so in Shi'ite law.49 
Etan Kohlberg's study of the status of walid zina (offspring of illegitimate sexual 
relations) in Imami law reveals a strong tendency in pre-modern and some modern Shi'ite 
jurisprudence to link anti-Alid feelings to walid zina. It is said that amongst the many 
detestable and unfailing characteristics of walid zina is hatred for ahl al-bayt, such that it 
is thought that "a common denominator of all anti-'Alids is illegitimate descent [...]."5° 
Although the matter may not be overlooked due to common practice, as the mustafti 
The preference for this term is explained with reference to the concept of Islam as al-din al-fitri (the 
religion of nature). It is said that when someone converts to Islam they are in reality 'reverting' to the 
universal natural human state into which all people were born, and this condition is understood to be that of 
Islam. The notion is based on some prophetic sayings common to Sunni and Shi'ite traditions. For example, 
the prophet is believed to have said: "Every newborn is born in the natural condition (yuladu 'aid al-fitrah); 
his parents transform him into a Jew, a Christian or a Zoroastrian." Sahth Bukhdri, Kitdb al-Jana 'iz 81 
(1:3451), quoted and referenced by Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion, 109. The famous Shi'ite 
compilation of sayings attributed to Imam Ali, Nahj al-Baldghah, has the following, slightly different 
rendering: "The people make the forbidden permissible and despise the wise. They are born mfitrah, and 
they die in kufrah." (wa al-nds yastahilun al-harim, wa yastadhilun al-hakim. yuhyun 'aldfitrah, wa 
yamutiin 'aid kufrah). Imam Ali, Nahj al-Baldghah, 2:38 (CD-ROM, ALAQAED version 1.0). The editor 
explains the latter sentence as meaning that people are born in fitrah but "apart from the knowledge of the 
divine law [...]" but after they come to know it, "they change and exchange it, and take idols for Gods and 
the wind as the law, and so die as unbelievers (kuffdr). 
49
 See, for example, Lankarani, Resalah, 267, "The Imam of the congregational prayers should be: adult 
(Jbaligh); sane; Twelver Shi'ite (ithna 'ashariShi'ah); just ('adit); of legitimate birth; and being able to 
offer the prayers correctly. Furthermore, as an obligatory precaution, the Imam also should be a male." 
50
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suggests it be, it may become neutralized by reliance on local laws which would 
effectively nullify the prohibitive element. Otherwise, the question tests the limits of 
jurisprudence. 
SERVING LUNCH TO NON-MUSLIMS DURING RAMADAN 
Istiftd': Does someone who is fasting during the blessed month of Ramadan in a 
non-Islamic country have the right to provide lunch (it'am al-ta 'amfi al-nahar) 
for non-Muslims? 
Fatwa: Yes, he is permitted to do this unless it is an occasion to weaken 
(tawhln) his religion and his mission (da 'watihi) of making it known that he is a 
Muslim. The prohibition against serving food would be a visible (manifest) sign 
of his adherence to his religion and his pride in it, while serving food would be 
a dishonour to the sign mentioned and would manifest contempt and scorn for 
his religion. 
This fatwa is from al-Hakim. Similarly to his fatwa on prayer at work, a central 
element here is an underlying discourse of identity and da 'wah. The Ayatollah initially 
grants permission, apparently because there is no real legal reason to prohibit it. But he 
immediately goes on to qualify the permission to the point that it becomes a virtual 
prohibition on pietistic, if not legal, grounds. Al-Hakim's anxiety to have Muslims in the 
West publicly affirm their Islamic identity as a means of religious propagation adds to the 
prohibition a moral obligation to uphold the honour of Islam and Muslims. Failing in this 
regard, al-Hakim reasons, is tantamount to manifesting "contempt and scorn" for one's 
religion. His central concern, in other words, is for the pride of Islam, most clearly 
portrayed through the Muslim's public and unapologetic practice of Islamic ritual. 
The following fatwa from Fadlallah on giving charity to non-Muslims 
demonstrates a similar, though perhaps more understandable, preoccupation with turning 
ritual practice into da 'wah. 
51
 al-Hakim, Murshid al-Mughtaribin, 218-19.115. 
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Istiftd': Some foreigners come to the door with a little box in which they are 
collecting donations towards helping cancer [patients] or other illnesses. 
Should we help them? 
Fatwa: It's fine to do so in order to affirm our humanity to people in sharing in 
human suffering so that it becomes propaganda for Islam (di 'ayah li al-islam). 
Fadlallah's recognition of the value of charity as a means of da 'wah reflects his 
understanding of the nature of the latter. Da 'wah, he says, is a spiritual and intellectual 
endeavour whose appeal must be made to the hearts and minds of people, which, he 
argues, is only possible to do by peaceful means, in line with the Qur'anic message of 
submission to God offered without compulsion. According to Fadlallah, da 'wah differs 
from two other related concepts in the Qur'an. In contrast to commanding good and 
forbidding evil (al-amr bT al-ma 'rufwa al-nahT 'an al-munkar), "da 'wah is the 
movement that Muslims engage in outside the Islamic boundaries for the sake of bringing 
others into Islam."53 While both are important,54 the former is directed towards Muslims; 
the latter towards non-Muslims. 
Da 'wah, Fadlallah says, is also different from dawlah (a formalized social order), 
in nature and in method. The Qur'an speaks both of calling people to God (da 'wah), and 
establishing a social order based upon people's acceptance of its message, but it does not 
confuse the two. Unlike dawlah, which may include military force (jihad) and killing 
(qital) to realize its goals, da 'wah is by nature peaceful because it is an appeal to the 
human mind and spirit. Accordingly, it can rely only on intellectual and spiritual methods 
52
 Fadlallah, al-hijrah wa al-ightirab, 393-94. 
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that give people freedom to reflect and choose Islam. Da 'wah is therefore the necessary 
prelude to establishing an Islamic society.56 
It is evident that both al-Hakim and Fadlallah would like Muslims in the West to 
understand their presence there as the fulfillment of a calling to spread Islam through 
word and deed. It is perfectly conceivable that they would envision this as the first step 
towards the Islamization of Western society. 
II. NATURAL ENVIRONMENT OF WESTERN NATIONS 
TIMES OF PRAYER AND FASTING IN NORTHERN TIME ZONES 
This question is addressed to Fadlallah several times, as well as to al-Hakim, 
Sistani, Khui, and others. Responses reflect a flexibility not seen in the context of 
employment. Perhaps this is due to the natural causes of the difficulties in the current 
question which would not so much test the divine law as demonstrate its essential 
connection to creation. The following question represents the main ideas common to all: 
Istifta': In some countries, the sun does not go down (there is no sunset), or, 
(conversely) — in certain seasons — it does not rise for many days or months. 
On which set of times should a person depend for his prayer and fasting? 
Due to their common reliance on the lunar calendar, prayer and fasting frequently 
converge in the same question. While there is substantial agreement on regulations for 
both rituals, there are also notable differences of opinion resulting from differing weights 
given to various obligations. 
Regarding prayer, al-Hakim includes a detailed astronomical calculation and 
advises the person, on the basis of obligatory precaution, "to perform the two 'asha' 
prayers after the sun enters in the lowest middle of the circuit and to perform the morning 
55
 Ibid., 22-24. 
56
 Ibid., 27. 
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 Fadlallah, Islamic Lanterns, 307.D5; Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar, 134. 
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prayers before it leaves this middle."58 Fadlallah and Sistani both advise, on precaution, 
following the times of "the nearest places that have night and day covering all twenty-
four hours."5 In addition, Fadlallah suggests a more lenient solution of arranging one's 
own schedule for praying the five prayers within a twenty-four hour period. Khui says 
that if it is possible for the person to migrate "somewhere where it is possible to pray and 
fast, this is obligatory for him." Otherwise, as a precautionary measure, he offers 
Fadlallah's more liberal suggestion of spreading the five prayers throughout the day.61 
Al-Fadil echoes Khui's travel advisory but on the basis of precaution, and recommends 
following one's homeland timings as an option.62 
Rules for fasting likewise exhibit a range of reasonable opinions. In one fatwa, 
Fadlallah recommends that the person make up the fast as qada' at some time.63 Al-
Hakim similarly advises postponing it till a time when night can be distinguished from 
the day. In another fatwa, however, Fadlallah says that if daylight lasts 18 hours or 
longer, one should fast for 18 hours, but one is permitted to break the fast "if he is afraid 
of harm."65 Sistani and Khui say that it is obligatory that the person move or migrate to 
another country, but if this is "impossible," Sistani requires giving fidyah (monetary 
compensation for valid omission of an obligatory religious duty) instead.66 Al-Fadil al-
Lankarani regards fasting as obligatory "regardless of how long the time is," but suggests 
58
 al-Hakim, Murshid al-Mughtaribin, 197-98.83. 
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Lanterns, 307.D5. 
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 Sistani, Ahkam al-Mughtaribin, 94.217. 
62
 Ibid., 100-101.238. 
63
 Fadlallah, Islamic Lanterns, 307.D5. 
64
 al-Hakim, Murshid al-Mughtaribin, 197-98.83. 
65
 Fadlallah, Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar, 134. 
66
 Ahkam al-Mughtaribin, 98.231 (Sistani); 94.217 (Khui). 
228 
that "in order to facilitate performing prayers at proper intervals, and likewise to perform 
the obligatory fast," one may travel elsewhere out of precaution (ihtiyat). 7 
What is the significance of these rulings to the question of Islamic identity in the 
West? Interpreting these fatawa within the context of juristic discourses and wider 
Islamic worldview raises several relevant issues. For example, if ritual performance 
cannot, at times, be sustained at legally acceptable levels in some Western countries, is 
migration to these places thereby rendered forbidden, as the juristic discourse on 
migration stipulates, and as Sistani and Khui rule in the case of fasting and Khui in that of 
prayer? If, as observed repeatedly in this study, freedom to manifest the signs of Islam is 
the necessary precondition to migration, is the source of impediment to this freedom 
relevant? Are only political or sociological obstacles implied in this directive, or does it 
include those that are rooted in nature, the former being a case of "oppression"6 and the 
latter of divine dominion? Fadlallah's opposite statements on prayer in the place of 
employment on the one hand and in northerly time zones on the other suggests an 
implicit distinction between impediments of human and natural origin. 
Or, do Sistani's and Khui's relative inflexibility with regard to prayer and fasting 
in northerly time zones suggest, rather, a moral anxiety to not replace divine law, by 
which ritual time is ordered, with human discretion? Would permitting personal choice in 
ritual performance, as Fadlallah suggests, open the door to choice in matters of ethics and 
morality as well? The status of rituals as "pillars" of religion adds some weight to this 
speculation. One could easily comprehend, in this case, the consistent inflexibility 
exhibited in this field and the reluctance to provide rulings susceptible to serious 
67
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adaptation to context. Or, do more rigid opinions reflect other factors, such as a cautious 
initial period in the very recent development oifiqh al-aqalliyat? Khui is already 
deceased, and his fatawa for Shi'ites in the West are fewer in number than those of the 
younger and still living authorities such as the relatively liberal Fadlallah. 
Finally, al-Fadil's/aftva advising a person to follow the ritual timings of one's 
homeland has implications for the integration of a person's identity in a minority context. 
In his risalah, Sistani rules that any place a person lives permanently is his homeland 
(watan), "irrespective of whether he was born there," or other conditions.69 
Differentiating between the location of one's ritual and one's ordinary life would likely 
hinder the development of an integrated identity by creating a psychological and practical 
dichotomy between two fundamental areas of life. Fadlallah's opinions, though lacking in 
juristic rigour, have the merit of facilitating a more localized identity. 
III. WESTERN SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE AND INSTRUMENTS OF TECHNOLOGY 
FINDING THE QIBLAH FROM AND PRAYING IN AN AIRPLANE 
This question is addressed by Fadlallah, al-Hakim, and Sistani. It is also helpful to 
include a ruling by Khomeini for comparative purposes. The first question is the one put 
to Fadlallah, and the second to al-Hakim and Sistani. The latter includes reference to the 
important legal matter, as seen elsewhere, of certainty of knowledge. Rather than quote 
the fatawa in full, I will incorporate quotes where they are useful to the discussion. 
Istifta': How can one pray in an airplane, with regard to determining the 
qiblah? Is it necessary to pray in a standing position, or is it pe rmi t ted to pray 
while sitting, even if there is no [physical] incapacity for praying while 
standing? 
Seestani, Islamic Laws, 250.1338. 
Fadlallah, Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar, 135. Cf. Islamic Lanterns, 307.D3. 
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Istifia': How do we pray our obligatory prayers in an airplane, since the qiblah 
is unknown and we lack confidence [in knowing it]? 
Ordinary rules of prayer for travelers consist primarily of determining whether or 
not the distances covered oblige the person to offer shortened prayers (qasr), and 
determining the direction of the qiblah (prayer direction).72 Airplane travel represents a 
mustahdathah not often covered by regular risalahs. As the question does not address the 
issue of qasr (brevity), it is unclear whether the mustaftls assume the prayer requirement 
to be full or shortened. That the questioners do not entertain the possibility that it be 
performed as qada' might be inferred from silence, given what we have seen of istifta' 
regarding prayer at work. 
Fatawa 
The question of praying while in flight turns out to be quite straightforward. All 
the mujtahids agree that finding the qiblah is both necessary and, with the possible 
exception of al-Hakim, not a complicated or difficult matter, a point underlined by 
Sistani's personal narrative. One is permitted to inquire of anybody who might know, 
particularly the captain or other airline staff, and may act on that knowledge, even if it is 
only "valid supposition (zann)."74 This latter point is virtually consistent with, but slightly 
more relaxed than the standard position with regard to determining the qiblah in 
situations where uncertainty prevails. For example, in his risalah, Sistani says: "Aperson 
who wishes to offer prayers, should make efforts to ascertain the direction of Qibla, and 
for that, he has to either be absolutely sure, or acquire such information as may amount to 
71
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Mughtaribin, 98.232. 
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certainty, like [the] testimony of two reliable persons." However, where this is not 
possible, it is permissible to act on "an idea," even if this is obtained from a non-Muslim 
using a "scientific method."75 
The effort al-Hakim urges upon mukallafs to "investigate and do their utmost to 
know the qiblah" suggests a closer adherence to the rule of certainty, though he likewise 
permits acting on the basis of zann. Al-Hakim further advises that failure to reach either 
certainty or valid speculation requires waiting until one is on the ground if the time 
permits that it does not become necessary to perform the prayer as qada'. As a last resort, 
one may pray "in whatever direction is closest to probability."76 
The question of praying while seated is answered by Fadlallah as "not permissible 
... so long as it is possible to do so standing."77 This ruling is not given explicit legal 
justification or a socio-religious purpose such as asserting one's Islamic identity in 
public. However, Sistani's personal account of airplane prayer, mentioned above, does 
make explicit reference to the value of conspicuous performance in drawing positive 
attention from non-Muslims and bringing honour to Islam.78 
Khomeini's interesting judgment provides five different rulings on facing the 
qiblah according to an equal number of hypothetical problems. The fourth ruling 
invalidates prayer performed in an airplane passing over Mecca, given the impossibility 
Seestani, Islamic Laws, 153.790. 
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"of maintaining the right position." His ruling underlines both the comprehensive 
possibilities of the law and the importance of the qiblah orientation. 
CONCLUSION 
This analysis of fatawa addressing practical concerns of Shi'ite ritual observance 
in the West uncovers very little socially integrative ijtihad. From the perspective of 
mujtahids, it appears that context does not readily provide occasion to reform Islamic 
law. I suggest that this is partly due to methodological constraints. Although proudly 
professing a comprehensive ijtihad (ijtihad mutlaq), the range of interpretive possibilities 
available even to the highest jurists is nevertheless restricted by the Usui! legal 
methodology that requires a textual determinant ('illah) for defining hardship or adapting 
laws to time and place (zaman wa-makan). Rather than inspire a more innovative ijtihad, 
the non-Muslim context serves to test and display the comprehensiveness of the law's 
resources to deal with new situations without making fundamental changes in its content. 
What fatawa of ritual worship for the West appear to showcase, then, is the law's 
capacity to remain unchanged and uncompromised through social change. 
At the same time, while mujtahids are by and large far more reluctant to consider 
the relevance of social context to rulings than are mustaftis, some contexts may serve to 
justify rulings of prohibition. This is particularly noticeable where a prohibition or 
conservative ruling has the potential to enhance da 'wah. Given the exceptionally high 
value of 'ibadah in Islamic law and worldview, it is not surprising that any ijtihad 
exercised in this domain would tend to enhance, rather than weaken the importance of 
'ibadah. In addition to being an uncompromising duty, 'ibadah in the West becomes a 
fundamental and indispensable topos of minority Muslim identity. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FA TAW A ON EDUCATION: 
RETICENCE AND RESISTANCE 
Fatawa on education provide a rich resource for the central problematic of this 
study—the construction of Shi'ite minority identity in the West. To recall, I have applied 
a typology of identity models that enables us to map the material according to trends that 
an analysis of language and key elements of UsulT methodology renders observable. 
According to this analysis, fatawa on education demonstrate a strong tendency towards 
the resistance identity model. If education is a developed nation's primary source of 
cultural influence those who stand, and wish to remain, outside of the dominant 
worldview are compelled to provide a rationale for resistance, if not an alternative model. 
Members of the Shi'ite legal establishment utilize two elements common to such a 
process: exposing the dangers of assimilation; and presenting the moral world of one's 
own group as superior. Added to this rubric is the notion of divine mission, or the sense 
that the community is called to use its moral superiority to influence the wider culture. 
While the resistance identity model characterizes the leadership, who comfortably 
issue fatawa from their places of residence at a fair distance from the believing 
community, the community itself reflects a somewhat different dynamic. An analysis of 
istifta 'at on education reveals some inclination towards the "selective assimilation" 
model characteristic generally of the majority of immigrants. MustaftTs regularly refer to 
the context in which they must not only function, but succeed. There is a sense in which 
it is understood that if they fail in the realm of education, they fail as individuals and 
families. The evident desire to succeed appears to raise an objective awareness of the 
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values of Western education culture that prompts questions regarding how far religious 
legal observance will allow them to go in adapting to context. Thus, education fatawa 
highlight the tensions between mustaftls and mujtahids also evident in other arenas of 
life. 
FADLALLAH AND THE CLASSICAL MODEL OF MIGRATION: SEPARATION AND 
STRENGTH 
Fatawa on education are solicited from several mujtahids including Fadlallah, 
Khui, Sistani, al-Hakim, Tabrizi, Khamenei, Makarim, and Fadil. The only mujtahid to 
give the subject a section of its own is Fadlallah, who, intentionally or not, links his 
valorization of education with the central legitimizing element of migration in the 
foundational period of Islam. We recall that the original emigration of the Muslim 
community that was to Medina stressed the objective of strengthening the community in 
order to expand further afield. Fadlallah's proposal reflects this early model of emigration 
on at least three levels. He argues, firstly, that it is legitimate, in principle, to emigrate to 
the West for educational purposes, as education strengthens the Muslim community.1 
Thus, Fadlallah shares the early motivational justification for migration while giving it a 
modern application. 
Secondly, the language Fadlallah uses, and the practical details of his propositions 
mirror this early model yet further. For Fadlallah, migration to the West for education 
may legitimately be considered migration "to Allah and His Messenger."2 It appears that 
Fadlallah would have his readers understand that when done for the sake of Islam, as is 
the case in migration for education, migration to the West carries a religious value equal 
to that of the original hijrah and migrants are thus no less honourable than the muhajirun 
1




of the Prophet's time. Fadlallah thus shares the early valorization of migration for the 
sake of Islam. "* 
Thirdly, Fadlallah shares the strategic structural model of the original migration. 
He recognizes, however, that there are dangers to the contemporary expression of this 
model. In structural terms, the early muhajirun were moving from profane space in 
Mecca to the sacred space of Medinah, that is, from a situation of weakness to one that 
contributed to the strengthening of the believing community. This is not the case in 
migration to the West. Thus, in order to reflect the structure of the early model more 
precisely, migration to the West requires some modification. Fadlallah addresses this by 
encouraging spatial delimiters that effectively sacralize specific places within profane 
space. Rather than simply blend into the educational system in the West, Fadlallah says, 
Muslims should establish Islamic schools that can function as what he calls "incubators" 
against the "deviant atmospheres" of Western primary and secondary educational 
institutions.3 According to Carola and Marcelo Suarez-Orozco the establishment of such 
"safety nets" is an important element of the adaptation process, generating support for 
negotiating one's path in the new environment.4 Fadlallah relies heavily on this strategy 
but goes further in framing his "incubators" as places of separation from and preparation 
to influence mainstream society. 
GENERAL FEATURES OF EDUCATION FATAWA: CONTENT AND STYLE 
In general, education fatawa deal predominantly with questions of social morality. 
Concerns are centered on sexual temptations occasioned by coeducation, easy access to 
alcohol, and courses that involve allegedly forbidden activities, such as dance and art; all 
3
 Ibid., 205-6. 
4
 Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco, Children of Immigration, 90. 
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of this is surrounded by an apprehension regarding perceived underlying philosophical 
values such as atheism, and what is frequently understood as a generally morally lax 
environment. Fadlallah is again a special case in that while he shares these concerns, his 
fatawa also include matters of medical ethics,5 performance of religious duties in 
academic settings, and a more explicit perception of educational institutions as places of 
potential influence from Christianity and other cultural ideas. This added dimension 
might suggest that Fadlallah's followers have a broader conceptualization of morality 
beyond the more established and traditional matter of male-female relations that seems to 
pervade the legal approach to social morality. Or, it may simply be that he has more 
followers and thus a larger pool of questions. Generally speaking, his fatawa exhibit the 
same anxiety and "fear" (khawf)—this is the word he uses repeatedly—of moral laxity, a 
fear that presses his decisions towards prohibition. 
Two elements appear prominently in the exchange between mustaftis, and 
mujtahids: the question of social context, and reference to UsulT principles of ijtihad. 
With regard to the former, mustaftis often stress that their context is the Western 
educational system where there is no sexual segregation in public schools or universities, 
the school curriculum includes sex education, drawing of living objects, and other 
allegedly prohibited activities; universities employ male and female professors, the latter 
of which are not veiled; politesse involves minimal physical contact with the opposite sex 
(shaking hands), and alcohol is often present at academic gatherings of a professional or 
social nature. All of these factors, incidental and inconsequential to the average Western 
student, raise serious questions for the legally observant Muslim. At the same time, they 
provide a contextual framework for the mustaftTs terms of reference. 
Khamenei also responds to questions on medical ethics. 
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MustaftTs also frequently make tacit reference to Usull principles of ijtihad, 
apparently in the attempt to influence a mujtahid's decision. The most popular principle 
is that of haraj, or excessive harm incurred by observing a legal precept, on the basis of 
which the rule may be lifted. In the matter of handshaking between unrelated men and 
women the standard rule, as quoted from al-Yazdi's al-Urwah al-Wuthqa, is that it is 
forbidden except on condition of wearing gloves or something similar.6 Likewise, al-
Khui and Sistani consistently allow it only when all routes of escape—including wearing 
gloves or not shaking anyone's hand at all, men included—fail, but forbid it otherwise. 
As this issue arises regularly in academic or other formal meetings and elicits some 
tension between mustaftis and mujtahids, it provides a suitable case study, which I will 
examine below. For the moment, I use it to demonstrate my point about mustaftis' 
tendency to rely on social context and Usuli principles. MustaftTs tend to see the inter-
gender handshake contextually: a harmless cultural necessity, neglect of which produces 
haraj. 
According to mustaftis, haraj is here understood to be the result of a course of 
action that reflects badly on Muslims and their, manners. Mujtahids on the other hand 
tend to understand haraj in a significantly narrower manner and tend not to accede to the 
claims of mustaftis that maintaining the non-handshake rule elicits hardship. As used by 
mujtahids, haraj does not appear to extend to the psychological or social harm that 
observing some Islamic restrictions are likely to bring about, as a contextualized 
6
 Al-Sayyid Muhammad Kazim al-Yazdi, al- 'Urwah al-Wuthqa (Qom: Mu'assasat Isma'iliyyan, 
1412/1991), 2:637. The ruling reads: "Layajuz musafahat al-ajnabiyah; na'm la ba's bihamin wara' al-
thawb kama la ba's bi-lams al-mahram." This text, as noted elsewhere, remains the standard reference 
work of contemporary jurisprudence. 
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interpretation might suggest.7 On the contrary, minimizing Western cultural obligations 
in this regard, mujtahids classify forbidding the inter-gender handshake as a non-
negotiable Islamic legal duty, on the level of not imbibing or serving alcohol and other 
sins.8 Sistani includes women shaking hands with unrelated men in a list of activities that, 
if forced to do by her husband, justifies her leaving him and remaining entitled to full 
maintenance.9 Fadlallah goes so far as to imply that the alleged haraj claimed by a 
mustaftl is nothing but intentional self-deception.10 "Man is a telling witness against 
himself although he tender his excuses," Fadlallah quotes from Surah 75:14-15. 
Elsewhere, however, Fadlallah acknowledges the permissibility of shaking hands in 
"compelling cases" but not otherwise.11 Al-Sayyid Ja'far Murtada similarly argues that a 
medical doctor need not shake hands with his female patients to provide good care. 
People, he suggests, are quick to imagine the presence of haraj. "Will their imagination 
that social custom equals haraj also make adultery permissible?" he asks cynically.12 
Although fatawa on education are brief and do not commonly include the 
mujtahid's reasoning processes, some allusions to specific choices within the legal 
methodology may be observed. When dealing with controversial or problematic issues, 
mujtahids tend to rely on principles that favour conservatism, such as obligatory 
Similarly, according to al-Sayyid Ja'far Murtada, harm and necessity may not be invoked in the interests 
of academic success, or embarrassment, such that the forbidden becomes permissible, (reference below, 
143). 
8
 See, for example, al-Sayyid Ja'far Murtada al-' Amili, Khalftydt Kitdb Ma 'sat al-Zahra' [CD-ROM, 
ALAQAED, version 1.0] (Beirut: Dar al-Sirah, 1419/1998), 1:64,143. 
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 Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Fatawa al-Maslrah [CD-ROM, ALAHKAM, version 2.0] (Maktab al-Samahah, 
1417/1996), 427. Aside from shaking hands with unrelated men, the list includes being forced to remove 
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precaution (ihtiyat wajib) or a narrow definition of haraj, rather than apply a more 
rigorous use of UsiilT methodology which could potentially produce a different opinion. 
Our hand-shake fatawa are a case in point, as are other issues in which mujtahids are 
evidently partial towards ihtiyat. Although a legitimate UsiilT principle, ihtiyat is far more 
common in Akhbari legal theory, which lacks a set of principles for deriving a diversity 
of opinions in cases of ambiguity, revelatory silence, or new situations. UsiilT theory, on 
the other hand, need not rely so heavily on precaution as the process of ijtihad may lead 
to more specific rulings based only on probable opinion (zann)P The following fa tawa 
illustrate in more detail the analysis described in general terms above. 
SHAKING HANDS WITH THE OPPOSITE SEX: HONOURING ISLAM 
Reading several handshake fatawa in sequence clearly shows the efforts of the 
mustaftis to obtain a favourable ruling. For example: 
Istiftd': A male student in a western country is applying to university and needs 
to attend interviews with that university's teachers. When attending these 
interviews the student needs to greet the teachers with a simple hand shake. If 
the teacher is female and the student does not shake hand [sic] with her then the 
student will be discriminated against for his religion and this will jeopardize his 
chances to be admitted to the university and this will drastically change his life. 
Is he permitted to have [sic — the istifta' is cut off at this point] 
Fatwa: Under circumstances where a problem may arise, light handshake sans 
any sexual feelings is allowed. 
Interestingly, this fatwa appears, and has appeared for a long time, on the homepage of 
Khui's website, perhaps a result of site managers wishing to give his marji 'Tyah an air of 
comparative progressiveness, although as a deceased mujtahid he should no longer be 
This means that while Akhbans can issue fewer fatwas, those they do issue are established with certainty, 
whereas the principle oizann permits UsulTs to issue innumerable fatwas. For a good comparison of the 
two methodologies and their respective application of ihtiyat, see Gleave, Inevitable Doubt. 
14
 Imam al-Khoei Islamic Center, www.al-khoei.org/kb/Article.aspx?id=10117 (accessed February 1, 
2009). 
240 
followed (apart from those who followed him prior to his death). Its completely positive 
approach is, however, misleading in light of additional details that appear in an Arabic 
print source: 
Hand-shaking is not permitted (lajajuz) unless not doing so would result in 
corruption (mafsadah) and harm (darar). It is also okay (la ba's) between a veil 
(al-sitr) and without any misgivings or sexual feelings (ribah wa shahwabi). 
While the English version (quoted first) does not even mention the general prohibition, 
the Arabic (quoted second) gives it priority before shifting to a rather weakly worded 
permission, the term used to grant it, la ba 's, being the mildest form of permissive 
expression. It reflects an atypical engagement with a mustaftiwhose use of the mujtahid's 
language demonstrates a vigorous attempt to extract a permissive ruling. The mustafti 
emphasizes a perceived compulsion in the situation (idha idtarra al-insan, i.e., if 
someone is compelled), innocence of motive (without any misgivings or desire (min dun 
aya ribah aw raghbah), the fact that it is initiated by the woman in the context of a 
formal meeting, and the extreme hardship (haraj shadid) and dire consequences not 
shaking hands would occasion, including insult to the Muslim and disdain of his religion 
and his testimony to Islam,16 drawing on the cultural rubric of honour and shame as well 
as the idea of da 'wah. 
The mustaftTs apparent success here raises the question as to whether mustaftis, 
in the manner in which they pose their questions, can have any significant influence on 
fatwa giving. A survey of several hand-shake fatawd suggests that if this is the case in the 
above example, it is not typical. Nor is extensive detail in the istifta' always helpful; it 
can even be counter-productive. In one such case, Sistani adds that his permission is 
15
 Ahkam al-Mughtaribin, 187.506. 
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qualified by a condition of necessity in attending these meetings, but that "if one is not 
able to avoid haram then it is forbidden to attend."17 
Ayatollah Tabrizi is not in the least persuaded by the arguments of mustaftis. To 
Khui's/a/wa above, he adds the comment that even in a situation of "harm (darar) and 
corruption (mafsadah)" the most precautious course of action is to desist because "by 
[this ruling] the honour (sharaf) of Islam is preserved."18 Similarly, Tabrizi identifies the 
non-handshake as among sha 'a 'ir al-din) We noted previously how the sha 'a 'ir al-din 
have special significance in legal discourse on migration as essential symbolic markers of 
Islamic identity. By locating the rule on not shaking hands within this essential category 
Tabrizi implies that he sees it as a highly significant marker of Muslim identity. 
Although the handshake is widely held as forbidden, not all mujtahids follow 
Tabrizi's method. Al-Sayyid Ja'far Murtada argues that although not shaking hands in 
and of itself is not an absolute and necessary precept, if one allows it to be subject to new 
ijtihad, there will be a ripple effect, leading to the breakdown of such fundamentals as the 
imamate, the number of rak'ahs (bowings) in each prayer, or other rules for prayer, the 
consumption of alcohol, sexual ethics, and so on.20 The issue here is not hand-shaking 
per se, but a clearly articulated reticence to allow new situations in the West to initiate 
alternative and relevant ijtihad. It is not, I suggest, simply a reluctance to exercise the full 
potential of Usull methodology that is evident here, but rather, the socio-political context 
of residence in the West that compels such resistance. Analysis of additional fatawa in 
light of post-colonial theory of identity suggests that the institutional leadership's 
17
 Ibid, 188.511. 
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 Ibid, 187.506. 
19
 Ibid, 188.509. 
20
 al-'Amili, Khaljiyat, 5:64-65. 
242 
preferential option for ihtiyat over ijtihad is rooted in this over-arching discourse of 
resistance to the host culture and adoption of what some authors call "adversarial 
identities."21 Seen from this perspective, it becomes easier to comprehend the inflexibility 
with which mujtahids treat this issue. 
Ayatollahs al-Fadil and al-Makarim forbid the unclothed handshake outright and 
remind mustaftls, who feel culturally obliged to shake hands so as not to insult their 
professors, of their legal obligation to explain the Islamic origins of this tradition and 
absolve themselves of the accusation of "bad manners."22 This echoes Fadlallah's 
frequent calls for Muslims to use such opportunities as this to propagate Islam by 
describing and defending its ethical principles. Likewise, to al-Hakim, the handshake is 
a practice of "infidels" that represents a threat to Islamic identity, on the level, by 
implication, of cultural imperialism, again reflecting a post-colonial construction of 
resistance identity. Consequently, he says: "It is the duty of believers to eliminate these 
conventions and customs that deny religion, as following these customs leads to the loss 
of our religious identity."24 
Interestingly, although an apparently non-negotiable benchmark of Islamic ethics, 
or at least a preserver of one, not one mujtahid draws on a scriptural source, Qur'an or 
See Wrong, "Adversarial Identities, 10-14. See also Haddad, "Dynamics of Islamic Identity," 19-46. 
Haddad underlines the role that conflicting ideological allegiances and historical power dynamics play in 
the shaping of Muslim minority identity in the United States. Her article is filled with the language of 
oppositional differentiation characteristic of resistance identity: Muslims in the U.S. are portrayed—in 
Haddad's assessment of American attitudes—as victims, a constructed enemy, powerless minority, 
uncivilized people, a cancer, war mongers, villains, consummate terrorists, and "conspiratorial forces of 
hatred." American attitudes are expressed in terms of: negative propaganda, anti-Islamic "wave sweeping 
across the United States," prejudice, deliberate falsifications, perpetrated demonization, and Christian 
missionary assaults. While, offering a reasonably valid critique, Haddad's article suffers from 
overgeneralization and unbalanced positive and negative stereotyping of Islam/Muslims and 
Christianity/Americans respectively. 
22Ahkam al-Mughtaribin, 189.514.517. 
23
 See, for example, Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar, 321-22. 
24
 Al-Hakim, Murshid al-Mughtaribin, 443.476. 
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Tradition, to support his position against male-female handshaking, even though such 
traditions exist. It is said that when Ali was given the oath of allegiance at Ghadir 
Khumm, he placed his hands, along with those of unrelated women, in a basin of water so 
as to avoid direct contact.25 Further, al-Hurr al-'Amili cites a tradition on the authority of 
al-Sadiq reporting that handshaking between non-related men and women is forbidden.26 
A Sunni mufti, M. Sa'id Ramadan al-Bouti, who rejects the idea that minority fiqh is at 
all justified, claims that the prohibition is based on a hadith to the effect that the Prophet 
was never known to shake hands with a woman.27 
In conclusion, there seems to be no remarkable influence on fatawa by questions 
of elaborate detail arid verbal manipulation. Such attempts to elicit favourable answers 
seem futile. They only highlight the tension between the mustaftis,'' desire for cultural 
accommodation and the mujtahids' strong resistance to Western cultural practices—such 
as the male-female handshake—practices that are believed to invite moral corruption and 
loss of religion. As does the treatment of other issues in this literature, fatawa on hand-
shaking demonstrate how deeply legal discourse for the West is embedded in the 
historical context of post-colonial discourse. As Yvonne Haddad argues, Muslims in the 
West today struggle to find acceptance, particularly in the American (U.S.) context of 
widespread distrust of Islam and Muslims. Perceiving themselves to be "a powerless 
al-Shaykh Mehdi, al-lmam 'AlifiAra' al-Khulafa'. (Qom: Mu'assasat al-Ma'arif al-Islamiyah, 1420 
a.h.% 73. 
26
 al-Hurr al-'Amili, Al-Fusul al-Muhimmah, [CD-ROM, ALAQAED, version 1.0] (Qom: Mu'assasat 
Ma'arif IslamTlmam Rida, 1418), 2:342. 
27
 Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan al-Bouti, official website, http://www.bouti.com/bouti_e_ fatawa_c8.htm#l 
(accessed February 1, 2009). 
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minority" in the lands of their "conquerors," Muslims in the United States have adopted a 
variety of strategies in response, including the adversarial stance of cultural resistance. 
Mujtahids such as al-Murtada, al-Hakim, and others should be situated within this 
theoretical context. Their fatawa of resistance may then be understood as attempts to 
compensate for feelings of victimization, insecurity, and inferiority by asserting the 
opposite pole of Muslim moral superiority. Casting the practice of not shaking hands with 
the opposite sex as a mark of superior moral orientation and a solution to the moral decay 
of the West demonstrates a strategy of resistance to a perceived threat of cultural and 
political hegemony. It suggests that while powerlessness may bring shame and dishonour, 
Muslims in the West may recover their honour by maintaining Islamic morality in spite 
of the challenges. 
OTHER QUESTIONS: MORALS AND MISSION 
Other education-related topics include attending co-educational and non-Muslim 
schools and universities; questions related to medical education; certain types of classes; 
influence of unbelieving teachers; and miscellaneous issues. Mustaftis are either parents 
or guardians of children and youth asking on behalf of a silent party, or university 
students asking on behalf of themselves. Both frequently select the kind of detail they 
provide apparently in an effort to sway the mujtahid's fatwa in one direction or another. 
However, as in the handshaking fa tawa, these attempts do not appear to have a significant 
impact. Further, with few exceptions, fatawa on these questions, like that of hand-
shaking, demonstrate the same reticence to exercise new ijtihad and the same resistance 
to the dominant culture. 
Haddad, "Dynamics of Islamic Identity," 21. 
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Questions from medical students deal predominantly with looking at or touching 
the private parts of patients, the same or opposite sex, in the course of study, or viewing 
the same in pictures, models, or films. Khamenei is remarkably permissive on these 
matters. His permission appears to be based on the legal principle of muqaddimat al-
lazim. That is, what the law permits, it renders permissible whatever actions are 
inseparable from its performance. Since saving lives is assuredly permissible, whatever 
activities are a necessary in training towards this goal are also permitted. However, it is 
not permissible simply on the grounds that it is asked of the student by the professor; if 
this were the only criterion, it would be forbidden.30 Thus, in spite of an intractable 
cultural conservativeness, Khamenei's ijtihad allows him some flexibility in deriving 
permissive rulings. 
Khamenei's medical fatawa are striking in comparison with those of Sistani and 
Fadlallah. Fadlallah gives permission to examine genitals only from a negative 
perspective—if forbidding it "is a cause of [the student's] failure," and "if [failure] is a 
distress for [the student]."31 The connection between medical training and practice does 
not appear to be a causal factor in his decision. Sistani is singularly illogical in forbidding 
the performance of autopsy on a dead Muslim for educational "or other purposes" but 
permitting it in the actual saving of the life of another Muslim, "even if in the future."32 
This is about the limit of qualified permissive fatawa; the remainder tends 
strongly towards prohibition. The matter of non-Islamic schools is problematic, 
29
 Khamenei, Practical Laws of Islam, available at http://www.leader.ir/langs/EN/index.php# Fatwds 
#1300,1301,1302,1303,1304,1305,1306,1307,1308,1310. 
30
 Ibid, #1302: "The medical examination being part of the curriculum or an assignment required from the 
student by his professor does not justify the commission of what Islamic law has decreed unlawful. 
However, the criterion here is the need for the training to save the human life or the requirement of a 
necessity." 
31
 Fadlallah, Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar, 318. 
32
 Sistani, al-Fiqh U al-Mughtaribln, 249.350. 
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especially for Fadlallah, who advances a vigorous appeal for the foundation of Islamic 
schools in the West to act as "incubators" against the "deviant atmospheres" of Western 
primary and secondary educational institutions. His theory is that as children and youth 
lack sufficient grounding in Islamic knowledge they can easily become accustomed to the 
Western outlook they learn at school, such that it becomes "natural" and comfortable to 
them. They then become confused and irritated by their parents' criticisms.34 As their 
guardians, parents are responsible to "rescue" children from "moral and intellectual 
deviation."35 Separate schools are seen as facilitating protection from outside influence 
while also strengthening the community for advancing Islamic religious, moral, social, 
and political interests in the West. Fadlallah'sfatawa are guided by this underlying 
principle. For example: 
Istifta': You have spoken in the Bayyanat about how a university student must 
not blend in with the laden a tmosphere . Does this mean, then, that w e must try 
t o change the society there? Wha t is our role in such an environment? 
Fatwa: I was saying that when a person lives in a society that is overcome with 
er ror he should not lay down his a rmor , and not fall before this society. Rather, 
he should work from the beginning to be balanced and guard his mind and heart 
so as to not allow deviation to enter in, and to protec t his steps as well , to the 
best of his knowledge. Further, he should try to further his knowledge and to 
develop relationships in order to steer the conversation towards Islam and the 
ethical steps that God wants from people , to protect himself when he takes on 
himself the character of a missionary {da 'lyah) because this suggestion and 
practice might give him another (kind of) strength. 
Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco explain that according to the adversarial 
identity model, embracing elements of the dominant culture is perceived as acquiescence 
or surrender to the dominant culture, rendering that culture the victor in a struggle for 
Fadlallah, Islamic Lanterns, 162, 263, 279. 
34
 Ibid., 205-206. 
35
 Ibid., 225. 
36
 Fadlallah, Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar, 321-322. Alternatively, da'iyah may be translated as propagandist, 
herald, or one who calls others to something. 
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power. Fadlallah's advice reflects this approach in Islamic terms. Although not 
advancing a call to military jihad against dar al-harb, he maintains these conceptual 
categories and a jihadi approach to life in the West. According to Fadlallah, Muslims in 
the West are at the forefront of a moral, spiritual, and political jihad, and should use their 
presence there to advance "the call of Islam" and gradually transform non-Muslim 
society into an Islamic one. For Fadlallah, Islam is a religion of the mind, perfectly in 
harmony with the "universal laws of the cosmos" and the "laws of history." Rationality 
and Islamic social values are part of the "armor" that Muslims should always wear, as 
they hold the key to the transformation of America's apparent social malaise. 
Consequently, to the student struggling to maintain his Islam in a foreign university, 
Fadlallah advises him or her to "make the greatness of God have command over [him or 
herself]." He suggests that: 
the more you are certain of physics, chemistry, and biology, the more you'll 
know God; and if you know God more, then the more you can feel your need 
to obey and get closer to God, as Imam Ali said in the Hadith about the 
certainties, 'They glorified the Creator in themselves and the things around 
them looked smaller in their eyes.' Therefore, if you want to strengthen your 
commitment, then try to strengthen your faith in God. 
In spite of his preoccupation with rationality and the scientific approach, Fadlallah 
tends to be no more or less permissive than other mujtahids. His one outright permission 
is in regard to studying about loans and interest in economics courses. Since this is only 
for the purpose of knowledge, he says, there is no problem with it.40 The point, of course, 
is that Western culture should have no influence on the Muslim migrant, but the migrant 
37
 Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco, Children of Immigration, 107. 
38
 See, for example, Fadlallah, "His Eminence's call to emigrants in all countries," Islamic Lanterns, 225-
31. 
39
 Fadlallah, Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar, 322-23. 
40
 Ibid., 320. 
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should work to influence Western society for Islam. This requires that Muslims in the 
West adopt an identity of difference and Fadlallah's/afawa facilitate this process by 
compensating for the Muslim's apparent powerlessness in Western society by 
juxtaposing it with a perceived moral superiority in Islam. By avoiding rigorous ijtihad 
and stressing the ethical strength of the traditional Islamic moral code Fadlallah clearly 
positions himself within the resistance identity camp that utilizes themes of difference 
and othering to flex its socio-moral muscles. 
But Fadlallah also encourages a methodology of time and place with respect to 
applying cherished legal practices. He frames this as understanding the difference 
between the unchanging moral principles of religion, based in "humanity," and 
"traditions" tied to circumstances of time and place, by which he means that while the 
law provides unchanging principles, the changing conditions of socio-historical context 
provide opportunity for creative application of the law. He refers to this as an 
intellectualization of Islamic morals aimed at jurisprudential reform so that rulings may 
be formulated along "general Qur'anic lines" and in awareness of the new realities.41 For 
example, since the main problem with Western schools is sexual promiscuity, he advises 
alternatives such as making marriage easier, and regulating the practice of temporary 
marriage.42 In light of this, Fadlallah may be said to promote a minority identity of 
selective engagement, though to a very limited degree and, more importantly, on Islamic 
legal terms only. 
Sistani is in full agreement that the lax sexual mores of Western schools is a 
prohibitive factor for Muslims attending co-ed schools: 
41
 Fadlallah, Islamic Lanterns, 207-208. 
42
 Ibid., 163. 
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lstifid': Is it permissible for male and female pupils in elementary school 
to mix when one knows that this mixing will surely lead one day to a 
forbidden act by the male or the female student, even if just a forbidden 
glance? 
Fatwa: It is not permissible under the circumstances described. 
A fatwa from Sistani in response to a question presenting both sides of the argument still 
prioritizes a conservative Islamic moral code over the possibilities for social 
advancement via education. Given the fatwa above, it would appear that the ruling would 
not change even if segregated schools did not exist, leaving families with limited options. 
Istijia': Is it permissible for those who reside in the West to send their 
muhajjabah daughters to co-ed schools (irrespective of whether or not education 
is compulsory) while there exist segregated schools which obviously are 
expensive, located far away or of a low academic standard? 
Fatwa: It is not permissible [even] if it [just] corrupts their character, let alone if 
it harms their beliefs and commitment to the faith which is what normally 
happens! 
However, responsible young adulthood seems to lessen the restrictions somewhat, 
as a Muslim woman is advised that she may attend a co-ed college in spite of the lax 
moral atmosphere "if she is confident that she can preserve her faith, fulfill her religious 
duties, including the hijab, refrain from haram looking and touching, and be immune to 
immoral and adverse atmosphere [...]; otherwise, it is not allowed."45 Male and female 
university students enjoying leisure travel time together receives the same highly cautious 
permission. 
Al-Hakim's mustaftis, as those of other mujtahids, include a brief description of 
the immoral and corrupt atmosphere of these schools in what appears to be attempts to 
support the restrictions they wish to impose on their children with the authority of the 
43
 Sistani, al-Fiqh lial-Mughtaribln, 237-38.328. English translation: fatwa 325. 
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 Sistani, al-Fiqh li al-Mughtaribin, 318-19.535. English translation, fatwa 483. 
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mujtahid. Al-Hakim's position is that in and of itself, co-education is not forbidden, but it 
is reprehensible and the young person must be certain of their immunity to influence; if 
not, then it is forbidden.46 
The presence of alcohol at academic meetings, conferences, and parties is clearly 
problematic. MustaftTs tend to simply present the facts of the situation. Some point out 
that non-attendance could be an obstacle to their careers, and thus a cause of haraj. 
Khamenei advises Muslim students that participation in these gatherings is forbidden 
unless attendance is obligatory. In this case, it should be of sufficient length to fulfill the 
obligation only and be accompanied by an explanation as to the Islamic moral code 
regarding alcohol.47 
Attending certain types of classes such as dance, music, art, or sex education, 
according to Fadlallah, might be permissible—if the intent is educational and no 
forbidden activities ensue.48 Attendance at a Christian school, on the other hand, while 
cautiously permitted, is highly discouraged, (as is attending secular schools).4 Similarly, 
according to Fadlallah, it is forbidden—unless nothing else is available—for children to 
attend schools where teachers "deny the existence of God." If no Muslim school exists, 
Muslim parents should establish one and in the meantime, must assure that their children 
attend mosque regularly.50 For Sistani, parents are responsible to ensure that their 
children do not attend such schools.51 
See, for example, al-Hakim, Murshid al-Mughtaribin, 432.450.451. 
Ahkam al-Mughtaribin, 47, 310. 
Fadlallah, Islamic Lanterns, 369. 
Fadlallah, Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar, 320. 
Fadlallah, Islamic Lanterns, 395. 
Sistani, al-Fiqh IT al-Mughtaribin, 237.327. 
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It is worthy of note that no mujtahid suggests the possibility that other religious 
communities might share the same fears regarding influence of a perceived immoral 
social climate on their youth. It is well known that social and personal morality, 
particularly in regard to sexual ethics, is a major pre-occupation of conservative Jewish, 
Christian other religious communities. The mujtahids'' apparent unawareness of this 
reality leads them to negatively over-generalize their perspective on Western culture and 
to intensify assumptions of incompatibility between Islam and the West, thereby 
elevating feelings of isolation in the community. This allows the mujtahids to reinforce 
the missional motivation of migration, but at the same time might result in missing 
opportunities for dialogue on social concerns shared by other religious communities. 
CONCLUSION: OBLIGATORY PRECAUTION 
Education fatawa demonstrate a consistent application of conservative legal 
principles such as certainty of immunity, absolute necessity, and obligatory precaution 
(ihtiydt wajib). These are more prominent than are principles of a more flexible ijtihdd 
such as time and place, or the presence of haraj. The fatawa underline the idea that 
Muslims' legal responsibility, as parents and as muqallids, obligates them to tolerate 
inconveniences, difficulties and obstacles in the course of upholding their Islamic moral 
commitment and expressing a positive witness to Islamic ethics. The hand-shaking 
dilemma once again demonstrates a tension between muqallids and mujtahids regarding 
boundary lines around cultural accommodation and compromise. 
Aside from supporting the fundamental principle in modern juristic theory of 
migration to the West, that is, that migration is conditional on the preservation of religion 
and protection from non-Islamic influence, mujtahids seem to be keenly aware of the 
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ability of education to penetrate a people's worldview. This is especially characteristic of 
Fadlallah whose fatawa on education are probably among his most restrictive. They 
consequently seek to maintain a position not only of passive but also proactive resistance 
to Western influence. The perceived moral corruption of Western society provides a 
backdrop for advancing Islam as the solution to the moral crisis of the West, even as 
Islamic educational institutions provide the safety net needed to fulfill this calling. 
Fatawa in this field thus support a strong leaning towards resistance identity, articulated 
within a post-colonial interpretation of Muslim-other relations. 
253 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CLOTHING AND BEARDS: ASSERTION OF IDENTITY 
OR RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION? 
Legal discourse on clothing and other aspects of appearance finds its roots, as is 
usual for all matters of law, in the Qur'an and the supplementary and explanatory 
literature of hadith. These texts provide the principles for legal discourse regarding male 
and female appearance, the central features of which are piety and modesty. In the 
context of appearance, piety and modesty refer not just to an attitude of obedience to the 
divine law and sexual propriety, but also reflect the Qur'anic value of economic frugality 
or moderation. Thus, we find that items such as gold and silk, specifically for men, are 
usually forbidden, or at least not recommended to be worn. A third stream of thought 
contributing to legal discourse on Islamic dress and appearance is that of identity and the 
socio-political and religious values that clothing and appearance communicate. 
The most well known item of Islamic modest dress is what is commonly known 
as the female hijab. Much has been written on this very controversial subject. The 
purpose of this chapter is not to determine which interpretation of the several possibilities 
is the correct one, nor is it to investigate the origins of the custom. This is a theoretical 
matter that, while relevant to the wider ideological context, is beyond the scope of the 
present study.1 Further, as much of the field research drawn on for this analysis indicates, 
1
 Debates abound about the meaning of Qur'anic vocabulary that has, in popular parlance, been subsumed 
under the term hijab and interpreted as an item of clothing that should be added to a woman's attire, 
specifically a headscarf. Similarly, it may also refer to a wider understanding of modest dress, including 
some form of head-covering. This is the predominant view in popular understanding. Classically, the hijab 
was more often interpreted as a curtain, or veil of seclusion, modeled after the injunction of Surah 53:33, 
that was intended to protect Muhammad's wives from the indiscretions of other men. Lynda Clarke shows 
how this seclusion interpretation was carried on in hadith and eventually worked its way into law, 
expressed as a series of rules conditioning women's freedom of movement to the permission of her 
husband. The hijab as clothing can then be understood as a modern modification, a sort of portable 
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a large proportion of women who wear the hijab in the West are relatively uninformed of 
this literature. We will therefore content ourselves with footnotes summarizing the main 
lines of argument and otherwise refer the reader to more specialized studies.2 
seclusion, allowing woman greater freedom of mobility. See Lynda Clarke, "Hijab According to the 
hadith," in The Muslim Veil in North America: issues and debates, ed. Sajida Alvi, Homa Hoodfar, and 
Sheila McDonough (Toronto: Women's Press, 2003), 214-86. 
The contemporary Iranian cleric, Ayatollah Azeri-Qomi, alludes to the classical interpretation 
when he speaks of a "culture of hejab [sic]," by which he means a social structure that protects women's 
pious character as well as their bodies. His vision of the ideal Islamic society that follows this culture of 
hijab would also include female seclusion behind the walls of their homes and otherwise have them 
covered in full chador. See Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary 
Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 67. 
For a modern Shi'ite treatment of hijab that carries the wider meaning of female modest dress, see 
Murtaza Mutahhari, The Islamic Modest Dress: Hijab, trans. Laleh Bakhtiar (Chicago: IL: Kazi 
Publications, 1992), 7-9. Mutahhari offers a concise summary of the standard legal definition of hijab in the 
following: "The philosophy behind the hijab for woman in Islam is that she should cover her body in her 
associations with men 'whom she is not related to according to the Divine Law' (na-mahram) and that she 
does not flaunt and display herself (8). Mutahhari's argument against a definition of hijab as a veil 
secluding the prophet's wives from other men, even though the sole use of the word hijab in the Qur'an in 
relation to women is precisely with this meaning (53:33), admits this Qur'anic usage, but goes on to negate 
it by saying that this is not the meaning of hijab because it "is not the intention of Islam to imprison 
women" (8). It is likely that Mutahhari's unsubstantiated argument was intended to appeal to modern 
revolutionary, but pious women. 
For a different interpretation, reflective of the classical view, see Soraya Hajjaji-Jarrah, "Women's 
Modesty in Qur'anic Commentaries: The Founding Discourse," The Muslim Veil, 181-213. Hajjaji-Jarrah 
argues that of the Qur'an's eight references to hijab, none refer to women's clothing and all suggest "either 
a physical or a metaphorical barrier without any reference to women or their clothing [... ] Thus, the 
Qur'anic usage of the term hijab seems somewhat removed from the notion of dress or clothing of any 
kind" (184). Yet the tqfsir (exegesis) tradition demonstrates strong support for this latter understanding. 
Hajjaji-Jarrah suggests that this is a product of "an affective relationship between the commentators and 
their social reality. [...]. As a result," she argues, "assumptions of female inferiority in medieval Islamic 
societies derived more from scriptural commentaries than from the Qur'anic verses themselves" (183). 
In this same volume, Lynda Clarke demonstrates that, like the Qur'an, the hadith pays minimal 
attention to women's clothing, and contains "no explicit reference to covering either the head or the hair," 
even though numerous ahadlth refer to the necessity of men covering their 'awrah, meaning their "private 
or shameful parts." Clarke, "Hijab According to the Hadith," 218,222. Clarke advises me that for the 
traditional Muslim scholars, the absence of clothing meaning in the Qur'an and Tradition does not diminish 
the legitimacy of the developed law and the ijma' that underlies it. For a sociological analysis of the debate 
on the hijab, see Anne Sofie Roald, "Islamic Female Dress," in Women in Islam: The Western Experience 
(London: Routledge, 2001). 
Leila Ahmed's Islam and Gender: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1992) is a seminal work on the origins of the veil. For a different perspective, see Fatima Mernissi, 
The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam, trans. Mary Jo 
Lakeland (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1991); see also Barbara Freyer 
Stowasser, Women in the Qur 'an: Traditions and Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994). More recent writings include the already cited The Muslim Veil in North America (2003); Amina 
Wadud-Mohsin, Inside the Gender Jihad (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006); and Asma Barlas, "Women's 
Readings of the Qur'an," in Cambridge Companion to the Qu'ran, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also the sources cited in footnote 1. 
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This chapter examines contemporary legal discourse on clothing and other aspects 
of appearance, such as ties, beards and make-up, around the three central foci mentioned 
above: piety, modesty, and Muslim identity. As is the pattern in other chapters, I also 
look for meaning in an analysis of the conversation between mustaftis and mujtahids. The 
chapter does not include questions dealing with clothing from a ritual point of view; these 
are included sporadically in issues of purity and impurity. 
In addition to the primary sources of our research, that is, contemporary Shi'ite 
legal and popular discourse, I also incorporate the results of the significantly large pool of 
published scholarly field research. Although the majority of this research focuses on 
Sunni women, the findings are, in this case, widely applicable to Shi'ites as well. For 
example, as Sunni styles of wearing hijab are found to be indicative of a woman's 
ideological sympathies, Linda Walbridge's research shows that Shi'ite styles often signify 
specific political affiliations, particularly, to the Lebanese Hizbullah and Amal parties; or 
indicate that one is an admirer of Ayatollah Khomeini.3 In view of my inclusion of the 
results of field research among Sunni women, as well as the contribution they add to our 
analysis, I also include some fatawa from Sunni muftis,. 
The chapter begins with a summary of findings from documented field research, 
followed by a brief account of Canadian attitudes (or, more correctly, Muslim perceptions 
of those attitudes) to the veil. I then examine the fatawa along the lines of three analytic 
foci. I use the term piety to delineate observance of the law; by modesty, I mean the form 
of dress that hides a person's attractive qualities; the third focus of identity is expressed 
also in terms of resembling unbelievers (al-tashabbuh bi al-kuffar), which I understand to 
be a less sophisticated traditional version of the contemporary socio-political discourse 
3
 Walbridge, Without Forgetting, 177-82. 
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described in the field research section. Throughout, there is a subtext of hijab as an 
instrument of da 'wah. While the matter of not resembling unbelievers addresses several 
questions regarding male appearance, questions related to piety and modesty deal 
predominantly with female appearance. This typically medieval phenomenon stands in 
contrast to the hadith literature which, as pointed out above, places far more emphasis on 
covering male nakedness.4 
In this chapter, I argue that while the motivations of Muslim women in the West 
and of the mujtahids are fundamentally at odds, in practical terms, they reinforce each 
other. Whereas for a certain segment of veiled women in the West, the hijab has socio-
political meaning, representing personal autonomy and rejection of Western sexist values, 
for the religious class as a whole, the hijab affirms female subordination to male honour 
and authority. In consequence, while deciding for hijab for very personal reasons, veiled 
Muslim women in the West in effect enhance the standard legal orthodoxy and give 
credence to an impression of clerical authoritarianism as both relevant and vital. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM FIELD RESEARCH MATERIAL 
Recent field research on the hijab in the West demonstrates a high level of 
identity politics among Muslim women.5 Several researchers conclude that the veil is 
often taken up by women in the West as a symbolic strategy to articulate what one author 
has called "Muslim first identities."6 This is understood to be in tension with identities 
4
 Clarke, "Hijab According to Ihe.Hadith" 217-18. 
5
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6
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based primarily on ethnicity and tradition.7 Further, while rooted in religion, it makes 
short use of the notion of obligation; rather, religion functions more as a symbol of 
identity, the markers of which may be taken up or discarded at will. Exemplifying this 
particularly well is one young female informant cited by Nadine Naber, who wore hijab 
when with her local MSA (Muslim Students' Association) chapter but took it off when 
among secular Arabs.8 Although the results of the two discourses often reinforce each 
other in practice—which is what makes the "Muslim first" discourse so strategically 
valuable—differences between the discourses as they inform and motivate women's 
choices are more significant. 
In "Muslim first" identities, women understand themselves to be asserting Islamic 
values of female personhood and individuality over against their parents' authoritarian 
cultural justification for traditional gender roles. Young adherents of "Muslim first" 
identities, both male and female, attempt to disentangle the religious norms they choose 
to embrace from the "cultural essentialism" handed down to them from their parents. As 
young adults everywhere, they wish to be "actively engaged in a process of building their 
own personalities and beliefs."9 Rejecting what they see as their parents' unwarranted 
conflation of the pervasive cultural value of "abe" (shameful) with the religious notion of 
haram (forbidden), they attempt to shed the moral authority of the former, which they see 
7
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as irrational and gender biased, in favour of the latter, which, conversely, they idealize as 
both fully rational and gender equal. 
Nevertheless, when asked specifically about their own expectations regarding 
gender roles, informants confirmed the traditional values held by their parents in cultural 
terms. In consequence, as Naber points out, the selectively strategic Islamic 
rationalization for hijab, while changing the discourse, does not present a formidable 
challenge to cultural or family norms.10 Even so, by adopting the veil for religious 
reasons, women are able, much as in some Islamic societies, to "gain or maintain esteem 
within a patriarchal society..."11 and so to successfully negotiate a greater measure of 
self-autonomy. 
But the veil as a visible Islamic identity marker, or "flag," as one informant put 
it,12 is the inevitable destination of a brief, but significant history that brings together 
several motivating strands. Homa Hoodfar tracks this narrative in her lucid analysis of the 
data obtained by a team of researchers among young Muslim women in Toronto and 
Montreal in the late 1990s.13 She observes that while very few women (4/59) initially 
claimed that the veil was a mark of Arab or Muslim identity, the data showed otherwise. 
Hoodfar's analysis indicates an increasingly politicized interpretation of the veil that 
women's collective experience before and after taking up the veil brings to light. 
In the initial stages, young Muslim women from traditional, even if not religious 
homes, found their options for social engagement increasingly limited after puberty. In 
10
 Naber, "Muslim First, Arab Second," 488-89. 
11
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response to the social stigmatization of socially active unveiled Muslim women within 
the community, young women began to take up the hijab as a means of asserting their 
will to pursue an education and socialize with friends without the high cost of losing 
respectability in the eyes of their families and communities. So successful was the 
strategy, that one informant boasted that "the veil is the answer to all Muslim girls' 
problems here in North America."14 
Having adopted the hijab, women found that Islamic teachings in other areas, 
such as the right to choose a spouse, provided them with an effective vehicle of resistance 
to confining cultural traditions, a step that represents what I see as the second stage of 
development. At this stage, study groups around what was seen as true Islam began to 
form among increasingly knowledgeable, articulate, and often second generation, veiled 
women. The group solidarity forged by this project made what was often initially a 
difficult and lonely choice appear more attractive. The third stage therefore saw a more 
confident assertion of Muslim identity associated with veiling. Rather than remaining 
marginalized, women founded social groupings that affirmed and strengthened their 
moral values while allowing them to avail themselves of opportunities offered by 
Canadian society. Similarly, as Naber's study suggests, non-white social groupings that 
emerged in California to counter racist policies strengthened identity politics among 
Muslim youth, such that one informant claimed it was popular to think that "to be 
somebody, you have to hang with Blacks, Asians, Latinos, or Muslims."15 
At the fourth stage, women developed a contextual argument in response to 
feminist accusations that the veil symbolized the oppression of women. Rather, they 
14
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argued, the pervasive North American sexualization of women's bodies was the real 
source of oppression. The Islamist argument stressed the value of the hijab in enabling 
women to be seen as useful members of society, and not "sexual objects, their half-naked 
bodies used to sell everything from toothbrushes to sports cars."16 Informants in several 
studies expressed this instrumental interpretation of the veil as a symbolic statement of 
dissociation and liberation from female exploitation that was seen to emanate from "the 
dictates of the fashion industry and the demands of the beauty myth."17 
In a similar way, Walbridge's study of Shi'ite women in Dearborn Michigan 
showed that for these women, the hijab was not worn primarily to hide their beauty, but 
to make a statement concerning sexual and religious values. It underlined their 
commitment to the notion that modern was a heterogeneous term not inseparable from 
Westernization. Wearing hijab meant that they could be fully modern without buying into 
the entire Western value system of sexuality.18 
These inter-related elements combine to represent the final stage, in which the 
veil functions as a symbolic marker of Muslim identity, in the sociological and religious 
meanings elucidated here. The veil is a powerful way of making that identity public and 
thereby shaping an ideological basis for social and communal solidarity. Nevertheless, I 
would argue that while being relatively successful at disentangling the cultural from the 
religious, the women studied in this field research tend to conflate the functional with the 
normative. While adopting the veil largely for functional reasons, they come to see its 
16
 Hoodfar, "More Than Clothing," 29. 
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liberative aspects as coalescent with Islamic norms and so become ardent defenders of an 
idealized reification of Islamic legal discourse on gender. 
In conclusion, we observe that along with their Islamist moorings, "Muslim first" 
identities are closely aligned with what Roald and others refer to as the "socio-political 
reasons behind the new veiling [.. . ] . " 1 9 The matter of veiling or unveiling remains a 
potent political and ideological tool in Islamic countries, but increasingly also, among 
many women in the Muslim minority context of the West. In privileging interpretations 
of Islam that they see as congruent with modern society, women find the veil a strategic 
means of advancing the pursuit of their own legitimate interests. 
As will be demonstrated in subsequent sections of this chapter, the legal 
discourse, in contrast, grounds veiling in an ethic of duty and obedience to perceived 
scriptural dictates. I argue that the mujtahids' emphasis on duties rather than rights issues 
not only from the classical discourse that focuses on duty, but also out of a manifest 
concern with how Muslim women in the West can best serve the interests of Islam and 
the Muslim community. That mujtahids either consciously distance themselves from the 
socio-political discourse or are unaware of it - a less likely explanation - becomes 
evident in the analysis that follows. 
It is perhaps ironic that Shi'ite mujtahids should be largely mute on the symbolic 
value of the hijab, considering the long history of the veil's role in anti-colonial 
discourse. The slogan, made popular during the 1978-79 Iranian revolution, "Sister, your 
hijab is more combative than my blood!" demonstrates the passionately felt political, 
even revolutionary significance of the female Islamic covering. In that particular 
19
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instance, Hoodfar notes, women's veiling became a potent symbol of political victory for 
the new regime, even as de-veiling had been pursued by pro-Western regimes in Iran and 
elsewhere in the Middle East since the 19th century.21 As Hoodfar and others argue, the 
issue of women's emancipation or rights, though touted as such, was nowhere envisioned 
as a matter of actual concern by either side of the modernist-conservative divide in Iran 
of the late 1970s. Rather, women's clothing and make-up was "the symbolic battlefield 
on which the modernists and conservatives fought out their differences."22 
Though leading to a similar praxis, the integrally religious character of the legal 
discourse would appear to be at odds with the socio-political discourse of identity 
developed by Muslim women in the West. One Egyptian informant, Mona, captures this 
tension well: 
I would never have taken up the veil if I lived in Egypt. Not that I disagree with it, but I 
see it as part of the male imposition of rules. [...] But since the Gulf War, seeing how 
my veiled friends were treated, I made a vow to wear the veil to make a point about 
my Muslimness and Arabness. I am delighted when people ask me about my veil and 
Islam, because it gives me a chance to point out their prejudices concerning Muslims. 
In this case, the "subversion" of the veil24 as a socio-political symbol grounded in 
religion nevertheless fuses well with what emerges as the primary interests of the 
mujtahids, that is, advocating adherence to a strict code of Islamic dress on grounds of a 
traditional Islamic interpretation of female sexuality and subjection of personal interests 
to those of religion. This broad-based coalescence between "subversive" uses of the hijab 
and the traditional gender orthodoxy of the clerical class lends considerable credence to 
Haideh Moghissi's astute observation that the former's eloquent theorizations of the veil 
21
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as liberator of female personhood may well in fact - knowingly or unknowingly - be 
instrumental in reinforcing "the oppressive discourses and actions of Islamist ideologues 
[.. . ] . " 2 5 Clearly, the fine distinctions between the two sets of logic are lost on most of the 
observing mainstream population. In the final analysis, what the hijab actually means 
remains elusive, having whatever meaning one's perception of and method of dealing 
with reality ascribes to it. 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE hijab IN THE WEST 
Having described the factors leading to popular support for the hijab among 
Muslim women in the West, we look briefly now at the second, though less conspicuous, 
major player in this field: the Western non-Muslim public. Given the diversity of Western 
views, I focus on Canadian perspectives. What is expressed in the literature as 
representing their views is a valuable backdrop to the exchange between mustaftis and 
mujtahids.26 The dual impact of the hijab in the West, vis-a-vis in-group and out-group, is 
succinctly summarized by Reem Meshal: "The act of donning the hijab renders its wearer 
more visible even as it covers her form. Veiled, she is marked and identifiable, not just to 
the Muslim community, but also to the wider Canadian society." 
The Canadian context is distinctive for its adoption of official multiculturalism. 
Nevertheless, perceptions of the hijab do not necessarily conform to the values typical of 
multicultural theory. While the research shows a range of views in Canadian society from 
tolerance and support on the one hand to disdain and even insult on the other, the 
25
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general atmosphere has been one of mistrust and misunderstanding, particularly in 
Quebec where the memory of women's bitter struggle against ecclesiastical control of 
women is still fresh. Having said this, advances made in education of the Canadian public 
since the publication of these sources may well have changed the landscape here 
described for the better. 
Sheila McDonough's analysis of popular Canadian journalistic writing in the 
1990s shows a high level of mistrust based on a widely held one-dimensional 
understanding of a woman in hijab "as an instrument of the threat of fundamentalist 
attack on the democratic values of Quebec and Canadian society."29 This negative 
stereotyping is reflected in Meshal's statistical analysis of Canadian perceptions of hijabi 
women. Perceptions of this sort are subject to misinterpretation, given the range of 
potential variables that might be behind discriminatory actions, in addition to the (hyper) 
sensitivity to the issue already felt by veiled women in post-9-11 Western society. 
Nevertheless, given the corroboration provided by other studies, Meshal's data may be 
taken as relatively reliable. Moreover, it is instructive for its allusions to what 
McDonough more explicitly identifies as Western women's reactions to an auto-
constructed definition of hijab and not to the subtle symbolic meanings held by many of 
those who wear it. Ironically it seems, as Western women who react strongly against 
hijab usually do so on the understanding that it represents male dominance of women and 
lack of respect for women's personhood, women who wear hijab often do so, as 
explained above, in order to assert this same person-centered rather than sexuality-
centered definition of femaleness. More than anything, it is this talking at cross-purposes 
29
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that is indicative of the "mutual incomprehension [that] exists between Muslim-
Canadians and non-Muslims."30 
As the debates in France in particular make clear, for many on the political right, 
the hijab represents a threat, a potent symbol of a dogmatic and institutionally supported 
assertion of resistance to Western values and non-integration into mainstream society. 
Mc Andrew refers to this phenomenon as a product of a "heterocentrist cultural 
constructivism" wherein the hijab is symbolic of "the failure of integration and/or a 
sexist/fundamentalist plot."32 Although, as discussed in the previous section, many 
women who wear hijab state that they do so in order to better integrate into Western 
society, Meshal's data indicates that 29% of women who did not wear the hijab referred 
to themselves as "very integrated" and only 4% "described themselves as "not integrated 
at all." The remainder "considered themselves 'integrated to some degree.'" Among 
hijab! women, on the other hand, only 10% considered themselves "very integrated" and 
21% "not integrated at all." When the number of non-Muslim friends a Muslim woman 
has was used as a measure of integration, the results were similarly weighted in favour of 
non-hijabi women.33 Thus, the statistics are indicative of a positive correlation between 
hijab and non-integration. 
That Meshal finds these statistics unsurprising is understandable but intriguing, 
given women's statements to the contrary elsewhere, as discussed above. From my 
perspective, this disparity does not call into question the women's integrity, but 
underscores the complexity of the issue. Any notion that women, or anyone else for that 
30
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matter, are free agents in an absolute sense, constructing their own identity, is belied by 
the data. As Mc Andrew points out, explanations of the hijab as a product of 
"individualistic constructivism," while popular in liberal thought, do not adequately 
acknowledge "the complex grid of constraints linked to internal and external power 
relationships that Muslim women face when they have to decide for themselves whether 
or not to wear the hijab [...]."34 Given the absence of consensus on the meaning of the 
hijab among Muslims themselves—not to mention some Muslim and secular feminists 
for whom the hijab also represents oppression of women—one gains sympathy for the 
fact that there is a lack of understanding on the "true" meaning of the hijab among 
Westerners. 
Finally, and what brings us to the central section of this chapter, any ambiguities 
present in the statistical data on the relationship between hijab and integration is 
noticeably absent from the fatwa literature. Rather, the perception that the hijab is a 
protection against the threat of integration and assimilation (al-ta 'arrub ba 'd al-hijrah) 
finds ample support among the mujtahids. Also in agreement with the legal discourse js 
the number of Muslim women, whether they wear or do not wear hijab, who draw a 
direct link between piety and Islamic female covering, demonstrating how pervasive is 
the standard orthodoxy promoted by the clerical class. 
ISTIFTA'AT AND FA TAW A ON CLOTHING AND APPEARANCE 
As mentioned above, the logic of fatawa on clothing and appearance revolves 
around three central foci: cultural difference, piety, and modesty. The cultural framework 
involves a debate around the meaning of common markers of Islamic identity, notably the 
34
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female hijab, male beard, and lack of necktie. Apart from maintaining close attention to 
the classical imperative of not resembling unbelievers, mujtahids tend to distance 
themselves from the strong sense of symbolic value of the hijab articulated by many 
Muslim women in the West. However, they sometimes fall back on this logic as part of 
their manifest concern that migrants not fail in preserving their Islamic identity, and also 
fulfill their calling as messengers for Islam in the West. 
In contrast to the socio-political discourse of the hijab, mujtahids frame their 
support for Islamic modest dress in terms of a religious obligation that has little to do 
with cultural symbols or the Western context in any way. I refer to this as the logic of 
piety. The logic of piety leads to a strong reluctance to allow exceptions due to contextual 
factors, as is typical of other areas of law that we have already examined. Again, context 
is important only in so much as it provides the contrast needed to emphasize a perceived 
superiority of Islamic modesty. It is here, in the role that clothing and appearance play in 
facilitating an Islamic witness in the West, that piety, modesty, and not resembling 
unbelievers demonstrate their mutual symbiosis. 
CULTURE, PIETY, AND MODESTY: DISTINGUISHING BELIEVERS FROM UNBELIEVERS 
Several istifta 'at ask if it is forbidden (haram) or permitted (halal) to wear 
clothing and hair styles that are fashionable in Europe, since this "is commonly known 
among people as tashabbuh beh kufjar [Persian]."35 Whatever else it may refer to, for 
mustaftis, the concept of al-tashabbuh bi al-kuffar (Arabic) refers to clothing style, as it 
does in the group of hadith that establishes the concept. Ties receive a particularly 
unfavourable evaluation in the contemporary Islamic dress code of Iran as they are seen 
35
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as indicative of Western culture. Thus, in the print text of the istifta' quoted above, the 
questioner goes on to ask if it is permissible "to wear a tie or other things that people 
wear that look like kuffarT Sanei's response contains an unexplained conditional 
prohibition: "If this promotes the culture of hostile forces who are enemies of Islam, it is 
forbidden and not permissible," he says.37 
Under what conditions would wearing Western clothing contribute to war against 
Islam? Is Sanei's response in reference to the common understanding of clothing as a 
cultural identity marker, such that wearing the latest Western fashions would imply a 
capitulation to cultural imperialism? Or is it in aiding the economy of Western culture? 
Who are the enemies of Islam in this fatwal Is Sanei making reference to a particular 
segment of the West or to the West as a whole? It is plausible that specific mention of the 
necktie underlies his rather strongly worded reply. 
Similarly, a questioner attempts to cover both the religious and cultural 
perspectives on the matter of clothing, asking if Muslims should follow the example of 
the Prophet in regard to clothing style and, presumably if not, should they follow their 
"own people and nationality?" Sanei's response, vague as it is, encourages maintaining 
cultural and religious autonomy. "What is desirable in terms of clothing and shelter is 
that a person does not settle on being influenced by Western culture."38 Sanei presumably 
accepts the notion that one's style of dress, as well as architecture and interior design, 
reveals one's cultural outlook and he implies, further, that western cultural forms of dress 
and housing are incompatible with Islamic identity. Muslims are distinct from others, he 
36
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implies, not just in religion, but in the way they appear in their clothing styles and 
environmental context. He therefore encourages visible marks of Islamic identity. 
Sistani likewise rules that "based on obligatory precaution it is not permissible for 
Muslims to adorn themselves with adornment particular to unbelievers."39 It is unclear 
what "adornment particular to unbelievers" refers to, as Sistani permits men to wear ties, 
even if made of silk; the latter detail is permitted because the tie is not a large enough 
article of clothing to affect prayer.40 Beards, however, are not to be shaved. "On the basis 
of obligatory precaution, it is not permitted for men to shave their beards, nor is it 
permitted, on the basis of obligatory precaution, to leave the hair on the chin and shave 
the sides of the face."41 The rule is not changed if maintaining the beard "merely" hinders 
one's chances for employment in certain companies, but it is permitted to shave it if it 
causes "undue hardship" or is necessary for medical treatment.42 
Al-Hakim likewise allows little leeway on the beard rule, permitting Muslims 
who work as barbers to shave only those who are justified (ma 'dhur) [presumably for 
medical reasons] in going beardless. The rule applies to Muslims and non-Muslims alike, 
a position that is not unique to al-Hakim.43 The Muslim barber in the West is even 
required, he says, to investigate whether the person requesting a shave is among those so 
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permitted or not. If not, and the barber goes ahead and shaves the beard regardless, his 
wages are not permissible.44 
It is difficult to conclude that al-Hakim's insistence on the beard is due purely to 
its Islamic symbolic value, given the ruling on non-Muslims as well. What seems more 
likely is al-Hakim's severe reluctance to admit contextual factors in his ijtihad. To the 
argument that shaving is so common in society it would be absurd to forbid it, al-Hakim 
replies that "prevalence in society does not change the Islamic ruling."4 This principle 
seems indicative of his theoretical frame of reference generally. In contrast, al-Khui 
allows one whdse occupation involves shaving other peoples' beards to do so, "if he is 
obliged because he has no other means of earning a living [.. . ] " 4 6 
Though suggesting similarity to Sanei on the level of cultural distance between 
Islam and the West, Fadlallah's approach to the question of resembling unbelievers is 
more original. He suggests that "resembling" refers not to appearance but to attitude and 
behaviour. Muslims in the West are therefore free to dress in whatever fashion appeals to 
them on two conditions: 1) they must maintain Islamic modesty, including hijab for 
women and proper covering, preferably a beard as well, for men. The latter, and not the 
tie-less apparel advocated by Iranian clerics, functions for Fadlallah as a symbol (shi 'ar) 
of Islam, for which reason it should not be abandoned;47 2) they must preserve their 
intellectual and moral autonomy, resisting the impact of Western cultural imperialism, on 
behalf of which the media acts as weaponry. At the same time, Fadlallah refuses to allow 
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the excuse, as he intimates, of female engagement in society to justify easing hijab 
restrictions on the premise that the latter is a valuable assertion of Muslim identity. Its 
abandonment, he argues, suggests capitulation to an "imagined" intimidation that does 
not normally exist in Western society.48 Fadlallah seems to have a decidedly favourable 
impression of Muslim minority conditions in the West. 
Fadlallah's reasoning, similar to the manner in which he deals with the purity of 
non-Muslims, distinguishes between mental worlds of discourse on the one hand and 
material conditions on the other. The former is the privileged locality of reality, the latter 
merely superficial and extraneous to the real condition of things. At the same time, 
however, he acknowledges that mental worlds are manifest in externals and that a 
Muslim should not have, what he calls, a divided personality. 
In contrast to other mujtahids, Fadlallah also looks at fashion from a historical 
perspective, arguing that as fashions change with time, there is no fixed notion of Islamic 
or non-Islamic clothing styles. The following is quoted in full: 
Istifta': What is the ruling on a woman wearing Western clothing when no Westerners 
are present? Is this not a case of 'resembling the West'? 
Fatwa: A women has the right to wear whatever she likes so long as she does not live a 
glittering life. There is a difference between someone who dresses his mind in Western 
garb and someone else who dresses his body; there is no objection to the latter. The 
problem is when the things of the West \al-ghaiblyiiri\ enter our minds, since the 
important thing is that we do not follow Western fashions of thinking or behaving. But 
in the matter of dress [it is a fact that] in the contemporary movement, people 
exchange their clothing customs, and this is something very natural, as there is no 
people who has kept their historical clothing [styles]. 
The historicism Fadlallah displays here does not extend to the wearing of hijabs 
and beards; there are, it seems, some fixed ideas of Islamic appearance that suggest that 
Fadlallah shares with others a perception of the symbolic significance of these items. 
Fadlallah, Islamic Lanterns, 283, 326. 
49
 Fadlallah, Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar, 164-65. 
272 
Likewise, Fadlallah forbids Muslims from wearing other symbols, such as a cross, 
because, he says, they promote unbelief. Given his critical approach, his insistence on 
the hijab and beards indicates that he sees the wearing of these items as a religious 
obligation, and not simply a cultural option. 
The Sunni Muftis, Dr. 'Ali Jum'ah, Mufti of Egypt, and Sheikh Yusuf al-
Qaradawi, likewise reject the symbolic justification for wearing hijab. They are, it seems, 
forced to this conclusion by the implications accepting the symbolic meaning of hijab 
would entail with regard to the current debate in Europe. Thus, 'Ali Jum'ah argues that 
hijab "is not merely a symbol that distinguishes Muslims from non-Muslims. It is an 
obligation that forms part and parcel of the Islamic religion."51 He continues with the 
alleged scriptural justifications for this requirement. It is clear that his objective, as al-
Qaradawi's, is to counter some of the right wing elements in Western society who claim 
that public announcement of one's commitment to Islam is somehow a threat to the wider 
society and its alleged values of freedom and equality. 
Al-Qaradawi's more elaborate denunciation of the socio-symbolic meaning of the 
hijab serves as a major premise of his argument against efforts to ban the hijab from 
certain public spaces in Europe: "Claiming that hijab is a sign of religion is by no means 
acceptable," he says, "because a religious sign or symbol has no function but to declare 
the religious beliefs of the one who wears it, such as the cross for a Christian and the 
kippa for a Jew. [...] Hijab, on the other hand, has a religious function, namely, to protect 
Muslim women and preserve their chastity." He goes on to reveal his unawareness, 
intentional or unintentional, of the popularity of this option, "It could not strike the mind 
50
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of hijab-clad women to wear it for declaring their religious beliefs," he asserts. 
"Therefore, the hijab ban contradicts the principles of freedom and equality that have 
been asserted by the French Revolution [.. .and...] is a form of persecution against the 
committed Muslim women; it infringes upon their freedom; it prevents them from their 
right to learn and work to the favor of non-Muslim and uncommitted Muslim women."52 
The typically legal understanding of hijab on the part of Sunni muftis expressed 
above is generally in keeping with the Shi'ite legal discourse, though no Shi'ite mujtahid I 
have studied argues explicitly against the hijab''s symbolic value, and Fadlallah at least 
suggests implicit support for such an interpretation, along with its legal obligation. In 
contrast to the lack of flexibility on wearing hijab in a Western context observed among 
the majority of mujtahids, the Sunni Sheikh al-Azhar, Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, 
argues that the Shari'ah justifies conformity "to the laws of a non-Muslim state," even if 
their "rulers want to adopt laws in opposition to the veil, [...]." Muslim women in this 
case "are under the conditions of him who obligates them (ft hukm al-mudtarrf and they 
do not, therefore, bear the responsibility (wizr) for the situation."54 
As mentioned above, while addressing issues of modest dress for men and 
women, the hadith corpus places far more emphasis on covering the nakedness of men.55 
Contemporary istifta 'at, reflecting the conservative orthodoxy and developed classical 
Quoted in ibid., 213-14. Emphasis added. 
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tradition, displays a far greater preoccupation with female modesty—inquiring about 
everything from coloured contact lenses to high heeled shoes. For all mujtahids generally, 
with some minor variations, the guiding principle is that women are forbidden to wear 
anything that draws lustful and unlawful attention from men. 
According to Fadlallah, a woman should dress so as to project an image of herself 
as a human being, not one "inspired by her instinctive feelings of her femininity."56 It is 
not important, at least for Fadlallah, that this be specifically Islamic styles of dress, since 
both "Islamic" and "non-Islamic" clothing may accentuate the form of the body or not.57 
What is important is the principle of modesty, as defined by the SharTah. As such, feet, 
for example, must also be covered even though, as at least one mustafti argues, "people 
[in the West] do not look at us [at our feet]." Fadlallah's alleged reason for covering them 
up anyways is the lack of guarantee that this general expectation will hold true in every 
case.58 Unlike al-Hakim, who, as noted earlier, dismisses contextual factors out of hand, 
Fadlallah avoids this route, finding reason enough to maintain his ruling in the legal 
principle of precaution. 
In our exploration of the sociological research of jfu;oZ>-covered women in the 
West, I noted the relative independence with which women chose this style of dress. 
Fadlallah does not exclude this possibility when it is in choosing to wear hijab, but he 
does not allow it in the other direction. So firm is Fadlallah on the hijab as obligation it is 
a husband's duty, he says, to oblige his wife, whether she is Muslim or non-Muslim, not 
to leave the house without proper hijab. In the case of a non-Muslim wife, Fadlallah says, 
56
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"He must make the hijab obligatory for her, so that she harmonizes with his Islamic 
atmospheres [sic], for otherwise, this might bring harm to him as a believer and to his 
children in the future and to his Islamic social atmosphere."59 
If a woman's job (possibly in the public sector) precludes wearing hijab, the 
former must be abandoned, as in any conflict between employment and obedience to a 
command of God.60 Fadlallah again suggests that claiming oppression for observing 
religious obligations is more a consequence of the Muslims' imagination than reality. In 
situations of actual "compulsion (haraj), danger (khatar) or harm (darar)," however, 
restrictions may be eased, "but only to the minimum extent that is needed."61 As noted 
above, Fadlallah is reluctant to believe that Western freedoms do not extend to a broad 
tolerance for diversity of clothing styles, and, as he does with some regularity, suggests 
that the real motive in cases such as the one above is the Muslim's wish to justify 
abandoning Islamic restrictions. Passport photos provide another exception. All of those 
surveyed agree that such a photo may be taken without hijab —by a relative unless 
necessity dictates otherwise.62 
On the extent of covering, there is general consensus among the mujtahids; the 
face and hands need not be covered, but feet, and wigs, if worn, must be, as well as skin-
coloured nylons. Ayatollah Qazvini63 agrees with the majority opinion that "[t]he proper 
covering for women is to cover the entire body except the face, hands and feet. The body 
Qur'an 24:31 "And let them not display their ornaments." Fadlallah, Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar, 161-62; 
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figure and shape also may not show." In contrast, the early modern scholar Mirza al-
Qummi (d. 1816) holds the more restrictive, minority position that hijab includes the face 
and hands as well. 5 The debate on how extensively a woman's body should be covered 
dates from at least the 9th c. CE, as Clarke discusses in her study of veiling in the hadith. 
Early in this debate, the famous exegete, Ibn Jarrir al-Tabari (d. 923), defended a 
"liberal" interpretation of Q. 24:31, commanding women "not to reveal their adornment 
(zinah) except to their husbands" and other close male relatives. Clarke's reading of this 
tafsir shows that al-Tabari's objective was not so much to establish the covering of 
women, as it was to argue for its limitation.66 
The bottom line of al-Tabari's argument—that women are not required to cover 
the face and hands—is not unique to him. As the majority position, it is not surprising to 
find in contemporary fatawa that the face covering (niqab) may even be prohibited, if it 
elicits undue negative repercussions from Western society. If covering the face causes 
"disapproval or repulsion among the general population," Sistani classifies it as libas al-
shuhrah (clothing of notoriety), in which case, he says, "it would not be permitted to 
wear it there."67 
On the other hand, Fadlallah regards as whimsical a similar question that shows 
thoughtful reflection on contextualization: 
Istifta': In some societies the hijab is considered a sign of fundamentalism, and it affects 
Muslim women and may sometimes expose them to danger. Is this in itself a 
justification to take off the hijab, especially if they preserve some sort of dress deemed 
respectable by that society? 
Fatwa: This is not allowed, for we believe that Muslim men and women must not run 
away from every situation Uiat frightens them, and we have to emphasize our 
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obligatory Islamic traditions, and to emphasize our religious adherence, and we should 
make an issue of standing fast at least in this matter before the oppressors. I believe that 
they cannot fight all Muslim society and all the Muslim women wearing the hijab: 'It 
is Satan that prompts men to fear his fol lowers; but have no fear o f them, 
and fear Me , if you are true bel ievers. ' 3: IS.68 
Fadlallah's concern here is clearly not simply with modesty. He seems to 
acknowledge, at least implicitly, the symbolic potency of the headscarf and its political 
efficacy as a "flag" of resistance against the West. Moreover, his position displays an 
aggressiveness that is somewhat disconcerting, as it dismisses an opportunity for self-
reflection, deflecting it to a supposed anti-Muslim conspiracy on the part of all 
Westerners, generally. This is quite unlike his rather more nuanced view of Westerners 
expressed elsewhere, including his fatawa on respecting non-Muslim laws. 
We discussed above the notion of resembling unbelievers as being particularly 
apropos of the Western context and suggested there a second arena of special 
applicability to the West. This is the idea that obedience to an Islamic ruling, in this case 
hijab, provides yet another occasion for da 'wah. Muslim women, especially the young, 
al-Hakim says, are expected by their modest dress and demeanor to demonstrate the 
honour of Islam and display its "sublime teachings." In this way, they can be messengers 
for Islam in the midst of the "vulgar and disintegrated societies" of the West.6 Thus, by 
their morality and dress, women are responsible not just for maintaining family bonds 
and the moral fabric of society, as is clearly articulated by the modern religious class;70 
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according to al-Hakim, they also shoulder much of the missionary responsibility of 
upholding confidence in the moral superiority of Islam over Western society. 
In spite of the numerous traditions regarding the need for modesty in men's attire, 
I can find only one such question in the contemporary Western fatwa literature.71 This 
seems to reflect the likely possibility, as many have argued, that legal literature on female 
modesty is heavily influenced by cultural assumptions regarding the roles of men and 
women in society. The question on male modesty is addressed, not surprisingly, to 
Fadlallah and concerns wearing shorts in public. Fadlallah's response reflects the hadith 
tradition, which specifies the legal requirement of "covering nakedness" (sitr al-
'awrah)—that is, "specifically the area from the knees upward, referred to as fakhidh or 
'thighs'."72 While Fadlallah asserts the traditional norm of "covering nakedness," he also 
urges constraint, as wearing shorts "in front of people and in front of women could 
sometimes possibly result in forbidden acts and is, in any case, among things that are not 
acceptable (or not preferred; laysat rajihah) for believers."73 Fadlallah appears to 
understand personal modesty as the duty of both men and women in society, reflective of 
his more progressive attitude towards women's issues in the Muslim context.74 
Several questions inquire about activities that involve beautification of oneself or 
other women. Al-Hakim forbids properly veiled women to remove unwanted facial hair 
mother wherein the effects of the visit bring chaos to the house of a week, they say not to under such 
circumstances. The family must not be disturbed." The Islamic Modest Dress, 43. 
71
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"if it is certain that it is for beautification."75 Sistani rules that this is permitted "on 
condition of the assurance she does not fall into haram acts and if it is not done to invite 
forbidden glances her way."76 Al-Hakim cautions against "uncommon" (ghayr 
muta 'arraf) application of female ornamentation, such as kohl (eye liner) and rings "if 
they affect men sexually." At the same time, they are permitted if done innocently (bi 7-
wijih al-muta 'arraf al-basit) "even if they affect some men because it is the man's 
responsibility to avert his affected glance."77 The distinction here seems to be between 
women who flaunt their beauty in order to attract allegedly illicit attention and those who 
do not. Sistani likewise permits kohl and rings "on condition it is not for the purpose of 
arousing men's passions and she is certain not to fall into haram acts..."78 
Sistani's cautionary permission for women to work in beauty parlours frequented 
by "traveling women who beautify themselves in front of foreign men" takes into account 
the same "highly unlikely" possibility that it is done "in the promotion and spreading of 
evil," in which case it would be forbidden.79 Al-Hakim, in this case, does not consider 
this possibility in his blanket permission: "Yes, she has the right to do this."80 Applying 
colour to one's hair that, naturally, will be exposed in women's meetings—"specifically 
for the purpose of marriage"—is permitted by Sistani on condition it is "simply for 
beauty and without deceit, such as hiding blemishes or age." x 
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Fadlallah's position on women using various means of beautification in public is 
highly restrictive. For example, like Sistani, he does not allow coloured contact lenses, 
"if it is for beauty as is the custom ('urf), or if it is confirmed to be for display."83 Nor 
does Fadlallah permit a woman—on the basis of Qur'an 24:31 "and let them not reveal 
their ornaments,"—to leave her house with make-up on, even if accompanied by her 
husband. Further, her husband has the right to force her compliance in this matter, "but 
with wisdom and good speech." Were the husband to give his permission, this, too, 
O f 
would not make it legal. On the other hand, if the law permitted it, her husband would 
have no right to forbid her.86 It seems that Fadlallah wishes to emphasize the individual 
character of a Muslim's legal responsibility—that woman is, as is man, accountable 
directly to God for her behaviour and even a husband has no place intervening between 
his wife and the divine law. Fadlallah is atypical among mujtahids in this regard. 
Talib Aziz similarly notes Fadlallah's support for a woman's right to a higher 
degree of marital independence than is common among mujtahids. "In sermons," Aziz 
writes, "Fadlallah has articulated that a woman should be allowed to leave her husband's 
house to attend religious sermons and educational gatherings. Her husband should not 
deny her such rights once she has fulfilled her marital duties."87 According to Aziz, 
Fadlallah' sfatawa regarding women are remarkably progressive, eliciting much 
controversy within clerical circles. For example, in contrast to many fuqaha', Fadlallah 
rejects the notion of women's intellectual inferiority and suggests that she may even 
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excel some men in this regard. This leads Fadlallah to express support for women's 
participation in the public, and even political, sphere.88 Aziz concludes that Fadlallah's 
more liberal views can be attributed to his legal method of privileging the Qur'an over 
traditions.89 This is borne out, as we have previously observed, by Fadlallah's reliance on 
Qur'an 9:28 in his legal discussion of the purity of non-Muslims. It is balanced, however, 
by his fatwa, noted above, that a husband has the right to impose hijdb on his wife, as this 
is a non-negotiable rule. It seems, then, that while exhibiting a liberality with regard to 
controversial issues, Fadlallah remains closely attached to traditional consensus with 
regard to issues he consider non-negotiable. 
Having said this, I would argue that Fadlallah's liberality is also due to his 
emphasis on the humanity of non-Muslims and women. Whereas others typically view 
women and non-Muslims as either ontologically or in some other manner inferior to 
Muslim males, Fadlallah's Qur'an centered hermeneutic is complemented by his 
humanistic focused approach. It should not be surprising then, that whereas others permit 
only temporary marriage with women from ahl al-kitab, Fadlallah allows permanent 
marriage.90 That Fadlallah should, in spite of his progressive stance on these issues, still 
maintain a traditional view on female modest dress suggests just how firmly he sees the 
issue to be a fundamental non-negotiable element of Islamic identity. 
CONCLUSION 
The research demonstrates that while women's choices regarding veiling and 
investigating their Islamic rights appear often to be "in consideration of how to best serve 
Ibid., 212. 
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their own particular situations," the primary consideration for mujtahids is the woman's 
duties to Islamic legal requirements. While the reasons for choosing to veil may be 
different, the results are very similar, a fact that underscores the hidden complexities of 
the issue and renders "the distinction between a religious and political hijab more 
blurred." Further, whereas some mustaftis reflect a willingness to adapt Islamic garb to 
Western standards of modesty, the tendency among mujtahids is to resist 
contextualization. In some cases, the preference is even to take the legal requirements to 
the limit so as to accentuate visible piety "to make a point [...] against the Western 
world."93 
In terms of methodology, mujtahids appear reluctant to allow new terms of 
discourse to influence their ijtihad, even though the end result may well agree with that of 
these discourses. In insisting on relying solely on a classical legal frame of reference, 
they prevent the possibility of exploiting new forms of discourse to support their 
positions. As we discussed in chapter three, this is a matter that some members of the 
clerical establishment, such as Ayatollah Shabistari, see as problematic. Shabistari's 
argument is that legal discourse ought to engage with modern cultural knowledge and 
ought to include insights from modern academic disciplines such as sociology, history, 
and political science within its ijtihad. 
What an analysis of the data here reveals is reminiscent of the message depicted 
in a popular Iranian film, Marmulak (The Lizard).94 In one pivotal scene, the main 
character, a prisoner disguised as a Shi'ite cleric, is attempting to learn the ropes of "his 
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new profession" through what he sees on religious television. While he gravitates 
towards a modern looking cleric relating Islam to contemporary pop culture, his advisor 
turns his attention to the traditional variety, saying: "Mullas don't speak like that; they 
talk like this," as he switches the station to a conservative talking head. Try as he may, 
Marmulak (as he is called) is unable to fit the role. Instead, he carves out a new way. He 
chooses to follow the path his heart takes towards God, as he attempts to make sense for 
himself of the meaning of religious guidance. The film depicts the warmth and attraction 
of the form of religion he finds for himself, contrasting it with the cold sterility of the 
institutionalized clerical legalism, depicted as disconnected both from the source of its 
strength and from the reality of human experience. The issue is one of context and 
relevance. 
In a similar way, mustaftis in the West appear to be searching for a religiously 
valid way to adapt Islamic customs to Western worldviews. The goal of mujtahids, on the 
other hand, seems to be directed towards resisting what they perceive as elements foreign 
to an Islamic worldview and identity. Whether of adaptation or resistance, each sees their 
own path as the most faithful way of being Muslim in the West. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
RESPECTING THE LAWS OF NON-MUSLIM GOVERNMENTS: ASSUMING JIHAD, 
ABIDING BY CONTRACTS, AND KEEPING THE FAITH 
Legal discourse in the form of fatawa on the question of obeying non-Muslim 
governments and observing their laws has received little attention from modern scholars.1 
This is surprising as such issues are of obvious importance and occupy a significant 
amount of space in the fatwa literature. The fatwa material to be examined here may be 
divided into two sections. The first category looks at istifta 'at that approach the question 
in terms of political identity, asking how loyalty to Islam and Muslims might be 
compromised if preempted by legal obligations of living in a non-Muslim state. 
Questions revolve around whether actions that are otherwise illegal or unethical may be 
justified under certain circumstances, specifically, in some form of defensive jihad. 
Mustaftis appear to be led by certain assumptions regarding the state of war with non-
Muslims, how it is defined, and its rules of conduct. Analysis indicates that they may be 
influenced by non-legal or popular quasi legal discourse that promotes a vigilante 
activism not generally supported by the legal texts. 
The second category highlights the tension between faithful observance of 
religious laws and customs that are marginalized in or legally excluded by non-Muslim 
societies. Which side ought to concede to the other in these cases? How can a person be a 
faithful Muslim in a secular society? Mustaftis exhibit concerns raised by the tension 
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between conscientious commitment to Islamic legal obligations and accommodating 
themselves to a non-Muslim context. Fatawa bring to light those elements of religious 
law a mujtahid considers non-negotiable Islamic duties. 
An examination of both of these categories of fatawa offers intriguing insights 
both into the apparent ambivalence demonstrated by questioners towards the West and 
the tensions at times evident between mustaftis and mujtahids. The chapter demonstrates 
that, unlike other fields of inquiry, dissonance between mustaftis and mujtahids on the 
question of obeying non-Muslim governments reflects a reversal of the more common 
trend. If, in other areas, the trend is for mustaftis to push for a model of selective 
engagement with the West, while mujtahids generally stress a model of resistance, in the 
field of civil obedience, it is mustaftis who appear strongly inclined towards the 
resistance model. With the possible exception of al-Hakim, mujtahids demonstrate a 
notable leaning towards selective engagement in this field of activity, though within a 
particular frame of reference which will emerge in our analysis. 
In spite of general disapproval among mujtahids of violating non-Muslim laws, 
some distinctions are worth mentioning. Fadlallah, for example, is the only marji' to 
provide a detailed rationale for his position. He is, further, the only mujtahid to include 
the Qur'anic sources on which his argument is based in the fatawa themselves, and the 
only one to compare the Islamic moral code with that of others, notably, the Jews, his one 
habitual display of negative stereotyping. Although generally pacifistic, Fadlallah allows 
exceptions, in certain circumstances, to his high regard for and promotion of 'good 
citizenship'. These will be noted in the discussion below. Thus, while Fadlallah's 
286 
inclination to dialogue with the West is evident, his paramount commitment is 
unmistakably Islamic universalism. 
In contrast to Fadlallah, al-Hakim appears far less conciliatory and exhibits little 
readiness to engage in a dialogue of equals with the West. It may be significant that the 
majority of al-Hakim's mustaftls identify themselves as refugees, possibly Iraqis who fled 
the anti-Shi'ite persecutions of Saddam Hussain. Motives for settlement in the West are 
many, and it may be the case that al-Hakim has a disproportionately larger contingent of 
disaffected oppressed followers. While it is possible that their choice of al-Hakim is 
motivated simply by demographic factors—although Sistani is as well if not better known 
to Iraqis—some laypeople may choose to follow him precisely because of his more 
politically abrasive, or at least more abrupt, less discursive approach. 
TERMS OF IDENTITY: KUFR AND THE WEST 
We may make some preliminary observations on the basis of an examination of 
the terms of identification chosen by mustaftls and mujtahids. More often than not, 
mustaftls tend to refer to their place of residence or its people in non-judgmental terms: 
the West, Western or non-Muslim countries or people, and non-Islamic; or by more 
specific geographic terms: Europe, America, Sweden, etc. Derogatory religious 
terminology—kafir (in reference to people or country) and the plural, kuffar—is used far 
less frequently, suggesting an awareness on the part of the mustaftls of their environment 
in geopolitical, more than religious terms. How, then, to account for what was alluded to 
above regarding an apparent jihadi sense of entitlement—as Muslims—legally or 
illegally, to the benefits of the West? An analysis of the material will suggest the 
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hypothesis that mustaftis conceptualize their entitlement in terms of post-colonial third-
world political struggles. 
Mujtahids, on the other hand, use the terms—kafir, kuffar, and kufr—about as 
frequently as non-Muslim or non-Islamic, or other terms such as people, Jews, Christians, 
or Others (al-akharm). From the point of view of the Qur'an, kufr and its related terms 
are best described as "ethico-religious concepts" with a range of meanings embracing "all 
negative ethico-religious values."2 The root k-f-r is not applied to Christians and Jews in 
the Qur'an. But exegesis and law have broadened the term. Although the Qur'an 
commonly refers to Christians and Jews as ahl al-kitab and those of them living in 
Islamic territory generally belong to the juristic category of ahl al-dhimmah (protected 
peoples, literally: people of the contract), the Qur'an is quite ambiguous regarding the 
religious value of their beliefs.3 The Qur'an and related material, notably works of 
exegesis, often subsume them under the larger category of kuffar and mushrikln.4 
Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts, 156. Izutsu identifies a number of ethical concepts associated with 
what he terms "the inner structure of the concept of kufr," that are viewed negatively, including ingratitude 
(which appears to be its primary meaning), unbelief (a logically derived meaning), associating (shirk) 
others with God, going astray, arrogance or haughtiness, and contentiousness. The "semantic field of kufr,'" 
he argues, encompasses, among others, the terms fisq (grave sin), zulm (evil, injustice, tyranny), and i'tada 
(transgression beyond proper bounds, rebellion). See Izutsu, chapters VII and VIII, 119-55 and 156-77 
respectively. 
See Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion. Friedmann examines the textual and historical application of the 
terms kufr and shirk to Christians and Jews, in addition to the more commonly known classification of ahl 
al-kitab. See especially pages 69-72. Jane Dammen McAuliffe's superb examination of the exegetical 
tradition of a selection of Qur'anic verses mentioning Christians offers overwhelming evidence of this 
ambiguity. She argues that in the exegetical literature, the Qur'an's apparently generous attitude towards 
those it calls Christians is significantly narrowed to those whose beliefs exclude traditional Christian 
doctrines regarding God's nature and the identity of Jesus. See McAuliffe, Qur'anic Christians; and by the 
same author, "Persian Exegetical Evaluation ofthe Ahl al-Kitab," Muslim World 73 no. 2 (1983): 87-105. 
4
 The Christian belief in "the Trinity" is understood, according to Q. 5:76-77, as an instance of shirk and 
kufr, as is the related belief in the "Sonship" of Jesus in Q. 10:69-71. See Izutsu, Ethico-Religious 
Concepts, 156. 
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Shi'ite exegetical tradition on Q. 9:28 permits a particularly comprehensive 
understanding of the term mushrikin, frequently including Jews and Christians.5 That 
contemporary jurists continue to apply these theologically value-laden terms broadly to 
Western non-Muslims, the overwhelming majority of whom belong to ahl al-kitab, 
indicates a continuing attachment to early scriptural and legal terms of reference. Such 
use of ethico-religious terminology would indicate that with regard to the relationship 
between Muslims and non-Muslim governments, mujtahids take a different approach 
than that of mustaftis. If the latter conceptualize the relationship in terms of a political 
struggle for recognition and justice, mujtahids tend to prioritize expressly religious values 
and rationalizations for preferred modes of behaviour. 
Having said this, in the doctrine of jihad, kufr takes on a social, in addition to its 
more commonly understood theological, signification. Sachedina points out that while 
unbelief may be directed primarily against God, its semantic connotation of zulm— 
oppression or evil—may be understood to express kufr's social or moral dimension of 
threat to and disruption of the Muslim public order. In the purely theological sense of 
kufr, Sachedina explains, human beings are responsible only before God, who will 
exercise judgment in the hereafter. The socio-moral dimension, in contrast, represents a 
condition against which "the Qur'an justifies, even commands the use of force by the 
believers[.]"6 As will become apparent in what follows, mustaftis appear to have some 
5
 Exegetes who classify Jews and Christians as mushrikun also, in consequence, deny them access to 
Muslim holy places, especially the haram of Mecca. Unpublished study by the author, "The Notion of 
Impurity in Muslim-Other Relations: Shi'i Exegesis of Surah 9:28," 2002. 
6
 Abdulaziz Sachedina, "The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History," in Cross, Crescent, 
and Sword: The Justification and limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition, ed. James Turner 
Johnson and John Kelsay (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 43. Sachedina quotes Qur'an 2:190-91 
"Fight [qatilu] in the way of God against those who fight against you, but begin not hostilities. Lo! God 
loveth not aggressors. And slay them wherever ye find them, and drive them out of the places whence they 
drove you out, for persecution [fttna] is worse than slaughter" in support of this claim. 
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form of this notion in mind, perhaps as absorbed by Islamic revolutionary discourse 
which re-articulates this latter understanding of unbelief as active hostility against "the 
rights of God."7 Moreover, possible influence from other quarters, including numerous 
fatawa issued by radical Sunni leaders, the theologically qualified and unqualified among 
them, should not be underestimated.8 
In contrast, the contemporary Shi'ite legal discourse tends towards the more 
quietist line of the pre-modern juristic tradition after the disappearance of the divinely 
guided Imam. Before analyzing the fatawa, it is valuable to offer a brief survey of jihad 
tradition and of modern revolutionary political discourse in Shi'ite Islam.9 
CLASSICAL JURISTIC TRADITION ON JIHAD 
According to Etan Kohlberg, sayings on the authority of the Prophet and the 
legitimate Imams extolling the pious virtues of jihad and citing it as a duty imposed by 
God are a prominent theme in early Shi'ite tradition-texts.10 Kohlberg suggests that "the 
7
 Ibid., 42. 
8
 Shmuel Bar, preface to Warrant for Terror: Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihad (Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), xiii. The author underlines the vital role that fatawa play in 
re-interpreting authoritative sources to provide religious legitimation for acts otherwise considered legally 
prohibited (xiv). 
A hot topic for academics, journalists, political theorists, various classes of Islamic leaders, and other 
interested parties, the question of Islam's relation to war and peace is strenuously argued and is not lacking 
in polemics. John Kelsay puts it well when he states that there are two trends in modern discussions about 
jihad, particularly in Islamic writings: the apologetic, which seeks to dissociate Islam from violence; and 
the revolutionary, which stresses "the justice of Islamic struggle against Imperialism." John Kelsay, "Islam 
and the Distinction between Combatants and Noncombatants," in Cross, Crescent, and Sword, 209. While 
these comments are made primarily in reference to Sunni Islam, they are equally applicable to the Shi'ite 
context. 
10
 Etan Kohlberg, "The Development of the Imami Shi'i Doctrine ofjihad," in Belief and Law in Imami 
Shi'ism (Brookfield VT: Gower Publishing Company, 1991), XV 64-65. For example: '"The root of Islam 
is prayer, its branch is alms-giving, and the top of its hump jihad for the cause of God.'" This is a Tradition 
on the authority of the fifth and sixth Imams, Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 114/732 or 117/735) and Ja'far al-
Sadiq (d. 148/765) respectively. The author provides the Arabic text, which reads: "Asluhu 'l-salat wa-
far'uhu 'l-zakat wa-dhurwatu sanamih 'l-jihadfi sabll allah" and cites a number of sources including 
Muhammad b. Ya'qub al-Kulayni, Usui al-kafi, ed. 'AH Akbar al-Ghaffari (Tehran 1375), 7:11, 23-24. Ibn 
Babawayh (d. 381/991) states: '"jihad is a religious duty imposed by God on mankind.'" Again, Kohlberg 
quotes the Arabic: "Al-jihadfarida wajiba min Allah 'ala khalqihF and cites the source as Ibn Babawayhi, 
al-Hidaya, (Tehran, 1377), 11; as well as Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi, Bihar al-anwar (Persia 1305), 
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typically Shi'i view of history" evident in some traditions is that "all believers (i.e. 
Shi'is) are by definition mazlumun [oppressed], since they have been robbed of their 
rightful property, the territory at present held by the unbelievers (the dar al-harb). Thus, 
according to this view, all Shi'ites are in a state of "perpetual jihad.,,n 
By the late 8th century CE, after the period of the early conquests and Civil Wars, 
the so-called wars of fitnah, the notion of perpetual war between two opposing worlds 
(Islam and unbelief) became normalized in the juristic literature. The introduction of the 
terms dar al-isldm and dar al-harb reflected the dichotomous juristic understanding of 
legitimate warfare, which was premised on the objective of expanding the political, if not 
religious, hegemony of the former.12 As Elizabeth Mayer observes, the use of these terms 
and their associated notion of "Islamic military expansion at the expense of non-Muslim 
countries" persisted in the literature well beyond the times in which they could have had 
practical reality.13 
Pre-modern Shi'ite law urged offensive jihad against two groups of people: 
unbelievers who did not submit willingly to Islamic rule, and Muslims "who rise against 
one of the twelve legitimate Imams" (ahl al-baghi).u Although the latter category does 
not concern us here, it may be noted that both in terms of how ahl al-baghT are defined 
and the level of duty attached to fighting such people, this is a point of difference 
15:XXI, 93. The prophet is also said to have included jihad with prayer and charitable piety as "the three 
works most beloved by God." Among his cited sources is Ibn Babawayhi, Kitab al-khisdl, ed. Ali Akbar al-
Ghaffari (Tehran, 1389), 163,185. Kohlberg, "Doctrine of jihad," 64-65. 
11
 Kohlberg, "Doctrine of jihad," 67. As noted by Kohlberg, Shi'ite scholars of the classical period of law 
cite Qur'an 22:39/40 in support of this position: "those who are fighting have permission [to do so] since 
they have been unjustly dealt with" (Ibid). 
12
 Fred M. Dormer, "The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War," in Just War and Jihad: Historical and 
Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, ed. John Kelsay and James 
Turner Johnson (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), 50. 
13
 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and International Law, in Just War and 
Jihad, 195. 
14
 Kohlberg, "Doctrine of jihad," 69. 
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between Sunni and Shi'ite theories of jihad. Further, in contrast to Sunni theory, which 
allows the Muslim head of state to declare jihad, Shi'ite doctrine conditions offensive 
jihad on the permission of the Imam or his representatives, the jurists.16 Sachedina 
suggests that this reflects jihad'1 % intention of establishing a social order that recognizes 
the authority of a divinely guided leadership. Mpreover, such leadership is essential to 
ensuring that the motives for undertaking jihad conform to Qur'anic criteria and "the 
goals of Islam."17 Further, unlike rituals of devotion such as prayer or fasting, which are 
the duty of every Muslim individually (fard 'ayri), jihad is a duty incumbent on the 
community at large (fard kifayah). That is, only some need undertake it for the duty to be 
fulfilled on behalf of all. An exception is made in a situation in which Muslims are faced 
with "grave danger," a matter with which Sunni law is in agreement.18 
The disappearance of the Imam in the 9th century CE severely limited offensive 
jihad in practice, though its theoretical constitution persisted in the juristic tradition. It 
was supported by the notion that the Imam's absence does not reconcile the Shi'ites with 
their enemies, but allows for a "temporary truce (hudna)" until the Imam is again 
revealed. The vulnerable position of Shi'ites in a Sunni dominated empire meant, 
however, that even prior to the Imam's total absence, jihad effectively went into 
abeyance in anticipation of conditions that would guarantee victory, a situation that, it is 
Ibid., 68-74. While Sunnis define the ahl al-baghias political dissenters and the duty to fight them 
depends on the presence of actual threat, for Shi'ites, jihad against ahl al-baghl is "a central tenet, which is 
not contingent upon any particular historical occurrence" (69). Hence, unlike Sunni historians, Shi'ites 
lawyers speak of the three civil wars of Ali's caliphate as instances of jihad against bughat (74). Although 
there is consensus that ahl al-baghi are considered unbelievers, Imami jurists debate the terms of their 
treatment in jihad (See Kohlberg, "Doctrine ofjihad" 74-78). 
16
 Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Kitab al-Jihad: dirasah istadlaliyah jiqhtyah hawl mawdu 'at al jihad wa 
masd'ilihi (Beirut: Dar al-Malak, 1416/1996), 251-56. This differs from the Sunni position which 
authorizes the Muslim head of state to declare offensive jihad. See Kohlberg, "Doctrine of jihad," 69, 80-
81. 
17
 Sachedina, "Development of Jihad," 41; 44-45. 
18
 Kohlberg, "Doctrine of jihad," 68. See also Sachedina, "Development of Jihad," 45. 
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understood, will precipitate the return of the Twelve Imam, or Mahdi, and the messianic 
age he ushers in.19 Until that time, the followers of the Hidden Imam are urged, as a 
matter of precautionary wisdom, to practice taqiyah. 
In contrast to this quietist trend, Abu Ja'far al-Tusi (al-Shaykh'ut-Ta'ifa, d. 
460/1067) declared that, as a moral obligation, defensive warfare remains incumbent on 
the community and does not require the permission of the Imam. Al-Tusi does not apply 
the term jihad to this type of warfare and does not allow it to be used to convert people to 
Islam, as this—the only type of war he classifies as offensive jihad—requires the 
presence of the Imam.20 Prominent jurists of the 13th and 14th centuries added that 
defensive warfare nevertheless does require the authority of those "appointed by the 
Imam," that is, the jurists.21 Others, such as al-Shahid al-Thani (d. 966/1558), declared 
that defensive war to protect Muslims' lives and property did not require even the jurists' 
authority.22 
Regarding lawful targets of jihad, juristic discourse distinguishes between 
combatants and noncombatants. Although the ahl al-harb is considered collectively 
responsible for opposing Islamic hegemony, apart from certain exceptions, only active 
19
 Kohlberg, "Doctrine of jihad," 78. For further discussion of the Mahdi's role as leader of the end times' 
battle, see the present article by Kohlberg, "Doctrine of jihad," and al-Shaykh al-Mufid, Kitab al-Irshad, 
trans. I.K.A. Howard (W. Sussex: Balagha Books, 1981); and Abdulaziz Sachedina, Islamic Messianism: 
The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi 'ism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981). 
20
 Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in 
Imamite Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 111-13. According to Sachedina, "later 
jurists" classified war against unbelievers who attack Muslims, those who kill Muslims and drive them 
from their homes, and those who rise up against the Imam, as defensive jihad (113). 
21
 Kohlberg, "Doctrine of jihad," 80-81. 
22
 Sachedina, Just Ruler, 115. Quoting al-Shahid, Sachedina writes: "As for other forms of jihad [i.e. 
defensive ones], it is not necessary for the Muslims to engage in these under the aegis of the Imam, or his 
'special; or 'general' deputy." 
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combatants may be killed. The relevant question for our purposes is whether non-
combatants may in other respects be despoiled, for example, of their property. 
According to classical Islamic legal doctrine, moveable and immovable spoils 
may be appropriated only after victory is achieved by the Muslims in actual battle, as it is 
defeat in battle "which alienates the enemy's rights of ownership and enables the 
Muslims to claim or divide the enemy's property."24 In consequence, spoils may not be 
distributed until they are brought back to dar al-islam and divided according to legal 
norms,25 a fifth belonging to the Imam.26 Shi'ite law allows that spoils of war be allotted 
not only to those who entered the battlefield prior to the distribution of booty, but also to 
those who were willing to go to war but unable to do so.27 Fadlallah argues that the legal 
proofs for this position are weak, and that booty belongs to active combatants only, 
which he defines as those who arrived to the battlefield whether prior or subsequent to 
victory by the Muslims. 
On the other hand, from the legal principle that "every person retains ownership 
of his property unless there is legal proof [otherwise,]"29 Fadlallah argues that Muslims 
may recover whatever is taken as booty by the kuffar by whatever means available, 
including stealing, since there is no legal proof allowing the kuffar the right to booty from 
Muslims. In support, Fadlallah quotes the Hadith, saying: "The Muslim is more entitled 
Kelsay, "Combatants and Noncombatants," 201-202. Women (unless they are polytheists), children and 
old men are not to be killed. They are, nevertheless, subject to "other types of force—e.g., enslavement." 
Fadlallah notes two conditions in which non-combatants may be killed: when victory in war against 
unbelievers depends on it; when those it is not permitted to kill are armed. Fadlallah, Kitab al-Jihad, 272, 
274. 
24
 Khadduri, "Muslims in non-Muslim Territory," 120. 
25
 John Kelsay, "Combatants and Noncombatants," 202-3. 
26
 Fadlallah, Kitab al-Jihad, 397-98. 
27
 Ibid., 400. 
28
 This is also the majority Sunni position. See Khadduri, "Muslims in non-Muslim Territory," 120. 
29
 Fadlallah, Kitab al-Jihad, 403. 
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to his property wherever he finds it." It may be that these two legal trends—that only 
active combatants may avail themselves of the spoils of war, and that Muslims have the 
right to recover what the kuffar take as booty from the Muslims—in the context of the 
colonial and post-colonial narrative, represent one explanation for the evident disparity 
between Fadlallah's legal opinion and the apparent confusion and sense of entitlement 
that marks some of the istifta 'at. 
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS 
We noted above the shift from offensive jihad to taqiyah after the disappearance 
of the 12th Imam, a move that did not adversely affect defensive jihad. Moreover, for 
both Sunni and Shi'ite modern nation-states, the historical reality of political weakness 
and vulnerability obliged revision of the received tradition that allowed only for 
temporary peace treaties between otherwise warring nations.31 In consequence, modern 
theories of. jihad, similarly to Western just war theory, found further justification for the 
shift towards support exclusively for defensive war. In the face of the threat posed by the 
Russian invasions of the 19th century, the Qajar jurists of Iran revived the imperative of 
defensive jihad. In such situations, where the community faced serious danger, defensive 
jihad was considered a far A 'ayn in which every Muslim (including women, the elderly, 
the sick, and the insane, normally exempted from active participation) was expected to 
contribute to resisting the enemy in some manner.32 
Kohlberg summarizes a text entitled Risala-yi jihadiyah, a collection of fatawa 
expressing Qajar juristic thinking on jihad. The text renews the classical praise ofjihad in 
place of taqiyah and declares that defensive war does not require the permission of the 
30
 Ibid., 401. 
31
 Mayer, "War and Peace," 196-97. 
32
 Kohlberg, "Doctrine of jihad," 82-84. 
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Imam or the jurists, but may be called by "whoever is best equipped to win the war." It 
further defines defensive jihad as consisting of four justificatory branches: a) to defend 
territory and the community from attacks from unbelievers; b) to prevent unbelievers 
from gaining control over the persons of Muslims; c) to repel unbelievers who threaten to 
gain power over Muslims; d) to evict unbelievers who gained control over Muslim 
territory. 4 While relatively expansive, the text limits defensive jihad to political and 
territorial aggression, or to attacks against the persons of Muslims; it does not appear to 
sanction war for the spread of Islam, or for conversion. This is left to revolutionary 
discourse that, although framing their discourse in terms of defense, radically expands its 
definition. 
REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
Clerical advocates of Iran's Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911) revived Shi'ite 
activist discourse, calling on the 'ulama' to "defend [the nation] against the imperialism 
of the infidels."35 Popularized by the architects of the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution, 
modern Shi'ite revolutionary discourse as expressed by Ayatollah Khomeini, as well as 
Ayatollahs Murtada Mutahhari (d. 1979) and Mahmud Taleqani (d. 1979), and layman 
AH Shari'ati, among others, draws on the central Shi'ite motif of Husayn's struggle 
against the Islamic "imperialism" of the Umayyad polity. In contrast to the Safavid image 
of Husayn, for whom weeping on the part of the faithful assures them of his intercessory 
powers, the revolutionary image of Husayn compels emulation of his self-sacrificing 
-" Ibid., 84. 
34
 Ibid., 83 n.106. 
Said Amir Arjomand, "Ideological Revolution in Shi'ism," in Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism, 
ed. Said Amir Arjomand (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 179. 
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commitment to justice on behalf of the downtrodden. It is this grievance for the fate of 
the Imams that has shaped Shi'ite approaches to jihad and served to preserve the oft-
present link between jihad and justice.37 
For some modern clerical thinkers, fighting for justice and freedom from 
oppression on a global level falls within the definition of defensive, and thus permissible, 
jihad. As Mayer suggests, the objective of attaining justice is thought to qualify such 
struggles as compatible with just war theory, being interpreted as "a form of self-
defense."38 Ayatollahs Mutahhari and Taleqani reflect this justice-oriented interpretation 
of defense that merits some attention. Mutahhari, a major clerical ideologue of the 1978-
79 Iranian revolution, argues that while jihad against unbelievers simply because of their 
unbelief is illegitimate, jihad against aggression and in defense of human rights is as 
justifiable as it is mandatory.39 
Although Mutahhari uses language such as 'human rights' and 'freedom,' he does 
not interpret these terms in the Western sense of individual rights and freedoms. Rather, 
he interprets them in terms of the right to hear and the freedom to respond to the message 
of Islam. Mutahhari argues, therefore, that jihad is obligatory against any government 
that "creates a barrier against the call of Islam by negating its freedom and becoming an 
obstacle to it diffusion, whereas Islam stipulates that such barriers are to be destroyed; 
For a study of note treating this comparison, see Mary Hegland, "Two Images of Husain: 
Accommodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village," in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi 'ism from 
Quietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 218-235. For popular 
expressions of both the interpretations, see also Reinhold Loeffler, Islam in Practice: Religious Beliefs in a 
Persian Village (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988). 
37
 Assaf Moghadam, "The Shi'i Perception of Jihad," alNakhlah (Fall 2003) article 2. The Fletcher School 
Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization. Available from 
http://netcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/archives/fall2003/moghadam.pdf (accessed January 28, 2009), 5. 
38
 Mayer, "War and Peace," 211. 
39
 Ayatullah Murtada Mutahhari, "Jihad in the Qur'an," in Jihad and Shahadat: Struggle and Martyrdom in 
Islam, ed. Mehdi Abdi and Gary Legenhausen (Houston, TX: Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 
1983), 92; 93-102. 
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[...]' Whether those so 'tyrannized' request help or not is immaterial as the Muslim is 
duty-bound to ensure "the prosperity and happiness" of all peoples.41 
Thus, the question, Mutahhari argues, is not about whether jihad is lawful only in 
defense; it is. The dispute, he says, is about how to define defensive warfare and whether 
it "is limited merely to self-defense, or at most to defense of one's nation, or whether it 
should also include defense of humanity."42 Mutahhari argues that defending the rights of 
others, as he defines them, is consistent with the sacred principle of enjoining good and 
forbidding evil. Where this intersects with jihad for the sake of religious beliefs lies in 
understanding monotheism as a human right, and polytheistic beliefs as against the best 
interests of humanity. Muslims are justified, therefore, in initiating military aggression 
"in order to pluck out the fundamental roots of evil from that society." This is not the 
same as "imposing belief in monotheism" which is contrary to Islam.4 Thus, defensive 
jihad is obligatory not only to liberate those who are mazlum (oppressed) because of 
territorial occupation, but also to secure the social and political conditions necessary for 
the freedom of "the call" of Islam "in every nation."44 
Likewise, Ayatollah Taliqani's definition of'defensive' blurs the boundary 
between the classical formulation of defensive jihad waged "to stop aggression" and 
jihad "aimed at conversion to Islam."45 For Taliqani,y*Via<i in defense of one's "rights, 
territory, dignity, nationality, and what have you" is a natural human instinct similar to 
4U
 Ibid., 83. 
41
 Ibid., 97,104-106. 
42
 Ibid., 106. 
43
 Ibid., 110. 
44
 Ibid., 111. 
45
 For a discussion of the classical tendency see Sachedina, "Development of Jihad" 36. 
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the sexual impulse, or appetite for food. The desire to protect one's self and interests 
arises, he argues, out of anger. Like sexual and culinary appetites, the expression of 
warlike emotions is healthy and natural when regulated by divine law and leads to human 
and social illness when left to human caprice. In place of the abolition of war, which, he 
argues, would be contrary to human nature,47 Islam provides the most sensible solution -
defensive war. He defines it as struggle and conflict "in the way of God," that is, for the 
establishment and protection of a social order in conformity with divine revelation. The 
alternative, which is typical of unbelievers, Taliqani argues, is to "strive [jahada] in the 
way of taghut." 48 
The meaning of the term taghut is disputed. The majority of English translations 
of its use in the Qur'an prefer the meaning of "an idol" or "false deity," a translation that 
is borne out by verses that seem to place it in binary opposition with God.49 Taliqani 
rejects this interpretation in favour of a more politicized meaning of a social despot, 
whose "overflow"50 and excess of self-ambition drives him to trample on and extinguish 
the rights of others. 1 Iranian revolutionary discourse, for which Taliqani was largely 
responsible, popularized the term in adjective form {tdghuti) as a slur against wealthy and 
worldly persons apparently resistant to the values of the revolution, as interpreted by its 
ideological spokespersons. For Taliqani, the prevalence of tdghuti values calls for and 
Mahmud Taleqani [sic], "Jihad and Shahadat," in Jihad and Shahadat, 49. Emphasis added. (The more 
common spelling of his name, which I use throughout my text, is Taliqani. Abdi and Legenhausen's text, 
Jihad and Shahadat, uses Taleqani, which I therefore use in this context only.) 
47
 And which, Taleqani argues, is characteristic of Christian naivety. "Jihad and Shahadat," 53. 
48
 Ibid., 51. 
49
 See ibid., 72 n. 3 which summarizes commentary on the use of the term in the Qur'an. The term taghut 
appears in Surahs 4:51, 60, 76; 5:60. Surah 4:76, which Taleqani quotes, states: "Those who believe do 
battle for the cause of God and those who disbelieve do battle for the cause of taghut. So fight the minions 
of the devil. Lo! the devil's strategy is always weak." 
50
 Taleqani rightly points out that the root meaning of the term (tagha) means "to exceed proper bounds, 
overstep the bounds, be excessive [...]; to overflow," etc. 
51
 Ibid., 51. 
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justifies jihadJT sabil Allah, that is, in defense of truth and justice. As prayer and fasting, 
activities that are intended to nurture "intimacy with God," are likewise spoken of as 
being fi sabil Allah, jihad against tyranny over Muslims and others is likewise incumbent 
upon all believers as a means of them getting close to God.52 In the final analysis, it is 
'"the mission of liberating the nations of the world from slavery to human laws and false 
religions which are for a particular class, and to lead them [sic] to the glory of Islam"' 
that defines jihad as both 'defensive' and Islamic.53 
Defensive jihad also figures largely in political discourse linked to the cause of 
Palestinian liberation and Arab nationalism. This discourse, both Sunni and Shi'ite, 
identifies the three-fold enemy of Israel, Zionism, and world imperialism.54 While direct 
struggle against these forces is seen as unquestionably just, the discourse also invokes the 
notion of guilt by association such that a class of people "who support the enemy or who 
stand idly by" while the rights of Muslims are being violated "incur guilt and become, in 
some sense, legitimate targets of military force."55 As Kelsay observes, the enemy 
becomes defined not by role (as soldiers, for example), but by presumed or actual 
ideological commitment.56 
Among Shi'ites, Khomeini's writings and speeches clearly endorse an adversarial 
position towards American and British interests on the basis of their complicity with 
Israel, which, Khomeini avers, "derives from America" and is the cause of "[a]ll of our 
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troubles today." Those who support Israel are "in a state of war with the Muslims 
CO 
[...]" Resistance, therefore, is justified in terms of defensive jihad. In a 1978.speech 
that was, as were his other speeches, circulated to Persian-speaking Muslims in North 
America, Khomeini declared that it was "the duty of everyone to oppose [the Shah's 
regime], to refrain from aiding it in any way, to refuse to pay taxes or render any other 
assistance [...]" to a nation that betrays Islam and Muslims by providing help to Israel.59 
Whether Khomeini's call to withhold the payment of taxes to the Iranian government is 
applicable to others, such as the U.S.A, is an open question. 
The discourse of jihad against the Zionist state and its supporters is likewise 
important to the Lebanese Hizbullah whose endorsement of political violence is 
defended, morally and religiously, by the imperative of resistance against the 
"insufferable and draconian [...] oppression" exhibited by the Zionist state and its tacit or 
overt supporters.60 Foremost among the latter is the United States which, Fadlallah avers, 
does not even have "an American policy in the Middle East, but an 'Israeli policy', which 
stems from the US' ideological commitment to Israel."61 In spite of this intractable 
association, Fadlallah's legal opinions acknowledge the political legitimacy of the United 
States. This, it will be seen, allows Fadlallah to stress the Islamic legal imperative of 
upholding contract obligations, a matter that is not applicable in the case of Israel. 
In sum, while the classical law tends to minimize vigilante activity, 19th and 20th 
century reinterpretations broadened the scope of possibilities for jihad. Further, the 
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severity of the obligation to defensive jihad incumbent on the community blurs the 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate fields of action, even as it resuscitates the 
dichotomous spirit expressed in the classical terminology of dar al-islam and dar al-
harb. Upon this foundation revolutionary Islamic political discourse mingles a re-
interpretation of the classical connection between jihad and justice with a re-articulation 
of the central Shi'ite motif of Karbala. It is not uncommon to find this typically Islamic 
discourse then fused to the terminology and ideology of revolutionary third-world 
struggles wherein the concept of justice is extended towards "the desire to secure the 
well-being of all humanity."62 With this as background, we are better positioned to 
examine istifta'at and fatawa that treat attitudes to non-Muslim governments. 
WHO IS MY ENEMY AND IS THIS JIHAD? 
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah 
Istifta' (1): Is Norway considered to be at war with Islam and is it permitted to 
seize the wealth of the state illegally? 
Istijia' (2): We notice that you always speak about the duty of respecting the 
laws of Western countries that we travel to, but many laws of these countries 
are opposed to Islam, in addition to the obligatory high taxes of which a portion 
goes to help Israel. So, what is the problem if Muslims evade these laws? 
Istifta' (3): Regarding the impermissibility of using deception in relation to the 
wealth of unbelievers and the duty of respecting it, what do you say with regard 
to Western nations that steal the wealth of Muslims daily? 
Istifta' (4)': We commonly think of the West as the arrogant, imperialist West. 
This Islamic perception makes many Muslims violate the system, money, and 
property of Westerners. What is your legal opinion on this? 
Sachendina, "The Development of Jihad" 37. 
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It is important that we understand these istifta 'at within the historical context 
alluded to above, that is, the "typically Shi'i view of history" that appears to be 
confirmed by Western colonial history. While alluding to issues discussed in the law of 
jihad, these istifta 'at effectively ask if Muslims are obliged to obey the laws of non-
Muslim governments perceived to be hostile to the interests of Islam and Muslims. Their 
tone—especially that of questions (2) and (3)—intimates a challenge to Fadlallah's 
perspective, implying that at least some mustaftis consider juristic authority as susceptible 
to critique. Istifta' (4) presents the question in a more neutral manner, while exhibiting 
awareness that there is a difference of opinion on how Muslims ought to respond to 
Western imperialism. 
Istifta' (1) suggests that the writer has in mind pre-modern juristic conceptions of 
Islam's position with regard to non-Muslim nations, given the absence of any actual 
political conflicts between Muslim states and the European country named. The writer 
further seems to suggest that if the situation is as presumed, that is, if Norway is at war 
with Islam, there are questions regarding spoils that need to be addressed. Legal precepts 
regarding spoils of war, discussed above, make it difficult to conceive how any kind of 
property could be appropriated in the mustaftfs context, i.e. by mere residence in a non-
Muslim country in the absence of open conflict. To attempt to justify disobedience or to 
propose that Muslims "seize the wealth of the state illegally" on the premise that the 
West is "at war" with Islam would suggest an opportunism that is contrary to the letter of 
the law, of which the mustaftT is evidently uninformed. 
Although different in their emphases, the writers of istifta 'at (2), (3), and (4) raise 
the question of international complicity in Middle Eastern conflicts and suggest that this 
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ought to be a pertinent factor in formulating an appropriate Islamic legal response. 
MustaftTs appear to draw on the anti-imperialist discourse discussed above that, in 
general, enlarges the scope of conflict and which may be phrased, in the Muslim context, 
in terms of jihad. In suggesting the validity of illegal, though peaceful, acts of resistance 
far removed from the geographic conflict, they seem to echo the Lebanese Hizbu'llah's 
"logic of resistance" against the injustice and oppression of the (former) Israeli 
occupation of south Lebanon. Based on speeches given by al-Sayyid Hassan Nasru'llah, 
the Lebanese Hizbu'llah leader, Saad-Ghorayeb describes the party's principle of popular 
resistance against Israel as a non-relinquishable '"religious legal obligation' (wajib 
shar'/)" required of every Muslim. Recognizing the impracticality of this expectation 
on the military level alone, Hizbu'llah qualifies its interpretation of individual obligation 
(fard 'ayri) for military jihad by insisting that other forms of resistance—cultural, 
educational, political, and economic—remain incumbent on every individual Muslim. 
Thus, mustafti(2)''s inclination to evade taxes may be interpreted in light of this Shi'ite 
understanding of individual responsibility for resistance to oppression and humiliation, 
reflected in the paradigm of Imam Husayn. The writer of istifta' (4), though seemingly 
aware of the interpretation appears uncertain of the correct legal position and thus 
requests Fadlallah's opinion on the matter. 
Finally, mustaftis implicitly express the popular notion that Muslims may act as 
individuals in situations that are effectively matters of international relations. The writer 
of istifta' (3), for example, implies that unilateral respect for the property and wealth of 
"unbelievers" in "Western nations" neglects to take full account of the legitimacy of 
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acting in self-defense, on a rather ad hoc and individualistic basis. Mayer's discussion of 
"legal personality" suggests that the mustaftfs reasons for assuming this position may not 
necessarily be due purely to religious reasons, as it is reflective also of modern Third 
World social justice discourse in which '"peoples' enjoy legal personality and are 
covered by international law."69 While its legal status is still debated in international law, 
the notion of the legal personality of peoples involved in struggles against imperialism 
enjoys popular support. 
In conclusion, it may be argued that the mustaftis above reflect tendencies 
characteristic of a leadership influenced by Iranian and Lebanese revolutionary discourse 
that feeds well into a general sense of alienation and entitlement also reflected in the 
istifta 'at. Analysis of the fatawa below will show that Fadlallah's position is clearly more 
conciliatory and pacifistic. Does Fadlallah signal a new generation of Shi'ite leadership or 
do his fatawa reflect the reality of individual differences presupposed by the Shi'ite 
juristic method of original ijtihad, sometimes exercised in response to historical 
conditions? Or, might we conclude, rather, that when acting in a legal capacity, mujtahids 
are constrained by the methodology and classical tradition of the legal discourse, 
notwithstanding any revolutionary inclinations they may have on another level? 
Fatwa (1): I do not permit seizing the wealth of kafirs as long as they do not 
enter into actual war against Muslims. The mere unbelief of unbelievers does 
not make their wealth permitted [to Muslims]. God says: "God does not 
forbid you to show kindness and act justly to those w h o have not 
warred against you on account of religion or driven you from your 
homes. God loves those w h o deal justly" (60:8). "But God forbids 
you to make friends of those w h o warred against you on account of 
religion or drove you out of your homes and helped to drive you 
out. Whoever makes friends of them, they are the wrongdoers" 
(60:9). The Jews were blamed because they made lawful the wealth of all who 
were not Jews when they said: "We have no duty to the Gentiles" (3:75). 
Mayer, "War and Peace," 210. 
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But this country is a special case because it is considered a peaceful country and 
is not among the warring countries in the clear sense of the word war. 
Fatwa (2): We say: it is a person's duty to not harm the security or the public 
order of the country to which he goes. The reason is that when someone goes to 
any Western country, whether on a visa, or as a refugee, it is his duty — and this 
is a condition of his travel there being accepted — to respect the laws of the 
country to which he travels and this becomes an agreement between him and 
that country. Yes, if there is something that violates Islam, such as someone 
saying some forbidden things, this is not permitted to him. With respect to 
taxes, these countries provide social security, health and such things for you by 
means of these taxes. Therefore, we say: when Muslims go to Western 
countries, it is their duty to present a radiant image of their duties and 
obligations, not like some do, who make the wealth and lands of people lawful 
to themselves, such that they distort the image of Islam in the name of Islam. 
Fatwa (3): There is a difference between countries at war that behave with 
warlike actions, and peaceful countries that behave with peaceful actions, and 
we have to distinguish between a country and the people. "God has not 
forbidden you to show kindness and act justly to those w h o have 
not warred against you on account of religion or driven you from 
your homes. God loves those w h o deal justly" (Qur'an 60:8): this 
verse indicates that we must deal justly and follow the path of justice with 
everyone who does not fight against us on account of religion, and has not 
chased us from our homes. What we infer from this is that the Qur'an forbids us 
from taking the wealth of kafirs simply because of their kufr "God has 
forbidden you to be kind to those w h o have fought you on account 
of religion or drove you out of your homes and helped to drive you 
out" (Qur'an 60:9. We notice that when God blames the Jews, what he 
blames them for: "There are those from among the people of the Book 
w h o , if you trust him with a we ight of treasure wil l return it to you , 
and among them he w h o , if you trust him with a dinar wil l not 
return it to you unless you cont inue to stand over him. This is 
because they say w e have no duty to the Gentiles" (Qur'an 3:75). 
God blames them because they consider themselves responsible to respect only 
Jews and their wealth, blood, and lands, and are not responsible to respect the 
whole world of non-Jews. So, if Muslims think in this way: "We're not 
responsible for kujfar, so w e can kill them and take their wealth by 
force and oppose them," what would be the difference between us and the 
Jews, when God blames them for this?! 
Fatwa (4): God (may he be praised) desires for the Muslim, in his human duties 
regarding relations with people, and in his religious duties, that the trustworthy 
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person, because of the value of trustworthiness that is a part of his Islamic 
personality, be far from the nature of other people, towards whom one is to be 
t rustworthy. ( Q u r a n 3:75 as above) This reveals to us the Qur'anic inspiration 
that God does no t want people to be t rustworthy with Muslims and to be 
untrus tworthy with non-Muslims; because trustworthiness, like honesty, is a 
value connected to the trustworthy person in his concept of responsibility 
towards the proper ty of people. Likewise, honesty is embodied in the value 
expressed in the honest person regardless of other people. [Q 60:8-9 and 
religious duty of respecting proper ty of people amongst whom Muslims live] 
And if governments oppress us or fight against us, the people are not similarly in 
agreement with the activities of these governments. [...] 
From another perspective, the person who migrates to a country and 
takes an entry visa to that country holds within himself a contract [ 'ahd] 
between himself and that country stipulating that he may enter the country to 
preserve its security, order, and all its vital affairs. Consequently, those who 
violate the proper ty of a country or its people, who act unlawfully against its 
security or such things, violate the contract that they took upon themselves; 
therefore, I issue afatwa prohibiting, as a basic principle (bi'l- 'anwan al-awwalT), 
the violation of the wealth of people , whether they are Muslims or kafirs. As a 
basic principle, I do not deem lawful the wealth of kafirs. Even thosefuqaha' 
who have issued afatwa specific to this subject do not permit this as a secondary 
principle (when an additional factor intervenes — bi'l- 'anwan al-thanawT), 
because it sullies the reputation of Islam and mars the image of Muslims. [...] I 
request all of my brothers and all my sons to be trustworthy wi th the wealth of 
people and to exemplify the radiant image of Islam in their trustworthiness and 
honesty and that they respond to the call of imam al-Sadiq: "Be ca l l er s t o t h e 
p e o p l e w i t h o u t y o u r t o n g u e s ; l e t t h e m s e e g o o d n e s s , h o n e s t y , a n d 
g o d l i n e s s f r o m y o u , for th i s is da'wah."7i 
Fadlallah'sfatawa stress several inter-related lines of argument: determining the 
conditions that define a state of war, the legitimacy of non-Muslim governments and 
contracts made with them, distinguishing between governments and their citizens, and the 
ethical and missionary duty of modeling Islam before non-believers, that is, of engaging 
in da 'wah. In addition, he employs an anti-Jewish polemic in an attempt to motivate his 
followers to differentiate themselves from their alleged enemies. Our discussion will 
elaborate on these themes, comparing his position with that of other modern jurists, and 
suggesting some implications. 
Ibid., 194-96. Emphasis added. 
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In saying that "the mere unbelief of unbelievers does not make their wealth 
permitted [to Muslims]" does Fadlallah mean precisely what he says, i.e. that unbelief is 
not equivalent to aggression, and therefore cannot justify defensive jihadl Or, do his 
fatawa share the presuppositions evident in Mutahhari's or Taliqani's views? That is, are 
there hidden nuances to his otherwise pacifistic/a/wa? For, as one journalist interviewer 
said of him, "With Master Fadlallah one has to read between the lines to find the truth."74 
In principle, Fadlallah accepts the idea of jihad for the purpose of da 'wah, in 
addition to other religious objectives. "Da 'wah to Islam is an Islamic objective that 
justifies plunging into battle on its behalf (for its sake)."75 However, he says, the Qur'an 
(2:193) qualifies this as a defensive permission only, to eliminate fitnah, which, he 
defines in this context as societal or political obstacles preventing the spread of Islamic 
doctrine and the fulfillment of its revolutionary objectives; and turning Muslims away 
from Islam. It is not, he says, a matter of using force to compel people to embrace 
Islam.76 Rather, the universal mission of Islam justifies the use of force to protect its 
missionary efforts for the good of humanity.77 Therefore, while denying any direct link 
between unbelief and aggression, Fadlallah affirms that when unbelief sets up obstacles 
to the spread of Islam—that is, when it manifests itself as oppression or persecution—it 
may justifiably be met with the sword. 
With regards to political conflicts involving Muslims, Fadlallah does not appear 
hesitant to endorse conventional as well as unconventional forms of violence in defense 
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of the rights of Muslims. The latter, he argues, are the weapons of the "oppressed nations 
[which] do not have the technology and destructive weapons America and Europe 
have."79 However, when considering how Muslims should behave in Western nations—in 
spite of the complicity of some with Israel—Fadlallah's stance is absolute in its call to 
peaceful, law-abiding, and upright, honest behaviour. There is no indication in the 
material that he makes any distinction in this regard between states the foreign policies of 
which are supportive of Israel, and others, such as Norway. Rather, followers are advised, 
even when living in the United States, "to be good and peaceful citizens if they have 
acquired the nationality and good guests if they have not."80 
Fadlallah underscores the distinction between unbelief - a private matter; and 
aggression - a public threat, in afatwa he gives against killing foreign tourists in Muslim 
space. While stating that Islamic law forbids harming anyone who legally enters Muslim 
territory, Fadlallah's main argument is that hostility towards Islam does not have a direct 
correspondence to ethnicity, religion, or nationality; Muslims themselves may well be at 
fault in this regard. Furthermore, conversing with tourists is more likely to change their 
outlook than is killing them, he says.81 
When asked specifically what a Muslim's legal obligations are towards Western 
states that "cooperate, [and] perhaps even conspire, with the Zionist enemy," Fadlallah 
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quotes the same Qur'anic text as mfatwa (1) above, arguing that while the early Muslim 
community may have needed to "enforce its authority" through war, the more effective 
methods of bringing people to Islam today are those of peace.82 Muslims today are to 
follow Qur'an 41:34 instructing them to "repel (evil) with what is better."83 The utilitarian 
motive of his counsel is repeated frequently; Muslims should behave this way "so as to 
give Islam the civilized image that would encourage people to embrace it" and contribute 
to the transforming of "a big society into an Islamic one."84 To do otherwise would be 
counterproductive to this mission. In other words, while offensive jihad for the sake of 
da'wah was legitimate in its own historical context, today's context requires that it be 
replaced by da 'wah and dialogue.85 
The second reason Fadlallah gives for supporting obedience to non-Muslim laws 
in matters not forbidden by Islamic law is the fundamental Islamic duty of abiding by 
contract ('ahd) obligations, the purpose of which is to provide mutual security to and 
peaceful relations between two parties. The term ''ahd is the same, the author of lisdn 
al- 'Arab states, as the dhimmah by which the Muslim state was bound to the protection of 
its primarily Jewish and Christian subjects.87 Likewise, Fadlallah says, contracts "are by 
nature the frame of security and peace."88 
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Keeping contracts is central to Qur'anic social, legal, and personal ethics. Several 
texts identify contract keeping as a defining moral quality of Muslims. After cataloging a 
list of pious virtues such as believing in God and the Last Day, the prophets and angels, 
giving to the needy and setting slaves free, Surah 2:177 adds: "And those who keep their 
covenant ('ahdihim) when they have made one, and the patient in tribulation and 
adversity and the time of stress; these are the sincere ones and these are the pious." Surah 
70:32-3? similarly lists "those who keep their trust {amanah) and covenant ('ahd)" along 
with those who give true testimony and are faithful in worship as the ones who will be 
honoured in Paradise. 
These verses suggest that a contract in Islamic thought is essentially a religious 
undertaking; the Muslim party to any contract, large or small, is bound firstly to God who 
has commanded unfailing fulfillment of its provisions. As Azizah al-Hibri puts it, the 
Qur'anic view on contract obligations, including unilateral and bilateral, suggests that 
"reneging on one's commitment, whether in exchange for another or not, is wrong. This 
follows regardless of the presence or absence of formalities when the commitment was 
made, because the need to fulfill it does not derive from legal formalities but from divine 
orders and religious morality."90 
The idea that keeping to one's agreements is a distinctive mark of Muslim piety in contrast to the 
ignorance of idol worship is brought out also in ibn Hisham's biography of the Prophet. The Muslims who 
had taken refuge in Abyssinia are said to have explained their faith and their circumstances by saying: "We 
were an ignorant people, worshipping idols [...], until God sent us a Messenger [...] who commanded us to 
be honest in speech and to fulfill our trust {amanah), [...]." Ibn Hisham, Al-Sirah al-Nabawlyah (Cairo: 
Mustafa Alban al-Halabi wa Awladihi, 1936/1355), 1:359. 
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Fadlallah mentions only one exception to the obligation of faithfulness to 
contracts.91 Muslims can break their contracts, he says, only if the other party has done so 
first, as the life of the Prophet illustrates in his relations with the Jews and the Quraysh. 
Thus, Fadlallah argues that any "initiatory breach of contract" is "a grievous sin."93 
Consequently, for Fadlallah, faithfulness to contracts is a fundamental and unconditional 
legal principle ('anwan awwalt), not contingent upon factors extraneous to the law. 
Accordingly, it is not determined merely by the legitimate interest of presenting a 
favourable image of Islam, but by the legal and ethical responsibility of maintaining the 
public order of any state in which the Muslim resides; nor is it conditional on the religion 
of the other party. Other mujtahids, he notes, arrive at the same conclusion by other 
means, that is, by stressing the secondary element of concern for the reputation of 
Muslims, but for Fadlallah, fulfilling contract obligations is fundamental to Islamic 
morality and law. 
In addressing the psychological conflict Muslims might suffer in expressing 
loyalty towards a state the foreign policies of which they may not agree with, Fadlallah 
argues that as in polygamous marriage, one is duty-bound to treat all wives equally, 
regardless of any emotional attachment one might have towards one wife over others. In 
other words, he reasons, obedience to the law does not require subjective feelings of 
al-Hibri argues, with good reason, that Muslim jurists have typically understood an incident in the life of 
the Prophet as pointing to the non-obligation of abiding by contract conditions that violate Islamic ethics, 
or, as al-Hibri puts it, public policy. In brief, the Prophet had chastised the owners of a slave that 'Aishah 
wanted to buy because they had tried to "overreach" the terms of the contract by imposing an 
"unconscionable stipulation" on her sale. The Prophet advised 'Aishah to free the slave so as to render the 
terms of the contract, including its unconscionable provision, null and void. Ibid., 190-194. Jurist have 
commonly interpreted this to mean that the duty to fulfill any contract "is implicitly contingent [...] on 
public policy, morality, and similar concerns," 194. That Fadlallah doesn't mention this does not, of course, 
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affection. Indeed, in the case of obeying non-Muslim governments, Fadlallah cautions 
against forming an emotional attachment or loyalty.94 Fadlallah is fond of making fairly 
fine distinctions between closely related concepts; in this case, differentiating between 
legal and emotional loyalty enables him to reconcile two apparently conflicting moral 
issues. While promoting integration on the level of legal obligation, Fadlallah's analogy 
demonstrates a parallel desire to avoid promoting an internalization of patriotic emotions 
towards the host country.95 
However, the legal value of Fadlallah's directive is not insignificant. The tension 
between the pre-modern juristic discourse presupposing an inequality between Islamic 
and non-Islamic polities on the one hand and contemporary international law recognizing 
the legitimacy of the nation state on the other is reflected in conflicting attitudes towards 
the relationship between Islam and the international community in the contemporary 
world. Bassim Tibi summarizes these two positions in Sunni Islam: "Fundamentalists" 
adhere to the classical terminology and idea of a perpetual state of war between dar al-
islam and dar al-harb. In contrast, the more prominent "conformist" stance coming from 
institutions such as al-Azhar "[reinterprets] the Islamic notion of jihad to discourage the 
use of force."96 Tibi notes how the duty of honouring agreements allows for the 
Fadlallah's official website: "The Jurisprudence of Minorities," 
http://english.bayvnat.org.lb/Jurisprudence/minorities.htm Questions 8,12, & 19 (accessed February 1, 
2009). 
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recognition of the fundamental principle of international law which, unlike the Islamic 
law of nations that is community based, is defined by territorial borders.97 Fadlallah's 
statements about contract obligations reflect the norms of international law and suggest 
that, like many of his mainstream contemporaries, Fadlallah sees Islamic law as 
compatible with these norms. 
With regard to zulm, Fadlallah's definition is no different from Taliqani's. Zulm 
consists of three essential elements: 1) plundering the rights of others, which may be 
done by Muslims and non-Muslims alike; 2) unbelief, which is injustice against God; and 
3) occupying positions of authority illegally. This is true even in cases where the state 
considers the government to be legitimate and where it is elected by the people. 
According to Fadlallah, the latter two definitions belong to all non-Muslims by default. 
Fadlallah's position regarding what counts as defensive war differs from that of Taliqani 
primarily on the level of semantics. In his Kitab al-Jihad, Fadlallah argues that, in 
addition to repelling military aggression, defensive jihad includes the religious objectives 
of ensuring the supremacy of Islamic law and defending its doctrine against "oppression 
and imperialism."98 While unbelief itself is not a declaration of war, and thus does not 
lead to the alienation of the property of unbelievers, it is possible to understand his 
position as defining relations between the West and the Muslim world mjihadisi terms of 
"oppression and imperialism." In other words, Fadlallah does not define defensive, and 
thus just, war unequivocally "as involving only a response to military aggression," which 
would render his view consistent with the rules of international law.99 
Ibid., 187. 
Fadlallah, Kitab al-Jihad, 74. 
Mayer, "War and Peace," 204. 
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Nevertheless, Fadlallah's more rationalistic method of interpretation than the 
ideologically inclined Ayatollahs Taliqani and Mutahhari, set as they were in the 
revolutionary environment of Iran in the 1960s and 1970s, and the prominence he gives 
to faithfulness to contracts, gives him opportunity for more subtle lines of distinction. 
Consequently, in place of actions of ajihadT nature, Fadlallah advises four inter-related 
courses of action: 1) obedience to the law, as discussed above; 2) "following the path of 
openness and cooperation" with non-Muslims without forming intimate bonds of 
friendship that might lead to compromise; 3) creating Islamic political parties in 
connection with "an Islamic movement;" and 4) "working towards making Islam a force" 
and getting Muslims into positions of power.100 Muslims may even work for the security 
services or other government agencies if doing so "serves the interests of Islam" and can 
be effective in countering Zionism.1 l 
Fadlallah's position is not dissimilar to the views of a large proportion of state 
sponsored Sunni muftis102 who likewise direct their communities in the West both to obey 
the laws of non-Muslim countries and to participate in the political process.103 Those in 
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the Muslim world, however, recommend doing so in some form of alliance with political 
movements in the Muslim world.104 Fadlallah goes further by not permitting Muslims to 
join non-Muslim political parties on the assumption that this would weaken their ability 
to achieve Islamic objectives. Rather, they should form Islamic parties linked to those in 
the Middle East. Whether resident in the Muslim world or in the West, mainstream Sunni 
muftis, like Fadlallah, advise cooperation with non-Muslims in order, as the Prophet did, 
to defend Muslim interests. Some muftis resident in Europe depict this as responsible 
global citizenship.105 
Ayatollahs Al-Hakim, Sistani, and Others 
Sistani does not issue significantly different legal opinions than those of 
Fadlallah. Likewise, he shares his evident concern for the reputation of Islam and 
Muslims. The main difference between them is in the matter of style and method. Where 
Fadlallah explains his decisions with reasoning both from Islamic textual sources and 
general but frequent reference to Western values, Sistani is far more concise, preferring 
to provide the sources of his reasoning in the preliminary sections of their General Legal 
Treatises. These are simply quoted, with no context or exegesis added. The apparent 
meaning is assumed to attach authority to the fatawa to follow. In those sections, al-
Hakim in particular supplies numerous ahadith and Qur'anic texts in support of his 
positions. Finally, both Sistani and al-Hakim differ from Fadlallah in their emphases and 
approaches to some questions. 
Shadid and van Koningsveld, "Religious Authorities," 167-68. 
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If, as Haddad rightly observes, American attitudes towards Islam and Muslims 
indicate "an apparent need" to create an "other" who is different, and thus, an enemy,106 
al-Hakim may be said to mirror this approach. Al-Hakim rests a substantial measure of 
his decisions on presuppositions regarding the incompatibility of "corrupt" Western 
society with Islam and Islamic culture. He assumes an absence of common moral, 
cultural and religious ground, suggesting that the infidelity of the former is as absolute as 
the Tightness of the latter. For al-Hakim, this presents an enormous challenge to Muslims 
whom he exhorts to make tremendous effort to acquire the means to protect themselves 
from the loss of religion, going into great detail outlining the essential components. He 
advises, for example, knowledge of the textual sources of Islam and legal decisions of 
what is haldl and haram; acquisition of and familiarity with legal manuals of maraji'; 
regular observance of prayer and other religious rituals of remembrance; unity; visiting 
the homeland often; teaching Arabic to children and using Arabic at home; tolerating 
differences within the Muslim community; welcoming those who repent after having 
strayed from the path; collaborating with all Muslims in the missionary task; and taking 
individual responsibility to observe all the above.107 
At the same time, al-Hakim sees the absolute disparity between Islamic and 
Western society as presenting an opportunity for Muslims to "lift the flag of Islam and 
call [people to embrace it...]."108 Muslims in the West should see themselves as 
"companions of the message calling the people there to their religion."1 The most 
important means of doing this is by good behaviour, an ethic al-Hakim endorses on two 
106
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premises: firstly, because it is an Islamic duty; and secondly, because by it, one gives 
Islam and Muslims a good reputation. This is particularly the case in the area of obeying 
the law of the land. Westerners, al-Hakim argues, have a high proclivity towards 
maintaining law and order, which inclines them to respect those who do the same. 
Similarly, disobeying the law is inadvisable, primarily it seems, because it brings Islam 
and Muslims into disrepute. 
This is apparent in exceptions to the general rule that al-Hakim appears to allow. 
For example, in reply to a question regarding the permissibility of working "without the 
knowledge of the government so as not to cut off social assistance, and similarly, [of not 
paying] taxes by using various means," al-Hakim states that this "is permitted in and of 
itself unless it involves putting the religion in danger of harm by defaming the reputation 
of Islam and Muslims."110 Similarly, while faithfulness to contracts is stated as an Islamic 
duty, failing to do so because of negligence is not considered a breach of contract. 
Istifia': When a Muslim is presented as a refugee he signs some papers, among 
them [the obligation] to respect the laws of the country or to not violate them. 
It is possible that the refugee may not be attentive \ghayr multafit] to this. Do 
you consider violating the law to be a breach of the contract or guarantee that 
the sacred law does not permit? 
Fatwa: This is not a breach of the contract. 
In contrast, conscious contract violation is a serious matter, as Sistani and 
Khamenei make clear. Sistani specifies the categorical obligation of upholding local laws 
regarding theft and vandalism irrespective of the other party's religion and irregardless of 
the risk to the reputation of Islam and Muslims. "It is neither permissible," he says, 
to steal from the private as well as the public property of non-Muslims, nor 
vandalize it, even if that stealing or vandalizing does not tarnish the image of 
110
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Islam and Muslims. Such an act is counted as perfidy and violation of the 
guarantee given to non-Muslims indirectly when one asked permission to enter 
or reside in diat country. And it is forbidden to breach the trust and violate the 
guarantee in regard to every person irrespective of his religion, citizenship, and 
beliefs. 
It is a position with which Khamenei agrees: 
There is no difference between the property of people and the property of the 
government whether Muslim or non-Muslim and between whether this is in an 
unbelieving (kufr) country or Islamic country, or between the ruler being 
Muslim or kafir in the requirement of maintaining respect for the property of 
others and in the prohibition of usufruct without their permission [...]. 
Mustaftis, in contrast, including some of Sistani's, appear to assume different 
rulings in dealings with non-Muslims than with Muslims; and to suppose that criminal 
behaviour is illegitimate only if it results in immediate consequences to the reputation of 
Islam and Muslims, or to their physical safety. For example, a mustafti asks Ayatollah 
Sanei if a Muslim who "travels to a communist country and is able, without any risk of 
harm to his person or money, to kill someone and take their possessions" is permitted to 
do so. It is entirely possible that the mustafti in question, who may be a Shi'ite Afghan 
and may be writing at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, sees himself to be 
at war. 
Earlier, we suggested the possibility of a popular though legally invalid notion 
that Islamic law permits vigilante despoiling of non-Muslims arising out of Shi'ite or 
general Third World revolutionary discourse, in which violating the property of non-
Muslims has a retaliatory function. Whatever their views of the West morally or 
politically, legal scholars regularly stress the seriousness of contract obligations, which 
are, as Fadlallah says, the basis of law and order. In response to the question above, for 
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example, Sanei emphatically insists that nothing short of war permits the violation of 
persons and property of Muslims or non-Muslims.114 
Sistani's approach to political participation is more lenient than that of Fadlallah 
who, as observed above, advises attachment to parties in the Muslim world. Sistani omits 
this condition, permitting "membership of [sic] political parties" in the West, and 
participation in parliaments and representative assemblies "as much as is demanded by 
the interest [of the Muslim community...]." Short of having any formal association with 
Islamic parties elsewhere, the level of need demanded by the interests of Muslims must 
be determined "by consulting the trustworthy experts,"11 that is, "ahl al-khibrah" or, the 
marji 'Iyah.n6 
ISLAMIC VERSUS SECULAR LAW: NEGOTIATING TENSIONS AND KEEPING THE FAITH 
The istifta 'at in this category appear to reflect a concern for personal piety rather 
than for questions of jihad or politics. They exhibit the perception of a conflict of 
priorities where Western laws prohibit or curtail adherence to Islamic laws and traditions. 
The following are addressed to Fadlallah. 
Istifta' (1): Is it allowed to violate some laws of the host country if they 
contradict our Islamic habits, traditions, and values? 
htifta'{2): During his reception of the French Minister of the Interior and of 
Religion in 1998, 8 the imam of al-Azhar, Sheikh Tantawi, said that Muslims 
who live in France or other non-Muslim countries are obligated to respect the 
laws of these countries. It is as if he justifies the Western administration's 
Ayatollah Sanei's official website: 
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rejection of girls wearing the Islamic hijab in the schools of these 
administrations, considering that whoever does not like the laws of these 
countries can leave. What are your comments on this? 
As istifta' (2) is a particular example of the more general question of 
istifta' (1), their respective fatawa similarly express general and specific 
principles: 
Fatwa (1): It is allowed provided that this is done wisely and flexibly and in a 
way that does not harm the Muslims' situation or reputation there , for it is 
obligatory on Muslims to preserve their habits, values and Islamic rulings 
wherever they are, if this does not lead to very intense difficulty (haraj shadeed); 
also, it is obligatory on them to preserve Islam's and the Muslims' reputat ion in 
the eyes of others. 
Fatwa (2): There are two kinds of law — laws on which order , security, and the 
public conditions of the country depend; in these, we must not do harm to the 
system or security of the country to which we migrate; because the visa w e 
receive from the embassy of any foreign country is understood to have 
established a contract be tween us and these countries, it imposes on us the duty 
of its laws. And there are laws which defy (tatahadda) our legal responsibilities 
in what relates to our religious duties; these we refuse; because they deviate 
from our obligations, exactly as the French government did when it forbade 
Muslim girls from wearing the hijab in schools, even though France, as it 
professes, is a country of freedoms and this mat ter relates to personal freedom. 
The imam of al-Azhar should have reminded the French minister of religion or 
the minister of the interior to not prevent the freedom of Muslims in what they 
believe or wear , in whatever does no t harm die public order . 
These two fatawa elucidate three essential principles. The first, as suggested in 
the earlier section, is that the legitimacy of the laws of any state, Muslim or non-Muslim, 
lies in their intended purpose of protecting the public order and welfare of the people. 
Any behaviour that harms the public good is therefore forbidden to Muslims.122 Other 
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laws concern only private behaviour and do not affect the public good. The second 
principle is that Muslims are forbidden to neglect their Islamic duties. The third principle 
is that if the performance of Islamic duties runs into conflict with Western laws that 
concern private behaviour only, the latter are not absolutely binding on Muslims. 
Fadlallah argues in fatwa (2) that the present question represents a case in which the third 
principle becomes operative—Muslims are to give precedence to upholding their Islamic 
duties. Wearing the hijab, it seems, is one such duty.123 As does Fadlallah, Sistani and al-
Hakim permit the violation of Western laws where they conflict with fundamental 
Islamic duties, obligatory or recommended.124 
Fadlallah also argues the point on the logic of Western values, a practice that sets 
him apart from his more traditionally inclined colleagues. Since, in the Western legal 
system, religious observance is considered a private matter, the state should have no right 
infringing on the individual's rights of observance, as long as such does not harm the 
public order. Fadlallah portrays the hijab as an instance of private religious practice that, 
within the French legal system, should be of no concern to the government. From an 
Islamic perspective, it can be overridden only by an additional principle, which is that the 
Muslim must not do anything that brings Islam and Muslims into disrepute. In summary, 
any course of action where Western laws and Islamic religious duties collide should be 
decided by careful calculation of harms and benefits resulting from the intersection of a 
to do with the specific welfare of the people, as is the case in the present question." Tahaddiyat al-Mahjar, 
210. 
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three-fold obligation to maintain: the public order; Islamic religious duties; and the 
reputation of Islam and Muslims. 
CONCLUSION: GOOD CITIZENSHIP 
In summary, with one major exception, the trend among the mujtahids examined 
here is to advise obedience to non-Muslim governments and their laws in what concerns 
public order, differences being mainly in degree and rationale. For the majority of 
mujtahids surveyed, disobedience to non-Muslim governments is permitted only when 
Western laws conflict with Muslims' observance of what are considered 'private' Islamic 
duties. In addition to matters of 'ibadat, mujtahids include issues such as the female dress 
code and marriage as 'private' matters, thus enlarging the space that is kept safe from 
outside influence. Interpreting these issues as 'private' also places them within the 
boundaries of the modern Western understanding of religion as a personal and private 
matter. Disregarding the law in these matters may then be legitimized as the exercise of 
freedom of religion. Making this distinction allows observing Islamic law in 'private' 
matters, even when prohibited by Western secular law, to be understood as "harmless" to 
the public order, and thus permissible. 
With regard to respecting the persons and property of non-Muslims, Fadlallah and 
Sistani express their position in absolute terms and agree that this is a primary legal 
precept; it is not contingent on the consequences, good or bad, to Muslims and Islam, 
though this is valid as a secondary principle. Thus, for Sistani and Fadlallah, even when 
obeying the law involves indirect aid to Israel, such as in paying taxes, the rule that 
19S 
beneficiaries of a service are obliged to pay for it prevails. 
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Al-Hakim's position is more equivocal, as is Khui's. Al-Hakim sometimes 
permits unethical behaviour so long as there is no risk of negative repercussions on the 
reputation of Islam. This is coherent with his methodology. In contrast to Sistani and 
Fadlallah, he appears to countenance obedience to non-Muslim laws mainly as a 
secondary principle, i.e., subject to conditional factors, which might suggest a less stable 
confidence in the objective value of non-Muslim laws. It will be remembered that some 
of al-Hakim's permissions to violate the law are in the context of contract obligations, to 
which Sistani and Fadlallah consistently advise strict compliance. Two fatawa from al-
Khui also exhibit atypical support for disobeying Western laws: 
Istifia': "Is stealing from harbl kuffar or deceiving them in dealings or something 
else permitted or is its prohibition absolute?" 
Fatwa: "Yes, there is no prohibition with them in what you have mentioned, 
and God knows." 
Istifia': "If someone traveled to one of the kafir countries and there spoiled the 
property of kuffar, is he liable?" 
Fatwa: "According to the question there is no liability, and God knows." 
Some difference of opinion is also evident when a particular action implicates 
Muslims in providing indirect support for Israel. While not lacking in support for jihad 
against the Zionist entity, Fadlallah seems to advocate only direct confrontation with the 
enemy, while ruling that the primary consideration with regard to Western governments 
that one mustn't pay the fee for water and electricity to the non-Islamic government that tries to annoy its 
Muslim population, especially if it differentiates between followers of ahl al-bayt and others in their 
treatment of them. Is it permissible for us to forbid paying water and electricity bills to these 
governments?" Fatwa: "This is not permissible but everyone who benefits from the use of water and 
electricity from government sources is obliged to pay its fee to the government, even if it is not Islamic." 
Ahkam al-Mughtaribin, 401-2.1227. Sistani's conformist stance may also be a consequence of his habitual 
dissociation from revolutionary political discourse, which may be said to afford him a legal objectivity not 
enjoyed to the same degree by other mujtahids. 
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rests on other grounds, particularly the obligation of faithfulness to legal agreements. On 
the other hand, optional activities, such as buying "from companies that help and support 
the Zionist entity" may be forbidden by others, as, for example, by Ayatollah Tabrizi. 
Further, all of those surveyed allow exemption where demanded by specific 
conditions: the higher interests of Islam and Muslims, or a situation of actual war with the 
country in question—apart, one is led to understand, from cases that relate to contractual 
19Q 
obligations. For example, although Fadlallah considers lying wrong regardless of 
whom one lies to, he rules that lying in a non-Muslim context is permitted if "benefit to 
Islam" depends on it, and may be permitted in other situations if the resulting benefit 
"exceeds the harm of lying [...]. But, if the harm of lying is stronger than the benefit, 
then it is not permitted."130 
This ruling agrees with the legal principle of mafsadah and maslahah, according 
to which laws should be crafted so as to maximize good (or benefit) and minimize evil 
(or harm).131 Muhaghegh-Damad says that the principle is "of great significance to the 
process of ijtihad''' and that it means that in certain situations, a rule may change. Thus, 
while at first glance, Fadlallah'sfatwa that only if lying would cause harm to Islam—by 
sullying its reputation and character—would it be forbidden might seem utilitarian and 
imply the promotion of a feeble ethical dependability, the logic behind it suggests 
consistency with principles of ijtihad, especially when one takes into account the virtual 
"personhood" of Islam as far as law is concerned. 
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It is conceivable that the roots of this principle go back to the work of early 
Muslim ethicists who, when discussing "the etiquette of the self (adab al-nafs)," 
explained that it was "designed to protect the limbs as well as religious symbols from 
harm: Implicitly this invokes the obligation not to inflict harm intentionally (the ethical 
principle of nonmaleficence)."133 Thus, Fadlallah's ruling may also be said to be 
consistent with an established ethical principle. Further, while on the surface, the fatwa 
appears conflictual with the unconditional tone of the "thou shalt not lie" ethical ideal 
valued in much of Western culture, the notion that lying can sometimes bring about 
greater good than can telling the truth is hardly a strange idea to Western ears. 
Some of Fadlallah's fatawa are noteworthy also in demonstrating openness to 
dialogue with the West, though often accompanied by allusions to the universal mission 
of Islam.134 It is in enthusiastic support for this mission that migrants should find the 
motivation for fulfilling their religious obligations. Hence, while Fadlallah presents Islam 
as a religion of dialogue {din al-hiwdr), it would be naive to interpret this as an indication 
that he shares the fundamental philosophical premises of the contemporary mainstream 
dialogue movement. His approach to dialogue appears to be largely one of expedience 
and unapologetically linked to da 'wah in the West. 
Applying our typology of identity models, we may conclude that fatawa on 
obeying non-Muslim governments would tend to support a model of "selective 
engagement," conditioned by Islamic legal norms. In other words, fatawa articulate an 
ethical approach to government that legitimates integration on its own terms, by 
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appealing to the nobility of service to Islam, wherein piety functions as an instrument of 
community identity and propagation. That is, integration may be considered a legitimate 
goal so long as it remains within the boundaries of authoritative interpretation of Islamic 
legal norms. In contrast, in this field alone mustaftis reflect an atypical model of 
resistance identity that appears to be inspired more by revolutionary than legal discourse. 
In consequence, mustaftis and mujtahids once again find themselves to some degree at 
cross purposes in the task of shaping minority Shi'ite identity. 
In the final analysis, we note that fatawa in this domain generally exercise a 
restraining influence on jihadist leaning impulses and encourage civil obedience.135 
Exceptions tend to be associated with two conditions: observance of what are interpreted 
as private religious duties, and an idea pervasive in the fatwa literature for the West, 
succinctly expressed in the words, "for the sake of Islam," which, as we have noted, 
complies with the principle of harm and benefit. 
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CONCLUSION 
TEXTS OF TENSION, SPACES OF EMPOWERMENT 
A central task of this study has been to examine the practical validity of a 
methodological claim within Shi'ite Muslim legal discourse. The claim, of course, is that 
of dynamic ijtihad, or legal interpretation conscious of and sensitive to the social context 
to which it is addressed. Throughout the work, I have endeavoured to see how the tools of 
ijtihad are applied in a social context of major change and challenge. Through methods of 
discourse analysis, I have undertaken to uncover major assumptions and expectations of 
each of the two parties to the discourse: layperson and scholar, and to comment on the 
significance of the thought patterns embedded in their conversation. I have attempted, 
further, to explain what I found in terms of Muslim minority identity in the West. This 
chapter brings together the various threads of meaning discovered throughout this 
process. 
It would have been difficult as well as imprudent, I think, to draw conclusions had 
my study confined itself to one or two areas of legal discourse and especially, had it been 
limited solely to either 'ibadat or mu 'amalat. By extending the analysis across a broad 
spectrum of fields of normative practice, it has been possible to discern trends and 
patterns that point toward some plausible conclusions and implications. 
MVSTAFTIS AND MUJTAHIDS: DIALOGUE AND DISSONANCE 
In the requesting of afatwa and in the issuing of a response, there is a constant 
negotiation taking place between mustaftis and mujtahids. One word that sums up the 
findings is tension. Between mujtahids and mustaftis is a tension that exists, it appears, 
because the assumptions, goals, and expectations of each party tend to push in opposite 
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directions. Mustaftis assume that principles of ijtihad, particularly hardship (haraj) and 
time and place (zaman wa-makan), would be relevant, perhaps especially so, to the 
development of new approaches to Muslim life in the West. They appear to expect that 
situations that they themselves see as justifying the use of these principles would 
stimulate some modification of the ideals of Islamic legal rulings formulated in different, 
often Muslim majority, contexts. Given theoretical principles in usul al-fiqh that premise 
the need for ongoing ijtihad to meet the reality of changing circumstances, these would 
appear to be reasonable expectations. 
In terms of minority identity, mustaftis exhibit an empirical understanding of 
minority adaptation that is largely coherent with successful immigrant adaptation models 
developed by sociologists. Mustaftis regularly search out ways to contextualize rules, or 
implicitly suggest the application of principles intended to legitimize adaptive 
behaviours. Thus, they reflect a belief that innovative solutions to the moral and practical 
dilemmas they face as Muslims in secular societies, influenced to some degree by a 
Judeo-Christian social ethic, may be found in the legal resources of their tradition. In 
suggesting, for example, postponing prayer because of practical difficulties caused by 
employment, mustaftis do not appeal to humanistic values of Western secularism, but to 
Islamic legal principles of qada' and haraj. In suggesting that the no hand-shake rule 
complicates their lives to a degree that threatens their ability to provide for themselves 
and their families, their objections are likewise framed in terms of Islamic values of 
providing for one's family, respect for others, and with concern for the honour of Islam. 
Offending non-Muslims by not shaking hands with them, for example, it is believed, 
might reflect badly on Muslims and Islam. 
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Mustaftis thus exhibit an awareness of sociological complexities and tensions 
between strict and uncompromising legal observance on the one hand and successful 
adaptation on the other. They display discernment around legal matters that seem to them 
unnecessary burdens in the Western context and that compete with what they see as more 
urgent concerns, such as education and employment opportunities. This recalls 
GhaneiBassiri's observation that in balancing personal needs and goals with the 
requirements of religion, Muslims in California tended to put more emphasis on the 
former. Like the young Muslims of California, the mustaftis of this study may be said to 
reflect worldview discourses commensurate with their identity as laypersons with very 
practical objectives. It is not that mustaftis wish to disregard religious observance, but 
rather that they understand the law to be largely in their favour and supportive of the 
project of cultural adaptation. 
The mustaftis' expectations, however, are often not realized, as the rigorous 
ijtihad that they anticipate appears to be considerably constrained by other factors and 
conflicting interests. The legal decisions offered by mujtahids indicate that the interests 
of the non-migrant scholars do not lie in facilitating the construction of a blended, 
localized, or contextualized identity^but in protecting the faithful from the pitfalls of 
straying from the straight path of the law as developed within Islamic social contexts. As 
discussed in chapters one and three, given the logic of hijrah, classically understood as 
fundamental to the building of a specifically Islamic society, contemporary Islamic legal 
discourse on migration must first provide the justificatory foundation that would permit 
Muslims to live in non-Muslim territory. The specific rules of behaviour that mujtahids 
derive must remain consistent with this foundation. Mujtahids are thus constrained by 
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philosophical presuppositions not always shared by mustaftis, who tend to see their place 
in the West in more practical terms. 
Further, from the perspective of mujtahids, living in Islamic society under the rule 
of Islamic law is the ideal; residence in non-Muslim society is acceptable under strictly 
regulated conditions only. Why, then, would Muslims choose this less preferred option? 
Are contemporary migrants implicitly suggesting something negative about Islamic 
society by migrating to the West? Perhaps the dissonance often revealed between 
mustaftis and mujtahids may be partly understood as an expression of an underlying 
discourse related to tensions around this question. Mujtahids appear anxious to emphasize 
the negative characteristics of non-Muslim society in order to support the philosophical 
presuppositions of their position. It is here that legal discourse takes on a rather polemical 
dimension. Mujtahids tend, in their discourse, to construct a hostile external world that is 
sometimes Christian, sometimes atheist, but generally threatening to Muslim identity. 
They appear on the whole to be beholden to an ideological frame of reference given to 
sharp differentiation of the non-Muslim "other" and non-Islamic society. 
For mujtahids, then, the beauty and efficacy of the law is in its ability to protect 
Muslim identity by containing it. Safety and security, as said earlier, are found deep 
inside the boundaries of the law, as they are in the interior space of dar al-islam itself. 
Thus, rather than exploit the fatwa's potential to initiate legal reform, as Wa'el Hallaq 
argues has occurred in the past, not only do legal scholars seem anxious to maintain the 
status quo and to inhibit the generation of negotiated or adaptive solutions to problems of 
Muslim life in the West, but their decisions actually appear to be directed towards 
intensifying normative values against perceived threats and dangers. The mujtahids' 
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emphasis is on how the migrant's largely uncompromising adherence might support and 
advance the moral and practical triumph of Islam over Western social values. They tend 
to see migration largely as a means of da 'wah given to upholding the honour of Islam. 
Applying the typology of minority identity models to this conversation, we find 
two quite different models. While mujtahids are strongly inclined towards the resistance 
model, apparently because it strengthens the honour of Islam, mustaftis, owing to their 
desire to live productive and uncomplicated lives in the West, appear to favour the model 
of selective engagement. Thus, while mujtahids and mustaftis are engaged in the common 
project of determining what kind of Muslims they will be in the West and how the 
principles and results of legal interpretation might respond to that question, their journey 
takes them in different directions, largely because their primary objectives and the 
presuppositions with which they begin also differ. Mujtahids appear to be working with a 
set of presuppositions that encourages the construction of religious idealism and 
discourages contextualization. Al-Hakim's recurring message of the Muslim migrant's 
duty to uphold the honour of Islam by refusing to allow social context to alter, and thus 
weaken, fulfillment of religious obligations reflects his confidence both in the 
possibilities of an idealized practice and its value in rendering service to the cause of 
Islam in the West. 
There is, however, one field of issues where mustaftis and mujtahids take reverse 
positions on the model of minority identity. With regard to obeying non-Muslim 
governments, mustaftis tend towards an ideology of entitlement and appear to be 
influenced by Islamic or third-world revolutionary discourse. They exhibit the notion that 
identification with Muslim countries on the political level entails some form of moral 
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obligation to not collaborate with or otherwise support political systems of the West, at 
times reflecting the classical paradigm of hijrah and jihad. Mujtahids, on the other hand, 
stress the legal and moral, even pietistic, value of contract obligations. While supporting 
Islamic triumphalism over Western values, they do so through a paradigm that situates 
da'wah (call to Islam) rather than jihad, as in the classical formulation, as the other half 
and primary objective of hijrah. According to this paradigm Muslims in the West are 
encouraged to understand themselves as the vanguard of a wide-reaching Islamization 
project. 
DOING IJTIHAD m CULTURAL CONTEXT: THE FEAR FACTOR 
It is true that some mujtahids are active in promoting a more progressive 
discourse when rendering legal decisions not directly associated with Muslims in the 
West. It is well known that Fadlallah has issued some radically progressive fatawd, some 
of which have been mentioned in this work, that are not directly connected to questions 
about living in non-Muslim social contexts of the West.1 On women's full participation in 
politics, for example, Fadlallah has stated that the Qur'an places men and women on 
equal footing of mutual social responsibility, that they should '"endeavour to be each 
others' guides, protectors, helpers, lovers, and to be to each other all that wildyah is 
meant to be.'"2 Fadlallah also understands women to have the same intellectual and 
rational capacity as men,3 implying that the claim of alleged diminished mental capacity 
may not be used to justify female exclusion from public life. 
1
 See chapter seven. 
2
 Aziz, 209, quoting Fadlallah, "'Anaween fi al-'Amal al-IslamT," a lecture to hawzah students in Beirut, 




On matters of concern to Muslims in the West, Fadlallah is also at times more 
progressive than others. Yet he still retains a strongly protectionist approach, suggesting 
sharply separated spheres of Muslim and non-Muslim social engagement. He apparently 
prefers, for example, that Muslims avoid non-Islamic educational institutions or any 
situation of potential influence from non-Muslims. This study, then, calls into question 
the validity of assuming that an approach used in the Muslim social context would readily 
carry over to a Western environment or that progressive views in one field (gender, for 
example) would necessarily imply the same in other traditionally conservative areas 
(specifically, relations between Muslims and non-Muslims). The reasons for this are 
nowhere stated explicitly, but in analyzing the discursive language of fatawa, it appears 
that fear of assimilation or influence, in general, fear of Muslims in the West losing their 
religious commitment, plays a prominent role in the reasoning behind restrictive legal 
opinions. 
I would argue, then, that the data indicates the importance of place and context in 
shaping approaches to ijtihad. That is, opinions sometimes become more conservative in 
a Western context, where Islam is felt to be under a much greater threat than in Muslim-
majority contexts. Likewise, it seems that mujtahids are less willing to take risks in 
ijtihad for minority contexts than when dealing with contemporary issues in the Muslim 
context. It is not necessarily that the legal basis for change is not present, but that choices 
about how, when, and where to apply these principles are influenced by factors external 
to the authoritative texts themselves. 
Thus, Western social context does not appear to be operative in pushing ijtihad 
towards creative solutions to legal problems encountered by mustaftis, who seem to have 
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some awareness of principles intended to heighten ijtihad's contextually dynamic 
possibilities. On the contrary, the Western context appears to heighten mujtahids' 
hesitancy to use these principles in facilitating adaptive solutions to problems in the 
West. Rarely are the conditions for the use of principles duly noted by mustaftis admitted 
by mujtahids to be present. Consequently, while the instruments of legal interpretation— 
principles geared towards balancing human needs and divine commands—often provide a 
sense of optimism for mustaftis, the set of ideas to which mujtahids are beholden, which 
by and large are apologetic and polemical as they are juristic, do not answer to this 
optimism. 
Mujtahids, then, appear to form their opinions in response to Western society as 
constructed within their own worldview, considerably shaped by a narrative of mutual 
incongruity and resistance. In understanding non-Islamic society as a dangerous force 
that threatens to unravel Muslim identity, mujtahids are compelled to construct walls of 
protection around spaces of safety and to ascribe to them a power of their own. This 
power is seen in that when confronted by the qualities of Islamic legal practice, it is 
claimed, non-Muslims in the West will surely recognize and honour Islam for its moral 
superiority. The narrative framework within which interpretation of the law takes place 
thus remains rooted in a post-colonial discourse of liberation from western dominance. 
One major exception where change is made in favour of legal opinions that 
facilitate integration is that of the purity status of non-Muslims. The majority of 
mujtahids appear to base their argument for the purity of scriptuary non-Muslims by 
appealing directly to the scriptural sources that, in their opinions, suggest merely ritual 
impurity; it is not, therefore, necessary to avoid non-Muslims since ritual impurity is not 
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contagious. Ruling scriptuaries intrinsically pure has significant consequences for 
Muslims in the West. In the first place, mustaftis can be confident, as mentioned in 
chapter four, that they are not surrounded by a constant danger of ritual preclusion. This 
eliminates a significant barrier to performing ritual worship, which, as made clear in 
chapters three and five, functions as the essential foundation of Muslim identity in the 
West. The purity of non-Muslims therefore also helps to support the mujtahicTs response 
to what it means to be Muslim in the West, faithfully upholding the honour of Islam by 
fulfilling ritual obligations without major impediments. Thus, ruling non-Muslims as pure 
might be understood to be a practical necessity for a community otherwise surrounded by 
the potential of ritual danger. 
At the same time, however, mujtahids also tend to have an optimistic perception 
of religious liberty and tolerance in the West, to which they sometimes appeal when 
attempting to defend their case against mustaftis who would plead hardship and difficulty 
as impediments to their full compliance with a strict interpretation of the law. From the 
viewpoint of mujtahids, far from impeding Islamic legal observance, Western cultural 
and political systems give Muslims the opportunity to enhance and expand the Islamic 
character of Western space. 
WORDS, SYMBOLS, PRACTICES AND THE MAKING OF MUSLIM SPACE 
As observed in chapter three, the ideal and most honourable practice for Muslims 
after the establishment of Medinah under the Prophet's authority was to make the hijrah 
there, to live in Muslim territory. The central element in determining the legality of 
remaining in dar al-harb was freedom to practice Islam, strictly defined as ritual 
practices such as salat. This two-fold principle continues to determine the law's position 
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regarding contemporary migration to the West. Unless one has compelling reasons, it is 
best to remain in dar al-islam, as do the idealized sources of emulation. Migration is 
permissible if the would-be migrant is free to perform obligatory worship in the precise 
manner stipulated by the law. However, in addition to ritual worship, the fundamental 
elements of Islamic practice that legitimize contemporary migration seem to encompass a 
larger field of conduct than was prevalent in the early period, including behavioural 
norms belonging to the field of mu 'amalat. Wearing hijab, not shaving one's beard, 
avoiding dealings with alcohol, not shaking hands with the opposite sex, and generally 
bearing witness to Islamic morality, in the majority of cases in this discourse become the 
essential criteria for migration to the West. When not viewed as absolutely essential, as in 
the minority opinion, they remain highly significant symbolic elements of Muslim 
identity. 
The reasons for this are at this point relatively speculative. There are indications 
in the discourse to suggest that the increased number of issues critical to a manifest 
Muslim identity in non-Muslim society (or simply to affirming one's obedience and 
faithfulness to God in such places for one's own sake) points to a set of inter-related 
socio-political factors. There is, as discussed in chapter one, the very modern and 
contemporary pre-oceupation with identity and associated freedoms for individuals and 
communities to pursue assertive identities. As noted above, for all its faults in the eyes of 
mujtahids, Western societies are seen to be places of religious freedom where such 
identities need little censoring.4 Yvonne Haddad's theory that the American experience 
4
 This has been observed by other scholars researching Muslim identity in the West. Yvonne Haddad 
writes: "Muslims as a minority find that the guarantee of freedom of religion provides opportunities for 
new experiments and developments in ideas, institution building, and propagation, unequaled in the 
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itself provides not only freedom but also an unusually high expectation that people of 
non-white and non-Christian heritage display their "otherness," thereby compelling 
Muslims towards an assertive identity, may have some credibility here. 
There is also the historical background of power relations between Christendom 
and the Muslim world, and the ongoing lack of Muslim confidence in American foreign 
policy, setting the stage, as Haddad and others have noted, for a dynamic of reciprocal 
contestation. However, if the West in general appears to be maintaining its position of 
dominance on the political scene, the mujtahids of this study would suggest that it is 
losing on the moral level. It is plausible that the pressure on migrant Muslims to 
showcase the perceived moral superiority of Islam, as discussed above in the context of 
creating spaces of safety, may also account for treating matters of mu 'amalat with the 
same rigorous standards of compliance. Both 'ibadat and mu 'amalat contribute to the 
goal, not just of maintaining one's Islam for one's self (though Sistani seems to confine 
himself largely to this matter), but to the larger project of expanding Islamic society, as 
seen primarily mfatawa from Fadlallah and al-Hakim. 
Thus, we can say that for the mujtahids in general, the social context of al-fiqh IT 
al-mughtaribin is hardly silent or irrelevant. Assumptions about power and place latent in 
the narrative discourse give voice to an identity shaped by resistance to perceived 
relations between Islam and the West. Out of this dynamic a conception and construction 
of Muslim space emerges. We noted in the introduction the variety of ways, in addition to 
the conventional territorial conception, by which space may be defined. In particular, we 
took note of Gupta and Ferguson's challenge to assumed isomorphic definitions of 
countries from which they came." Haddad, "Dynamics of Islamic identity," 24. If this is the case for Sunni 
Muslims, it is even more so for Shi'ites outside of Iran and, more recently, Lebanon. 
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territory and culture and the value of symbols, rather than territory, to the task of defining 
cultural space. The notion of ddr al-islam as space governed by Islamic law is 
particularly amenable to being constructed and bounded by "normatively enjoined" 
words, symbols and practices, and this is precisely what the mujtahids do. 
As several contributions to a study of Islam in North America and Europe 
centered on the concept of sacred space suggest, the new ddr al-islam need not be 
territorial or physical; it may also be psychological and personal, created by "a world of 
ritual, relationships, and symbols" carried by Muslims wherever they go. In her 
introductory essay to that study,5 Barbara Metcalf suggests that two key features are 
needed to constitute Muslim space: "the preeminence of sacred words and normatively 
enjoined practices."6 A young Toronto Muslim put this individualized praxis-centered 
definition of ddr al-isldm most succinctly when he claimed that "where he was, was 
daru'l-islam [sic]."7 
Haddad suggests that geographic space in the West, while not strictly Muslim, 
might still be considered "home."8 I would argue, however, that from the fatwd's point of 
view, the otherwise hostile space of Western society becomes "home" only as that space 
is Islamized through the transference of the symbols of Muslim identity. In the effort to 
protect against the undesirable condition of losing one's faith because of migration, the 
mujtahids appear anxious to reinforce, if not the physical qualities of ddr al-islam, its 
conceptual, ethical, and cultural boundaries. In maintaining a conservative approach to 
5
 Barbara Metcalf, "Introduction: Sacred Words, Sanctioned Practice, New Communities," Making Muslim 
Space in North America and Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 3. 
6
 Ibid., 5. 
7
 Ibid., 11. 
8
 In Haddad, "At Home in the Hijrah: South Asian Muslims in the United States," 239-258. 
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normative practice as a vital symbol of Muslim identity, ihefatwa literature seems 
appreciably directed towards the Islamization of space in the West. 
In some sense, then, we can say that what migrates to the West is not only people, 
not just a community, but dar al-islam itself. If, as noted earlier, dar al-isldm is defined 
as the space within which it is safe to lead an ethical life in obedience to shartah, I 
suggest that in the context of non-Muslim society, individual and collective normative 
behaviour becomes that space of safety and immunity from the influence of all that, 
culturally speaking, is not Islam and therefore, in the eyes of jurists, threatening. We see, 
in other words, the construction of sacred space that moves beyond geography to include 
a transnational, ideological space bordered by particular forms of behaviour. 
THE FUTURE OF THE MARJI'IYAH IN THE WEST 
The tension between mustaftis and mujtahids described above puts the marji 'Tyah 
in a precarious situation where the fiqh of minorities (fiqh al-aqalliyaf) is concerned. As 
the Western born Shi'ite population increases and exposure to alternative sources of 
religious guidance becomes more common, it is conceivable that the gap between 
mujtahids and mustaftis currently evident may widen further. Scholars such as Abdulaziz 
Sachedina and Liyakatali Takim, who speak from within the migrant community, have 
identified an inadequate clerical training method as a key root of the problem. Training 
takes place with little or no experience of life in the West and or even academic training 
in Western cultural values. 
If the marji 'Tyah is going to maintain its relevance for Shi'ites in the west, it will 
likely require the emergence of one or two exceptionally intrepid reformers amongst the 
clerical class who can provide more adaptive solutions solidly based on principles of 
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ijtihad. A model for progressive legal interpretation may even be found within the 
marji 'Jyah itself, which does show some progressive thought in treating contemporary 
issues within the Muslim social context. Applying this work to the non-Muslim context 
would require shedding a narrative framework of the West in opposition to Islam and vice 
versa. 
Alternatively, if one of Sistani's North American wakils, Seyed Mahdi 
Shahrestani, is any indication, perhaps the hope of reinvigorating the marji'iyah for 
Shi'ites in the West lies in strengthening and gradually expanding the position of the 
wakih and their role as intermediaries. Currently, however, wakils are relatively few in 
number and do not have the authority to issue, fatawa themselves. This makes their 
current role as cultural mediators of great significance. A full study of the selection, 
training, and role of wakils in North America and Europe has yet to be undertaken. This 
study suggests it as a useful undertaking. 
If the marji 'Tyah fails to take any of these, or perhaps other, courses of action, the 
tone of questions coming from many mustaftis indicates that they may increasingly 
choose to opt out of the system altogether and find their own sources of guidance. Thus, 
the fear of migrant Muslims losing their religious identity, which seems to be behind so 
much of the restrictive Tarawa, may, as a worst case scenario, elicit what I call the 
"Marmulak effect." Although the Marmulak escaped from the prison of an unyielding 
and uninspiring interpretation of Islam to shape an extremely compelling and humane 
one, more consistent with the spirit of the textual sources, as he and the majority of 
ordinary people saw it, he was in the end apprehended by the governing authorities and 
returned to his place of silence. Yet in the end, his warning echoed through the corridors 
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of austerity: "You can't force people into heaven, dear brother; you will push so hard 
they might fall off the other side into hell."9 Though a rather dramatic statement for the 
present context, one could say that the mujtahids' efforts to maintain faithful adherence to 
entrenched symbols of identity through unimaginative and largely unyielding methods 
may turn out to be counter-productive to the project of strengthening Muslim identity in 
the West. 
9
 "Akhe, behesht keh zuraki nemlsheh 'azizeh baradar; anqadr feshar miyari keh az tin var-e jahennam 
mizaneh bTriin." Marmulak, 2004. 
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'alim (pi. 'ulamar) 




those who revolt against a legitimate Imam 
the family (house) of the Prophet 
People of the Book (Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians) 
Protected peoples (People of the Covenant) 
the most precautionary 
Traditionist branch of Shi'ite/zg/i 
supreme knowledge 
religious scholar 
'an al-munkar commanding good and forbidding evil 
(enlightened) reason 















Abode of Contract 
Abode of War 
Abode of Migration 
fatwd council 
Abode of Islam 
Abode of Unbelief 
Abode of Peace 
necessity/necessary 
calling to Islam 










individual legal duty 
duty sufficed by a portion of the community 
learned legal opinion based on original ijtihad 
Islamic jurisprudence (lit. understanding) 
jurisprudence of minorities 
jurisprudence of foreigners (those away from home) 





hadTth (pi. ahadith) 
not slaughtered Islamically (not pure) 
extremists 
full bath of purification 
minor pollution, transient effect 











hukm (pi. ahkam) 
hukm awwalT 
i'anat al-haram or i'anat al-sharr 






























pilgrimage to holy sites of Prophet 
permitted 
right 
hardship (in legal sense) 
forbidden 
Islamic seminary 





aiding the performance of what is forbidden or evil 
worship, matters pertaining to one's relation to God 
permission, authorization 
practical legal interpretation 







legal reasoning in search of an opinion 
comprehensive legal reasoning 
avoidance 
effective cause (of a legal opinion) 
leader of a mosque 
one of twelve divinely designated Shi'ite leaders 
faith 
question in search of afatwa 
transformation 
discerning the public interest 




exertion (especially in the way of God) 
tribute, head tax 
unbeliever 
(morally) filthy, evil, bad 
fear 
(moral) filth, wickedness 
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madhhab (pi. madhdhib) 
mafsadah wa maslahah 
makruh 




















muqallid (pi. -un/iri) 












a dark substance for colouring the eyelids 




harm and benefit 
detested 
source (of emulation) 
institution of legal guidance 
source of emulation 
Grand source of emulation 
preferred 
question, matter, issue 
root, verbal noun 
common good, benefit 
divinely protected from sin, evil 
the Islamic position 
carrion 
oppressed 
matters pertaining to social relations 
legally indifferent or permitted 
pure, slaughtered Islamically 
Sunni legal scholar qualified to issue fatwas 
migrant 
one qualified to exercise ijtihad 
legally capable; obliged to observe Islamic law 
an act that is permitted because it is inseparable 
from a permitted act 
one under taqlid of a mujtahid 
one who associates others with God 
absolute, comprehensive 
one who requests afatwa 
recommended 
new, modern issues 
impurity, filth 




































pillar (of religion) 
preventing access to a wrongful action 
Islamic ritual worship 
fast 





associating another with God 
fasting 
backwash, spittle 
al-ta'arrub ba'd al-hijrah 
tab'id 
tagh ut / tdgh uti (adj.) 
to assimilate after migration (although, cf. 127 n.75) 
composite legal rulings 
Qur'an: idol, false deity; also used in revolutionary 



























divine unity an unicity (lit. making one) 





a fundamental and unconditional legal principle 
social custom 
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ease and hardship 
principles of jurisprudence 
Rationalist branch of Shi'ite/zg/i 
erroneous conjecture 
obligatory 
duty sufficed by a portion of the community 
religious legal obligation 
representative 
guardianship 








obligatory religious tax 
time and place 
valid conjecture 
oppression 
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